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PREFACE
The lUmo'is Const'itut'ion: An Annotated and Compara-
tive Analysis^ has been prepared to assist the members of the
1969-70 Illinois Constitutional Convention in their most
difficult task of drafting a Constitution to be submitted to
the voters of Illinois. During the course of the Convention,
the members will require a great deal of historical, legal,
and comparative information about the present Constitution.
The purpose of this volume is to present as much of this
information as possible in a readily usable format.
Our approach has been to provide an analysis .of each
section of the 1870 Constitution. Thus, for each section,
there is a history of its development through past Illinois
Constitutions; an explanation of its meaning, relying, in par-
ticular, on judicial interpretations; a comparison with similar
provisions in the constitutions of other states; and, lastly,
such comment as each of us has considered appropriate. We
sincerely hope that these section analyses will constitute a
definitive reference work for the Convention members and
research staff.
An annotated Constitution was prepared for the 1920
Illinois Constitutional Convention by the Illinois Legislative
Reference Bureau. It was primarily a summary analysis and
digest of the decisions interpreting the constitutional pro-
visions. This volume, in contrast, concentrates upon the pri-
mary decisions which define the essence of the provisions
under analysis. Thus, although it updates the 1920 Annota-
tion, its format and substance give stronger emphasis to the
synthesis and understanding of basic principles.
In the process of preparing this work, we reviewed the
pertinent literature, and relied heavily on appropriate legal
Vll
documents and state and federal court decisions. Considerable
attention was also given to the published debates and journals
of earlier Constitutional Conventions. The principal basis for
the comparative analysis was the Index Digest of State Cofi-
st'itut'i072s and the Constitutions of tJie United States^ National
and State^ both published by the Legislative Drafting Re-
search Fund of Columbia University. The Model State Con-
stitutioii and other documents by the National Municipal
League as part of its State Constitutional Studies Project
were valuable research tools.
Since this analysis is keyed to the several sections and
articles of the 1870 Constitution as amended, some topics
freqently found in other state constitutions either are not
discussed or are referred to relatively briefly in an appropriate
Comparative A?ialysis or Comment. Topics not mentioned
at all, such as primary elections and civil service, most stu-
dents of state constitutions would agree, are not essential
constitutional material. Illinois, of course, has its share of
nonessential material, such as Article XIII on warehouses,
and just as we suggest the desirability of abandoning such
material, so we suggest not adding nonessentials that other
states, for one reason or another, have adopted.
Abbreviations Used
In order to provide a document that could be readily
used by laymen, the normal footnoting of legal and other
publications has been omitted. Instead, citations appear in
parentheses. Many works thus cited are referred to by ab-
breviations, as follows:
P.N.C. — State of Illinois, The Proposed New Constitution
of Illinois (1922).
C.A.M.C. — Citizens Research Council of Michigan, A
Comparative Analysis of the Michigan Constitution
(1961).
VIU
LS.L. — Illinois Commission on the Organization of the
General Assembly, Improving the State Legislature
(1967).
Index — Legislative Drafting Research Fund of Columbia
Univ., Index Digest of State Constitutions ( 2d ed. 1959).
Bulletins — Legislative Reference Bureau, Constitutiofial
Conve7ition Bulletins ( 1920).
Annotations -— Legislative Reference Bureau, Constitution
of the State of Illinois^ Annotated (1919).
Model State Constitution — National Municipal League,
Model State Constitution (6th ed. rev. 1968).
Debates — State of Illinois, Debates and Proceedings of the
Constitutional Co?ivention (1870).
Journal — State of Illinois, Journal of the Constitutional
Conventio?i ig2o-ig22 (1922).
Proceedings — State of Illinois, Proceedings of the Con-
stitutional Convention ( 1922).
Division of Respo?isibility
Early in the study, we made this a "joint and several"
enterprise. For purposes of research and writing, the Consti-
tution was parceled out article by article, and in a few in-
stances, section by section. Drafts were exchanged for
comment and criticism, and each of us takes this occasion to
express deep appreciation to the other for such comment and
criticism, but in the end, ultimate responsibility for the final
product is as follows:
Mr. Braden: Articles I, III, IV, V, VII, and X through
XIV in toto; Sections 15, 16, and 20 of Article II; Sections
4 and 5 of Article VIII
;
Sections 7,11, and 1 3 of Article IX ;
and the Separate Section on Convict Labor.
Mr. Cohn: Article VI in toto; Article II, except for
Sections 15, 16, and 20; Article VIII, except for Sections 4
IX
and 5j Article IX, except for Sections 7, 11, and 13; and
Separate Sections, except for the Section on Convict Labor.
We included the 1 870 Schedule and the Schedules to the
1954 and 1962 Amendments. Schedules are transitional pro-
visions which, if the drafters stick to the rules, soon become
obsolete. We would observe that constitution-drafters have
a tendency to overwrite a schedule. For example, Sections
1, 2, 3, 5 and 6, and possibly Section 4, of the Schedule
to the 1870 Constitution could have been compressed into
one short section. It also seems fair to suggest that the ex-
tensive details on the procedure for adoption as set forth in
Sections 8 through 1 2 of the 1 870 Schedule are not necessary.
Notwithstanding the theoretical status of a constitutional
convention as a body creating an entirely new government,
it seems permissible to rely on all existing laws for purposes
of the referendum on adoption. All that a convention has to
do is explain what to vote on and when to vote.
The headings of sections used in this volume generally
follow those used by the Secretary of State in his publication
of the Constitution. In many cases these have been inserted
for editorial convenience and are not part of the Constitu-
tion. In a few instances the headings have been modified
in this volume for the sake of uniformity.
A cknowledgements
As in any study of this magnitude, many persons helped
at various stages of its preparation and we should like to
acknowledge this assistance. At the outset, we should like to
thank the Constitution Study Commission, and its chairman,
Thomas G. Lyons, and co-chairman. Senator Terrel E.
Clarke, for making the project possible. The commission
assisted us in ways too numerous to mention.
Professor Cohn acknowledges the invaluable contributions
of Mrs. Susan Wolff. Mrs. Wolff, a member of the Indiana
Bar, prepared Sections 1, 2 and 3 of Article \TII; all of
Article IX except Sections 7, 11, and 13 j and the Separate
Sections on Canals, Municipal Subscriptions, and the Illinois
Central Railroad. Her drafts were critiqued, edited and ap-
proved by Professor Cohn, but the major credit for their
preparation belongs to Mrs. Wolff.
Professor Cohn also acknowledges the fine assistance he
had from Mr. Barry R. Miller in the closing phases of the
project. Mr. Miller, a senior in the University of Illinois
College of Law, provided general research assistance includ-
ing the indexing of the material. Glenn F. Seidenfeld, then
a senior in the College of Law, assisted Professor Cohn in
the early stages of the project.
Professor Cohn especially wishes to express his apprecia-
tion to Mrs. Rosemary Tucker, of the secretarial staff of the
University of Illinois College of Law, whose typing skill
miraculously deciphered reams of his undecipherable hand-
writing.
Mr. Braden acknowledges the assistance of Mr. Robert
G. Granda, of the Illinois Legislative Council, who provided
valuable historical material concerning the Governor's veto
power; the valuable criticism of Mr. William J. D. Boyd,
of the National Municipal League, who reviewed the manu-
script on Sections 6, 7 and 8 of Article IV; and the most
helpful critical review of the manuscript of Article X by
Professor Clyde Snider of the University of Illinois.
Mr. Braden wishes particularly to acknowledge the assist-
ance of his secretarial assistant, Mary Jane Van Voast, who
performed excellent clerical support.
Together, we wish especially to recognize the assistance
of the staff of the Institute of Government and Public
Affairs of the University of Illinois. The Institute, the
publisher of this volume, through its director. Professor
Samuel K. Gove, alternated between wielding a whip to spur
us on and holding our hands through difficult periods—
xi
figuratively speaking, that is
— in order to bring this study-
to completion. In particular, we wish to acknowledge the
assistance of Assistant Professor Joseph P. Pisciotte and
the Institute secretarial staff. W t are most grateful to Mr.
Anthony Edelblut of the RCS Press for his able technical
assistance and for the constant attention he paid to the many
details involved in printing a volume of this nature, Ronald
Day of the University of Illinois Press rendered valuable
technical advice in preparing the manuscript for publication.
Mrs. X'^irginia Speers provided excellent editorial assistance
in the concluding work on this project.
In conclusion, we again hope that this volume provides
considerable assistance to the members of the 1969 Constitu-
tional Convention. If so, our efforts will be well rewarded.
George D. Braden*
Rubin G. Cohn
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Constitution of the State of Illinois
PREAMBLE
We, the people of the State of Illinois — grateful to Almighty God for the
civil, political and religious liberty which He hath so long permitted us to enjoy,
and looking to Him for a blessing upon our endeavors to secure and transmit the
same unimpaired to succeeding generations — in order to form a more perfect
government, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the com-
mon defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to
ourselves and our posterity; do ordain and establish this Constitution for the
State of Illinois.
History
The Constitution of 1818 contained an untitled introductory para-
graph which was essentially a combination of a preamble and a statement
of boundaries. The preamble section of the paragraph stated that the
"People of the Illinois Territory," through their convention representa-
tives, agreed to form the State of Illinois pursuant to relevant sections
in the United States Constitution, the Ordinance of 1787 and the Con-
gressional Enabling Act which atithorized such action. Many of the
phrases foimd in the Preamble to the U.S. Constitution ("in Order . . .
to establish Jtistice, . . . promote the general Welfare") were inckided
in Ithis introdtictory paragraph.
, The Constittition of 1848 was the first Illinois Constitution to contain
a^ separate paragraph specifically entitled "Preamble." Unlike the 1818
Constitution, the 1848 Preamble makes explicit reference to God; then
it follows with practically the same language as the U.S. Constitution's
preamble.
The Preamble in the 1870 Constitution, with a few minor changes
in punctuation and spelling, is exactly the same as the 1848 Preamble.
l^he Preamble in the proposed 1922 Constitution made no significant
changes although there were some alterations in wording and punctua-
tion.
Comment
Preambles are now a common feature of written constitutions. All
states but two have preambles to their constitutions and most of them
follow the general form and wording of the Preamble to the U.S. Consti-
tution. Generally, a preamble is intended to be a broad statement of
purpose of the document which follows, and can be a guide to the inten-
tion of the constituent assembly which drew up the docimient. Preambles
have never evoked much political controversy and, strictly speaking, are
not operative parts of a constitution.
1

Article I
BOUNDARIES
The boundaries and jurisdiction of the State shall be as follows, to-wit:
Beginning at the mouth of the Wabash river; thence up the same, and with
the line of Indiana, to the northwest corner of said State; thence east, with
the line of the same State, to the middle of Lake Michigan; thence north along
the middle of said lake, to north latitude forty-two degrees and thirty minutes;
thence west to the middle of the Mississippi river, and thence down along the
middle of that river to its confluence with the Ohio river, and thence up the
latter river, along its northwestern shore, to the place of beginning: Provided,
that this State shall exercise such jurisdiction upon the Ohio river, as she is
now entitled to, or such as may hereafter be agreed upon by this State and the
State of Kentucky.
History
The Congressional Enabling Act of April 18, 1818, authorized the
"inhabitants ot the territory ot lUinois ... to form for themselves a con-
stitution and state government, and to assume stich name at they deem
proper." (ch. 67, 3 Stat. 428.) The Enabling Act set forth the boundaries
of the new state and retjuired the first Constitutional Convention to
accept tliem. The 1818 Convention did this by setting forth and rati-
fying the botindaries in the Preamble. The 1848 Constitution put the
boundaries in a separate Article, added the words "and jurisdiction"
at the beginning and added the proviso concerning the Ohio River. The
1870 Convention made no changes. The proposed 1922 Constitution
omitted Article I, presumably as a result of the essay by Urban A. Lavery
disctissed below.
Explanation
Mr. Lavery was the Chief Legislative Draftsman for the 1920-22 Con-
vention. Before the Convention completed its work he wrote an essay
(Lavery, "The Boundaries Article of the Illinois Constitution," 16 111.
L. Rev. 361 (1922)) in which he pointed otit that the northern boundary
between Illinois and Wisconsin was first
officially surveyed between
October, 1831, and January, 1833, and that the survey was inaccurate.
'Tn summary it may be said . . . that the line begins on the west about
three-quarters of a mile too far north in Wisconsin, and finally comes
4 Art. I
out on Lake Michigan about the same distance too tar south in Illinois."
{Id. at 365.) In other words, the present line recognized by Illinois and
Wisconsin is not in fact "north latitude torty-two degrees and thirty
minutes." (There is also a surveyed l)()undary between Indiana and
Illinois north from the point where the Wabash River ceases to be
the boundary, but no question appears to have arisen about it.)
In the same article, Lavery pointed out that "and jurisdiction" was
added in 1848, and that this turns out to be erroneous. For example, in
1904 in the case of Wedding v. Meyler (192 U.S. 573 (1904)), the United
States Supreme Court said that Illinois and Kentucky have concurrent
jurisdiction over the Ohio River notwithstanding the language of the
Enabling Act which placed all of the Ohio River in Kentucky. Lavery
also pointed out that in all other cases of a river boundary
— with Indiana,
Iowa and Missouri — the applicable Act of Congress provided for con-
current jurisdiction over the river. (Lavery, supra at .868.)
In Jewell t'. Carpentier (22 111. 2d 445 (1961)), an ingenious argument
was offered to the effect that because Article I defined the "boundaries
and jurisdiction" of the state, an Illinois driver's license could not be
suspended on the basis of an accident occurring in Indiana. The Supreme
Court gave the arginnent short shrift. In fact, the argument could have
been made ecpially well in the absence of the word "jurisdiction" in
Article I and equally well in the absence of a Boundaries Article. The
problem in the case was whether Illinois could exercise jurisdiction
inside its own boundaries in the manner in which it acted.
Comparative Analysis
Slightly more than half of the state constitutions contain ciefinitions
or descriptions of their territory. Neither the Constitution of the United
States nor those of any of the original 13 colonies contains a boundary
description or definition.
Comment
In view of the fact that the description of the northern boundary is
not the boundary long recognized by Illinois and Wisconsin, it would
seem advisable to omit the Boundaries Article. It is questionable in any
event whether the Article serves any constitutional purpose. Any boundary
dispute would involve another state and any resolution of the dispute
would have to be by agreement of the states, ratified by Congress, or by
litigation. In any such litigation, the controlling documents would be
Congressional Enabling Acts and other external sources, not the Illinois
Constitution. In the case of the boundary with Wisconsin, the United
States Supreme Court would undoubtedly accept the actual boundary
as recognized for almost 140 years.
Article II
BILL OF RIGHTS
Introductory and Preliminary Comment
A bill ot rights in state constitution, as in the United States Con-
stitution, seeks to define rights and liberties so fundamental to a free
society as to remain invulnerable or only partly subject to governmental
authority. Mindlul of a history of governmental tyranny, unchecked by
enforceable restraints, which had trampled rights of conscience, religion,
speech, and assembly, and which had denied procedural fairness, pri-
marily to persons accused of crime, the framers of state constitutions
deliberately sought to assure a political structure in which governmental
power to impair or prejudice these rights would be minimal or non-
existent. The bill of rights is such an effort.
It is an historical fact that ratification of the Federal Constitution by
the states was conditioned upon an early submission to and ratification
by the states of amendments establishing limitations upon the powers
of the newly created national government. These limitations, constitu-
ting the first ten amendments to the Federal Constitution, and poj>ularly
known as the Bill of Rights, were ratified in 1791, when Virginia became
the eleventh state to approve them. In many respects they parallel, some-
times almost in verbatim form, the bill of rights provisions of the several
states, a not-surprising fact as some of the states, before the adoption of
the Federal Constitution, had adopted their own constitutions and formu-
lated their own bills of rights.
It is of course the accepted generality that the federal Bill of Rights
operates as a limitation upon the powers of the federal government and
not upon the powers of state government, whereas state bills of rights
operate as limitations only upon the powers of state government. This
generality, firm and true through most of our constitutional history, has
been severely modified by United States Supreme Court decisional law,
mostly within the past two decades, which holds that many provisions of
the federal Bill of Rights operate as limitations upon the power of state
governments as a consecjuence of their "incorporation" into the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the
United States which expressly prohibits states from enacting laws which
6 Art. II
dc|Jiive any person ot lile, liberty or j^roperty \\ithout due process oi
law. The consequences oi this rule oi incorporation, without regard to
the merits of the constitutional controversies it has provoked, have been
momentous.
Action in areas within a state's bill (jI lights which is held by the state
court to be permissible exercises ot governmental power may now be in-
validated as a violation ol the comparable provision in the federal Bill of
Rights as incorjjorated into the Fourteenth Amendment. A ready examj^lc
is the upholding by the Illinois Supreme Court of the so-called "released
time" religious instruction in the public schools against a challenge that
it violated the religious freedom guarantees of Article II, Section .H, of
the Illinois Constitution and the reversal of this decision by the United
States Supreme Court (People ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ, 396
111. 11 (1947), rex/d 333 U.S. 203 (1948)) on the ground that it violated
the "establishment" clause of the First Amendment ot the Constitution
of the United States as that clause was now incorporated into the Four-
teenth Amendment. The normal effect of the incorporation doctrine,
where relevant, is to expand the protective scope of the right or liberty
alleged to be infringed by making applicable to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment the frecjuently greater limitations upon the exer-
cise of federal governmental power encompassed within the federal Bill of
Rights. A measure of this effect can be gathered by recalling recent federal
decisions involving state criminal prosecutions, including noteworthy
decisions dealing with right to counsel, limitations upon powers of arrest,
the use of confessions, right to speedy arraigmiient after arrest, and the
application of procedural due process requirements to juvenile court
proceedings.
On the other side of the coin is the principle that a state court holding
which invalidates governmental action because of a violation of a state
bill of rights provision takes precedence over a United States Supreme
Court decision that the state action does not violate the due process
guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment. Again, illustratively, the United
States Supreme Court sustained a state statute (in fact, in this case, a state
constitutional provision) against a Fourteenth Amendment due process
challenge which revived a cause of action which had been barred by the
running of the statute of limitations. (Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson,
325 U.S. 304 (1945); Campbell v. Holt, 115 I'.S. 620 (1885).) The essence
ot the holding was that a right to a defense arising from the bar of a
statute of limitations was not
"property" within the meaning of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Illinois, however, in Board of Education v. Blodgrtt
(155 111. 441 (1895)), held that a revival of a barred cause of action did
indeed deprive a defendant of property without due process of law in vio-
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lation of Article II, Section 2, ot tlie Constitution ot Illinois. The Illinois
decision prevails, since the United States Supreme Court will not normally
substitute its judgment ior that ot the highest state appellate court on
issues ol interpretation ot state constitutional provisions where the effect
of the decision is to impose a limitation on the power of state government.
The question may properly be asked whether there is any purpose in
retaining provisions in a state bill of rights which have been "pre-empted"
by the incorporation doctrine so as to become federally prescribed limi-
tations upon the exercise of state power. The most persuasive case, it is
submitted, favors retention in the constitution of the state. Part of the
rationale for this conclusion has been developed in the above discussion
of the primacy of state court interpretations of state constitutional limi-
tations. Of course, where the incorporation doctrine prevails, state pro-
visions must yield and cannot be given precedence even by state constitu-
tional amendments which offend the federal standards. The customary
invalidation of state action, however, involves a state provision which is
not, on its face, violative of federal standards but which has been inter-
preted by tlie state coiat in a way which offends the federally protected
right. Here the retention of the provision is desirable, not only for the
reason already noted, but also because there is nothing immutable about
judicial interpretations of the Federal Constitution. The "incorporation"
doctrine itself may conceivably be modified or abandoned in all or parti-
cular existing applications by judicial re-evaluation. If this occurs, the
parallel state provisions take on new vitality. It woidd appear, therefore,
to be the course of good judgment not to discard existing state constitu-
tional guarantees simply because the incorporation doctrine bears heavily
upon their meaning and application.
A final preliminary observation is in order. Several of the provisions
in the Illinois bill of rights, notably but not exclusively the due process
provision in Section 2, have been the subject of "massive" judicial analysis.
It would be a futile if not impossible task to analyze all or most of these
decisions, nor does such a coinse of action seem desirable tor the purposes
of this document. Some of the principles are models of legal abstractions
and conceptual generalities which simply defy incisive analysis or defi-
nition. "Due process," for example, comprehends a myriad of concepts
and subconcepts, pregnant with ambiguity, and extremely difficult of
consistent definition and application. The decisions, many of which are
not susceptible to rational reconciliation, reflect the accuracy of this
assessment. Accordingly, the legal analysis of this Article, perhaps to a
degree greater than those of other Articles, will seek to distill the essence
of the judicial interpretations, and will deal only with such cases as
contribute importantly to an understanding of that essence. Federal deci-
8 Art. II, § 1
sions arising out oi tlie "incorporation" dodrinc will be noted because
ol their impact upon and relevance to the particular provision under
consideration.
Inherent and Inalienable Rights
Sec. 1. All UKii arc Ijy iialurc free and iiulependent, and have certain
inherciil and inalienable rights — among these are liie, liberty and tlie pursuit
of happiness. To secure these rights and the protection ol proijerty, govern-
ments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers Irom the consent
of the governed.
History
The 1818 and 1848 Constitutions contained identical provisions to
the effect that the great and essential principles of liberty and free
government require the recognition and unalterable establishment of
the principles that all men are f^orn equally free and independent, and
have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are the en-
joyment and defense of life and liberty, and of acquiring, possessing and
protecting property and reputation, and of pursuing their own happi-
ness; that all power is inherent in the people, and that all free govern-
ments are founded on the authority of the people and instituted for
their peace, safety and happiness.
The 1922 Convention proposal adopted the 1870 provisions, incorpo-
rating, however, the provisions of Section 20 of Article II. (See History,
Sec. 20, inlra, p. 97.)
Explanation
The section, a substantially abridged version of the 1818 and 1848
declarations, is an almost verbatim statement of the fundamental prin-
ciples contained in the second paragraph of the Declaration of Inde-
pendence. It is not generally considered, of itself, an operative constitu-
tional limitation upon the exercise of governmental powers. Rather, it is
considered supplemental to and implicitly within the guarantees of
Section 2 which preclude the state from depriving persons of life, liberty
and property without due process of law. 1 here is thus little purpose
in treating this section as an independent source of constitutional law.
Instead the Explanatiofi under Section 2 will deal with the relevant
concepts under the due process principle.
Comparative Analysis
Approximately three-fifths of the state constitutions contain provisions
to the effect that all men are equal, free and independent. Approxi-
mately four-fifths of the state constitutions similarly provide that all men
have inalienable rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. All
Art. II, § 2 9
ot the state constitutions provide in some torm that government derives
its just powers from the consent ot the governed. The Model State Con-
stitution contains no similar provision. (National Municipal League,
Model State Constitution (6th ed. rev. 1968) [hereinafter cited as Model
State Constitution].)
Comment
Although the section expresses values of an essentially political nature
and of itself has little or no operative legal effect, it comes from consti-
tutional ancestry of unimpeachable and impeccable credentials. It is
not easy to suggest that fundamental conceptions expressed in the Declar-
ation of Independence are expendable in the reshaping of constitutional
charters. Nor is it necessary to do so. Constitutional tradition justifies
the expression of the basic values of a free society as a preface to the
more detailed provisions which follow.
It is true that there is considerable argument over the value of pro-
visions like this section and Section 20. (Infra, p. 97.) On the one hand,
some will argue that the statements are pieties that are not specific
enough for courts to use in protecting the rights of the people. On the
other hand, some argue that the basic American theory of limited gov-
ernment includes, in addition to the explicit limitations set forth in a
bill of rights, a sort of residual limitation that implicitly reserves to
the people fundamental rights of freedom not otherwise spelled out. It
does not seem necessary to try to resolve this argument. For one thing,
both Section 1 and Section 20, as noted, express sentiments that are
acceptable to all. Moreover, under our system of judicial review, courts
will strike down legislation or administrative action that they believe
contrary to fundamental rights, and they will do so in the name of some
constitutional provision. Removal of Sections 1 and 20 would not de-
crease the power of the courts. In sum, this section (and Section 20) may
be of value and are certainly not harmful in any respect.
Due Process of Law
Sec. 2. No person shall be deprived ot life, liberty or property, without due
process of law.
History
The 1818 and 1848 Constitutions contained the historic Magna Charta
declaration that "no freeman shall be . . . deprived of his life, liberty, or
property, but by the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land." The
present provision retains the essence of this principle but substitutes
"due process of law" for the last clause.
The 1920 Convention proposal retained the 1870 provision without
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change. An ellon to add clauses in lorni precisely the same as the privi-
leges and innnunities and ecjual jirotection clauses ol the Fourteenth
Amendment oi the Constitution ot the rniicd States was unsuccesslul,
presumably because the Fointeenth Amendment secured those piecise
guarantees to the people ol this state.
Explanation
in ihe Inlroductojy and Prelimin(ny Comtnenl on this Article the
point was made that due process as a legal concept cannot be defined
in incisive and precise terms and that an analysis ol the legion oi deci-
sions interpreting this fundamental guarantee would be impossible and
indeed unnecessary. The breadth ol this historic limitation upon gov-
ernmental power is vast, encompassing almost unlimitetl areas ol gov-
ernmental impact upon individual (or corporate) rights and privileges.
At the outset, it might be instructive to note that the due process
guarantee is not and was not intended to insulate individuals irom all
forms of governmental action which interfered with or dei:)rived them
of their lives, liberty or property. This proposition is, of course, elemen-
tary. In a society governed by the rule of law, a society in which govern-
ments are the servants and not the masters of men, deriving "their just
powers from the consent of the governed," the inherent, inalienable and
fundamental rights of individuals must of necessity yield to the para-
mount interest of society. This notion is obviously implicit in the due
process clause. If we recast its language as a grant rather than a limita-
tion of power, it would read "a person may be deprived of his life, liberty
or property, but only through the application of due process of law."
The import of this principle, thus phrased, may produce an initial
psychological shock, but its truth should be obvious with but a little
reflection. The state can and does constitutionally deprive a person of
his life if he commits a capital offense, and his liberty, through im-
prisonment, if he is convicted of a criminal offense. The whole criminal
code of the state, and the hundreds of additional statutes which provide
sanctions of imprisonment for violation, involves the state precisely in
depriving a person of his life or liberty.
The same principle justifies denying to a person the right to use his
property as he desires. If [ones wants to build a rendering plant in an
area zoned for residential use, he cannot do so. If he maintains his prop-
erty in a way which creates a nuisance or a threat to public health or
safety, the state may compel him to abate th.e nuisance at a consideral)le
cost to him. The state may condemn one's property for highway or other
legitimate governmental purposes. In a host of other ways, the state may
legitimately qualify or circumscribe a person's asserted right to own,
possess and use his property in accordance with his exclusive aspirations.
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Other illustrations readily suggest themselves. One cannot practice
medicine or any phase of the healing arts, or engage in business as a
plumber, banker, funeral director, common carrier, real estate broker,
agent or salesman, and a host of other business activities, without secur-
ing a license based on demonstrated competence, frequently conditioned
upon successful completion of a prescribed educational curriculum. The
state may deny a license, or having granted it, may suspend or revoke it
for violation of the regulatory statute, or the rules adopted pursuant
thereto. These are extraordinary powers which control or limit one's
property or liberty, and the existence of this power is conceded if there
is a public interest, paramount to the individual "right," which demands
or justifies the exercise of such power, and if such exercise conforms to
due process standards. Commonly the power of the state so to act is de-
fined as
"police power," a designation which currently may carry other
connotations, but which in the traditional context of the due process
clause means that none of the rights constitutionally guaranteed to the
people may be exercised without regard to the rights of others, and that
when it is necessary to protect an important societal interest — e.g., public
health, safety, morals or the catchall, conmion welfare — the rights of indi-
viduals must yield to the paramount public interest.
Yet in all of this the critical limitation, due process of law is of the
essence, and no exercise of governmental power, admittedly within its
competence as an abstraction, will be countenanced if it denies due
process to the person affected. In this connection, it is important to note
that due process of law was originally conceived of as a procedural guar-
antee only; that is, before property or liberty or life was taken or im-
paired, certain procedural steps deemed fundamental as a matter of fair
play, and essential as a check upon unfettered, or irresponsible or arbi-
trary, governmental action, had to be afforded. These procedural re-
quirements normally included notice and right to a fair hearing before
an impartial tribunal. The character of the notice and hearing may vary
with the nature of the proceeding, e.g., criminal, civil or administrative,
but the essential requirement of compliance with due process applies to
all agencies and instrumentalities exercising governmental power,
whether they be within the legislative, judicial or executive departments
of government.
The limited procedural concept of due process gave way, however, to
the principle that due process operates as a limitation on the power of
government, primarily but not exclusively the legislature, to enact laws
which were deemed substantively, and not as a matter of procedure, to
be oppressive, arbitrary or unreasonable. It is in this aspect of due
process that the awesome power of judicial review, the power of a court
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to declare an act of the legislature unconstitutional, has had the greatest
impact in limiting or prohibiting incursions upon indi\ ithial rights. For
a number ot years many state courts, acting perhaps more out of a sense
of power than responsibility, declared state enactments to be sub-
stantively beyond the legislative power and thus a violation of due
process. In more recent times, the courts have become sensitive to the
necessity of permitting legislative judgment a greater latitude in meet-
ing the problems l)esetting society. This attitude, coupled with a keener
perception that judicial restraint is essential to the preservation of a
proper balance of governmental power, has led to a substantial decrease
in the number of laws held unconstitutional by due process standards.
This is especially true in matters of economic regulation, and in the
licensing of trades, professions and other activities. The protection of
"property" against deprivation without due process has become a much
less significant concept than in the past. Liberty, however, seems to re-
main a top-level priority under due process, especially in the administra-
tion and enforcement of criminal laws.
As a final general observation, it is not unusual for a court to declare
an infringement ot a specific constitutional procedural right, such as
the right of trial by jury, a violation also of the state's due process guar-
antee. Frequently the decisions do not designate \\ith the clarity one
expects in judicial analysis the particular constitutional grounds relied
upon to invalidate a statute. On occasion, more than one constitutional
limitation on governmental power may rationally be applied to a judg-
ment of invalidity. In these cases it is not unusual for the court to apply
rather indiscriminately the due process clause as the rationale of decision.
It is a favorite catchall because its flexibility, ambiguity and adapta-
bility permit a reasonable exercise of judicial discretion.
This analysis thus far has dealt with general principles or so-called
"black letter" law. The difficulty with this kind of law is that it is of
minimum instructional value. Law unrelated to facts is frequently barren
and meaningless. Thus to put some substance into the due process clause,
brief reference will now be made to some laws or governmental action
which have been declared invalid as a violation of the due process clause
by the Illinois supreme and appellate courts. These cases are selected
only because they highlight the exceptions to an otherwise general pat-
tern of upholding of laws, and thus, hopefully, provide a sharper insight
into the limits of governmental power under the due process clause.
No particular pattern of subject matter, or of procedural or substantive
issues, is employed in these cases. They are simph illustrative of the
principle.
Cox V. Cox (400 111. 291 (1948)) invalidated a law which authorized
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the confiscation and summary destruction of fish nets not being used
tor an illegal purpose at the time of confiscation. The inherent lawful
nature of the property, unlike "contraband" or other basically danger-
ous articles, unquestionably swayed the Court against a power summarily
to destroy.
In People v. Weiner (271 111. 74 (1915)), a statute prohibiting the sale
of secondhand mattresses was held to be unreasonable, since whatever
health hazards they possessed could be removed by sterilization. The
state's options of regulation or prohibition will sometimes be assessed
in terms of reasonableness.
People V. Doe (334 111. 555 (1922)) held invalid a law which in
effect required cemeteries to use headstones furnished free by the United
States Government, because it unreasonably deprived cemeteries of their
right to use their own property as they saw fit. The law had no discern-
ible relation to public welfare, health, safety or morals.
In City of Chicago x>. Drake Hotel Company (274 111. 408 (1916)), an
ordinance prohibiting public dancing in restaurants was held invalid
as sweeping too broadly in the public morality arena.
In Figura i>. Cummins (4 111. 2d 44 (1954)), the trade of processing
metal springs by homeworkers was held not a proper subject for the exer-
cise of the police power absent a showing that such trade endangered the
public health, safety, morals or welfare.
In Marr v. Marr (43 111. App. 2d 25 (19t33)), an action by a wife for
divorce, defended by the husband on grounds of desertion and adultery,
the Court's refusal to permit testimony by children of the marriage, and by
a witness who allegedly was living with the wife, was held to be a denial
of due process to the husband. (Note — judicial rather than legislative
action).
In People v. Alterie (356 111. 307 (1934)), an amendment to the Vagran-
cy Act, which declared as a vagabond any person reputed to be an habitual
violator of criminal laws, was held invalid under the due process clause
because of vagueness and arbitrariness.
In People v. Savage (5 111. 2d 296 (1955)), a private investigation by
the Court in a criminal case was held to violate the defendant's rights
to a public and open trial and was, as well, a denial of due process.
(Note—judicial action. Note also combined particular grounds and due
process.)
In People v. Thompson (36 111. 2d 332 (1967)), erroneous instruction
to the jury which prejudiced the defendant was held to be a denial of
due process. (Note — judicial action.)
In People v. Love (39 111. 2d 436 (1968)), the denial of right to a
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speedy trial was also held lo be a denial ol due process. (Note—Iwo con-
stitutional guarantees.)
In People v. Brown (39 111. 2d .H()7 (I9(i8)), it was held that the right
ol appeal in a criminal case was not per se ot constitutional dimension
but that a dismissal of an appeal was subject to due process and equal pro-
tection guarantees of the federal and state constitutions. In this case the
dismissal of an ajjpeal from a conviction for jjandering was vacated when
the dismissal was the result of the defendant's attorney's failure to
prosecute the appeal. The rule that a client is bound by the acts or omis-
sions of his attorney is not to f^e applied in criminal cases wlien the at-
torney's failure to act prejudices the subtantive rights of liis client.
In People v. De Simone (9 111. 2d 522 (1956)), it was held that the right
of a defendant in a criminal case to counsel is not satisfied by the for-
mality of appointment of an attorney by the court, since the right em-
braces effective representation; and where the representation is of such low
caliber as to amount to no representation or to reduce the trial to a farce,
the defendant has been denied due process. (Note—two guarantees: right
to counsel—due process.)
It lias been noted that the due process guarantee is applicable to ad-
ministrative as well as judicial proceedings. However, due process of law
has frec^uently been held not necessarily to mean .judicial proceedings,
and an administrative proceeding from which may result sanctions
administratively imposed will constitute due process if procedural stand-
ards of fairness are met. {E.g., Sheldon v. Hoyne, 261 111. 222 (1913).)
The due process clause appears to have received judicial treatment
substantially comparable to that in other states. Apart from some federal
extensions through the incorporation principle (see Introductory and
Preliminary Comment, supra, p. 5), the course of judicial interpretation
and application seems quite normal and unexceptional.
Comparative Analysis
Twenty-seven state constitutions contain the same provision while
four others contain similar provisions. The remaining states provide, as
in Section 1 above, that all men have inalienable rights to life, liberty,
the pursuit of happiness and property. The Model State Constitution
contains the same provision but adds that no person shall be "denied
the equal protection of the laws, nor be denied the enjoyment of his
civil rights or be discriminated against in the exercise thereof because
of race, national origin, religion or ancestry." (art. I, § 1.02.)
Comment
Any suggestion that a new Constitution delete or tamper with this
section would in all probability be viewed as subversive. It is too funda-
mental and too deeply embedded in constitutional and political history
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to tamper with. A suggestion deserving of serious consideration, how-
ever, is that a provision concerning equal protection of laws could be in-
corporated into this section. (See Comynent, Art. IV, Sec. 22, infra, p. 225.)
Religious Freedom
Sec. 3. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship,
without discrimination, shall forever be guaranteed; and no person shall be
denied any civil or political right, privilege or capacity, on account of his
religious opinions; but the liberty of conscience hereby secured shall not be
construed to dispense with oaths or affirmations, excuse acts of licentiousness,
or justify practices inconsistent with the peace or safety of the State. No person
shall be required to attend or support any ministry or place of worship against
his consent, nor shall any preference be given by law to any religious denomi-
nation or mode of worship.
History
The 1818 and 1848 Constitutions contained identical provisions on
religious freedom. They expressed (1) man's natural and indefeasible
right to worship God according to his conscience; (2) a limitation on
governmental power to the effect that no person could be compelled to
attend, erect or support any place of worship or to maintain any ministry
against his consent; (3) a denial that human authority can in any case
control or interfere with rights of conscience; (4) a principle that no
preference shall be given by law to any religious establishments or modes
of worship; and (5) a prohibition against the requirement of a religious
test as a qualification to any office or public trust.
The religious test prohibition of the prior Constitutions was dropped
in 1870 in favor of the broader provision, "no person shall be denied any
civil or political right ... on account of his religious opinions," which was
intended to insure also that "no person shall be incompetent to be a wit-
ness, on account of his religious opinions." (State of Illinois, Debates and
Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention 1563 (1870) [hereinafter
cited as Debates]).
The clause in the present Constitution, "but the liberty of conscience
hereby secured shall not be construed to dispense with oaths or affirma-
tions, excuse acts of licentiousness, or justify practices inconsistent with
the peace or safety of the State," was added to establish that the broad
provision substituted for the religious test provision did not prohibit an
oath or affirmation and to insure that certain practices (nude religious
ceremonies, child sacrifices, and interruption of the Sabbath were ex-
amples given) would not be construed as being within the lawful exercise
of religious freedom. An additional restriction against polygamy, directed
at the Mormons, was not adopted.
The 1922 Convention proposal carried forward the 1870 provisions,
including an amendment, adopted after a ^oor fight, to the effect that
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the reading in the pubHc schools of selections ironi the Old or New
Testaments, without comment, should never be held to conflict with the
Constitution.
Explanation
The length and detail oi the current provisions are in marked con-
trast to the religious freedom guarantee in the First Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States which starkly declares that "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof . . . ." The simplicity of the federal principle has
not, however, added to its clarity. What constitutes an "establishment
of religion" or a prohibition on the free exercise thereof, as these limi-
tations are applied to state action through incorporation into the Four-
teenth Amendment, have proved to be troublesome cjuestions.
It is not likely that any of the specific limitations of this section go
beyond the more general First Amendment's proscription on govern-
mental power. That is, it is almost a legal certainty that a denial of a
civil or j^olitical right on account of religious opinions would be held
an unpermissible infringement under the Fourteenth Amendment if
sought to be applied by a state which did not have the specific Illinois
limitation. Nor is it likely that the provisions of this section which pre-
serve the state's power to require oaths or affirmations, and which do not,
in the name of religious freedom, excuse acts of licentiousness or justify
practices inconsistent with the peace or safety of the state, would be held
to conflict with First ar^d Fourteenth Amendment limitations on state
power. One can hardly suppose that human sacrifice or sexual debauchery
would be sanctioned by federal doctrine. Indeed, in Cleveland v. United
States (329 U.S. 14 (1946)), a criminal conviction of Mormons under
the federal Mann Act for transporting plural wives across state lines was
sustained by the United States Supreme Court, notwithstanding that
polygamy, as pointed out in the minority opinion, was a ctiltural in-
stitution deeply rooted in tlie religious beliefs of the societies in which
it appears. The point is that though the state seems to have spelled out
areas of permissible governmental interference with religious practices
and rights of conscience which on the surface appear to be proscribed
by the categorical First Amendment denial of any legislative power,
the kinds of interferences which would be held valid under state law
would in all probability be held valid under federal interpretations of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and conversely, the kinds of infringements held
to be beyond state power under Section 3 would in all probability be held
invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment.
In recent years, the most significant decisions respecting religious free-
dom have concerned laws and practices in the public schools. Since the
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Explanation and Analysis of Article VIII, Section 3 {infra, pp. 405-8) deal
with the relationship between education and religion in extenso, in-
volving the same decisional law as is applicable here, no effort will be
made to duplicate that discussion.
In areas other than education, some of the state decisional law is
instructive but some of it may, under present theory, be deemed question-
able. Religious freedom, like all other constitutional liberties and rights,
is relative and may have to yield to state action which can be justified
as within permissible concepts of police power. In People ex rel. Wallace
V. Labrenz (411 111. 618 (1952)), the Illinois Supreme Court held valid
a law which interfered with the religious beliefs and practices of parents
who sought to prevent blood transfusions believed medically necessary
to save their child's life. To be compared with this, however, is In re
Estate of Brooks (32 111. 2d 361 (1965)), a more recent Illinois Supreme
Court decision, in which the Court held that the appointment of a con-
servator for an adidt woman, and authorization for him to consent to
transfusions for her, without notice to her and her husband who had
religious scruples against such transfusions, violated their constitutional
rights of religious freedom where they had notified their doctor and
hospital of their beliefs and had executed documents releasing the doctor
and hospital from civil liability. The Labrenz case was distinguished
on the grounds that a minor was there involved, whereas in Estate of
Brooks an adult insisted upon a religious belief under circiimstances (no
minor children) in which the state's abridgement of her religious beliefs
served no legitimate state interest.
Of perhaps questionable validity today is Reichxvald v. Catholic Bishop
of Chicago (258 111. 44 (1913)) which held that the building of chapels
on county poor farms was not a violation of the prohibition relating to
compulsory support of a place of worship.
People ex rel. Bernat v. Bicek (405 111. 510 (1950)) involved a statutory
provision authorizing a judicial officer in divorce proceedings to invite
representatives of religious denominations of the contending parties to
a conference for the purpose of effecting a reconciliation. This was held
to be a denial of religious freedom and due process of law. And in
Hronek v. People (134 111. 139 (1890)) the Court quite predictably held
that any civil or political right, privilege or capacity enjoyed by citizens
generally could not be denied because of religious belief.
Comparative Analysis
All state constitutions provide substantially similar provisions for
free exercise of religion and religious worship. Eight states similarly
provide that no preference shall be given by law to any religious denom-
ination and the remaining states provide that the states may neither
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establish nor support religious denominations. The Model State Constitu-
tion adopts the First Amendment formulation that "No law shall be en-
acted respecting an establishment ot religion, or prohibiting the tree exer-
cise thereof...." (art. 1, § 1.01.)
Comment
It is a question of judgment whether the detailed statement ot limi-
tations and power respecting religious freedom is to be preferred over
the First Amendment or the suggested provision of the Model State
Constitution. As noted, despite the categorical nature of the First Amend-
ment provision, a measure of reserved governmental power has been
recognized. On the other hand, the present formulation in Section 3 does
have the merit of defining with a fair degree of certainty the essential
principles of religious freedom while expressing the principle of a
reserved governmental power to protect the public interest. A judgment
of preference for the Illinois statement is certainly supportable in prin-
ciple. It is noted, however, that the Commentary in the Model State Con-
stitution quite bluntly rejects the necessity of a provision prohibiting
denial of the enjoyment of civil rights, because the "protection of 'civil
rights' has been subsumed in both federal and state courts under due
process and equal protection . . . ." (Model State Constitution 30.)
Perhaps the correct assessment is that it is dangerous to meddle,
even with good intentions, with traditional bill of rights guarantees of
religious freedom. The effort usually generates passionate and conflicting
reactions. It may therefore be the better part of wisdom to retain the
existing language unless the making of a substantial change is deemed
essential.
Freedom of Speech
Sec. 4. Every person may freely speak, write and publish on all subjects,
being responsible for the abuse of that liberty; and in all trials for libel, both
civil and criminal, the truth, when published with good motives and for justi-
fiable ends, shall be a sufficient defense.
History
With the exception of several minor and insignificant style changes,
the 1818 and 1848 Constitutions contained identical provisions. They
provided that (1) the printing presses shall be free to every person who
examines the proceedings of the General Assembly or any branch of
government, and that no law may ever restrain this right; (2) the free
communication of thoughts and opinions is one of the invaluable rights
of man, and that every citizen may freely speak, write or print on every
subject, being reponsible for the abuse of that liberty; and (3) in prose-
cutions for the publication of papers investigating the official conduct
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of officers or of men acting in a public capacity, or where the matter
published is proper for public information, the truth thereof may be
given in evidence; and (4) in all indictments for libels, the jury shall
have the right of determining both the law and the fact, under the
direction of the court as in other cases.
The 1870 section eliminated the printing press provision; adopted
without substantive change and almost verbatim the provision respecting
the rights of citizens to speak, write and publish freely; broadened the
provisions respecting libels to cover all trials, civil and criminal, without
limitation to public officials; retained truth as a defense in libel actions,
but added significantly "when published with good motives and for justi-
fiable ends"; and deleted the provision giving the jury the right to deter-
mine issues of law and fact in libel cases. This section was reported out
of the Bill of Rights Committee in substantially its present form. It was
adopted with little debate or discussion and with no explanation for the
changes effected in the 1848 provisions.
The 1922 Convention proposal retained the 1870 provisions, making
only stylistic nonsubstantive changes.
Explanation
It is somewhat absurd to suggest priorities among the fundamental
rights and liberties protected against impairment by a bill of rights; yet
among these rights a strong case can be made for freedom of speech
and press as the most basic of all rights, without which there could be
no truly free society. The decisions, federal and state, frequently reflect
this view, though like all other rights, freedom of speech and press is
not absolute. Because of its absolutely central role, speech or press cannot
be punished or censored unless utterance or publication presents a clear
and present danger to society (the classic Holmesian principle) or unless
it is "shown likely to produce a clear and present danger of serious
substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance,
or unrest." (Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).)
Freedom is the rule and restraint is the exception. So the courts have
said or implied in many cases. But the exceptions which allow govern-
mental sanctions are by no means minimal. Speech which incites to
violence or crime, or which slanders or libels, or which is coupled with
unlawful conduct, or which is obscene, is subject to punishment or other
governmental sanctions.
Press is not limited to newspapers, but includes periodicals, pamphlets,
and every other sort of publication that affords a vehicle of information
(Montgomery Ward & Co. v. United Employees, 330 111. App. 49 (1946));
it embraces published matter whether circulated with or without charge
(City of Blue Island v. Kozul, 379 111. 511 (1942)); and it guarantees the
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right to publish, circulate, distribute and make known, and not merely
the right to speak and write (Village ol South Holland v. Stein, 373 111.
472 (1940)).
Curiously, motion pictures were not recognized as speech or press
within the protection ol the First and Fourteenth Amendments (the
doctrine of incorj)oration applies the restraints of the First Amendment
of the Constitution of the United States to the states through the Four-
teenth Amendment) until 1952 when the United States Supreme Court
so held in Joseph Bitrstyn, Inc. v. Wilson (313 U.S. 195 (1952)). A 1915
decision, reflecting the novelty of the medium, had held motion pictures
a business jjure and simple, having no comnumicative values within the
protection of the First Amendment. (Mutual Film (Jorp. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 236 U.S. 230 (1915).)
The nature of the governmental power exerted in respect to speech
or press is an all-important factor in determining the validity of the
power. As a general proposition, criminal punishment by fine or im-
prisonment for nonprotected speech or press is acceptable. This may be
called after-the-fact punishment, whereby the actor is not initially
censored by prior restraints, but, as in other cases of "criminal offenses,
is prosecuted for speech deemed unlawful. The critical inquiry, of
course, is whether the speech is indeed constitutionally protected against
any form of punishment. Speech which simply stirs people to anger,
or invites public dispute or brings about a condition of unrest, absent
the factors previously noted, is not subject to any form of governmental
sanction. (Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).) In Pickering v.
Board of Education (391 U.S. 563 (1968)), a decision of the Illinois
Supreme Court which sustained the administrative dismissal of a school
teacher for publishing letters in newspapers critical of the Board of
Education was reversed as a violation of the free speech and press
guarantee.*
On the other hand, speech or press which may be subjected to after-
the-fact criminal punishment may not, except in the area of obscenity
in motion pictures, be made the subject of a prior restraint which clas-
sically involves governmental consent as a precondition to publication,
normally through administrative licensing. This form of sanction is
censorship in its most suspect form in a free society, and its current
limitation to obscenity in motion pictures is understandable. A form
of jjrior restraint applied to newspapers
— injunction to suppress as a
nuisance the publication of newspapers devoted to defamatory, scan-
dalous and scurrilous attacks upon public officials — was stricken as an
infringement upon freedom of the press in the landmark case of Near v.
Minnesota ex rel. Olson (283 U.S. 697 (1931)). Not until 1961, in Times
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Film Corp v. City of Chicago (365 U.S. 43 (1961)), did the United States
Supreme Court concede the constitutional validity oi prior restraint
in its purest form, when it upheld the Chicago motion picture censor-
ship ordinance against a broadside attack which asserted a total absence
of governmental power to require administrative approval as a condition
to publication. Earlier, in 1957, the same Court converted prior dicta
into law by holding for the first time that obscenity was not protected
expression within the First and Fourteenth Amenchnents, and sustained
both state and federal criminal after-the-fact punishment for the publi-
cation of obscene printed materials. (Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.
476 (1957).) Also in 1957, the Court in Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Broivn
(354 U.S. 436 (1957)) had sustained a form of prior restraint by in-
junction similar to that outlawed in Near v. Minnesota as applied to ob-
scene publications. Distingushing Near v. Minnesota, the Court held in
Kingsley that it was dealing with constitutionally unprotected obscenity
and with a limited restraint on publication of a particular book pend-
ing judicial determination of obscenity, as contrasted with the Near
restraint on future publications of the newspaper.
Illinois, of course, under its own constitutional guarantee of free
speech and press, could outlaw prior restraints on the publication of
motion pictures if it so desired. As a matter of history, however, Illinois
anticipated Roth, Kingsley and Times Film by holding (1) that obscenity
was not protected expression within Section 4 of Article II of the state
Constitution or the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Federal
Constitution, and (2) that an administrative licensing scheme for motion
pictures was a permissible constitutional restraint on liberty of press.
(ACLU V. City of Chicago, 3 111. 2d 334 (1954).)
Notwithstanding the federal validation of an administrative licensing
scheme for motion pictures, the United States Supreme Court, sensitive
to this extraordinary and potentially dangerous governmental power,
has severely circumscribed this power by insistence upon procedural
safeguards which require an expedited administrative and judicial proc-
ess and which keeps to a minimum the degree of prior restraint. Thus
in Freedman v. Maryland (380 U.S. 51 (1965)), the Court prescribed the
standards for a valid prior restraint on the publication of motion pic-
tures which (1) imposed upon the administrative censor the burden of
proving that the film is obscene, (2) limited administrative restraint prior
to judicial determination to an undefined brief and minimum period,
and (3) assured a prompt and final judicial determination.
The City of Chicago rewrote its censorship ordinance to meet the
Freedman standards and in Ciisack v. Teitel Film Corporation (38 111.
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2d 53 (1967)) the state Supreme Court sustained the ordinance which
permitted a 50- to 57-day period for the administrative determination and
required an expedited judicial procedure. The United States Supreme
Court reversed on the ground that the ordinance tailed to meet the
Freedman standards for an expedited administrative and judicial process
which would assure a mniimum of prior restraint. (Teitel Film Corp. v.
Cusack, 390 U.S. 139 (1968).)
Prior restraints through the administrative licensing mechanism in
areas other than motion pictures, and on grounds other than obscenity,
have not been attempted in Illinois, nor is it likely that if attempted
they will be sustained. On the other hand, there is a significant develop-
ing law which recognizes governmental power to curb speech associated
with demonstrations and the use of public places which interferes ^\•ith
the rights of others. In City of Chicago v. Gregory (39 111. 2d 47 (1968)),
a conviction under a disorderly conduct statute was sustained against
civil rights marchers whose peaceful conduct aroused potentially danger-
ous adverse reaction by a hostile crowd of onlookers. The civil rights
marchers had refused police suggestions to leave the area, based on the
police judgment that violence would otherwise be unavoidable. The
United States Supreme Court reversed in a decision which did not find
it necessary to reach the constitutional issue concerning the marchers'
rights to free speech and to assemble. (Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394
U.S. Ill (1969).)
In City of Chicago v. Joyce (38 111. 2d 368 (1967)), a conviction for
disorderly conduct was upheld against a First Amendment challenge, the
Court holding that the defendant's conduct in sitting on sidewalks, block-
ing entrance to the city hall, and obstructing pedestrian traffic, had no con-
nection with any constitutionally protected fieedoms.
These Illinois decisions appear to be more than amply supported in
recent federal decisional law. Of particular importance are Cameron v.
Johnson (390 U.S. 611 (1968)) sustaining a Mississippi statute prohibit-
ing picketing or parading which obstructs or unreasonably interferes
with ingress or egress to or from the courthouse; Cox x'. Louisiana (379
U.S. 536 (1965)) which upheld convictions of civil rights marchers for
"obstructing public passages," where the demonstrators, in peaceful
fashion, marched from the state capitol to the courthouse grounds where
they prayed, sang and listened to speeches; and Adderly v. Florida (385
U.S. 39 (1966)) sustaining a state conviction for trespass, against a First
Amendment challenge, as to a group of student demonstrators who
entered jail grounds to protest arrests based on segregation ordinances
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and who, without violence or disorder, temporarily blocked a driveway
to the jail entrance not normally used by the public.
Illinois has followed the prevailing rule that speech which is an
integral part of unlawful conduct is not constitutionally protected ex-
pression. (Chicago Real Estate Bd. v. City of Chicago, 36 111. 2d 530
(1967) sustaining an ordinance proscribing the distribution by real estate
brokers of printed matter which was aimed at block-busting and panic
selling.) In the important area of picketing as a form of speech, Illinois
has held that picketing cannot be dogmatically equated with constitu-
tionally protected speech and may be curtailed where it is conducted
for purposes unlawful under state laws or policies. (Board of Educ. v.
Redding, 32 111. 2d 567 (1965).)
In contrast, note should be taken of Food Employees Local 590 v.
Logan Valley Plaza, Inc. (391 U.S. 308 (1968)) which validated as a First
Amendment freedom peaceful picketing of a shopping center located
on wholly owned private grounds, the Court equating the center, under
the conditions of its operation, to a business area located within the
city. The Court relied principally on a comparable holding relating to
a
"company town" (private property), holding that the streets and other
public places in the company town were proper places for the exercise of
speech under the aegis of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. (Marsh
V. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).)
In summation it must again be stressed that this analysis is not exhaus-
tive. Its purpose is to inform of the basic meaning and application of
the constitutional provision under discussion by reference to and de-
scription of the more important federal and state decisional law.
Comparative Analysis
All the states guarantee freedom of speech but four do not have a con-
stitutional provision guaranteeing freedom of press. Thirty-five other
states have a provision regarding libel. Of these, 21 provide similarly
that truth, when published with good motives, is a defense; 13 establish
that truth
"may be given in evidence" without specifying its effect; and
one provides simply that truth is a justification. The Model State Con-
stitution adopts the federal First Amendment language that "no law shall
be enacted . . . abridging the freedom of speech or of the press . . . ." (art.
I, §1.01.)
Comment
That portion of Section 4 which deals with speech and press is funda-
mental to a state constitution which seeks to preserve these indispensable
liberties. The last clause which deals with trials for libel and truth as a
defense, when published with good motives and for justifiable ends, is
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somewhat more diflicuk to assess as a constitutional principle, it was not
discussed in the Explanation because it has not been productive of liti-
gation or law which varies from its jjlain meaning. Perhaps truth alone,
without regard to the difficult burden of establishing good motives and
justifiable ends, should be suthcient for defense in civil or criminal libel
suits. An imjiortant consideration may be that many states do not con-
sider the provision, or variations thereof, worthy of constitutional status.
Trial by Jury
Sec. 5. The right of trial by jury as heretofore enjoyed, siiall remain inviolate;
but the trial of civil cases before justices of the peace by a jury of less tlian
twelve men, may be authorized by law.
History
The 1818 Constitution stated only that the right of trial by jury shall
remain inviolate. To this provision the 1818 Constitution added that
the right extends to all cases at law, without regard to the amount in con-
troversy. The present constitutional provision introduced the phrase "as
heretofore enjoyed" as well as the clause permitting the legislature to
authorize a jury of fewer than 12 men in civil cases before justices
of the peace. Deleted as unnecessary was the 1848 provision making the
right to a jury trial applicable to all cases, without regard to the amount
in controversy.
The 1922 Convention proposal suggested a radical revision of the
1870 provision. It retained the opening phrase but removed the words
"as heretofore enjoyed," the debates noting this to be necessary to the
remainder of the proposal which (1) authorized waiver of a jury trial
except in capital cases, (2) expressly qualified women to serve as jurors,
and (3) authorized the General Assembly to provide by Igiw for juries of
fewer than 12 men and nonunanimous verdicts in all civil cases.
Explanation
Although this section applies to civil and criminal proceedings, the
discussion here is limited to civil cases. For the discussion of jury trials in
criminal cases see Section 9 of this Article. {Infra, pp. 41-2.)
The trial by jury guarantee is, in common understanding, a fundamen-
tal and incontestable political policy in free society. The public con-
sensus that one has the inalienable right to be tried by a jury of his
peers in civil as well as criminal cases probably remains quite firm. In
other democratic societies, however, and in England particularly, the
right to trial by jury has virtually gone by the boards in all but criminal
cases.
As a practical matter, however, the sweeping nature of this guarantee,
modified by the ambiguous phrase "as heretofore enjoyed" (a phrase
which has resulted in a welter of confusing and irreconcilable interpreta-
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tions by the Illinois Supreme Court) has not prevented the legislature
from devising and the courts from sustaining legal mechanisms for the
trial and determination of facts by agencies other than juries. Perhaps
the most striking example is the Workmen's Compensation Act which
established an administrative mechanism for the determination of com-
pensation claims. Initially the law, which substituted a statutory claim
for employment-related injuries for the common law action available to
employees, was effective only as to employers and employees who elected
to accept its provisions. This elective feature saved the act from a serious
constitutional challenge that it deprived employers of the right to a
trial by jury "as heretofore enjoyed." (Chicago Rys. v. Industrial Bd.,
276 111. 112 (1916); Deibeikis v. Link-Belt Co., 2j6\ 111. 454 (1914).) A few
years later, however, the law was made mandatorily applicable, without
election, to certain defined hazardous employments. Employers claimed
this deprived them of their common law right to a jury trial. The Court
disagreed and employed an ingenious rationale to sustain the new
administrative scheme. It held that the right to a trial by jury was guar-
anteed only in those causes of action recognized by law. Since the
original cause of action was destroyed or merged into a new statutory
remedy, the "incidental" right of trial by jury had nothing left upon
which to operate. (Grand Trunk Ry. v. Industial Comm'n, 291 111. 167
(1919).) Lost somewhere in this analysis was a right "as heretofore en-
joyed" which was to remain inviolate. The realistic analysis is that
common law principles of tort liability in the master-servant relation-
ship were no longer appropriate in an industrial society in which the
incidence of employment injuries and deaths was soaring to unprece-
dented heights, and that a process, more adaptable and sympathetic to
the new concepts of liability, was essential as a substitute for judicial
determinations. The Court rose to the occasion by finding a constitutional
rationale.
In like manner the administrative process which licenses and regu-
lates professions and business activities, and denies or grants licenses, and
suspends, revokes or refuses to renew licenses, all without a jury, has
been sustained because the right to a jury in these kinds of cases was not
"heretofore enjoyed." The rationale makes much more sense than in the
Workmen's Compensation case, but even here the administrative deter-
mination of fact, a function supposedly peculiarly within the province
of a jury, can have devastating consequences to the person aggrieved by
the administrative judgment.
Numerous other exceptions are also recognized. Thus the constitu-
tional guarantee does not apply to cases in equity as distinguished from
cases in law, as, for example, mortgage foreclosure, specific performance
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of contracLs, and injunction cases. Nor does it apply to special statutory
proceedings such as a proceeding to conniiit ior mental illness. (People
V. Niesman, 35() 111. 322 (1934).) Ot course a jury trial may be provided
by statute in these and other types ot cases in wliich the constitutional
guarantee is inaj)j)licable, but this would be simply a matter of legis-
lative grace.
It should again be noted that the phrase "as heretofore enjoyed" has
caused some trouble but the lav,' is fairly well crystallized now to the
effect that it means both the right as it existed at common law and as it
had come to be at the time of the adoption of the Constitution.
A special problem arises in respect to the provision concerning juries of
fewer than 12 persons in civil actions before justices of the peace. Under
the new Judicial Article (Article VI) there are no justices of the peace.
The magistrates of the circuit courts are not the lineal or constitutional
descendants of the justices of the peace. Although the magistrates by
law have been assigned substantially the same kinds of civil and quasi-
criminal cases previously handled by justices of the peace, they are full-
fledged judicial officers of the circuit court. The provision authorizing
a jury of fewer than 12 men has not been construed judicially. Its con-
stitutional status is quite uncertain, although the General Assembly has
authorized a jury of six, unless either party recjuests a jury of 12, in
all cases where the damage claim does not exceed $10,000. (111. Rev. Stat,
ch. 110, §64 (2) (Supp. 1968).)
There appears to be no particular purpose in analyzing the hundreds
of judicial decisions which deal with collateral aspects of the right, such
as waiver of jury, selection of jury, the functions of the jury, the role of
appellate courts in reviewing fact determinations, and numerous other
aspects incident to the application and meaning of the right. The central
point is that these principles must for the most part be left to judicial
determination in the interpretation of the basic constitutional guaran-
tee. There is no basis for any judgment that these decisions have seri-
ously misconceived the essential purpose of the guarantee.
Comparative Analysis
All state constitutions provide that the right of trial by jury is to remain
inviolate, but only seven provide that the right is to remain inviolate "as
heretofore enjoyed." Approximately one-fifth of the states authorize juries
of fewer than 12 in courts not of record such as the justices of the j)cace
courts. The present Illinois Judicial Article (VI) has abolished all courts
not of record. The Model State Constitution provides that "[i]n prosecu-
tions for felony, the accused shall enjoy the right of trial by an impartial
jury of the county [or other appropriate political sidDdivision of the state]
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wherein the crime shall have been committed, or of another county, if a
change of venue has been granted." (art. I, §1.06.)
Comment
The guarantee of this section, as applied to civil cases, may perhaps be
less compelling in principle than when last adopted in 1870. Given its
evolutionary development, particularly in England where jury trials in
civil cases are virtually a thing of the past, and the probability that the
administrative process may in some additional instances be an appropri-
ate substitute for the judicial process, the need for a hard look at this
section may be indicated. The principle is, however, too important to be
lightly treated, and no modification should be accepted which dilutes its
political and psychological value. In short, there are difficult policy
choices here which cannot be resolved easily. For the reasons noted, the
provision for juries of fewer than 12 must also be evaluated in terms of
its utility or need under the new Judicial Article.
Searches and Seizures
Sec. 6. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated;
and no warrant shall issue without probable cause, supported by affidavit,
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
History
The 1818 Constitutional provision, re-adopted without change in 1848,
provided that (1) people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and possessions, from unreasonable searches and seizures, and (2) general
warrants authorizing search of suspected places without evidence of the
fact committed, or seizure of any person not named whose offenses are not
particularly described and supported by evidence, are dangerous to liberty
and
"ought not to be granted." The 1870 provision substituted "effects"
for
"possessions," introduced specifically the probable cause and affidavit
requirements for issuance of warrants, and mandated that warrants par-
ticularly describe the place to be searched, and the person or things to be
seized, eliminating the somewhat innocuous and ambiguous phrase that
general warrants "ought not to be granted."
The present section was drafted almost entirely in committee. No ex-
planation, then, is recorded in the Debates for the changes made in the
section as it existed in the 1818 and 1848 Constitutions.
The Convention as a whole added to the committee recommendation
only that a warrant must be "supported by affidavit" — reflecting concern
about the practice of permitting the issuance of a warrant on the basis
of oral evidence alone. Several delegates noted that a permanent record
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of the evidence should be made, and apparently the Convention agreed.
The 1870 provision is almost an exact statement of the Fourth Amend-
ment of the Constitution of the United States, the only difference in fact
being the word "affidavit" in lieu of the federal requirement of "oath or
afhrmation" to support the warrant. The difference is not substantive.
The 1922 Convention proposal retained the 1870 provision unchanged.
Explanation
This gieat bulwark against governmental abuse of power had its origin
in the practice which prevailed in the .\merican colonies and in England
of issuing so-called 'Avrits of assistance' to revenue officers, empowering
them in their discretion, to search suspected places for smuggled goods,
and a similar practice of issuance of general warrants for searching pri-
vate houses for the discovery and seizure of books and papers that might
be used to convict their owner of libel. The issuance of general warrants
for indiscriminate search and seizure originated in the Star Chamber.
To the colonists these practices were an abhorrent and indefensible in-
vasion of privacv, and a tyrannous exercise of governmental power totally
incompatible ^\ith fundamental principles of individual liberty.
The history is quite clear that the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, the direct lineal ancestor of Section 6 of Article II
of the Constitution of Illinois, was designed to prevent these feared and
hated governmental infringements upon freedom. The framers of the
Constitution of the United States recognized, however, that the protec-
tion of individual rights, as in other instances, must yield to a superior
public interest. In the just administration and enforcement of criminal
laws, governmental seizure of papers and effects, or of persons, if con-
trolled by reasonable safeguards, is an indispensable need in a civilized
and ordered society.
The apprehension, prosecution and punishment of criminals require
a governmental power to seize and search. The problem again is one of
balance. The amendment sought to secure that balance by a categorical
denunciation of unreasonable searches and seizures, and by recognizing
the leffitimacv of searches and seizures authorized bv warrants (1) based
on probable cause and supported by affidavit, and (2) particularly de-
scribing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
In this wav the evils of the open-ended, indiscriminate writs of assistance
and general warrants were to be ended, while preserving the public
interest in the administration and enforcement of its criminal laws.
The first and perhaps most important point of emphasis, therefore, is
that the constitutional principle prohibits only unreasonable searches
and seizures, and that a reasonable search or seizure, based upon a
proper warrant, is constitutionally permissible. In addition, this provi-
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sion has been construed in most states, including Illinois, as not abridg-
ing the common law poAver of search and seizure Avithout ^varrant in
cases where (1) voluntary consent to a search of the person or premises
is secured, and (2) where the search and seizure are incident to a valid
arrest.
The second important point is that warrants must be issued by a
judicial officer, the interposition between the government and the indi-
vidual of an impartial magistrate being central to a reasonable searcli
and seizure, and that the warrant may not issue except upon probable
cause being established. Probable cause is not proof of guilt but more
approximately a showing that a reasonable ground for suspicion, suffi-
ciently strong to warrant a cautious man to believe that the accused is
guilty of the offense, exists. (People v. York, 29 111. 2d 68 (1963); People
V. Dolgin, 415 111. 434 (1953).)
The decisions interpreting this section are legion. Quite understand-
ably, defendants in criminal actions are quick to insist upon one or more
violations of the standards. Among the most common are the insufficiency
of the complaint and the absence of probable cause for the issuance of
a warrant, the insufficiency of the affidavit, the insufficiency of the warrant
(failure to describe with particularity the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized), the search and seizure not being incident
to a valid arrest, the invalidit\ of the search, and the inadmissibility of
evidence unlawfully seized. Most of these questions raise issues of law
which, however, are critically dependent upon the facts. A review of the
cases dealing with the reasonableness or unreasonableness of search and
seizure, with or without warrant, and the myriad of other issues generated
by searches and seizures and the proceedings incident thereto, would
not be sufficiently instructive to justify the enormous effort necessary to
a detailed treatment. Suffice it to say at this point, however, that the
Illinois judicial interpretations of this provision are markedly similar
for the most part to the federal and state decisional la^v which interpret
similar or identical constitutional provisions.
This Explanation would be deficient, hoAvever, if it did not deal with
several recent federal decisions which have a direct and important
bearing upon the meaning and application of the Illinois provision.
Mapp X'. Ohio (367 U.S. 643 (1961)) held that the Fourth Amendment
rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures and to have
excluded from criminal trials any evidence illegally seized were applicable
to state criminal trials under the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. (Herewith our old friend — the incorporation doctrine.)
The decision reversed Wolf v. Colorado (338 U.S. 25 (1949)). The central
though not exclusive importance of the Mapp reversal of Wolf was
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its efiect upon the issue oi the admissibility oi evidence which had been
illegally seized. The tcdeial nde, established in Weeks xl United States
(232 U.S. 383 (1914)), was that evidence seized in violation of the
Fourth Amendment was inadmissible in ledcral court criminal prosecu-
tions. Most states interpreting their own constitiuional search and
seizure provisions retused to accept the Weeks principle in state prose-
cution tor a state crime. Illinois was among the minority ot states that
followed the Weeks rule. {See City of (Chicago v. Lord, 7 111. 2d 379
(1956); People v. Touhy, 361 111. 332 (1935).) Illinois prior to Mapp
could have reversed its decisional law to make unlawfully seized evidence
admissible in state prosecutions, and indeed might have done so in the
light of current and aggravated tensions which have substantially in-
creased the problems of law enforcement. It can not do so so long as
Mopp remains the definitive law.
The total implications of the Mapp rule on other aspects of the Fourth
Amendment are not certain. Whether federal law will take precedence
over state law in the many procedural and substantive issues which
derive from probable cause, arrest, reasonable and unreasonable searches
and seizures, and related issues, is not certain, but in the critical area
of admissibility of evidence unlawfully seized, and its crucial relation-
ship to proof of guilt or innocence of the defendant, the rule is now
Mapp.
The effect of Mapp on state and municipal efforts to control and
prevent health and safety hazards may be devastating. In Frank v.
Maryland (359 U.S. 360 (1959)), a Baltimore City Code provision author-
ized municipal health inspectors, without a warrant, to demand entry
to any house, cellar or enclosure if they had cause to suspect that a
nuisance existed. A refusal subjected the owner or occupant to a §20 fine
or penalty for each refusal. The ordinance, in a 5-4 decision was sus-
tained against a Fourteenth Amendment due process challenge (Mapp's
incorporation doctrine re Fourth Amendment was two years distant),
but Fourth Amendment policy considerations were uppermost in both
the majority and minority opinions as they weighed the interest of
privacy of the home against a strong governmental argument that pro-
tection of the public health in modern urban conditions simply made
unrealistic and unreasonable a warrant requirement for inspection.
One year later the Court, by an equally divided vote, sustained a
warrantless municipal health inspection ordinance applicable to private
homes which did not require "cause to suspect that a nuisance exists"
(the Frank ordinance). (Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263 (I960).)
But in Camara v. Municipal Court (387 U.S. 523 (1967)), the Court, in
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a 6-3 decision, reversed Frank, holding that warrantless periodic routine
area health inspections of homes violated Fourth and Fourteenth Amend-
ment proscriptions against unreasonable searches and seizures. In a
companion case, See v. City of Seattle (387 U.S. 541 (1967)), a fire inspec-
tion ordinance authorizing the same kind of inspection for commercial
and industrial buildings was invalidated on the grounds relied upon in
Camara.
In both Camara and See, the Court recognized the grave nature of the
public health problem in densely populated urban areas and, in an
effort to partially alleviate the anguish of municipal health officials who
claimed that protection of the public health was impossible under stand-
ard Fourth Amendment procedures, suggested that a warrant procedure
could be devised in which the probable cause criteria need not be the
same as was required for the issuance of warrants in criminal cases.
The effect of Camara and See, based as it now is upon the Mapp in-
corporation doctrine, is to impose substantial! curbs upon municipal
health protection measures which had become fairly regularized. And,
as in the Mapp case, the states are powerless to adopt a different rule.
It is not to be inferred that Mapp, Camara, See and other decisions
imposing federally determined limitations upon states are arbitrary, irra-
tional or even unreasonable federal intrusions upon state powers. This
may be and indeed is a hotly debated issue, even within the Court itself.
The important point is that such decisions, for as long as they are not
themselves overruled or modified by the United States Supreme Court,
or by amendment of the United States Constitution, provide new dimen-
sions in the philosophy of federalism and state powers.
Comparative Analysis
A similar provision is contained in all state constitutions. As noted,
the federal provision is also the same. The Model State Constitution
contains the same provision but adds the following:
"The right of the people to be secure against unreasonable interception of
of telephone, telegraph and other electronic means of communication . . . shall
not be violated, and no orders and warrants for such interceptions shall issue
but upon cause . . . that evidence of crime may be thus obtairied, and particularly
identifying the means of communication and the person or persons whose com-
munications are to be intercepted.
"Evidence obtained in violation of this section shall not be admissible in
any court against any person." (art. I, § 1.03.)
Comment
Every consideration of policy suggests that this principle be retained
in the Illinois Constitution. A contrary conclusion is certainly not com-
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pellcd simply because the Mapp decision applies the federal Fourth
Amendment guarantees to the states through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. (See Preliminary and Inlrodiutory Coinineut to this article, supra,
p. 5.) Such frustrations as may be caused in some parts ot the body
politic by Mapp, Camara and other decisions imposing new limitations
upon state owners are surely not shared by other segments who view the
decisions as great milestones in the continuing struggle of people against
governmental power. In any event, there is nothing that can be done in
a convention to change the new constitutional interpretations.
As to whether the state should add limitations beyond those which
presently are embraced within the state and federal amendments, such
as the proposal in the Model State Constitution, this issue presents
subtle and difficult policy problems. The genius of generalized con-
stitutional principles is that they protect fundamental individual
rights in respect to which a broad public consensus exists, while
permitting ffexibility and adaptation as the dynamics of a changing
society may require. The moment specifics are added to the great gen-
eral principles, a whole host of new or related issues will command
the support of different constituencies hoping to enshrine their particu-
lar ideals into constitutional concepts. This is not to say that new par-
ticular limitations upon state governmental power are unnecessary. The
problem is to define those which are worthy of constitutional status,
and to prevent the inclusion of new limitations which time will prove
to be impractical or unwise.
Bail and Habeas Corpus
Sec. 7. All persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, except for capital
offenses, where the proof is evident or the presumption great: and the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of
rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it.
History
This section, except for minor grammatical changes, is the same as the
provisions of the 1818 and 1848 Constitutions.
The 1922 Convention proposal suggested that the section read as
follows:
"Excessive bail shall not be required. The privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus shall not be suspended unless in case of rebellion or invasion the public
safety may require it."
Curiously, the proposal when first offered was withdrawn, partly be-
cause of opposition to the principle that bail was to be discretionary with
the court in all cases, and partly because it permitted bail for persons
charged with capital offenses on grounds more liberal than the existing
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provision. It was revived and adopted after the rejection of another
amendment whicli retained the existing language of the present Consti-
tution, but added a discretionary power of the court to refuse bail to a
person previously convicted of a crime.
Explanation
The section is self-explanatory and has been productive of little liti-
gation. It reflects the humane philosophy that persons accused of crime
should not be made to languish in the dungeon pending trial. Bail is a
matter of right except for capital offenses, where the proof is evident
or the presumption great. Of course if the accused cannot meet the bail
as set by the court, he must make the best of it. The amount of the bail,
though discretionary with the court, must be reasonable. In a prepos-
terous abuse of judicial discretion, the setting of $50,000 bail on a
vagrancy charge, the trial judge was reversed despite his insistence that
his discretion was properly exercised in view of the defendant's past
criminal record. (People ex rel. Sammons v. Snow, 340 111. 464 (1930).)
Judicial discretion in fixing bail must take into account the state's
interest in assuring the defendant's appearance for trial. (People ex rel.
Gendron v. Ingram, 34 111. 2d 623 (1966).) In this case, the "sufficient
sureties" provision of this section was held not to be violated by a statute
which liberalized procedures for release on bail. The statute (111. Rev.
Stat. ch. 38, §§110-2, 110-7, 110-8 (1967)) destroyed the harsh and fre-
quently odious bail bondsman's racket by providing the following
options: (1) the execution of a personal bond without security, the condi-
tion of performance being the promise to appear at the date set for
trial; (2) the execution of a personal bail bond in a fixed amount
coupled with a cash deposit of 10 per cent of the bail set by the court;
(3) the execution of a personal bond in a fixed amount and the deposit
of cash or securities equal to the amount so set, or the transfer as security
of unencumbered real estate equal to twice the amount of the bail.
The guarantee that the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended
except in the extraordinary instances noted has produced no problems
of interpretation or application.
Comparative Analysis
'
Twenty-three state constitutions contain the same provision relating
to bail while those of the remaining states contain variations thereon.
Every other state provides that "excessive" bail is prohibited. The United
States Constitution provides that "[ejxcessive bail shall not be required
. . . ." (U.S. Const, amend. VIII.) All the state constitutions contain simi-
lar provisions relating to habeas corpus. The United States Constitution
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in Article 1, Section 9 (not in Bill ot Rights), is precisely the same as the
Illinois provision on habeas corpus. The Model State Constitution
contains similar provisions relating to bail and habeas corpus.
Comment
A number of states leave the matter of bail in all cases to the discretion
of the court rather than mandating it as a constitutional right available
to a person accused of crime. The current concern with "lawlessness"
has prompted some discussion that the right to bail be re-evaluated as a
constitutional principle. It should be noted that the United States has
not transferred the federal provision into the Fourteenth Amendment
through the incorporation doctrine. Since denial of bail will work, as it
has in the past, to the disadvantage of the poor, often with rank injus-
tice, It would be well to consider most cautiously any proposal which
would diminish the existing right.
The habeas corpus provision is standard state and federal constitu-
tional doctrine. No reasons are suggested which justify its repeal or
modification.
Indictment
Sec. 8. No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense, unless on
indictment of a grand jury, except in cases in which the punishment is by
fine, or imprisonment otherwise than in the jienitentiary, in cases of impeach-
ment, and in cases arising in the army and navy, or in the militia when in
actual service in time of war or public danger: Provided, that the grand jury
may be abolished by law in all cases.
History
The 1818 Constitution made no express reference to grand juries but
clearly implied their constitutional necessity by providing that no person
"for any indictable offense" shall be proceeded against criminally by
information. The term "indictable offense" was not defined. Presum-
ably the common law had established the general distinctions between
crimes of a serious nature punishable by death or imprisonment in the
penitentiary, e.g., felonies, and criminal offenses of lesser gravity, e.g.,
misdemeanors for which the punishment was either by fine only, or fine
and imprisonment in penal institutions other than the penitentiary, e.g.,
county jails, workhouses, etc., for a term generally less than one year,
or by both such fine and imprisonment. In a curious, almost unintelligi-
ble form, the 1818 provision excepted from the "indictable offense" cate-
gory "cases arising in the land or naval forces, or the militia when in
actual service, in time of war or public danger, by leave of the courts
for oppression or misdemeanor in office." Whether the phrase "by leave
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of the courts" was tied to the antecedent or succeeding clauses, or stood
by itself as a grant of unlimited discretionary power to foreclose grand
jury action for indictable offenses was only one of the interpretive diffi-
culties raised by this language. Fortunately the occasion to test these
ambiguities does not seem to have arisen, or if it did, it apparently
did not reach the Supreme Court.
The 1848 Constitution was somewhat of an improvement in clarity,
though it seemed substantially to change the 1818 philosophy of permit-
ting a wide range of nonindictable offenses. Introducing the first express
constitutional reference to
"grand jury," it mandated a general applica-
tion of the grand jury indictment for any "criminal offense," excepting
impeachment, the military and militia cases designated in 1818, and "in
cases cognizable by justices of the peace." A proviso prohibited such
justices from trying any person, except as a court of inquiry, for any
offense punishable with "imprisonment or death, or fine above $100."
The scope of this alteration of the 1818 provision was also uncertain. It
seemed to exclude grand jury involvement in misdemeanors by the gen-
eral exception of "cases cognizable by justices of the peace," but whether
in fact this was so was made uncertain by the reference to misdemeanors
punishable by a fine of more than $100. Again the ambiguities apparently
caused no complications.
The 1870 provision is a marked improvement in the elimniation of
the ambiguities of the 1818 and 1848 provisions, but its major substan-
tive contribution was in its authorization of the General Assembly to
abolish the
,grand jury "in all cases." A great deal of criticism directed
at the grand jury system was voiced during the Convention, causing ex-
tensive debate. It was argued on the one hand that the grand jury system
was outmoded, overly expensive, secretive, irresponsible, cruel, and un-
just, and on the other hand that the system was necessary, traditional,
and effective. In the end, after considering several compromises, it was
decided to defer the decision to the legislature which could provide
substitute systems, test them, and replace them, if necessary.
The 1870 provision retained the exceptions for impeachment and the
military and militia cases. In excluding the indictment requirement for
criminal offenses in which the punishment was by fine only, or non-
penitentiary imprisonment, the framers were drawing for the first time
a fairly clear distinction between felonies and misdemeanors as estab-
lished by law.
The 1922 Convention proposal offered several innovations. It read as
follows:
"No person shall be held to answer for a capital offense unless on indictment
of a grand jury. Offenses which may be punished by imprisonment in the
penitentiary may be prosecuted by indictment or on information filed by the
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attorney general or by a state's attorney. No such information shall be filed
by a state's attorney exccjn by leave granted, citlicr in term time or in vacation,
by a judge of a court of record having jurisdiction of the offense, after a showing
of probable cause. All other offenses may be prosecuted as provided by law."
As ciralted by the Committee on the Bill of Rights, this section in the
1922 Convention proposal apparently froze the grant! jiny system into
the Constitution. It provided no authority in the General Assembly to
abolish it. An attempt to grant this authority failed in part because
it was telt that abolition might endanger the liberties of accused persons.
It was pointed out, as well, that the legislature had not seen fit to act on
the existing authorization, and that this could reflect a legislative judg-
ment of the value of the grand jury. One delegate, however, expressed
the thought that legislative inaction was due to an attorney general's
opinion that "the legislature had no right to abolish the grand jury in
any case unless it abolished it in all . . . ."
Explanation
The grand jury indictment procedure derives from the Magna Charta,
as do most of the limitations upon governmental power expressed in the
Bill of Rights. In construing a comparable provision of the Massachu-
setts Constitution, Chief Justice Shaw, in Joucs x>. Robbins (74 Mass. (8
Gray) 329, 344 (1857)), expressed the most frequently cited rationale for
this provision.
"The right of individual citizens to be secure from an open and public ac-
cusation of crime, and from the trouble, expense and anxiety of a public trial,
before a probable cause is established by the presentment antl indictment
of a grand jury, in cases of high offenses [sic], is justly regarded as one of the
securities to the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive public prose-
cutions, and as one of the ancient immunities and privileges of English liberty."
Among the more important of its related objectives was to limit a
person's jeopardy to offenses charged by a group of his fellow citizens
acting independently of either the prosecuting attorney or judge (Stirone
V. United States, 361 U.S. 212 (I960)), and to give a citizen the oppor-
tunity to have the benefit of a charge specifying with reasonable cer-
tainty the statute violated and wherein it was violated. (Conklin v.
Cozart, 158 F. 2d 676 (1946), cert, denied, 332 U.S. 801 (1947).)
The federal Bill of Rights grand jury requirement appears as the first
clause of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States
(applicable to "capital, or otherwise infamous crime"). However, unlike
other procedural rights in criminal cases secured to the accused by that
section, the grand jury guarantee has not been incorporated into the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as a federal limita-
tion upon state power. Hurtado v. Califomia (1 10 U.S. 516 (1884)) estab-
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lished the nonapplication of the Fourteenth Amendment and no subse-
quent United States Supreme Court decision has disturbed it. (See Mor-
ford V. Hocker, 394 F.2d 169 (9th Cir. 1968).) State decisional law, there-
fore, remains supreme in its area.
The Constitution of Illinois does not define a grand jury. Its com-
position and procedure are left to statute and the common law. (People
ex rel. Ferrill v. Graydon, 333 111. 429 (1928).) Important decisional law
establishes that this section draws the line between felonies punishable
by imprisonment in the penitentiary which must be prosecuted by in-
dictment, and misdemeanors, by information (Brewster v. People, 183
111. 143 (1899)); and that if any offense is punishable by fine only, or
imprisonment other than in a penitentiary only, or by both such fine
and imprisonment, it requires only complaint by information to prose-
cute. It is not at all clear whether the legislature may expand the grand
jury indictment process to include misdemeanors. Given customary
rules of constitutional and statutory interpretation, there appears to be
nothing in this section which operates as a limitation upon legislative
power to do so. The legislature has not seen fit to pursue this policy;
thus there is no decisional law on this subject.
The fact that a criminal offense provides for fine or imprisonment in
other than the penitentiary (thus establishing it as a misdemeanor) does
not, however, empower the legislature to authorize prosecution by the
information route where a conviction called for the additional punish-
ment of loss of civil rights. (People v. Russell, 245 111. 268 (1910).)
However, where a conviction for drunken driving, then a misdemeanor,
was prosecuted by information, the fact that a conviction authorized
revocation of the license, in addition to fine or imprisonment, did not
convert the offense into an indictable one, revocation being considered
an incident of the regulatory power and not a punishment. (People v.
Kobylak, 383 111. 432 (1943).)
In respect to the constitutional grant to abolish the grand jury "in all
cases," the Supreme Court has held that the power can be exercised in
a selective class of cases and that abolition of the grand jury in less than
all criminal offenses is not a violation of this provision. (People ex. rel.
Latimer v. Randolph, 13 111. 2d 552 (1958).)
Finally it is important to note that the institution of criminal prose-
cution by the "information" route involves the formal presentation of a
charge by the state's attorney or other appropriate prosecuting official to
a court. The secrecy, confidentiality, and other procedural incidents of
grand jury deliberation which results either in a "true bill," in effect a
determination that probable cause has been established upon which
prosecution may follow, or a "no true bill," are not applicable to the
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information process. The difference derives from the presumed distinc-
tion in tlie gravity of felonies and misdemeanors and the consequent
need of assuring greater secrecy in the felony-grand jury cases.
Comparative Analysis
Only 25 states have constitutional provisions for indictment by grand
jury and in nine of these authorization is given to the legislature to dis-
pense with the requirement or to limit the offenses to which it is aj^pli-
cable. Prosecution by information is permitted in the other states. Only
Texas provides similarly that an indictment must be returned for all
criminal cases, suljject to the exceptions in the Illinois Constitution.
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "No
person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jmy, except in cases
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual
service in time of War or public danger . . . ."
The Model State Constitution contains no comparable provision.
Comment
There appears to be something basically contradictory in the inclu-
sion of a grand jui^ indictment procedure in specified cases as a funda-
mental liberty deserving of constitutional status irt a Bill of Rights, and
the coupling of this requirement with legislative authority to abolish
the grand jury in all cases. Given its historical context and the reasons
customarily given in support of its status as a fundamental liberty, the
power of legislative abolition seems to be "a most ingenious paradox."
On the other hand, the fact that the legislatme has not moved to dis-
pense with this requirement in any significant way suggests that the guar-
antee is firmly fixed in political consciousness as a basic protection against
abuse of governmental power. It is not possible to gauge its relationship
to proper and effective law enforcement, but if it makes more diffi-
cult a casual or arbitrary approach to the administration of criminal
justice, this very fact may justify its constitutional status. The assess-
ment of the guarantee, and the legislative power to abolish it is indeed
most difficult. It is not likely that any rationale behind any change in the
existing provision will secure a substantial consensus. This is, of course,
a most speculative judgment.
Rights after Indictment
Sec. 9. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to appear
and defend in person and by counsel; to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation, and to have a copy thereof; to meet the witnesses face to face, and
to have process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his behalf, and a
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speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the
offense is alleged to have been committed.
History
The 1818 Constitution provided that in all criminal prosecutions the
accused had a right to be heard by himself and counsel; to demand the
nature and cause of the accusation; to meet the witnesses face to face;
to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his
favor; and to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the vicin-
age. The final provision was to the effect that the accused shall not be
compelled to give evidence against himself.
The 1848 Constitution changed the 1818 provisions only in respect to
the locale of the jury. Instead of an impartial jury of the vicinage, the
new provision required a jury "of the county or district wherein the
offense shall have been committed, which county or district shall have
been previously ascertained by law."
The current provisions of the 1870 Constitution, nonsubstantive style
changes aside, retained the 1848 section intact except (1) in respect to
the locale of the jury wherein the jury was required to be drawn from
the county or district in which the offense "is alleged to have been" (in-
stead of
"was") committed, and the deletion of the last clause pertaining
to the county or district having previously been ascertained by law,
and (2) in removing the self-incrimination provision and transferring
it to Article II, Section 10.
The 1922 Convention proposal retained the 1870 provisions intact
after defeating an amendment which would have added, as a final sen-
tence, an authorization to the legislature to provide for the taking of
depositions of nonresident witnesses, other than in homicide cases, by
the state or the accused, to be used for or against the accused.
Explanation
The critical relevance of federal decisional law in respect to the often-
mentioned incorporation doctrine requires at the outset that it be noted
that the following comparable guarantees of the Sixth Amendment of
the Constitution of the United States have been applied to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment: (1) the right to counsel (Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)); (2) the right to a speedy trial (Klopfer
V. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967)); (3) the right to a public trial (In
re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948)); (4) the right to confrontation of opposing
witnesses (Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965)); (5) the right to com-
pulsory process for obtaining witnesses (Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S.
14, (1967)); and (6) the right to an impartial jury (Witherspoon v. State
of IlHnois, 391 U.S. 391 U.S. 510 (1968)).'
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To the extent that these federal decisions circumscribe state power
beyond the limitations adjudged by the state courts to be within the
scope ot the state guarantees, the state is powerless to react. What re-
mains of state power in these areas of incorporation of specific federal
Bill of Rights provisions into the Fourteenth Amendment is essentially
the discretion to impose additional limitations uj^on governmental
power. This it may do by constitutional amendment, by legislation or
by judicial interpretation of the existing state constitutional provisions.
These considerations are of course important to the Convention. Re-
duced to its essence, it means that a constitutional change cannot be
proposed which negates the Gideon v. Wainwright principle of right to
counsel in criminal cases, but that tlic constitutional right to counsel
may be extended to civil or administrative proceedings.
As in other general guarantees in Article II, the state decisions inter-
preting the complex of rights of an accused after indictment or informa-
tion are legion. Many of these, in whole or in part, have been superseded
or modified by the application of the new federal law. Many others
already approximated the standards imported by federal decisions into
the comparable federal Sixth Amendment provisions. To attempt a sub-
stantial collation, synthesis or analysis of hundreds of state and federal
decisions in these areas seems pointless. Guideline principles can be
offered simply to sharpen understanding. Beyond this, a review of several
of the recent decisions establishing new conceptions of some of the guar-
antees will be helpful.
Taking the specific rights in the order of statement in this section, the
right to appear embraces the right to be present at every stage of the
trial (People v. Smith, 6 111. 2d 414 (1955)), but does not extend to the
right to be present for argument in a post-trial motion People v. Berry,
37 111. 2d 329 (1967)).
The right to defend in person permits a defendant to conduct his own
case if he so desires, and w-aives the otherwise available right to counsel.
(People v. Robinson, 27 111. 2d 289 (1963).) The right to counsel ex-
tends to all critical stages in the criminal prosecution, beginning with
the
"accusatory stage," including the interrogation phase, and extending
into the trial phases. The definitive rules are expressed primarily in
Escohedo v. Illinois (378 U.S. 478 (1964)) and Miranda v. Arizojia (384
U.S. 436 (1966)).
The right to demand the nature and cause of the accusation runs to
the critical issue of notice. The offense and the salient factors associating
the accused with it must be described with that particularity which en-
ables him to prepare his defense. (People v. Williams, 30 111. 2d 125
(1963).)
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The right to meet the luitnesses face to face is designed to assure the
critical right of cross examination without which the guarantee of a fair
trial could be a mockery. (People v. Ferguson, 410 111. 87 (1951).) In
Smith V. lUinois (390 U.S. 129 (1968)), there is a strong hint that the
right of confrontation may be violated where the prosecution fails to
disclose the identity of an informer who testifies under an assumed name
with the consequence that it deprives the defendant of testimony which
could have been significant on the issue of the informer's credibility.
The right to compel the attendance of witnesses in behalf of the
accused, if denied or substantially impaired, will deny the accused the
fair trial to which he is entitled. (People v. Wilson, 24 111. 2d 425 (1962).)
The right to a speedy, public trial means a trial without vnidue delay.
The period may be relative and delays occasioned by the defendant's
conduct cannot be asserted as a violation of the right. (People v. Jones,
33 111. 2d 357 (1965); People v. Bryarly, 23 111. 2d 313 (1961); People v.
Utterback, 385 111. 239 (1944).) The public trial requirement is vio-
lated only by a blanket exclusion of members of the public. (People v.
Dronso, 83 111. App. 2d 59 (1967).)
The right to an impartial jury trial means generally a jury made up
of persons prepared to exercise their personal judgment, favoring neither
the prosecution nor the accused, standing indifferent to both, and guided
only by the law and the evidence. (People v. Hobbs, 35 111. 2d 263
(1966).)
The right to be tried in the county or district in which the offense is
alleged to have been committed incorporates the common law right to
be tried by jurors familiar with the locale and the accused. (Buckrice v.
People, 110 111. 29 (1884).) The right includes the right to seek a change
of venue, a recognition of the accused's privilege of waiver.
Numerous subtleties, modifications, exceptions, variations and cir-
cumlocutions surround these basic general interpretations. We leave
them untouched as unnecessary to this explanation.
Several recent decisions must be noted, however. Witherspoon v. Illi-
nois (391 U.S. 510 (1968)) establishes the important principle that a
statute authorizing unlimited challenges for cause for jurors who express
general conscientious scruples against the death penalty substantially
affects the fairness and impartiality of the jury by virtually assuring a
psychologically attuned "hanging jury" in violation of the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States.
In Duncan v. Louisiana (391 U.S. 145 (1968)), the Sixth and Four-
teenth Amendments were held to require a jury trial for "serious offenses,"
and a state statute defining a simple battery as a misdemeanor for which
a two-year sentence of imprisonment was authorized, without trial by
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jury, was a violation of these guarantees. And in Bloom t'. Illinois (391
U.S. 194 (1968)), the Court, reversing hallowed precedent, applied the
jury trial requirement and '"serious offense" concept of Duncan to a
conviction for criminal contempt of a court. In United States v. Jackson
(390 U.S. 570 (1968)), the provision of the Federal Kidnapping Act, in-
terpreted to subject the accused to a death sentence only if he demanded
a jury, a risk not assimied if he pleaded guilty or waived a jury trial,
was held to impair the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a jury trial. This
holding would apply, of course, to state statutes similarly construed,
through application of the incorporation doctrine.
Comparative Analysis
All state constitutions provide for right to counsel in criminal prosecu-
tions. Forty-four states provide a right to know the charge, while 21
provide also that the accused be given a copy of the charge. Forty-four
states provide that the accused has the right to be confronted by wit-
nesses against him. Forty states provide that the accused has the right
to compulsory process to obtain witnesses in his favor. Forty-four states
also provide a right to a speedy and public trial. (In relation to the re-
quirement of jury trial, see Comparative Atialysis under Sec. 5 of this
article.) The Sixth Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States contains provisions virtually identical with this Section 9. The
Model State Constitution makes comparable provisions for rights of
accused persons.
Comment
No attempt has been made to explain the political and legal philoso-
phy behind the fundamental post-indictment rights guaranteed by this
amendment. The rights are so basic, so well known, so intuitively under-
stood as indispensable to a free society, that any explanation of their
supporting rationale would be an affront to the Convention delegates.
What then does an analyst suggest as to the merit of such provisions?
The only sensible response that this analyst can suggest is that the amend-
ment should be left untouched, with its meaning and application subject
to the normal process of judicial interpretation, leaving to the wisdom
of that department the responsibility of assuring that these limitations
on governmental power are not abused. It is confidently suggested that
this judicial responsibility has thus far been exercised in a manner which
vindicates this delegation to the judicial department. Any attempt to
enlarge or diminish these familiar and time-honored guarantees could
be productive of harm and confusion. Again the cautionary observation
is made that this conclusion is subjective. Others may reasonably disa-
gree with it.
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Self-incrimination and Double Jeopardy
Sec. 10. No person shall l)c compelled in any criminal case to give evidence
against himself, or be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
History
The 1818 and 1848 Constitutions included the prohibition against
self-incrimination in the sections dealing with post-indictment rights of
the accused in criminal trials. (See History, Sec. 9, supra, p. 39.) Each Con-
tution carried an identical double jeopardy prohibition in a separate
section. The 1870 Constitution combined these two provisions with
minor and nonsubstantive language changes. The 1922 Convention pro-
posal recommended the 1870 provision without change.
Explanation
Self-incrimination
Again as a preliminary observation, it is important to note that the
federal Sixth Amendment right to be free of compelled self-incrimina-
tion has been incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment's due process
guarantee as a specific limitation upon state power. (Malloy v. Hogan,
378 U.S. 1 (1964).) To this extent the Convention's power to dilute the
guarantee as interpreted by federal standards is abridged. Of course, the
state's authority to expand upon these limitations, beyond the federal
standards, should it so desire, remains inviolate.
The right against forced self-incrimination has its origins in Twelftii
Century efforts of the Church to seek incriminating evidence concerning
secular and religious misconduct, thus provoking the concern and hos-
tility of the kings. The practice of that and succeeding centuries, both
religious and secular, however, sanctioned the use of torture to make
suspected persons give evidence against themselves, upon the basis of
which conviction and punishment would follow. The infamous Star
Chamber, and its use of corporal punishment to compel a person to
establish his guilt, extended well into the Seventeenth Century, when in a
celebrated case, the House of Conniions ruled illegal a Star Chamber sen-
tence which had severely punished a person for refusing to incriminate
himself. Thus was born the rule, first phrased in terms of "no one
should be required to accuse himself," that a person may not be com-
pelled in any criminal case to give evidence against himself. The prin-
ciple became a part of the common law and constitutional tradition in
the colonies and their successor original states, and by their insistence
was incorporated into the federal Bill of Rights as well as in the state
constitutional provisions.
The history and initial objectives of the provision seemed fairly clear.
As important as society's interest was in convicting and punishing per-
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sons accused ot crime, that interest could not, in the light of history, justify
compelled self-accusation of crime. The protection against self-incrimi-
nation came to be viewed as a truly fundamental liberty.
In the course of litigation, subtleties, nuances and shadings of mean-
ing were developed which went far beyond the initial simplistic Star
Chamber-torture-self-accusation syndrome. 7 he abiding conviction that
the rule was an indispensable attribute of freedom led to a rejection of
what seemed to be the plain and unambiguous limitation of the privi-
lege to criminal cases. Because any governmental inquiries, investigations
or proceedings could lead to the disclosure of evidence which might
thereafter be used in a criminal prosecution, the privilege was extended
to legislative investigations (Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178
(1957)) and in fact to any proceedings, criminal, civil, administrative,
judicial, investigative, or adjudicatory, whenever an answer to an in-
quiry might tend to subject the person to criminal responsibility (Brown
V. United States, 356 U.S. 148 (1958); United States v. Goldsmith, 272 F.
Supp. 924 (E.D. N.Y. 1967)). Moreover, the privilege is not limited to
the defendant in a criminal or civil case or the principal subject of an
administrative or legislative investigation; it may, as well, be claimed by
any witness to any such proceeding. The normal connotation of the
phrase "to be a witness against himself" reasonably suggests a privilege
to refuse to give a truthful answer the substance of which would support
a conviction under a criminal statute. It has been interpreted far beyond
that meaning, however, so as to permit a person to refuse to answer
any question which might furnish "a link in the chain of evidence" re-
quired to sustain a criminal prosecution. (Blau v. United States, 340
U.S. 159 (1950).)
So complex has the law of self-incrimination become, that in the words
of one very competent observer: "[T]he law and the lawyers despite end-
less litigation over the privilege have never made up their minds just
what it is supposed to do or just whom it is intended to protect." (Kal-
ven, "Invoking the Fifth Amendment: Some Legal and Impractical Con-
siderations," 9 Bull. Atom. Sciences 181, 182 (1953).)
Despite this devastating professional appraisal, it may still be desir-
able to suggest some of the more important applications and nonappli-
cations of the rule. Escobedo v. Illinois (378 U.S. 478 (1964)) relied
upon the privilege against self-incrimination as the constitutional foun-
dation of a person to have counsel during the post-arrest police interroga-
tion stage. That decision, and the guidelines which followed in Miranda
V. Arizona (384 U.S. 436 (1966)), have left many law enforcement officers
in a state of shock from which they are just beginning to emerge. If the
mandated Miranda advice and warnings are not given to the person in
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custody, e.g., that he has a right to remain silent, and that any statement
he makes may be used as evidence against him, the clear impact of the
decision is that no statement, even if voluntarily offered, may be used
against the accused by the prosecution.
In a less liberal vein the Supreme Court has held that the privilege
concerns only evidence given by a person which is testimonial or com-
municative in nature, and that it does not apply to a withdrawal of
blood from the accused and the admission in evidence of the analysis
thereof (Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966)); to a compelled
post-indictment police lineup inspection (United States v. Wade, 388
U.S. 218 (1967)); to the taking and use of a handwriting sample of the
accused (Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967)); or to the taking of
fingerprints (United States v. Braverman, 376 F. 2d 249 (2d Cir. 1967),
cert, denied, 389 U.S. 885 (1967).)
In a remarkable denial of the privilege, Shapiro x>. United States (335
U.S. 1 (1948)) applied the "rec|uired records" doctrine to a businessman
who produced his records, after claiming the privilege, and was thereafter
convicted on the basis of his own evidence. The relevant statutory im-
munity provision under these circumstances was held not to apply to
business records required by law to be kept, which records were held not
to be within the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination. How-
ever, in Marchctti v. United States (390 U.S. 39 (1968)) and in Haynes ik
United States (390 U.S. 85 (1968)), some of the sting may have been
taken out of Shapiro, which ^vas distinguished but not overruled. In
those cases the registration provisions of the federal wagering tax
statutes and the National Firearms Act, respectively, were held to violate
the privilege against self-incrimination. These latter decisions were
almost predictable after Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Board
(382 U.S. 70 (1965)) which held invalid, under the privilege, orders of
the board requiring named individuals, found by the board to be mem-
bers of the Commimist Party, to file registration statements acknowledg-
ing such membership, the effect of which could be to subject them to
criminal prosecution under federal statutes.
Of particular interest is Griffin v. California (380 U.S. 609 (1965))
which held that a prosecutor's comment on the accused's refusal to
testify, or an instruction that the jury may consider the defendant's si-
lence in weighing the evidence, violated the defendant's privilege
against self-incrimination. The Illinois posture on this issue under the
state constitutional provision appears to be the same as the federal rule.
Indeed, in most issues arising out of the state and federal constitutional
guarantees, prior to Malloy v. Hogan (378 U.S. 1 (1964)) applying the
federal self-incrimination provision to the states, the holdings were more
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parallel than disparate. Thus, both state and iederal decisions generally
agreed iliai in the absence ol claim ot privilege it is \\ai\ed; that the
privilege is personal and docs not aj^ply to corporate records which may
incriminate corporate officers; that physical examinations oi the person,
including other evidence ot a nontestimonial nature, are not within
the privilege: and that statutes granting innnunity lor compelled testi-
mony do not violate the guarantee il the scope ot the immunity is as
broad as the protective umbrella of the privilege. These examples do
not exhaust the areas ot concurrence.
The relationship ot the guarantees against unreasonatjle search and
seizure and selt-incriminaiion is immediately apparent. Evidence un-
lawfully seized, if permitted to be used, can obviously involve self-in-
crimination. The decisions suggest that the two guarantees, though not
identical, have an area of overlap. {See People v. Kalpak, 10 111. 2d 411
(1957); People v. Perry, 1 111. 2d 482 (1953).)
Again as in the explanations under other sections of the Article, the
purpose has been to inform generally, and not in an exhaustive and
critical way, of the meaning, scope and aj^plication of the provision in its
more common and important contexts. Many of the procedural com-
plexities with which the decisions abound, primarily in respect to ^\•hen
the privilege may be claimed and the scope of judicial power or discre-
tion in assessing the legitimacy of the claim of privilege, have not been
dealt with. Though important, they are essentially collateral to an
analysis of the principal objectives of the provision.
Double Jeopardy
In Palko V. Connecticut (302 U.S. 319 (1937)), the United States
Supreme Court held that the state could appeal and secure a new trial of
an accused it had cliarged with first degree murder, but convicted, in a
jury trial, of second degree murder. Against the defendant's claim that the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States incorpo-
rated the federal Fifth Amendment requirement that no person "be sub-
ject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb," the
response was negative. The decision further held that the due process
guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment Avould be applied in state
cases involving jeopardy only when the jeopardy subjected a defendant
to "a hardship so acute and shocking that our polity will not endure it."
(Id. at 328.)
On June 23, 1969, in Benton v. Maryland (395 U.S. 784 (1959)),
the Supreme Court overruled Palko and applied the incorporation doc-
trine to a situation in which the state was successful in securing a convic-
tion on a burglary coimt after the accused was acquitted of larceny. The
conviction was subsequently set aside on appeal on a wholly different con-
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stitiitional principle and the accused was thereupon retried on both the
burglary and larceny counts. His constitutional challenge of a retrial,
on due process grounds, oi the larceny charge was rejected by the trial
court and conviction loUowcd on both the burglary and larceny charges.
The Supreme Court of the United States coidd have ruled that a subse-
quent retrial and conviction of an offense which had earlier resulted in
an acquittal subjected the defendant, on due process grounds, to "a
hardship so acute and shocking that out polity will not endure it." In
a clear rejection of this obvious approach to the resolution of jeopardy
issues under the Fourteenth Amendment, it chose instead to follow the
trend of its own decisional expansion of the incorporation doctrine.
The double jeopardy principle, on its face, seems disarmingly clear
and simple. In fact it is Cjuite complex and abstract, and has given rise
to conflicting and troublesome issues of law and policy. The meaning
of
"jeopardy" and the "same offense" is hardly crystal clear. The facts
of the Benton case present the issue in its most simplistic form, a retrial
after an acquittal for what is clearly the same offense. The problem is
rarely posed, however, in such obvious terms. Some of the most difficult
problems arise out of the dual sovereignty concept of federalism, wherein
the federal and state governments seek and secure convictions against
the same person for separately defined state and federal offenses, involv-
ing the same facts and conduct. Other serious problems arise where
multiple prosecutions ensue for what is essentially the same criminal act,
e.g., robbing five persons, prosecution related to three of the victims
resulting in acquittal, followed by a prosecution based on robbery of the
fourth victim. In this not too inicommon instance of selective and multi-
ple prosecutions arising out of the same criminal offense, the United States
Supreme Comt, in Hoag v. New Jersey (356 U.S. 464 (1958)), sustained
the conviction as within the permissible latitude of the states' power to
administer their own systems of justice. An even more dramatic illustra-
tion of this latitude is C'nicci v. Illinois (356 U.S. 571 (1958)) where the
defendant, charged with the killing of his wife and three children, was
prosecuted in separate trials involving different victims, the state seeking
most earnestly to secure the death penalty. In the first two trials the
defendant was convicted but received sentences of imprisonment. In the
third trial the state finally secured the death penalty. The same evidence
involving all fom- deaths was introduced in each of the trials. The
United States Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, iq^held the murder con-
viction, holding that the state could i:)roceed either by a multiple-count
indictment in a single trial, or by separate trials. Hoag and Ciiicei
antedated Benton's incorporation rule and were decided only on due
process grounds. Whether Benton will have a significant effect on this
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and other issues ol tl(nil)le jeopardy is, oi course, questionable at this
point.
On the federalism matter, the issue is e\en more sensitive. The dual
sovereignty concept and the reluctance ol the lederal coints to impede,
except on the most compelling ol grounds, the right ol a state to prose-
cute lor an offense for which a prosecution has already occurred under
a federal criminal statute, suggests that lirulo)! will not be applied to
such cases.
The dual sovereignty concej^t received its first recognition in Moore
V. Illinois (55 U.S. (M How.) 1 :^ (1852)), wherein the Clourt said:
"Every citizen of the United States is also a citizen of a State or territory. He
may be said to owe allegiance to two sovereigns, and may be liable to punish-
ment for an infraction of the laws of either. The same act may be an offense
or transgression of the laws of botli. . . . That either or bolli may (if they see
fit) punish such offender, cannot be doubted. Yet it cannot truly be averred
that the offender has been twice punished for the same offense; but only that
by one act he has committed two offenses, for each of wliich he is justly punish-
able." (Id. at 20.)
This principle was reaffirmed in two major decisions, both involving
Illinois. The first was Bartkus v. Illinois (355 U.S. 281 (1958)). The facts
were as follows: defendant was tried for robbery in the federal district
court under the Federal Bank Robbery Statute and acquitted. Shortly
thereafter Illinois indicted and tried the defendant for the same offense
under the state robbery statute. He was convicted and the conviction
was affirmed by the Illinois Supreme Coiut, Avith the Court relying heavily
on the Moore rationale of dual sovereignty. (People v. Bartkus, 7 111. 2d
138 (1955).) The United States Supreme Court affirmed the conviction.
The second case is Abbate v. United States (359 U.S. 187 (1959)), de-
cided at the same term as Bartkus. The facts were different; Abbate was
separately tried and convicted first in the federal district court and then
in the state court for defined lederal and state criminal offenses arising
out of the same conduct, 'v^ereas in Bartkus a state conviction followed
a federal acqtdttal. The Supreme Court sustained the state conviction
in an 8-1 decision, refusing to yield on either due process or doidjle
jeopardy grounds from its prior holdings. It may be that the argument
most persuasive to the Court was the government's contention that a
reversal of the dual sovereignty principle could lead to a race by the
defendant (or tlie state) to the state courts for a conviction with a nomi-
al punishment which would then immunize the defendant from federal
prosecution and a potentially more severe punishment.
Whatever the merits of these decisions, the dual sovereignty rule
seems firmly entrenched at the moment and, as indicated, is probably
not endangered by the Benton rule of incorporation of the federal
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jeopardy provision into the Fourteenth Amendment. In Illinois, the
principle of dual sovereignty is applied to multiple prosecutions under
state statutes and local ordinances. In Robbins v. People (95 111. 175
(1880)), it was held in a decision which seems valid today that the same
act may be an offense against the state and a municipality and may be
punished under both.
In the more mundane areas of conflict, Illinois has held, among other
decisions, that a statute which provides increased penalties for second
or subsequent criminal offenses does not violate the state's double
jeopardy guarantee (People v. Manning, 397 111. 358 (1947)); that
aquittal of an offense operates as an acquittal and as a bar as to all
lesser included offenses on which a conviction coidd have been secured
on the iijdictment charging the higher offense (People v. Harrison, 395
111. 463 (1946)); that the right is a personal privilege which may be
waived (People v. Scales, 18 111. 2d 283 (I960)); and that acquittal bars
any appeal (People v. Miner, 144 111. 308 (1893)).
Illinois decisions dealing with collateral issues such as the time when
jeopardy attaches, the stage at which in a criminal proceeding the pro-
cedure establishes a bar to further prosecution, problems of waiver, and
others, need not be analyzed in this already too lengthy explanation.
Suffice it to say, in conclusion, that the areas of uncertainty are many,
and that the Benton decision will in all probability increase the
uncertainty.
Comparative Analysis
All state constitutions contain comparable provisions relating to the
right against self-incrimination. Seven states have no constitutional
provision on double jeopardy. The Model State Constitution contains
similar provisions. The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the
United States provides, "nor shall any person be subject for the same
offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a w'itness against himself . . . ."
Comment
Self-incrimination
It may come as a surprise that much respectable authority exists for
the proposition that this provision, as interpreted, goes far beyond appro-
priate notions of its proper meaning, and that legitimate state interests
in arriving at the truth in criminal and other proceedings are being
thwarted in ill-conceived efforts to protect individual freedoms. Jeremy
Bentham, an acknowledged giant among legal philosophers, asserted that
not only was there no justification for the privilege, but that it also
operated as an illogical and indefensible obstruction to justice. The
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pre-eminent Dean Wigmore in his famous treatise on evidence (J. Wig-
more, VIll Wigmore on Evidence §§2250-2284 (19(il)) denigrated the
reasons most irequently offered in defense of the rule and believed
firmly that it was too frequently abused to the detriment of the adminis-
tration of justice and the public. He concluded, however, that on bal-
ance the retention of the rule was probably more desirable than its
abolition. Justice Walter V. Schacfer of the Illinois Suj^reme Court,
one of the nation's most distinguished jurists, has severely criticized
the moral and ethical lountlations of the privilege and particularly
its application to police interrogation procedures as defined in the
Escobedo and Miranda decisions, and to virtually total prohibitions upon
the right of a prosecutor in a criminal case to comment upon the failure
of a defendant to take the stand. (Schaefer, "Police Interrogation and the
Privilege Against Self-incrimination," Gl Nw. L. Rev. 50(i (1966).)
There is, however, no lack of defenders of the privilege in its total or
partial meanings and applications. The mere statement of the privilege
seems to evoke a most passionate defense that it is a fundamental and
inviolate freedom against the threat of arbitrary governmental power.
Given the psychological consensus that it commands, it would seem
almost heretical to suggest that it be tampered with in any form. In the
last analysis it seems well to agree witli Dean Wigmore that its retention
will be less harmful than its abolition. Rather than suggest constitu-
tional amendment, it would appear preferable to leave to the courts
and the legislature the further development and evolution of the prin-
ciple, in the hope, perhaps well founded, that by this approach the
appropriate accommodation of public and private rights will eventually
be achieved.
Double Jeopardy
As with the privilege against self-incrimination, the double jeopardy
rule is deeply embedded in constitutional doctrine. It enjoys in its
doctrinal meaning a greater acceptance in principle among legal scholars
than does the privilege against self-incrimination. Despite its many un-
certainties it surely deserves constitutional status, again with the thought
that the normal evolutionary processes of the law will better assure its
effective implementation than any effort to engraft particular emphasis
or limitations upon the existing constitutional language.
Limitation of Penalties after Conviction
Sec. 11. All penalties shall be proportioned to the nature of the offense;
and no conviction shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate; nor
shall any person be transported out of the Slate lor any offense committed
within the same.
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History
Each of the three clauses of tliis section were parts of separate sections,
identically worded, in the 1818 and 1848 Constitutions. The section
providing for proportioning jjenalties to the offense added the benevo-
lent thought that it is "the true design of all punishment ... to reform,
not to exterminate mankind." The 1818 and 1848 provisions, absent
the philosophical observation, were consolidated into the present section.
The 1922 Convention proposal retained the present version except for
minor stylistic language changes.
Explanation
Penalties to be proporlioned to the nature of the offense
This provision, it has been plausibly suggested, is the lineal descend-
ant of that clause of the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution of the
United States which forbids cruel and unusual pimishment. In terms, it
is quite clear that the whole of the Eighth Amendment dealing with
excessive bail, fines and cruel and unusual punishment is based precisely
on the tenth Section of the historic English Bill of Rights of 1689 which
established the decisive victory of the people, through Parliament, over
the monarchy.
In O'Neil V. Vermont (144 U.S. 323 (1892)), the Supreme Court refused
to apply this clause of the Eighth Amendment, through the principle of
incorporation into the Fourteenth Amendment, as a limitation upon state
power, leaving undisturbed an unusually severe state sentence. In
Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber (329 U.S. 459 (1947)), the
Court assumed without deciding that the Eighth Amendment was ap-
plicable to the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, but denied that a second try at electrocution of the accused
(the first having gone awry) was cruel and unusual punishment. In
Robinson v. California (370 U.S. 660 (1962)), however, the Supreme
Court invalidated that portion of a California statute which made it a
criminal offense to "be addicted to the use of narcotics" as a denial
of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, but in another
reference clearly implied that the Eighth Amendment prohibition was
applicable to the states. Addiction was distinguished from use as being
a nonpunishable status offense, comparable to an illness. The Court
refused to extend the Robinson principle in Powell v. Texas (392 U.S.
514 (1968)) where a state criminal offense of "public intoxication" was
held to apply to use and not to status.
State decisional law views the clause as directed to the law-making
body. Judicial self-restraint in second-guessing the legislature has led
the Illinois Supreme Court to the general position that an objection to a
penalty established by the lawmakers will not be sustained unless it is
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cruel and degrading punishnieni unknown to the common law, or so
Avholly disproportionate as to shock the moral sense. (People v. Elliott,
272 111. 592 (1916).)
Whether this general proposition woidd today sustain a punishment
imposing some of the extreme physical tortuies known to the common
law is highly doubtiul, but in terms ot capital punishment oi imprison-
ment the authority ol the state is most expansively construed. Illus-
tratively, the tollowing piniishments have been held not to violate this
clause of the state Constitiuion: the death sentence lor nuucler, including
such sentence on a plea of guilty (People v. Chesnas, 325 111. 361 (1927));
a sentence of one year to life for armed robbery where the fruits of the
crime were but twenty-five cents (People v. \Villiams, 4 111. 2d 440
(1954)); a sentence of 199 years for muider wliich effectively precluded the
possibility of parole (People v. Grant, 385 111. 61 (1943); life imprison-
ment for aiding in rape (People \. Mundro, 326 111. 324 (1927)); a sen-
tence of five to 14 years for forgery where the defendant obtained but $45
(People v. Haynes, 73 111. App. 2d 85 (1966)): sentences within the in-
determinate limits fixed by law (People v. Calcaterra, 33 111. 2d 541
(1965)); and increased penalties for subsequent offenses under the Habit-
ual Criminal Act (Kelly v. People, 115 111. 583 (1886)).
In contrast, the Court has invalidated an act which made it a criminal
offense to be under the influence of or addicted to the use of narcotic
drugs. (People v. Davis, 27 HI. 2d 57 (1963).) The Illinois Supreme
Court relied on the drug addiction decision in Robinson <'. California
(supra, p. 51) but ciaiously made no mention of the relevance of this sec-
tion of the state Constitution. Earlier and somewhat surprisingly the
Court held that *a statute prohibiting freight rate discriminations and
providing for the forfeitine of all franchises as a penalty for violation
offended this clause, as the penalty would in some cases amoimt to a fine
of millions of dollars. (Chicago &: A. R.R. v. People e\ rel. Koerner, 67 111.
11 (1873).) The "somewhat surprisingly" reference is used because the
revocation of licenses which frequently involves the death of a professional
career and the loss of great investments and potential earnings is uni-
formly sustained as not involving "punishment" in a constitutional sense.
In Hayes Freight Lines, Inc. xk Castle (2 111. 2d 58 (1954)), the Court
sustained authorized suspensions of operating privileges of certificated
motor carriers for repeated violations of weight and load limitations.
(See the extended treatment of the Chicago & A. R.R. Co. case, infra,
pp. 367-8.)
Corruption of blood and forfeiture of estate
This clause of the section has no verbatim counterpart in the
United States Constitution. Article 3, Section 3, clause 2, of that Consti-
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tution which provides that no attainder of treason shall work corruption
of blood, or forfeiture, except during the life of the person attainted, is
obviously much more limited in scope. Illinois decisional law is sparse
but illuminating. In Wall v. Pfanscfniiidt (265 111. 180 (1914)), the
Court held that an heir who murdered the intestate did not lose his rights
of inheritance under the laws of intestacy and strongly suggested that a
contrary holding might involve an unconstitutional forfeiture of estate
under this section. Welsh v. James (408 111. 18 (1950)) reached the same
result with the same hint in sustaining the common law right of survivor-
ship of a joint tenant who murdered his co-tenant. Both decisions in
respect to the forfeiture issue were rejected and reversed, however, in
Bradley v. Fox (7 111. 2d 106 (1955)), involving the survivorship rights
of a murderer of his joint tenant. The forfeiture provision was also held
inapplicable in Collins v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. (232 111. 37
(1907)), where on public policy grounds the Court adopted the prevail-
ing view that a beneficiary who murders his insured loses his claim to
insurance benefits.
Transportation out of the state for any offense committed within the
state
Historically, banishment or exile from the realm was an accepted form
of punishment. The legislature has heeded the admonition against the
imposition of this particularly cruel form of punishment, thus obviating
any decisional law.
Comparative Analysis
Approximately half the states provide that penalties shall be propor-
tioned to the nature of the offense. Twenty-one states also provide that
no conviction shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate.
Fifteen other states provide that no person shall be transported out of
the state for any offense committed within the same. The Model State
Constitution makes no similar provision. The Eighth Amendment of
the United States Constitution forbids cruel and unusual punishments;
the Article 3, Section 3, clause 2, reference in the Constitution of the
United States to forfeiture and corruption is not relevant, and there is
no provision comparable to the prohibition on banishment.
Comment
The
"punishment shall fit the crime" provision, despite the wide lati-
tude it reserves to the legislature, appears, nevertheless to be worthy of
retention. It is at least a reminder to the legislative body that it is
not completely uninhibited in defining punishment. In all probability,
in view of the widespread and generally successful state efforts to abolish
capital punishment, efforts will be made to establish a constitutional ban
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on the death penalty. The issue has been extremely sensitive in recent
Illinois legislative sessions and efforts to provide experimental mora-
toriimis on capital punishment, though receiving substantial support,
have tailed of passage. Whether the issue shoidd be left to legislative
judgment rather than being raised to constitutional status depends
initially on the resolution of the basic policy issue. It is not possible to
provide purely objective guidelines on this important issue.
As to corruption of blood and forfeiture of estate, these provisions ap-
pear to be anachronistic. It is difficult to envision a legislative body pro-
viding now for either of these ancient sanctions. If such a law were to be
enacted, the reasonable probability is that it would be stricken under
the state and federal due process guarantees. The same observations
apply to the banishment clause. The Convention may well wish to con-
sider seriously the abolition of these clauses.
Imprisonment for Debt
Set. 12. No person shall be imprisoned lor debt, unless upon refusal to
deliver up his estate for the benefit of his creditors, in such manner as shall
be prescribed by law; or in cases where there is strong presumption of fraud.
History
The current section is a verbatim restatement of the identical pro-
visions in the 1818 and 1848 Constitutions. The 1922 Convention proposal
retained this provision in essentially the same language.
Explanation
Imprisonment for debt arising from contract, where the failure of
payment was untainted by fraud or concealment of assets and was due
simply to economic inability, was one of the horrors of the common
law. This section was designed to remedy the injustice by making wrong-
ful refusal or fraud, instead of mere inability to pay the debt, the stand-
ard for imprisonment. To imprison for debt it is necessary to establish
that the debtor is wrongfully refusing to deliver up his estate in satis-
faction of the debt, or that he was guilty of fraud in contracting the
debt or in avoiding the payment of it. (Huntington v. Metzger, 158 111.
272 (1895).)
The term "debt" means an obligation in the proper and popular
sense, involving a debtor-creditor relationship, and, with few exceptions,
debts which arise out of contract. (Cox v. Rice, 375 111. 357 (1940);
In re Blacklidge, 359 111. 482 (1935); People v. Zito, 237 111. 434 (1908).)
Accordingly, the ban on imprisonment does not apply to imprisonments
incident to and arising from the commission of an intentional or mali-
cious tort. (Lipman v. Goebel, 357 111. 315 (1934); Shatz v. Paul, 7 111.
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App. 2d 223 (1935).) Nor is imprisonment barred where the "debt" is
in the nature of a penalty imposed tor violation of a penal law of the
state (People v. Zito, 237 111. 434 (1908)) or for penalties for violations of
municipal ordinances or for fines and costs in criminal proceedings
(City of Chicago v. Morell, 247 111. 383 (1910)).
Continuing the logic, the failure to pay alimony and a consequent
commitment for contempt is not imprisonment for a debt; the rationale
is that the imprisonment is for disobeying a binding command of the
court. (Mesirow v. Mesirow, 346 111. 219 (1931); Barclay v. Barclay, 184
111. 375 (1900).) The distinction which justifies imprisonment for failure
to abide by decrees for the payment of money in alimony decrees has
been applied to other orders classified as equitable in nature (Tudor v.
Firebaugh, 364 111. 283 (1936); First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Desaro,
43 111. App. 2d 153 (1963)); but other decisions have evidenced a judicial
reluctance to enforce contempt orders by imprisonment unless the failure
to pay money is based on fraud or a willful defiance of the court (Blake
v. People, 80 111. 11 (1875); LaRue v. LaRue, 341 111. App. 411 (1950);
Meaden v. W. J. Anderson Corp. 301 111. App. 390 (1939)).
Federal decisional law is sparse on this issue. This section has no
counterpart in the Constitution of the United States. Any issue of
unconstitutional imprisonment for debt would surely invoke the due
process guarantee of the Fifth Amendment or the cruel and unusual
punishment provision of the Eighth Amendment.
Comparative Analysis
Thirteen states prohibit imprisonment for debt in all cases. Three
other states make an exception where the debtor refuses to deliver his
estate for the benefit of his creditors as required by law, and 24 others
except cases where there is fraud or a strong presumption thereof. There
is no similar provision in the Model State Constitution, nor is there any
comparable provision in the Constitution of the United States.
Comment
The section has not been the subject of much critical professional
analysis nor, for that matter, has it engendered much litigation. In its
basic policy of barring imprisonment for honest failure to pay con-
tractual debts, the section expresses a desirable limitation upon state
power. Some question may exist as to a policy which permits imprison-
ment for nonpayment of alimony or other types of equitable decrees.
Whether it is possible to single out particular additional areas deserving
of constitutional protection for nonpayment of debts or other obliga-
tions is most speculative. It is difficult to suggest whether this section is
worthy of retention or in what manner this section should be amended.
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In all likelihood the due process guarantee ot the state Constitution or
the state requirement that punishment siiall be proportional to the offense
would today invalidate imprisonment lor debt where no traud or eva-
sion Avas present. The variation in state constitutional provisions and
the absence of a comparable provision in the Model State Constitution
strongly suggest that the section may no longer be necessary as a distinct
constitutional principle.
Right of Eminent Domain
Sec. 13. Private property sliall not be taken or (huiuiged for public use
without just compensation. Such compensation, when not made by the State,
shall be ascertained by a jury, as shall be prescribed by law. 1 lie lee of land
taken for railroad tracks, without consent of the owners thereof, shall remain
in such owners, subject to the use for which it is taken.
History
The 1818 and 1848 antecedent provisions were identical. They stated
"nor shall any man's proj^erty be taken or applied to public use without
the consent of his representatives in the General Assembly, nor without
just compensation being made to him." The 1870 revision (1) substi-
tuted the words "or damaged" for "or applied"; (2) deleted the provi-
sion requiring the consent of the person's representatives in the General
Assembly; (3) added the provision requiring jury determination of the
compensation where compensation was to be paid by someone other
than the state; and (4) added the final sentence preserving the fee of
land taken for railroad tracks in the landowner.
It is clear that the words "or damaged" were inserted to overcome deci-
sions under the 1818 and 1848 Constitutions interpreting "taken or
applied" provisions to the effect that compensation was allowed only
when property was physically taken. Mere damage to property as a result
of state action which did not involve a physical taking was not com-
pensable under the just compensation provision.
The deletion of the provision "without the consent of his representa-
tives in the General Assembly" was without explanation in the 1870 pro-
ceedings. The addition of the provision requiring jury determination of
compensation in nonstate action was apparently intended to elimi-
nate administrative abuse of discretion in determining "just compensa-
tion." The provision for retention of the fee in land taken for railroad
tracks was also designed to prevent takings for railroad purposes, aban-
donment of the original purpose, and subsequent use for a different
purpose.
The proposed 1922 Constitution deleted the provision concerning the
fee and provided simply that: "Private property shall not be taken or
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damaged for public use without just compensation which, when not
made by the state, shall be ascertained by a jury."
Explanation
Eminent domain is the power ol the state to take private pioperty
for public use. The power is normally exercised through a so-called con-
demnation action. The power is said to be inherent in all sovereignties,
existing independently of constitutions or statutes. (Sanitary Dist. v.
Manasse, 380 III. 27 (1942).) One commentator has gone so far as to
suggest, without supporting authority, that "[wjithout constitutional
or statutory restriction, each of us holds his property subject to the right
of the state to take it without any compensation." (Righeimer, "The
Law of Eminent Domain," 43 111. Bar J. 206 (1954).) The point is prob-
ably overstated. Agreed that many decisions hold or suggest that the
power of eminent domain is an inherent power of sovereignty, and that
its existence does not depend on constitutional or statutory grant, it is
at least very questionable that the power is as unlimited as suggested. Due
process guarantees, as well as limits upon the exercise of the police power,
would surely be adequate today, without express limitations upon the
power of eminent domain, to foreclose the state from taking private
property for a public use without payment of just compensation. How-
ever, the question is basically academic, since all state constitutions and
the United States Constitution (Amendment V) forbid such taking. In-
deed, the Fifth Amendment prohibition has been held to apply to the
states through incorporation into the Fourteenth Amendment due
process guarantee. (Chicago B. & Q R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).)
Perhaps the first point to be made is that there is an interrelationship,
possibly even a conflict in realistic if not legal terms, between eminent
domain and the police power of the state. A taking or damaging of prop-
erty which is an incident of and referable to a governmental purpose to
protect the public health, safety, morals or welfare is not within the
terms of the constitutional eminent domain provision which mandates
just compensation. (State Bank & Trust Co. v. Village of Wilmette, 358
111. 311 (1934).) The distinction between compensable takings for a
public use and noncompensable takings or damages which are a conse-
quence of the police power have been recognized and applied in many
cases. As good an elucidation of this distinction as any is expressed in
Chicago ir Nortlnvestern Railway v. Illinois Commerce Commission (326
111. 625 (1927)), wherein it is noted that regulations under the police
power to promote and safeguard the health, safety, morals or general
welfare of the public which govern and restrict the use of property do
not constitute a taking or damaging for which compensation is required;
that police regulations of this nature may destroy the use and value of
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property and, in cases of necessity, may even destroy the property itsell
when its continued existence constitutes a menace to the public; that
police legislation is directed against property and the uses ot property
which are considered harmlul to society and that it operates by prohibit-
ing the use, or by destroying the property; and that no such elements
enter into a taking under the power oi eminent domain which is simply
the appropriation of property or the use of property for public purposes.
Most of what is stated in that case is dicta, but it does reflect with fair
accuracy the general status of the law. Zoning laws restrict the uses to
which an owner may wish to devote his property. Building codes im-
pose construction requirements ^vhich effect substantial economic bur-
dens, as do laws which restrict the height of buildings or set lot line
dimensions. Property which is a nuisance and a threat to public health
or safety may be taken or destroyed. These and other instances of non-
compensable police power takings illustrate the jjoint.
On the other hand, it has been held that the police power is itself sub-
ject to the constitutional restraints of due process and just compensation.
(Forbes v. Hubbard, 348 III. 166 (1932) (zoning ordinance restriction
held an unconstitutional taking); City of Chicago v. Ledercr, 247 111. 584
(1916) (ordinance purporting to be a police measine restricting the right
to erect a driveway across a public sidewalk subject to just compensation
requirement); Klever Shampay Karpet Kleaners v. City of Chicago, 238
111. App. 291 (1925) (invalidating an ordinance requiring a dry cleaner's
benzine room to be located at least 50 feet from any other building).)
The courts are obviously torn between competing constitutional values
and the decisions reflect the dilemma. The limits of police power can-
not be defined or applied with logical precision. What are the criteria,
beyond the instinctive or visceral predilections of judges, which deter-
mine that an enactment, purporting to be an exercise of the police
power, is or is not reasonably designed to remedy the evils which the
legislature has determined to be a threat to an important public interest?
When, in short, does a taking or damaging transcend police power limi-
tations and become a taking of private property for public use without
compensation or a deprivation of property in violation of due process?
These are difficult questions which pose the interrelationship (and con-
flict) between the power of eminent domain and the police power. Nor
are they answered by the generalities above detailed which purport to
define the difference between these powers. For despite the grandiose
judicial pronouncements covering the scope of noncompensable police
power takings or damagings, the decisions, as we shall see, tend rather
stibstantially to favor the property owner over the state, and to assert
the eminent domain-just compensation principle as the paramount value.
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The issue is not novel. It was discussed in sharply divergent views by
Justices Holmes and Brandeis in Pennsylvania Coal Company v. Mahon
(260 U.S. 393 (1922)), in which a statute making it unlawful to conduct
coal-mining operations in such a way "as to cause the caving in, collapse
or subsidence" of public and private buildings was held to exceed the
police power and to impair the company's conceded contract right to
mine for coal beneath the complainant's home, free from liability for
any damage which might be occasioned thereby. It was evident that Jus-
tice Holmes, speaking for himself and seven of his colleagues, was sorely
tried. "Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident
to property could not be diminished without paying for every such
change . . . ." [Id. at 413.) Some values must yield to the police power
"[b]ut obviously the implied limitation must have its limits, or the
contract and due process clauses are gone." {Id. at 413.) "When it [the
police power] reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not in all cases
there must be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to sus-
tain the act." {Id. at 413.) The resolution of the issue depends upon the
particular facts. No general rule is determinative; one of the critical
factors is the extent of the diminution; another is the extent of the pub-
lic interest which the act seeks to protect. "The protection of private
property in the Fifth Amendment presupposes that it is wanted for pub-
lic use, but provides that it shall not be taken for such use without com-
pensation. A similar assumption is made in the decisions under the
Fourteenth Amendment. . . . When this seemingly absolute protection
is found to be qualified by the police power, the natural tendency of
human nature is to extend the qualification more and more until at
last private property disappears. But this cannot be accomplished this
way under the Constitution of the United States." {Id. at 415.)
The general rule, said Justice Holmes, is that while property may be
regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recog-
nized as a taking. This to him was such a case: "We are in danger of
forgetting that a strong public desire to improve the public condition
is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the
constitutional way of paying for the change." {Id. at 416.)
Justice Brandeis in dissent reacted with vigor.
"Every restriction upon the use of property imposed in the exercise of the
police power deprives the owner of some right theretofore enjoyed, and is, in
that sense, an abridgment by the State of rights in property without making
compensation. But restriction imposed to protect the public health, safety or
morals from dangers threatened is not a taking. The restriction here imposed
is merely the prohibition of a noxious use. The property so restricted remains
in the possession of the owner. The State does not appropriate it or make any
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use of it. The State merely prevents the owner from making a use whicli inter-
feres with the paramount rights of the public." {Id. at 417.)
As to Justice Holmes' position that condemnation is available and
appropriate, Justice Brandeis replied:
"Nor is a restriction imposed through exercise of the police power inappro-
priate as a means, merely because the same might be effected through exercise
of the power of eminent domain, or otherwise at public expense. Every restriction
upon the height of buildings might be secured through accjuiring by eminent
domain the right of each owner to build above the limiting height: but it is
settled tliat the State need not resort to that power." {Id. at 418.)
The purpose — protection of public safety — being legitimate, it need
not be purchased on the market.
"If by mining anthracite coal the owner would necessarily unloose poisonous
gases, I suppose no one would doubt the power of the State to prevent the
mining, without buying his coal fields. And why may not the State, likewise,
without paying compensation, prohibit one from digging so deep or excavating
so near the surface, as to expose the community to like dangers? In the latter
case, as in the former, carrying on the business would be a public nuisance."
{Id. at 418-19.)
References to this case have been extensive because the issue is sharply
illumined and the respective protagonists so pre-eminent. Yet, in the
final analysis, what do these conflicting decisions establish other than that
each position is persuasive and logically compelling, and supported on
strong legal and j^ublic policy grounds? To Justice Holmes, the police
power must yield to private property and contractual rights when the
occasion or necessity for a taking without compensation is not convinc-
ingly evident. Conceding the existence of a valid pid^lic purpose, if
government has the option of taking without compensation under the
police power or taking with compensation under its power of eminent
domain, the equities demand that the property owner be compensated.
Justice Brandeis "zeroes in" instead on the governmental interest to pro-
tect the public health, safety, morals and general welfare. Fearing that
this inherent and essential power will be diluted to the detriment of
society if encumbered by a compensation requirement whenever property
rights are taken, damaged or impaired, he opts for the supremacy of the
police power.
The decisions, federal and state, reflect one or the other of these major
premises, but without any observable synthesis which establishes clear-
cut guidelines of application. In fact, there is sometimes a bewildering
confusion even on the basic premises. How does one evaluate the sweep-
ing pronouncement in Dube xl City of Chicago (7 111. 2d 313 (1955))
that constitutional declarations that private property shall not be taken
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for public use without just compensation or due process are always
subordinated to interests ot public welfare as expressed through the exer-
cise of the police power, with the statement in Heimgaertner v. Benja-
min Electric Manufacturing Company (6 111. 2d 152 (1955)) that the
police power, while paramount to the rights of the individual, is still re-
strained by the fundamental principles of justice connoted by the phrase,
due process of law, and that it cannot override the natural demands of
justice, nor disregard the constitutional guarantees in respect to the
taking of private property, due process and equal protection of laws?
There may be consistency in these views based on implicit or unex-
pressed premises, but it requires an act of faith to find that harmony.
Among the decisions supporting the police power supremacy thesis
are Mugler v. Kansas (123 U.S. 623 (1887)), denying compensation for
the greatly diminished value of a brewery business by a state law impos-
ing prohibition, and Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Company (272
U.S. 365 (1926)), sustaining a building restriction alleged to reduce the
value of the complainant's property. (See also Welch v. Swasey 214
U.S. 91 (1909); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Reinman
V. City of Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915); and Thomas Cusack Co. v.
City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526 (1917), for comparable holdings on build-
ing construction and open-area requirements in building and zoning
laws.) St. Regis Paper Company v. United States (1 10 Ct. CI. 271 (1948),
cert, denied, 335 U.S. 815 (1948)) sustained as a noncompensable act,
under the war powers, an order requiring the closing of a mine, and
Omnia Commercial Company x>. United States (261 U.S. 502 (1923)) sus-
tained the government's requisition of a steel company's entire produc-
tion for 1918, the effect of which was, in each case, to nullify contractual
rights. (See generally, United States ex rel. TVA v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266
(1943); Oro Fino Consol. Mine Inc. v. United States, 1 18 Ct. CI. 18 (1950).)
Takings under war powers are not, however, authorized constitutional
exceptions to the Fifth Amendment Just Compensation Clause, and other
decisions require the payment of compensation where the effect of the
governmental exercise of power is characterized as a taking instead of a
regulation. (Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481
(1931).) Again the reconciliation of the decisions is frequently nothing
more than an exercise in futility. One gets the uneasy feeling that the
Court is applying preconceived labels, e.g., "police power," "taking,"
"regulation," from which the inevitable conclusion follows. The results
may be just or equitable in the given case, depending upon how one
views the original label; the compelling logic and unity of legal concept
which the analyst hopes to find, however, are frequently missing.
The decisions which support the compensable compensation doctrine
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are legion. A rather dramatic holding is United States r'. Causby (328
U.S. 256 (1946)), in which flights ot military aircraft over private prop-
erty at snch low altitudes as to substantially interfere with the owner's
use and enjoyment w^as held to be a taking re(juiring compensation. (Cf.
Town & Country Motor Hotel, Inc. v. United States, 180 Ct. CI. 563
(1967).) In a more mundane setting, property rights affected by land
acquisitions for highway pmposes have l)ecn held to be within the pro-
tection of the eminent domain jjrovision. Typically illustrative is Creasy
V. Stevens (160 F. Supp. 404) (VV.D. Pa. 1958), rex)'d on other grounds
sub nom Martin v. Creasy, 360 U.S. 219 (1959)), holding that the right
of access to a public highway is a protected property right for which
compensation must be paid. (See also United States v. Gossler, 60 F.
Supp. 971 (Ore. 1945), holding that an easement in land, the fee simple
of which was condemned, was also a compensable right.)
Beyond the generalities and the philosophy, certain broad principles
do emerge. Since a taking must be for a public use, the courts do have
the ultimate review of whether a public use is in fact involved, but
the legislative determination is accorded great deference and is rarely
upset. (United States ex rel. TVA v. Welch, 327 U.S. 546 (1946); Poole
V. City of Kankakee, 406 111. 521 (1950).) Property which is subject to
condemnation and the taking of which is compensable extends to every
kind of property, tangible and intangible, and all rights and interests
therein. (City of Edwardsville v. County of Madison, 251 111. 265 (1911);
United States v. Finn, 127 F. Supp. 158 (S.D. Cal. 1954).)
The United States may condemn private lands in the states (Fort
Leavenworth R.R. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525 (1885)) as well as property
owned by the state (United States v. South Dakota, 212 F. 2d 14 (8th
Cir. 1954)). Similarly, the state may condemn property already devoted
to a public use. (People v. Illinois Toll Highway Comm'n, 3 111. 2d 218
(1954).) The power may be delegated to municipalities, political sub-
divisions, governmental instrumentalities, and to private corporations
operating as public utilities, subject of course to the public use standard
and compensation requirement. (Central 111. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Vollen-
tine, 319 111. 66 (1925); Village of Depue v. Banschbach, 273 111. 574
(1916).)
What constitutes
"just compensation" is in particular cases a difficult
problem. The general rule that just compensation is to be measured
by the property's fair cash market value for its highest and best use at
the time the condemnation petition is filed (Illinois Cities Water Co.
V. City of Mt. Vernon, 11 111. 2d 547 (1957)) may be adequate for tangi-
ble property, but wJiere the determination of value concerns the taking
or damage of intangible interests, or consequential damages, the problem
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is most complex. Decisional principles in this area are not very helpful.
(Useful readings include G. Schmutz, Condemnation Appraisal Hand-
book (1963); Dolan, "Consequential Damages in Federal Condemna-
tion," 35 Va. L. Rev. 1059 (1949); "Methods of Establishing 'Just
Compensation' in Eminent Domain Proceedings in Illinois: A Sym-
posium," 1957 U. 111. L.F. 289.)
In this connection, the rule that just compensation is that which
places the owner of property in as good a position financially after the
property is taken and improvement made as he was prior thereto (De-
partment of Pub. Works & Bldgs. v. Oberlaender, 92 111. App. 2d 174
(1968)) is a comforting assurance but hardly a principle of meaningful
certainty.
A
"taking" for which compensation must be paid offers few con-
ceptual difficulties. What constitutes compensable "damage" is quite
another story. Again the decisions are legion, confusing and sometimes
seemingly contradictory. Structural damage to a building caused by re-
moval of lateral support resulting from the construction of a public
improvement in an adjoining street was held compensable damage.
(Kane v. City of Chicago, 392 111. 172 (1945).) Obstruction of light and
air and interference with free access to the street and view occasioned
by the construction of elevated railways and other structures have also
been held to be damage in a constitutional sense. (Aldis v. Union Elev.
R.R., 203 111. 567 (1903): Field v. Barhng, 149 111. 556 (1894).) Noise,
smoke, cinders and vibrations caused by the operation of trains were
held to be compensable damages in Calumet ir Chicago Canal & Dock
Company v. Morawetz (195 111. 398 (1902)), Illinois Central Railroad v.
Turner (194 111. 575 (1902)), and Chicago North Shore Street Railway
V. Payne (192 111. 239 (1901)), but were held noncompensable in the
absence of a showing that the damage was special to the claimants as
distinguished from a damage suffered by the public generally (Illinois
Central R.R. v. Trustees of Schools, 212 111. 406 (1904); Aldrich v.
Metropolitan West Side Elev. R.R., 195 111. 456 (1902)).
In several cases it has been said that a claim for inconvenience, expense
or loss of business occasioned to property owners by the temporary ob-
struction of a street and interference with rights of access because of the
construction of a public improvement does not involve damage in a
constitutional sense. (Chicago Flour Co. v. City of Chicago, 243 111. 268
(1909); Lefkovitz v. City c"^ Chicago, 258 111. 23 (1908).) But in Barnard
V. City of Chicago (27'J 111. 27 (1915)), it was held that an owner of
property whose rights of access and egress were obstructed by improve-
ments in a street was entitled to compensation for damages. No mention
was made of the Chicago Flour case, the holding being quite categorical
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that such temporary obstructions constituted damage within the mean-
ing of this section. Yet in Department of Public Woiks ir Buildings x>.
Maddox (21 111. 2d 489 (19(jl)), the Chicago Flour rule ot noncompensa-
bility was reaffirmed.
The requirement that compensation be determined by a jury does
not apply to a taking by the state, but statutory provisions have made
jury trial applicable to the state upon request of either party. (111. Rev.
Stat. ch. 47, §1 (1967).) In nonstate proceedings the jury trial require-
ment was held violated by a statute which authorized commissioners
in lieu of a jury, in the sense recognized by the C^onstitution, to determine
compensation. (Juvinall v. Jamesburg Drainage Dist., 204 111. 106
(1903).) Notwithstanding what appears to be words of mandate in the
constitutional provision, it has been held that the language imports only
a privilege which may be waived by the parties. (Chicago, M. Sc St.
P. Ry. v. Hock, 118 III. 587 (1886).) Indeed in the Juvinall case above,
it was stated that a waiver of the right to a jury trial will be implied if
a specific objection to trial without jury is not raised.
Illinois, for highway acquisitions and for land acquisitions for the
Weston, Illinois, Atomic facilities, has enacted the so-called "quick tak-
ing" procedure. (See 111. Rev. Stat. ch. 47, §2.1 (Supp. 1968).) Under this
statute the taking, possession and use of private property by the state,
prior to the fixing and payment of compensation, a procedure condemned
in earlier decisions, has been sustained against eminent domain, due
process and other challenges. (Department of Pub. Works & Bldgs. v.
Butler Co., 13 111. 2d 520 (1958).)
Comparative Analysis
Nearly all states have some form of constitutional provision for the
exercise of eminent domain. Only 20 states other than Illinois require
compensation for both "taking" and "damaging." All others cover only
a
"taking." Some 37 states require the payment of a "just" amount, all
others requiring "adequate," "reasonable" or a similar standard. Only
16 other states, however, provide for a jury determination of the amount
of compensation, and foin- ot these provide a commission determination
as an alternative. Only two other states establish that the fee in lands
taken for railroad tracks remains in the owner.
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides:
"[n]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just com-
pensation." The Model State Constitution contains no eminent domain
provision.
Comment
The long explanation is not an indication that the section requires
change. The importance of the subject and its relationship to the due
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process clause and to the police power concept were deemed to justify
extended treatment in order to achieve a proper understanding of this
provision. The many uncertainties, ambiguities and contradictions in
the decisional law reflect only the extremely difficult task of reconciling
competing constitutional values. Whatever may be one's feelings about
particular applications of this section, there is little or no basis for dis-
turbing the general principle concerning just compensation for taking
or damaging of property. Caution should be the watchword in respect
to any proposals which may seek to change the present language. It is
not likely that new principles of constitutional significance can be de-
fined in this area. Suggested changes are more likely to reflect attitudes
concerning particular decisions in respect to which there may be some
unhappiness. To tamper with the traditional language of this section
may be productive of much harm.
On the jury trial requirement, given the nature of the issue that the
jury must determine, one could reasonably argue that a jury is frequently
less qualified than the court to evaluate economic data and to arrive at
a proper determination of just compensation. This conclusion seems
borne out by the absence of a jury requirement when the state is the
condemnor. Nevertheless, the tradition of a jury trial is so deeply rooted
that its retention may be deemed politically, if not practically, necessary.
The provision concerning railroad tracks seems at this point in his-
tory to be unnecessary. It is not likely that new railroads or additions to
existing railroads are the wave of the future. If indeed a problem should
arise, no reason exists why this provision, if deemed important, cannot be
legislatively prescribed.
Ex Post Facto Laws and Impairing Contracts
Sec. 14. No ex post faclo law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts,
or making any irrevocable grant of special privileges or immunities, shall be
passed.
History
The 1818 Constitution provided that "No ex post facto law, nor any
other law impairing the validity of contracts, shall ever be made, and
no conviction shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate."
The 1848 Constitutional provision deleted the word "other" in the first
clause, because of the inapt connotation that an ex post facto law meant
exclusively or substantially a law which impaired contracts. In other
respects the 1848 provision was precisely the same as its 1818 source.
The 1870 constitutional provision retained the 1848 ex post facto and
contract impairment clauses with only a minor nonsubstantive language
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change but made two major alterations: it deleted the clause pertaining
to corruption ot blood and forfeiture of estate and transferred it into
Section 1 1 of this Article, and added the present final clause imposing a
limitation on the passage of any law making any irrevocable grant of
special privileges or immunities. This clause appears to parallel in pur-
pose, -if not in scope, the prohibition in Article IV, Section 22, against
the passage of special and local laws "granting to any corporation, asso-
ciation or individual any special or exclusive privilege, immunity or
franchise whatever." The 1870 Debates disclose no explanation of the
relationsip between this provision and the provision in Article IV, Sec-
tion 22. Section 14 was adopted as reported from committee without any
debate. After extensive debate, with no reference to Article II, Section
14, Section 22, of Article IV was adopted.
The 1922 Convention proposal offered the 1870 provision without
change.
The United States Constitution in Article I, Section 10 (not in Bill
of Rights), imposes a number of limitations upon states, including a
denial of power to "pass any . . . ex post facto Law, or Law impairing
the Obligation of Contracts . . . ." Article I, Section 9, of the Constitution
of the United States prohibits Congress from enacting an ex post facto
law. There is no reference in the Constitution of the United States rela-
tive to the power of Congress to enact laws impairing the obligation
of contracts.
Explanation
This section deals with three distinct though not necessarily disparate
limitations on legislative powder, namely, (1) ex post facto laws, (2) laws
which impair the obligation of contracts, and (3) laws which make irre-
vocable grants of special privileges and immunities. As noted, the United
States Constitutional provision (art. I, §10) imposes upon states the
ex post facto and contract impairment limitations, thus making it un-
necessary for the federal courts to apply these limitations to states through
the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause. Each of the three limi-
tations of this section of the Constitution of Illinois will be treated
separately.
Ex Post Facto Laws
In Calderv. Bull (3 U.S. (3 Ball.) 386 (1798)), Justice Chase defined ex
post facto as limited to legislation which (1) makes criminal and punish-
able an act innocent when done; (2) aggravates a crime, or makes it
greater than it was when committed; (3) increases the punishment for a
crime and applies the increase to crimes committed before the enactment
of the law; and (4) alters the legal rules of evidence so that testimony in-
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sufficient to convict for the offense when committed would be sufficient
as to that particular offense and accused person.
With but minor and infrequent modifications, these rules have formed
the basis for the construction and application of the federal and state
constitutional provisions forbidding ex post facto laws. The principle
applies only to criminal laws. Thus, in Harisiades v. SJiaughnessy, 342
U.S. 580 (1952), it was held that deportation, though a severe sanction, is
a civil proceeding to which the ex post facta ban is inapplicable, and in
Jeiuell V. Carpenter, 22 111. 2d 445 (1961), it was held that the provision
has no applicability to civil financial responsibility requirements of the
Motor Vehicle Law. Occasionally the principle is blurred by nondis-
criminating rejection of the ex post facto principle on grounds unrelated
to the noncriminal natine of tlie law. [See People ex rel. Nabstedt v.
Barger, 3 111. 2d 511 (1954), upholding a law permitting the adoption of
children of parents who had prior to the law been adjudged mentally
ill. The clear inference of the decision is that the law is not ex post
facto because a parent's right or interest in his children is not an absolute
vested property right. See also Trustees of Schools v. Batdorf, 6 111. 2d
486 (1955), sustaining a law terminating certain interests in land after
50 years, in which it appears that an ex post facto challenge was rejected,
not because the law was noncriminal in nature, but because the rights
affected were mere expectancies of a nonvested character.)
The Barger and Batdorf cases suggest an important corollary to the
principle that ex post facto applies only to criminal laws, namely that
retroactive noncriminal laws may be valid though affecting property
rights, if such rights are not deemed vested. In addition to Batdorf, see
McNeer v. McNeer (142 111. 388 (1892)), right of dower; Wood v. Chase
(327 111. 9 (1927)) and Jennings v. Capen (321 111. 291 (1926)), terminat-
ing right of life tenant and remainderman to destroy contingent remain-
ders; and Butterfield v. Sawyer (187 111. 598 (1900)), enlarging contingent
remainder class of heirs by statute defining adopted children as heirs.
{See also J. Scurlock, Retroactive Legislation Affecting Interests in Land
(1954).) What constitutes a "vested right," however, is a most vexatious
legal problem. It is not an incorrect assessment, viewing the contradictory
and irreconciliable decisions across the nation, or even within a single
state, to suggest that "vested" right is simply indefinable in meaningful
conceptual terms. {See Smith, "Retroactive Laws and Vested Rights," 5
Tex. L. Rev. 231 (1927).) The problem of retroactivity, however, apart
from the ex post facto context, is not within the scope of this section.
Insofar as retroactivity is relevant to the contract clause of this section,
it will be considered under that heading.
There have been relatively few decisions involving a classic ex post
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facto law. It is not very likely that legislatures today would enact statutes
making criminal and punishable conduct which was innocent when
conunitted. This kind of ra^\' power passed from the realm ot reason-
able legislative possibility years ago. Even without a specific ex post facto
ban, such a law today woidd most likely be held to violate state and
federal due process guarantees. Such ex post facto issues as do occa-
sionally arise involve tangential aspects of the problem. For example,
habitual criminal laws which punish an offense more severely if the
offender has previously been convicted of the same or other criminal
offenses have frequently been challengd as ex post facto in that the
punishment is related to the prior criminal offense. The general liold-
ing is that such laws do not violate the ex post facto prohibition, it being
within the power of the state to provide increased punishment for recidi-
vists. In People v. Turner (396 111. 221 (1947)), the statute was sustained
even though the prior conviction was for an offense not mentioned in
the Habitual Criminal Act initially. {See also People v. Manning, 897
111. 358 (1947), sustaining habitual criminal statutes where proof of prior
convictions was given to the jury before a determination of guilt or
innocence on the offense being prosecuted.)
Where the criminal offense occurred prior to the enactment of the
statute defining the conduct as an offense or increasing the punishment
therefor, the statutes will not be considered ex post facto if the offense
is continuing in nature. Thus in Leyvas v. United States (371 F. 2d
714 (9th Cir. 1967)), a statute increasing the penalty with respect to a
criminal conspiracy which began prior to but continued beyond the
effective date of the statute was held not ex post facto. (See also People
V. Jones, 329 HI. App. 503 (1946), sustaining an act providing a penalty
for permitting an abandoned oil well to remain unplugged as applied
to an abandonment prior to the passage of the statute, since the gravamen
of the offense was permitting the well to remain unplugged.)
Although there are no Illinois decisions on the point, it has long
been held that the clause applies only to legislative and not judicial
acts which might otherwise be deemed to have ex post facto attributes.
(Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915).) Thus in a specific application
it was held in United States ex rel. Almeida X'. Rundle (255 F. Supp. 936
(E.D. Pa. 1966)) that if an aspect of the felony murder rule under which
the defendant was convicted w-as the result of a judicial construction ot
the murder statute made for the first time in that case, such judicial
action would not involve the application of the ex post facto principle.
However, in Bouie v. City of Columbia (378 U.S. 347 (1964)), the Court
stated that the fundamental principle that the criminal statute must
have existed when the conduct in issvie occurred must apply to bar
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retroactive criminal prohibitions emanating from courts as well as from
legislatures. In that case the state court applied a 1961 construction
of a criminal statute to conduct taking place in 1960 and at that time
not within the statute. Due process was the ground of invalidation, but
the Court equated the ex post facto ban on legislative action to judicial
action having the same retroactive consequences as a statute.
Impairment of Contracts
As in the case of ex post facto, legislative action challenged as an im-
pairment of the obligation of contracts must run the gauntlet, not only
of this state constitutional limitation, but also of the specific limitation
on state power contained in Article I, Section 10, of the Constitution of
the United States. Because of this, a brief treatment of the history
and of several decisions defining the limitations of the federal clause
may be helpful.
Chief Justice Marshall, in Ogden v. Saunders (25 U.S. (12 Wheat.)
212 (1827)), best expressed the historical origin of the clause and its
purpose:
"The power of changing the relative situation of debtor and creditor, of inter-
fering with contracts, a power which comes home to every man, touches the in-
terest of all, and controls the conduct of every individual in those things which
he supposes to be proper for his own exclusive management, had been used to
such an excess by the state legislatures, as to break in upon the ordinary inter-
course of society, and destroy all confidence between man and man. This mischief
had become so great, so alarming, as not only to impair commercial intercourse,
and threaten the existence of credit, but to sap the morals of the people, and
destroy the sanctity of private faith. To guard against the continuance of the evil,
was an object of deep interest with all the truly wise, as well as the virtuous,
of this great community, and was one of the important benefits expected from a
reform of government." {Id. at 354-55.)
The evil against which the great Chief Justice was inveighing was
the practice in some states in the period following the Revolution and
prior to the adoption of the Constitution of granting relief to debtors
who had incurred contractual obligations during this period of eco-
nomic dislocation and hardship, and who were hard pressed to meet
their debts. The state laws took several forms but most common were
measures suspending the collection of debts, remitting or suspending
the collection of taxes, and providing for delays in legal enforcement
proceedings.
As is almost predictable, the reasons which had occasioned the con-
stitutional principle were soon expanded to embrace state legislative
action within the generic scope of the language. The first United States
Supreme Court invalidation of a state law for impairment of the
obligation of contracts was Fletcher v. Peck (10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87
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(1810)). This decision, ironically, held invalid a 1796 Georgia law-
repealing an unconscionable 1795 statute which had conveyed millions
of acres of land, for what turned out to be a price of less tlian two cents
per acre, to a group of land speculators. The 1795 grant was held to be
a contract, the obligation of which could not, as against subsequent
innocent purchasers not implicated in the original state conveyance, be
impaired. Given the 1796 repeal, it is not likely that subsequent grantees
could meet bona fide purchaser-for-value standards. There had been,
however, a great number of conveyances since 1795 and 15 years had
elapsed when the Supreme Court rendered its decision. A contrary hold-
ing would surely have thrown many land titles in doubt, generating
extended litigation and great uncertainty in the ownership of property
interests.
The famous Dartmouth College case (Trustees of Dartmouth College
V. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819)) established the con-
tractual inviolability of Dartmouth's original royal charter against a
New Hampshire statutory attempt to provide what it believed to be a
more democratic charter. In the same year came Sturges xk Crownin-
shield (17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819)) invalidating a New York statute
which apparently had the effect of discharging some classes of insolvent
debtors from their debts. In 1843, a period of serious economic depres-
sion, Illinois enacted a mortgage relief law, extending the period for
redemption from foreclosure, and prohibiting foreclosure sales unless
two-thirds of the value of the property, as determined by an appraisal,
was bid. The act was held invalid under the federal contract impairment
clause. (Bronson v. Kinzie, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 311 (1843).)
These and other early landmark decisions established the central core
of the great principle which they were expounding. As in other consti-
tutional areas, however, great principles are rarely immunized from
exceptions which carry their own constitutional justification. Thus, in
time, the relative, nonabsolute nature of the right against impairment
began to emerge in the federal and state decisional law\ Among the iden-
tifiable exceptions is the exercise of the right of eminent domain. This
right, inherent in the concept of political sovereignty, needing no consti-
tutional grant to authorize its exercise and subject only to constitutionally
expressed limits on its exercise, is not restrained by the existence of a
contract. (City of Cincinnati v. Louisville &: N.R.R., 222 U.S. 390 (1912).)
Contract rights, holds Illinois, like all property rights, are subject to
eminent domain and the state may, for public use and by making com-
pensation therefor, impair and destroy rights granted by charter from
the state. (Metropolitan City Ry. v. Chicago West Division Ry., 87 111.
317 (1877).)
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Another recognized exception concerns the ever present, formidable
police power concept. Generally phrased in terms of the inability of the
legislature to bargain away the public health, morals or safety, the
principle has permitted the exercise of legislative power which clearly
interfered with, abridged or in some cases abolished contract rights.
Thus in Chicago Life Insurance Company v. Auditor of Public Accounts
(101 111. 82 (1881), aff'd, 113 U.S. 574 (1885)), the state was held to
have power to provide for the dissolution of an insurance company where
its financial condition made its continued acceptance of risks improper.
(See also Yates v. People ex rel. Anderson, 207 111. 316 (1904) (termina-
tion of legal existence of insurance company if it fails to transact
business for one year).) A number of Illinois decisions recognize the con-
tractual nature of special railroad charters validly issued prior to the
1870 Constitution but sustain safety regulations affecting such rights.
(City of Chicago v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n ex rel. Chicago & W.
Ind. R.R., 356 111. 501 (1934); State Public Util. Comm'n ex rel. Quincy
R.R. V. City of Quincy, 290 111. 360 (1919); Venner v. Chicago City R.R.,
246 111. 170 (1910).) Perhaps the best general summation of the relation-
ship of police power to contract rights in the railroad cases is contained
in City of Chicago v. O'Connell (278 111. 591 (1917)). In that case the
state regulatory commission's order for the improvement of a street rail-
way service was held validly to supersede part of the contract between
the city and the railroad. The court drew a distinction between contrac
tual provisions relating to matters other than those affecting the public
safety, welfare, comfort and convenience, such as the division of net
receipts and an option of purchase in the city, which were immunized
from impairment, and legitimate police measures to which contractual
provisions must yield. The rule is broadly applicable to all contract
rights, and the character of the contracting parties — whether individual,
corporate, governmental, or a combination of these — is immaterial.
A number of
"impairments" have been legitimized by what the
Supreme Court of the United States has characterized as the "continuing
and dominant protective power" of the state in respect to its economic
interests. (Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).)
Conceptually distinguishable from the police power, though at times
the distinction seems quite fuzzy, this category of permissible impair-
ments reflects the balancing concept which underlies so much of consti-
tutional interpretation, pursuant to which individual rights are meas-
ured against the public interest, and governmental action is sustained or
invalidated by a judgment which defines the superior value.
One of the earliest and most important decisions in this area was
Proprietors of the Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of the Warren
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Bridge (36 U.S. (II Pet.) 420 (1837)) in which the United States Supreme
Court sustained, against a challenge of contract impairment, a state enact-
ment establishing a toll-free bridge (after a short period of authorized
toll charges) which would substantially diminish the value of a toll
bridge authorized by a prior charter. The basic holding was that the
first charter did not create an exclusive j^rivilege, but the broader impli-
cations of a reserved state power to control its economic destiny were
the important constitutional legacy. Earlier than Charles River Bridge,
in 1827, the United States Supreme Court, which in 1819 had invalidated
the New York Insolvent Debtors Law in St urges x>. Crowinsheld {supra,
p. 70), took another look at the issue and sustained a state insolvency
law discharging contract obligations as to contracts executed after the
passage of the law. (Odgen v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213
(1827).) Therein was born the important principle that a law in
effect at the time the contract is made becomes an implied condition
of the obligation. Under these circumstances, the contract clause has
no apjjlication. The principle has been widely adopted in the states.
In Illinois, an illustrative case is Bossert v. Grariary Creek Union Drain-
age District (307 111. 425 (1923)) holding invalid an amendment author-
izing the abolition of drainage districts on petition as applied to districts
with contract obligations, but valid as to districts organized after the
effective date of the law. {See also Schewe v. Glenn, 302 111. 462 (1922);
Deneen v. Deneen, 293 III. 454 (1920); Burdick v. People, 149 111. 600
(1894).) Of more than passing interest is Home Building ir Loan Asso-
ciation V. Blaisdell (290 U.S. 398 (1934)) in which a Minnesota law
providing temporary relief from mortgage obligations was sustained as
a valid emergency economic measure. It will be recalled that in Bronson
V. Kinzie {supra, p. 70), a similar Illinois statute, also the progeny of an
economic depression, was invalidated. Although the Court in Home
Building & Loan Association strove mightily to distinguish the cases,
the fact is that the distinctions were insubstantial and that new concep-
tions of the state's powers to protect vital economic interests had evolved.
Rate regulatory laws are another instance of permissible "impairment"
of contract rights, thougji here the decisions are not always clear as to
whether the police power or the power to protect the state's vital eco-
nomic interests is the controlling rationale. In any event, it has been
held that rates of public utilities can be changed as an integral part of
the regulatory scheme and that such changes do not violate the prohi-
bition on impairment of the obligation of contracts. {See Hoyne v.
Chicago &: O.P. Elev. R.R., 294 111. 413 (1920); State Pub. Util. Comm'n
ex rel. Quincy Ry. v. City of Quincy, 290 111. 360 (1919); Railroad
Comm'n Cases, 116 U.S. 331 (1886).) Of course rates established by law
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may be confiscatory and a violation of due process, but that issue is not
the same as the contract impairment clause under consideration.
The state's power of taxation is another illustration of reserved state
power, the exercise of which may validly impair contract rights. Thus,
in Wabash Eastern Railway i>. Commissioners of East Lake Fork Special
Drainage District (134 111. 384 (1890)), a lien for property assessments
which was given statutory precedence over liens of existing encumbrances
was valid though it had a clear effect on existing contract rights between
individuals. A word of caution is necessary, however. Tax laws normally
need not take account of their effect on contract rights. It would be
intolerable if private contracts could delimit or proscribe the govern-
mental taxing power. But there may be instances where rights arising
under state or municipal contracts may be invalidly impaired under the
contract clause by subsequent governmental action. Such a case, appar-
ently, is People ex rel. Broiune v. Chicago ir Easter?! Illinois Railroad
(300 111. 467 (1921)), which held that the legislature may not reduce a
tax rate to a point where the revenues produced will be inadequate to
meet the obligations of bonds issued under a statute authorizing the
extension of a tax to pay the principal and interest on the bonds.
This explanation has emphasized the exceptions to the state's power
to impair the obligation of contracts. This should not be taken to mean
that the clause has no vitality. Quite to the contrary, contract impair-
ments not involving the state's police power, the exercise of eminent
domain, or the regulation of economic interests superior on a balancing
test to individual rights, are stricken, if not frequently, at least not
uncommonly. Illustrative are Murray v. Village of Skokie (379 111. 112
(1942)), invalidating an ordinance which impaired the obligation to
holders of special assessment bonds; Bardens v. Board of Trustees (22 111.
2d 56 (1961)), invalidating an amendment affecting rights to a public
annuity; and Jensen v. Wilcox Lumber Co. (295 111. 294 (1920)), giving
preference to a lien under the Garagekeeper's Lien Law over a chattel
mortgage of prior origin.
Interlaced with the problem of contract impairments are sub-issues of
vested rights, retroactivity of application, and differences between laws
affecting remedies only and those which affect the obligation of the con-
tract to which the remedy relates. It is simply not possible, within the
limits of this analysis, to deal with these as separate phases of the problem.
Nor is it necessary to do so, as they would add little to the basic principles
which have been discussed. We leave this subject noting an important
rule of general application that the contract clause is a limitation on
action of a legislative nature only and has no relevance to judicial deci-
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sions which may affect contract rights. (Prall v. Burckhartt, 299 111. 19
(1921); Thomson v. Thomson, 293 111. 584 (1920).)
Irrevocable Grants of Special Prhnleges and Immunities
In the History of this section {supra, p. 66) it was suggested that this
clause of Section 14 seems to parallel in prnpose, if not in scope, the
prohibition in Article IV, Section 22, against the passage of special or
local laws
"granting to any corporation, association or individual any
special or exclusive privilege, immunity or franchise whatever." The
Debates of the 1870 Convention throw no light upon the relationship
of these provisions to each other. One proposed amendment sought to
limit the prohibition in this Section 14 to special laws. The argument
was directed almost exclusively to the point that corporate investment
capital, especially in the railroad field, would wither away unless the
limitation on the making of irrevocable grants of special privileges or
immunities was limited to special laws. The logic and persuasiveness
of the argument were apparently lost on the members. Nothing was said
as to the provision in Article IV, Section 22, nor indeed as to the provi-
sions of Article XI, particularly Section 1 thereof, which prohibited the
creation of corporations or the extension or change of corporate charters
by special laws.
Insofar as the provisions of this section do so interrelate, a reading
of the Histo)-y and Explanation of the designated provisions in Article IV,
Section 22 {infra, pp. 153-4), and Article XI {infra, pp. 515-6) is desirable.
The annotations under this section are few and in some instances
erroneous or irrelevant. The decisions of importance establish, not
always with precision and clarity, that the creation of municipal corpo-
rations to perform a special public service, the effect of Avhich may be
to create a monopoly, does not necessarily violate the ban on the making
of an irrevocable grant of special privileges or immunities. (People ex rel.
Gutknecht v. Chicago Regional Port Dist., 4 111. 2d 363 (1954); People
v. Chicago transit Authority, 392 111. 77 (1945).) There are limitations
in these cases that municipal corporations are not ^\•ithin the excluded,
class of grantees since they must of necessity, in the exercise of govern-
mental power, be granted monopolistic privileges or immunities. (For
further discussion of this problem, see Art. IV, Sec. 20, infra, p. 197.) They
also intimate that in fact the grants are not exclusive or monopolistic
since the use of the public streets or other facilities, which are the sub-
ject of the giant, is not restricted to the particular grantee.
Grants to a private corporation in the nature of privileges and im-
munities have been sustained on grounds that the grants are not exclusive
or monopolistic since other corporations may imder the challenged law
qualify for a similar grant ( People ex rel. Shallberg v. Central Union Tel.
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Co., 232 111. 260 (1908)), or that the grant is not irrevocable since the
grantee's legal tenure is limited or the grant itself is terminable (People
V. City of Chicago, 349 111. 304 (1932)). Indeed in People v. City of
Chicago, the Supreme Court embraced a broad concept of permissible
grants to private corporations imder this section, stating:
"[Ejven if the act [statute amending general corporation act authorizing muni-
cipalities over 500,000 population to create local transportation companies] could
be said to foster a monopoly in one company doing a local transportation business
in a given metropolitan area, it would not necessarily be invalid. While the
public policy of this State formerly encouraged competition among public utility
companies and forbade monopolies, it is now recognized by the State that under
proper regulations a monopoly in this field is preferable to unrestricted com-
petition, and an act which permits such a monopoly is free from constitutional
objections." {Id. at 326.)
Whether this pronouncement is based on the reserved power of the
state to protect its vital economic interests (see supra, p. 54, impairment
of contracts) or on a police power concept, is not clear. The statement
does suggest qualifying limits but the sweep of the rule seems materially
to negate, at least in the public utility field, the unqualified ban in
this section on the power of the legislature to pass laws making irrevoca-
ble grants of privileges or immunities.
Comparative Analysis
Thirty-seven other state constittitions expressly prohibit ex post facto
laws. Thirty-six other states prohibit the making of laws impairing
the obligation of contracts. Some 21 other states prohibit irrevocable
grants of special privileges or immunities. Article I, Section 10, of the
Constitution of the United States prohibits states from enacting ex post
facto laws and laws impairing the obligation of contracts. Article I,
Section 9, imposes the ex post facto ban upon the Congress. The Model
State Constitution has no similar provisions.
Comment
The ex post facto and contract impairment clauses are considered
among the more important limitations upon state power. The presence
in the United States Constitution of an identical ban has not persuaded
very many states to omit these limitations in their constitutions. (See
Comparative Analysis.) Although federal limitations may be urged as
making comparable state provisions superfluous, there may nevertheless
be a substantial residual legal utility in the coexistence of such provi-
sions. For political and psychological reasons as well, it may be inapt to
propose the elimination of these clauses. Assurances of equivalent pro-
tection against abuse of power under the federal clauses, or under the
state due process provisions, may not be suificiently persuasive to many
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people. The retention of these clauses may, thereiore, be wise, though
an argument can be made to the contrary.
The clause prohibiting the grant ol irrevocable privileges or inunimi-
ties is somewhat more difficult to assess. The relationship of this clause
to the Article IV, Section 22, ban on special or local laws granting special
privileges, franchises or immunities, and to the Article XI limitation on
the creation of corporations by special law, as noted, is obscure, and the
decisions do not add much clarity. The clause generally expresses an
appropriate constitutional limitation which seems worthy of retention.
If retained, it should be integrated with the related provisions which
have been noted. In this connection, the suggestion in the Counncnl to
Article IV, .Section 22 {infra, pp- 225-6), appears to be an appropriate
solution.
Subordination of Military Power
Sec. 15. The military shall be in strict subordination to the civil power.
History
This section, as well as Section 16 concerning quartering of soldiers,
first appeared in the 1848 Constitution. The proposed 1922 Constitution
combined this section with the section on cpiartering soldiers.
Explanation
This self-evident proposition is a fundamental principle of American
democratic government.
Comparative Analysis
The fundamental nature of this principle of subordination of mili-
tary power is demonstrated by the fact that every one of the 50 states
except New York has a comparable provision. The United States Con-
stitution does not have one, but the principle underlies the provisions
that the President is Commander in Chief of the armed forces and that
Congress shall not appropriate money to support an army for a period
longer than two years. The Model State Constitution is silent on the
subject.
Comment
See Comment under Article XII. (Infra, pp. 538-9.)
Quartering of Soldiers
Sec. 16. No soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in any house without
the consent of the owner; nor in time of war except in the manner prescribed
by law.
History
As noted above, this section and Section 15 first appeared in the
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1848 Constitution. Also, as noted, the proposed 1922 Constitution com-
bined the two sections. The combined section differed in one substantive
respect from the 1870 Constitution. The words "in any house without
the consent of the owner" were changed to "on a householder without
his consent." The official explanation stated that the revision was "to
require the consent of the occupant of a house, the word 'householder'
being substituted for the word 'owner.'
"
(State of Illinois, The Proposed
New Constitution of Illinois 24 (1922) [hereinafter cited as P.N.C.].)
Explanation
This section is not only self-explanatory; it is so rooted in our tradi-
tions that there appears never to have been any litigation in Illinois
invoking the provision. With one irrelevant exception, this is also true
of the equivalent Third Amendment of the United States Constitution.
Comparative Analysis
Section 16 is almost an exact duplicate of the Third Amendment of
the United States Constitution. Most of the states have a similar provi-
sion, and one state, Kansas, has a provision similar to the change recom-
mended in the proposed 1922 Constitution. Four states, including the
two newest, Alaska and Hawaii, call for the consent of the owner or
occupant. The Model State Constitution is silent on the subject.
Comment
It is instructive to speculate on the significance of the change from
"owner" to "householder" proposed in 1922 and the formulation "owner
or occupant" used in the recent constitutions of Alaska and Hawaii. It is
reasonable to assume that there was no special significance in the use of
the word "owner" in the constitutions adopted at the end of the Eight-
eenth Century. It is doubtful that the drafters were consciously deciding
that in nonowner-occupied houses, the power of consent to quartering
rested with the landlord and not the tenant. The evil to be prohibited was
involuntary and presumably unpaid-for billeting of soldiers in private
residences. If a lawsuit had arisen about 1800 in which a tenant sued
military personnel for trespass, it seems likely that by one means or
another a court would have held that permission of the owner was no
defense.
If, however, a situation arose under the 1922 proposal where a tenant
had consented to quartering but the owner objected, it would be diffi-
cult for a court to get around the constitutional language. The language
in the Alaskan and Hawaiian provisions seems even more questionable,
for it permits either the landlord or the tenant to consent, notwithstand-
ing the other's objection. From all this, some might argue that the
language should be changed to require consent of the owner and the
occupant.
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The point of this speculation is to suggest t^\o rules ol constitution-
drafting. One is tliat, when adopting a provision embodying a funda-
mental principle, it is advisable to use simple language that can easily
be construed to cover all situations that fall within the spirit of the
principle. The second rule is that it is not advisable to tamper with the
historic language of fundamental provisions. For example, the foregoing
discussion concerning different language in the Tw'enticth Century coidd
be the basis for an argument that the changed quartering provision did
not cover apartment buildings. The argument would build on the theory
that drafters who covered
"occupants" in place of or in addition to
"owners" in recognition of the realities of the Twentieth Century but did
not change the word "house" must have meant to exclude the equally im-
portant Twentieth Century reality of apartment buildings.
It is also instructive to consider the comment made concerning the
Michigan quartering provision in the comparative analysis of the Mich-
igan Constitution: "Because of the provision in the United States Consti-
tution, the necessity for this provision within the state constitution is
tjuestionable." (Citizens Research Covmcil of Michigan, A Comparative
Analysis of the Michigan Constitution at 11-17 (1961) [hereinafter cited
as C.A.M.C.].) The premise of this comment is piobably correct even
though there has been no pronouncement by the United States Supreme
Court making the Third Amendment applicable to the states. But even
assuming such applicability, it does not follow that the substantially
identical provision in the Illinois Constitution is superfluous. It is true
that if the United States Supreme Court forbids state action as unconsti-
tutional under the United States Constitution, no Illinois court can
uphold such action. But it is equally true that if the Illinois courts
forbid state action as unconstitutional under .the Illinois Constitution,
such action remains unconstitutional in Illinois notwithstanding any
number of pronouncements by the United States Supreme Court that
such action would not be unconstitutional under the United States
Constitution. (Such a pronouncement would not be made in a case aris-
ing out of Illinois, for the United States Supreme Court will not review
a case decided on an adequate state ground. The situation would have
to arise from another state with a state constitutional provision identical
with the Illinois and United States provisions where the courts of that
state upheld the state action and the United States Supreme Court agreed
with the state interpretation of the Third Amendment.) In short, the
people of Illinois may reinforce their liberties for themselves by pre-
serving constitutional restrictions that also appear in the United States
Constitution against the day when the United States courts might be
less solicitous of those liberties than the courts of Illinois.
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Right to Assemble and Petition
Sec. 17. The people have the right to assemble in a peaceable manner to con-
sult for the common good, to make known their opinions to their representatives,
and to apply for redress of grievances.
History
The 1818 and 1848 Constitutions stated
"[t]hat the people have a
right to assemble together in a peaceable manner to consult for their
common good, to instruct their Representatives, and to apply to the
General Assembly for redress of grievances." The 1870 proposal was in
the form ultimately adopted. Without debate the earlier provision refer-
ring to application to the General Assembly for redress of grievances
was changed to delete entirely the reference to the General Assembly.
One can only speculate that the Convention believed the right to be too
narrowly stated or that the reference to the General Assembly was re-
dundant. Whatever the reason, the 1870 provision is clearly more ex-
pansive than the earlier provisions in defining the right to petition for
redress of grievances.
The 1922 Convention proposal retained the 1870 provision un-
changed.
Explanation
The Annotated Constitution of the State of Illinois, prepared by the
Legislative Reference Bureau for the guidance of the Constitutional
Convention which convened in 1919 (hereinafter cited as Annota-
tions), contained not a single judicial citation under this section.
Perhaps this was an editorial lapse. If so, it was not a serious one,
for the fact probably was that litigants and courts alike were not attuned
as they are today to the issues implicit in these liberties. The great
and continuing social convulsions in recent years have generated gov-
ernmental restraints which have jarred the sensitivities of many civil
libertarians, resulting in the invocation of the Bill of Rights to a
degree undreamed of in past generations. The process has been sub-
stantially aided by the United States Supreme Court's establishment
and steady expansion of the "incorporation" doctrine. The comparable
guarantees of the First Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States, applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment due
process clause, and the states' own constitutional pronouncements of
protected liberties, have been the subject of much litigation in recent
years. Because the rights of peaceable assembly and petition are frequently
intermeshed with rights of speech, it is not. always feasible or possible
to establish distinct categories in the decisions. Thus, the explanation of
the free speech guarantee of Section 4 of this Article provides analysis
of some decisions which are as relevant to the guarantees of assembly
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and petition for the redress of grievances. (Supxi, pp. 19-23.) Nonetheless,
some additional analysis is appropriate here, as the Supreme Court of
the United States continues to draw distinctions between
"pure speech"
and
"speech plus" which involves the communication ol ideas by conduct
such as patrolling, marching and picketing on streets and highways, or
assembling in public places for purposes ol protest against governmental
action.
Hague x>. CIO (307 U.S. 496 (1939)), though recognizing that the
privilege of persons to use the streets and parks for conniiiuiication of
views was not absolute, registered in strongest terms the predominance
of the privilege and the narrow and limited areas of permissible govern-
mental restraint. Edwards v. South Carolina (372 U.S. 229 (1963)) was
the first case which raised the broad Hague principle in the context of
a civil rights demonstration. In that case, a group of Negroes marched
to the statehouse and walked through the capitol carrying placards pro-
testing segregation. When ordered by the police to leave, they refused.
In peaceful fashion they sang, clapped hands, stamped their feet, and
one person made a speech. Although a group of several hundred white
persons gathered and showed signs of hostility, there was no violence or
disorder. The Negroes were arrested and chaiged with breach of peace.
The state convictions were reversed by the United States Supreme Court.
Justice Stewart, who wrote the Court's opinion, did not deal directly with
the issue of whether the persons had a constitutional right to use the
capitol grounds for a demonstration. But in the course of the opinion
which invalidated the convictions on Fourteenth Amendment due
process grounds of vagueness of the statute, he said that the demonstra-
tion was a clear exercise of
"petitioners' constitutionally protected rights
of free speech, free assembly, and freedom to petition for the redress of
their grievances." {Id. at 235.) This pronouncement was generally con-
strued to mean that the Hague principle, assumed to express a consti-
tutional right to use public open places for public assemblies, was being
reaffirmed. Shortly thereafter, in Cox v. Louisiana (379 U.S. 536 (1965)),
involving another peaceful student demonstration and a march from
the state capitol to the courthouse, the Court, though reversing convic-
tions of an ordinance for
"obstructing public passages" because of un-
equal application, sustained the ordinance and for the first time indicated
a deviation from the assumed Hague and Edxuards principle of a consti-
tutional right to peaceful use of open public places. Justice Black, how-
ever, tackled the constitutional issue directly. Viewing the First and
Fourteenth Amendments as removing from the federal and state gov-
ernments "all power to restrict freedom of speech, press and assembly
where people have a right to be for such purposes" (emphasis added), he
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went on to say that this "does not mean, however, that these amendments
also grant a constitutional right to engage in the conduct of picketing or
patrolling, whether on publicly owned streets or on privately owned
property." {Id. at 578.) This he followed with a categorical statement that
government could impose a ban on most forms of assembly in public open
places provided it did so without discrimination.
The impact of violence in the streets was beginning to show in the
decisions. In Adderly v. Florida (385 U.S. 39 (1966)), Justice Black's doc-
trine prevailed, the Court sustaining convictions, under a trespass statute,
of a group of student demonstrators who entered jail grounds to protest
prior arrests and municipal segregation practices. There was no violence
or disorder; only some evidence that a driveway, not normally used by the
public, had been temporarily blocked to vehicular traffic. The holding
was clear: the arrest and conviction under the statute did not violate First
Amendment rights of speech, press, assembly or petition. (See also
Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968), validating a state law punish-
ing unlawful obstruction of public facilities.)
The course of federal decision is hardly a total retreat, however. In
Shuttlesivortli v. City of Birmingham (394 U.S. 147 (1969)), a conviction
for a peaceful march conducted without securing a permit from the local
authorities was reversed on grounds that First Amendment rights of
assembly and speech could not be curtailed by a prior restraint exercis-
able by an open-ended delegation of discretionary power to grant or deny
a permit for reasons lelated to the city's needs to regulate the flow of
traffic. The government's right, indeed duty, to keep the streets open
and available for movement, was conceded, but the exercise of the power
could be justified only on narrowly drawn criteria. In this decision, the
Court was asserting principles established in other cases which generally
condemned state action authorizing prior restraints or too broadly and
prematurely applying state power to curtail speech and assembly.
Federal law invalidating state action in First Amendment cases is of
course binding upon the states. Federal decisions, however, which sus-
tain state restraints upon First Amendment freedoms do not prevent the
states from taking a contrary view. The state courts or legislatures may
recognize the need for limitations upon governmental power beyond
those which federal rules have defined. It is not a common occurrence,
however, for states to impose shackles upon their powers beyond those
clearly mandated by federal decisions or their own constitutions. More
often than not in this age the states seek to impose restraints upon speech,
assembly, and petition for redress of grievances where the conduct is
deemed inimical or dangerous to public safety. Such a case was City of
Chicago V. Gregory (39 111. 2d 41 (1968)) where the Supreme Court sus-
82 Art. II, § 17
tained a conviction, under a disorderly conduct ordinance, oi a group ot
demonstrators who were niarcliing in peaceable and orderly fashion
around the Mayor's home protesting the retention ot the city's Superin-
tendent of Schools. When the marchers were surrounded by a crowd of
counter demonstrators, the police, fearing violence, requested the march-
ers to leave, offering to provide an escort. Tlie demonstrators refused and
the arrests followed. The state court construction of the disorderly con-
duct ordinance did not include refusal to obey a police order to disperse.
A unanimous state court distinguished federal decisions reversing state or
local convictions of peaceful demonstrators on factual grounds establish-
ing the existence or nonexistence of violence or disorder, or the immi-
nence of such conditions. The United States Supreme Court reversed,
avoiding the sensitive constitutional issue of whether disorder created or
threatened by other persons can justify a restraint upon otherwise consti-
tutionally protected conduct. The prevailing opinion was based simply on
the premise that there was no evidence in the record that the defendants'
conduct was disorderly. Since the conviction was for disorderly conduct, an
offense neither defined nor interpreted to include refusal to obey a police
order, the conviction could not stand. In the course of its brief decision
the Court stated that
"[pjetitioners' march, if peaceful and orderly, falls
well within the sphere of conduct protected by the First Amendment."
(Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111. 112 (1969), citing Shuttleworth
and other cases.)
In another conviction for disorderly conduct and obstructing a side-
walk, the Supreme Court of Illinois saw no unconstitutional interference
with rights of assembly and petition where the defendant, with others,
sat or knelt before the city hall entrance. (City of Chicago v. Joyce, 38 111.
2d 368 (1967).) The Court was quite blunt:
"These rights do not mean that everybody wanting to express an opinion
may plant themselves [sic] in any public place at any time and engage in exhor-
tations and protest without regard to the inconvenience and harm it causes to
the public." {Id. at 371.)
The decision is probably sustainable on federal criteria. In an uncom-
mon application of the guarantee of speech and peaceful assembly, it
was held in Centennial Laundry Company r/. West Side Organization
(34 111. 2d 257 (1966)) that a temporary injunction, directed against
peaceful picketing in protest of allegedly discriminatory hiring prac-
tices, was so broad in scope as to offend the constitutional guarantees in
question.
In Landry ?/. Daley (280 F. Supp. 938 (N.D. 111. 1968)), a state criminal
statute defining "mob action" as the assembly of two or more persons to
do an "unlawful act'" was invalidated on First Amendment grounds of
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suppression of peaceful assembly and on Fourteenth Amendment due
process grounds of vagueness. Section 17 of Article II of the Constitution
of Illinois was not mentioned.
The provisions of this section were considered in a civil tort action in
Ariingt07i Heights National Bank v. Arlington Heights Federal Savings
ir Loan Association (37 111. 2d 546 (1967)). The gravamen of the offense
was that defendant had unlawfully induced the governing authorities of
a village to breach its contract with plaintiff for the vacation of a street.
Defendant had appeared before the Village Board to urge that the street
not be vacated. Its defense was based on its constitutional right to petition
government for a redress of grievances under the state and federal guar-
antees. The Court held that the right asserted was not absolute, but that
its conditional nature nevertheless required a showing of actual malice to
sustain a tort action, a burden which was not sustained by the plaintiff.
An earlier decision imder this section is probably valid on federal
standards. It held that a statutory prohibition against soliciting campaign
contributions from employees in the city civil service did not violate the
right of assembly guaranteed by this section. (People v. Murray, 307 111.
349 (1923).) Comparable federal provisions have been sustained. Perhaps
less likely to meet federal standards of permissible governmental restraint
is Coughlin v. Chicago Park District (364 111. 90 (1936)), which too
broadly suggests a constitutional power in a municipal corporation to
deny a park facility for a political gathering. Few of the later pronounce-
ments of even-handed nondiscriminatory treatment under narrowly
drawn standards seem to be implicit in this decision.
Comparative Analysis
All other state constitutions make similar provisions for the right to
assemble and petition. The Constitution of the United States carries a
comparable provision in the First Amendment. The Model State Consti-
tution has a similar provision.
Comment
As so frequently said before, the existence of a comparable limitation
in the United States Constitution should not be deemed a justification
for the elimination of the state guarantee. They are not parallel in scope,
since the state may establish limitations upon its powers that federal
courts may justify under federal standards. The fundamental nature of
the rights expressed in this section would seem to mandate its retention.
Free Elections
Sec. 18. All elections shall be free and equal.
History
This section appeared in both the 1818 and 1848 Constitutions. A
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resolution subniitted to the 1870 Convention prox ided that "all elec-
tions, whether by the people or the legislature, shall be iree and volun-
tary," followed by a lengthy series ot prohibitions in the nature ot a Cor-
rupt Practices Act. The Committee on the l>ill ol Rights, however, with-
out comment, submitted the section in its present torni. It was adopted
by the Convention, without debate or explanation, alter a bit of whimsy
by a delegate who inquired whether the section meant that the number
of votes on each side had to be ecjual.
The 1922 Convention proposal retained the 1870 provision unchanged.
Explanation
The section received its first significant construction in People ex rel.
Grinnell x>. Hoffman (116 111. 587 (1886)). Its definition ol free and ec|ual
elections has been frequently cited:
"Elections are free, where the voters are subjected to no intimidation or im-
proper influence, and where every voter is allowed to cast his ballot as his own
judgment and conscience dictate. Elections are equal, when the vote of every
elector is equal, in its influence upon the result, to the vote of every other elector,
— when each ballot is as eff:ective as every other ballot." {Id. at 599.)
This definition of
"equal" elections is remarkably similar to the "one
man-one vote" principle pronounced some three-quarters of a century
later by the United States Supreme Court. The fact that the shock of the
federal decision is still felt in many states attests only to the gap between
the pretension and the reality. The above-quoted definition of free and
equal elections was reiterated most recently in Thompson x'. Conti (,^9
111. 2d 160 (1968)) wiiere it was used to invalidate a township election
under this section and the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution
of the United States, the election being conducted in a town meeting
under conditions approximating a controlled election in a totalitarian
state.
The section has had several other commendable applications in void-
ing state action limiting the freedom and equality of elections. Thus in
People ex rel. Breckon v. Board of Election Commissioners (221 111. 9
(1906)), a provision of the 1905 Primary Election Law requiring candi-
dates for a certain office to pay a filing fee was held to be an unwarranted
restriction upon the right to seek elective office. Although the decision
speaks in terms of an arbitrary fee bearing no relation to the services for
filing the petition or to the expenses of the election, the import is clear
that the right to run for office cannot be conditioned upon monetary
exactions. The same decision invalidated other provisions of the Primary
Act on Article IV, Section 22, grounds of special or local laws, an ap-
proach which not too uncommonly overlaps into the free and equal
election provisions of this Section 18.
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In a more pedestrian context, Emery v. Hennessy (331 111. 296 (1928))
condemned an election as violating the free and equal guarantees where
the true electors were not separated from the false, where the safety of
the ballots was not secured and where other gross irregularities and
frauds were committed in the conduct of the election. Although this
section was not expressly mentioned, the decision referred generally to
the violation of the free and equal election guarantees.
People ex rel. Phillips v. Strassheim (240 111. 279 (1909)) invalidated
the Primary Election Law of 1908 because of several provisions which
were construed to deny to c|ualified voters in one part of the state the
right to vote in primary elections, while voters with the same residence
qualifications were permitted to vote in the remainder of the state.
A specific ground of decision was Article VII, Section 1, of the Consti-
tution of Illinois, but the Court also relied upon and adopted language
from Rouse v. Thompson (228 111. 522 (1907)) which, in invalidating
the 1906 Primary Election Law on somewhat similar grounds of dis-
crimination, referred to the destruction of the freedom and equality of
elections guarantees secured to the people by their fundamental law,
an obvious reference to Article II, Section 18.
Primary Election Laws were still fair game for the constitutional axe
when in McAlpine v. Dimich (326 111. 240 (1927)) and in People v.
Fox (294 111. 263 (1920)) the 1910 and 1919 Primary Election Laws, re-
spectively, were invalidated as denying free and equal elections because
the party nomination machiaery gave disproportionate voting strength
in the selection of candidates to the voters in small wards and districts.
Free and equal elections may be denied in proceedings antecedent to
elections. Thus in Larvenette v. Elliott (412 111. 523 (1952)), an election
statute which limited a circulator of a nominating petition for a candi-
date for state office to the county in which the circulator resided, but
authorized circulators of petitions for other offices comprising more than
one county to solicit signatures in all such counties, was invalidated on
Article IV, Section 22, grounds of special legislation arising from an
unreasonable classification. The act had been challenged on the free
and equal grounds of Article II, Section 18, but the decision was silent
as to that issue, though it appears to be as relevant as, if not more so than,
the Article IV, Section 22, challenge.
Article IV, Section 22, was also the basis for the invalidation of the
Hospital Authorities Act of 1947, although again the free and equal
guarantee of Article II, Section 18, seems more appropriate. (Grennan v.
Sheldon, 401 111. 351 (1948).) In this case a provision which required a
separate affirmative majority of the votes cast within the corporate limits
of a municipality and within the area of the proposed Hospital Authority
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District outside the city was held to be an unreasonable classification.
However, in People xk Francis (40 III. 2d 201 (1968)), a similar provision
applicable to a referendum on the establishment oi a Public Junior
College District was sustained. The Court strained mightily to distinguish
Grenuan but in the end simply overruled the broad holding that the re-
quirement of separate city-rural majorities violated either this section
or the equal protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States.
Francis may have been mortally stricken, however, by Moore v. Ogihne
(394 U.S. 814 (1969)) which invalidated a section of the Illinois Election
Law that recjuired petitions for the nominations of candidates for a new
political party to be signed by at least 25,000 qualified voters, including
200 qualified voters from each of at least 50 counties. The law was held
to violate the due process and equal protection clauses of tlie Four-
teenth Amendment. Given the uneven population distribution in Illi-
nois, namely 93.4 per cent of the state's registered voters resident in the 49
most populous counties, the statutory requirement of 200 voters from
each of at least 50 counties gave to the electors in the 53 counties having
6.6 per cent of the state's registered voters a disproportionate voting
strength in violation of the "one man-one vote" principle. The decision
overruled MacDoiigall v. Green (335 U.S. 281 (1948)) involving the same
statute. The free and equal guarantee of this section was not men-
tioned in Moore.
The great early decisions under this section, as may already have be-
come evident, dealt with the Primary Election Laws. Political parties,
striving both for statutory recognition as a legal entity, and for control
of the nomination process through the party machinery, were inclined to
embody procedures which gave precedence to party control over the
electoral rights of their members. This raised the critical issue of whether
primary elections, a mechanism unknown at the time of the 1870 Con-
vention, were elections within the meaning of the free and equal guar-
antees of this section. The issue was settled in People ex rel. Breckon xi.
Election Commissioners (221 111. 9 (1906)), which held without reservation
that a primary election was an election within the meaning of Article II,
Section 18, of the Constitution of Illinois, and that the rights of electors
at primary elections were the same as those constitutionally granted to
electors at regular (or general) elections. This principle was reaffirmed
in Rouse v. Thompson (228 111. 522 (1907)), People ex rel. Phillips x'.
Strassheiyn (240 111. 279 (1909)), People x>. Fox (294 111. 263 (1920)), and
McAlpine v. Dimick (326 111. 240 (1927)). In the course of these deci-
sions the Primary Election Laws of 1905, 1906, 1910, 1912 and 1919 were
invalidated for infringements of the free election guarantee in primary
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elections. Some of the outlawed provisions have already been noted,
but the most perverse issue involved the statutory authority delegated
to party committees to limit the number of candidates for the office of
representative in the General Assembly. This authority was related di-
rectly to the minority representation provision (Article IV, Sections 7
and 8, prior to 1954 amendments), the purpose of which was to assure to
the minority political party, through the cumulative voting authoriza-
tion, the election in each senatorial district of at least one of the three
representatives to be elected. If a party member could be limited in a
primary election to voting for fewer than three candidates of his party for
that office, his rights would not be equivalent to those of an elector at a
general election to vote for three candidates. The issue had been directly
and indirectly raised in several of the early cases cited, and resolved
against the authority of a party, or its committee, to so limit the rights
of its members. Finally, in People ex rel. Lindstrand v. Emmerson (333
III. 606 (1929)) the issue was again raised in a challenge to the 1927
Primary Election Law. The provision authorizing the senatorial com-
mittee to fix and determine the number of candidates to be nominated
by its party at the primary election for representative in the General
Assembly had resulted in a committee designation of two candidates.
The petitioner in a mandamus action to compel certification of his
nomination had received the third-highest number of votes for the office.
In rejecting the petitioner's challenge, the Court was forced to rethink
the long-standing rule that primary elections were elections within the
meaning of the free and equal guarantees. Recognizing that minority
representation simply could not be guaranteed if party electors at a pri-
mary election had the constitutional right to vote for three candidates for
the office, the Court overruled its prior decisions and held that a primary
"is an election only in a qualified sense." {Id. at 622.) In that sense
the statutory provision permitting the party committee to determine
the number of such candidates, and the action of the committee limiting
the number of party nominees to two, though three candidates would
ultimately be elected to office, did not offend the free and equal guaran-
tees of this section.
The Emmerson decision gave the political parties the flexibility needed
to insure minority representation. In no other way does it affect or re-
verse prior holdings respecting concepts of freedom and equality for
party members in respect to party structure, organization and adminis-
tration of elections. In this connection^ however, it should be noted
again that uniformity in the administering of the election machinery is
not mandated under the
"equal" requirement of this section if the system
is not discriminatory in respect to basic electoral rights. This principle,
88 Art. II, § 18
first stated in People ex rel. Grinnell v. Hofftnan (166 111. 587 (1886))
to sustain an election law applicable only to such cities, villages and
towns as adopted it by referendum, has been reaffirmed in People ex rel.
Mayes v. Wariek (241 111. 529 (1909)) and does not appear to be subject
to serious constitutional challenge today.
This explanation would be incomplete if it did not treat the extra-
ordinary at-large election of members of the Illinois General Assembly
in 1964, an election occasioned by the failure of the constitutional
processes to produce a required redistricting bill. The legislation estab-
lishing the procedures for this election provided for party convention
nomination of not more than two-thirds of the total number of seats in
the House of Representatives, and suspension of cumulative voting rights
for this election. The legislation in toto was sustained in People ex rel.
Daniels v. Carpentier (30 111. 2d 590 (1964)). The cumulative voting
provision was held to be applicable, by constitutional intendment, only
to regular district elections, and the at-large state-wide election was held
consistent with the "one man-one vote" concept. In fact, the Court
stated: "In our view, it would be difficult to envision a system of nomi-
nation and election that is in closer harmony with the Federal 'one man-
one vote' concept." (Id. at 596.) The act was sustained as establishing a
free and equal election under this section and as conformable as well to
the Fourteenth Amendment requirements.
One other problem should be noted. Legislation frequently authorizes
submission of proposals to the people for their approval or rejection.
Article II, Section 18, has been construed to prohibit the General Assem-
bly or other governmental units from prescribing a form of ballot which
combines two or more separate unrelated propositions into a single
question. A voter under these circumstances has no true freedom of
choice. Although a number of elections based on allegedly unlawful
combination ballots have been challenged, the Illinois Supreme Court
has been generous in validating the elections. Customarily the Court has
found that the propositions, though appearing to be separate and un-
related, were in fact single and germane. Illustrative is Voss xk Chicago
Park District (392 111. 429 (1946)) where a ballot for a $24,000,000 bond
issue for the acquisition, improvement, completing, ornamenting and
protecting of land and buildings, and for rebuilding all types of per-
manent improvements and construction necessary to render park prop-
erty usable for enjoyment as a public park, was held valid against a
challenge that it joined in one proposition a number of distinct, separate
and unrelated purposes. Only occasionally is a contrary result reached.
(See, e.g., O'Connor v. High School Bd. of Educ, 288 111. 240 (1919).)
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Comparative Analysis
All other state constitutions have comparable provisions for free elec-
tions. Only 13 other states, however, require "equal" elections. Three
states provide that voters shall have equal rights. The Model State Con-
stitution by implication calls for free elections in its Suffrage Article,
quoted elsewhere. (See iufra, p. 388.) There is no comparable provision in
the United States Constitution.
Comment
In all probability the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States would guarantee
all the rights protected against state impairment under this section. The
state guarantees, however, have a long and honored tradition. They have
been recognized and protected specifically in a number of decisions. The
specifics of the guarantees will probably commend themselves more readily
to voter acceptance than the more vague protections of due process and
equal protection. All states carry similar provisions tor free elections. The
Convention must weigh the benefits of a simply stated and generally
understood constitutional right against the cold logic which may argue
for a change. To this analyst, retention of the present section seems
preferable.
Right to Remedy and Justice
Sec. 19. Every person ought to find a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries
and wrongs which he may receive in his person, property or reputation: he
ought to obtain, by law, right and justice freely and without being obliged to
purchase it, completely and without denial, promptly and without delay.
History
Except for minor and nonsubstantive language variations, this sec-
tion appeared in identical form in the 1818 and 1848 Constitutions. In
that form it was offered to the 1870 Convention with an accompanying
statement by its sponsor that it was a fundamental and abiding constitu-
tional principle, expressing indisputable objectives which sorely needed
implementation. Noting that many people, especially the poor, were
victims of unconscionable delays in securing remedies in the courts for
their wrongs, and implying that justice indeed could be purchased by
the affltient, the sponsor virtually accused the legal profession of being the
malefactors in this sorry drama of democracy subverted. Noting also that
there were some 50-60 lawyers who were convention delegates, he added,
"I am not saying anything against lawyers. They are just as good as
laboring men, if they behave as well, if they are honest." Nothing further
appears until the vote on adoption when a delegate stated: "This section
is also in the present Constitution. It is declaratory of rights, not of
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powers." After the defeat of a proposed amendment which would have
substituted "shall" for the words
"ought to," the section in its present
form was adopted. The record contains nothing to indicate that the 50-60
lawyers reacted to the slur upon their profession and the administra-
tion of justice.
Explanation
The Illinois courts have never been quite sure what to do with this
section. The 1870 Convention member's explanation that the section "is
declaratory of rights, not of powers" is hardly a source of inspiration as to
its meaning. The uncertainty is evident in the judicial jjronouncements.
The Fourth District Appellate Court in 1950 stated that "this reference
to the Constitution [Article II, Section 19] is more of a statement of phil-
osophy than a rule which can be used to solve cases . . . ." (Welch v. Davis,
342 111. App. 69, 77 (1950).) One year earlier the First District Appellate
Court categorically stated that this section "is a clear mandate to the
courts, that wherever the legislature has failed to provide a remedy, the
courts must." (Skelly Oil Co. v. Universal Oil Prod. Co., 338 111. App. 79,
84 (1949).) Yet in 1963 another division of the First District Appellate
Court denied relief on both contract and tort theories to an infant illegiti-
mate child who sought recovery against his alleged father, deferring to
the legislature in this novel case the determination of whether a cause
of action should be created for
"wrongful life." (Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 111.
App. 2d 240 (1963).) The constitutional sting had been taken out of this
case when the Supreme Court of Illinois transferred the appeal to the
appellate court, refusing to accept the case on the constitutional chal-
lenges based on this section and the Fourteenth Amendment of the Con-
stitution of the United States. Lastly (though hardly the only remaining
judicial observation on the point) the Supreme Court, in Heckendorn v.
First Natioiml Bank (19 111. 2d 190 (I960)), in sustaining a statute which
barred husbands and wives from suing each other for a tort to the person
committed during coverture (the statute was an immediate legislative
response to and rejection of the decision in Brandt v. Keller (413 111.
503 (1952)) interpreting the statute as repealing the common law .im-
munity), held that Article II, Section 19, was not violated since that sec-
tion "enunciates a basic policy of jurisprudence that serves both to
preserve the rights recognized by the conmion law and to permit the
fashioning of new remedies to meet changing conditions." (Heckendorn
V. First Nat'l Bank, 19 III. 2d 190, 194 (I960).) The decision continues,
"However, this policy expression does not authorize us to create a cause
of action unknown to the common law in the face of an express statu-
tory prohibition." {Id. at 194.) It is difficult to reconcile the language in
this case. If the provision permits the fashioning of new remedies, the with-
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drawal therefrom of discretion to establish a cause of action unknown
to the common law leaves little room for judicial creativeness. A statu-
tory bar to a particular remedy should be critically measured against
the constitutional policy of this section and the due process guarantees
of the state and federal constitutions, rather than being casually accepted
as a reasonable exercise of police power and a rational determination
of the public policy of the state.
One contrasts the analysis in the Heckendorn case, affirmed in Wartell
V. Formiisa (34 111. 2d 57 (1966)), with Molitor v. Knneland Community
Unit District (18 111. 2d 11 (1959)), wherein the Court reversed a long-
settled judicial rule of school district immunity from tort liability.
Although the case involved no statutory bar as in Heckendorn, and
though the grounds of reversal were solely "public policy" unrelated to
constitutional guarantees, the Court fashioned a remedy where none ex-
isted at common law. Indeed, in a series of decisions which followed Moli-
tor, the Court held invalid under the Article IV, Section 22, prohibition
against a grant of special privilege and immunities by special or local
law, several laws, enacted in direct response to Molitor, which granted
total or partial immunity from tort liability to certain types of municipal
corporations. (Haymes v. Catholic Bishop, 41 111. 2d 336 (1968) (limited
liability of nonprofit private schools); Treece v. Shawnee Community
Unit School Dist., 39 111. 2d 136 (1968) (limited liability for public school
districts); Hutchings v. Kraject, 34 111. 2d 379 (1966) (total immunity of
counties); Harvey v. Clyde Park Dist., 32 111. 2d 60 (1964) (total immunity
of park districts).) Although Article II, Section 19, was urged in Harvey,
the first of these challenges, that section was not, in that case nor in
any of the subsequent cases, the constitutional basis of invalidation, the
Court preferring to go the route of unreasonable classification creating
a local or special law in violation of Article IV, Section 22. This approach
was in fact dictated by the Court's analysis in Harvey which virtually
invited the legislature to preserve the principle of sovereign immunity
for municipal government by classifications based on functions rather
than the type of the municipal government. The legislature obliged in
1965 by enacting the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees
Tort Immunity Act. (111. Rev. Stat. ch. 85, §§1-101 to 10-101 (1967).) The
net effect may be a substantial diminution of the ringing policy declara-
tion of Article II, Section 19, that "every person ought to find a certain
remedy in the laws for all injuries and wrongs which he may receive in
his person, property or reputation." To this may be added the state's
constitutionally established sovereign immunity (Art. IV, Sec. 26) which
also diminishes the force of Article II, Section 19, though the creation
of the Court of Claims mechanism for defined claims against the state
and certain other state instrumentalities has to some extent alleviated
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the harshness of the immunity principle. (See Explanation, Art. IV, Sec.
26, infra, pp. 232-3.)
This section has had its moments of constitutional significance and
they have not l)een of a minor character. Notwithstanding general judi-
cial pronouncements that "no person has any vested right in any rule
of law entitling him to insist that it shall remain unchanged for his
benefit; . . . that no constitutional right is necessarily violated by chang-
ing or abolishing a remedy available at common law. . . ." (Grassc v.
Dealer's Transp. Co., 412 111. 179, 190 (1952)), some legislative attempts
to change or abolish common law remedies have outraged the judicial
conscience and have been invalidated under this section. Thus in Heck
V. Schupp (394 III. 296 (1946)), a 1935 statute (Law of .May 4, 1935, ch.
38 [1935], Illinois Laws 716) which sought to outlaw civil causes of
action for alienation of affections, criminal conversation and breach of
contract to marry, based on an expressed policy that such actions were
conducive to extortion and blackmail, was held to violate this section.
The Court said:
"It requires no more than a cursory examination to discover that the act under
consideration here tends to put a premium on the violation ol the moral hiw,
making those who violate the law a privileged class, free to pursue a course of
conduct without fear of punishment even to the extent of a suit for damages.
The contract of marriage has always been known in the law as a contract in-
volving civil rights just as other contracts involve such rights, and no reason
appears why. under section 19 of article II of our constitution, such rights should
not have their day in court." (Id. at 299-300.)
The decision then held that members of a family and the state have
a right to protect Jihe family relationship and that to tie the hands of
injured members of the family who seek to vindicate that right by jjur-
siung actions of criminal conversation or alienation of affections would
be "not only clearly in conflict with section 19 of article II of our State
constitution, but . . . contrary to all sense of justice." (Id. at 300.) The
state's interest in outlawing such actions was summarily dismissed as
inadequate, a somewhat remarkable substitution of judicial wisdom for
legislative judgment in an area of public policy.
A few months earlier, in Daily !>. Parker (61 F. Supp. 701 (N.D. 111.
1945)), the same Illinois statute was also declared in violation of Section
19 of Article II of the Constitution of Illinois, thus constituting no bar
to the filing of an action in a federal district court for alienation of
affections.
It is of more than passing interest that in 1947 the Illinois General
Assembly, presumably in response to the Heck and Daily decisions, en-
acted several statutes limiting recovery in civil actions for breach of con-
tract to marry (111. Rev. Stat. ch. 89, §26 (1967)), alienation of affections
Art. II, § 19 93
(111. Rev. Stat. ch. 68, §35 (1967)), and criminal conversation (111. Rev.
Stat. ch. 68, §§42-44 (1967)) to actual damages (outlawing recovery of
punitive, exemplary, vindictive or aggravated damages). The statutes ex-
pressly forbade the consideration of the wealth or position of defendant,
the plaintiff's mental anguish, any injury to plaintiff's feelings, shame,
humiliation, sorrow or mortification suffered by plaintiff, defamation or
injury to the good name of the plaintiff or his spouse, or dishonor to the
plaintiff's family resulting from the tort, as elements of damage. Black-
mail and extortion were the expressed public policy premises underlying
these statutes. In Smith v. Hill (12 111. 2d 588 (1958)) the statute was
sustained as to actions for breach of promise to marry, and in Siegall i'.
Solomon (19 111. 2d 145 (I960)) as to alienation of affections. In both cases
it was urged that a holding of validity would clearly circumvent Heck
and Daily and Section 19 of Article II. The Court sustained the laws,
drawing a distinction between abolition of a common law remedy and
limitation of damages recoverable. In Siegall, the Court held further that
a marriage contract was not a contract within the meaning of the contract
impairment clause of the federal and state constitutions. Somewhere be-
tween Heck V. Schupp and the SmitJi and Siegall cases, the Court's sense
of outrage was mollified by a statute which virtually, though not tech-
nically, served the same "immoral" objectives as the invalid 1935 statute.
A somewhat similar legislative-judicial conflict involving legislation
seeking to curb the alarming increase in divorce and separate mainte-
nance cases occurred in 1953 and 1955. The 1953 law required as a con-
dition precedent to the filing of an action in divorce, separate mainte-
nance or annulment of marriage, the filing by the plaintiff of a "state-
ment of intention" to institute the action. It precluded the institution
of the actual suit for a period of 60 days after the filing of the statement
of intention. During this "waiting period," voluntary informal conferences
were to be held between the parties, with the judge participating, for
the purpose of trying to effect a reconciliation of the parties. In People ex
rel. Christiansen v. Connell (2 111. 2d 332 (1954)), the act was declared
invalid under this section of the Constitution of Illinois as denying the
plaintiff a right of access to the courts.
In 1955, the legislature reacted by passing a law which provided that
actions for divorce should be commenced by filing a praecipe for summons
"but prohibiting the filing of the complaint and entry of a decree for
a period of 60 days from the date the summons was served or the last
day of publication of notice." The purpose of the 60-day period was to
provide a mechanism for reconciliation of the parties, but the 1955 statute
omitted all references to conciliation conferences involving judges, since
provisions of that nature in the 1953 statute had also been invalidated as
imposing nonjudicial duties upon the courts. In People ex rel. Doty v.
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Connell (9 111. 2d 390 (1956)), the 1955 statute was sustained since im-
mediate access to the coints was secured by the filing ot the praecipe.
The 60-day waiting period was not discussed in terms ol the Article II,
Section 19, provision that the remedy shall be available "promptly and
without delay." Instead it was analyzed against a due process challenge
and sustained as a reasonable exercise ot the police power.
This section has generated some additional liberal conceptions of
wrongs lor which there should be remedies. In one ol the most tar-reach-
ing applications ot this section, the Second District Appellate Court in
Johnson i'. Luhman (330 111. App. 598 (1947)) sustained a cause of action
by minor children against a woman who had alienated the affections of
their father, depriving them of his support and society. Recognizing that
the existence of such an action at common law was extremely doubtful,
the Court, relying upon Daily v. Parker (152 F. 2d 174 (7th Cir. 1945)),
followed the principle of that decision which expressed the conviction
that "because such rights have not heretofore been recognized, is not a
conclusive reason for denying them." (/d. at 177.) The Second District
Appellate Coint stated:
"It is the opinion of this court, however, that the frank recognition by the
circuit court of appeals that the cause was without precedent, but that, never-
theless, the common law was sufficiently flexible t6 protect what are presently
regarded as family rights under our social standards and conceptions of the family
unit, is more conducive to the development of unambiguous legal precepts, than
if the court had invoked some legal fiction to accomplish what it deemed to be
a desirable result." (Johnson v. Luhman, 330 111. App. 598, 603 (1947).)
Great reliance was placed upon "the doctrine of justice embodied in
the Illinois constitution." [Id. at 607.) Although not clear cut, the decision
verges upon a holding that Section 19 of Article II permits or requires
courts, in the discharge of their responsibility, to fashion remedies for
wrongs for which the common law provided no redress. This bold
approach, however, was not applied in Wallace v. Wallace (60 111. App.
2d 300 (1965)), wherein the Second Division of the First District Appel-
late Court refused to invoke this section in behalf of an illegitimate
child seeking rights -of visitation for his putative father so that the child's
rights of companionship would be protected. Denying the existence of
a common law cause of action, the Court cited Heckendorn v. First
National Bank (19 111. 2d 190 (I960)) for the proposition that Section 19
of Article II "enunciates a basic policy of jurisprudence that serves both
to preserve the rights recognized by the common law and to permit the
fashioning of new remedies to meet changing conditions." The Court
failed to explain why the objective of "fashioning new remedies" was in-
apropos to this case other than in its reference to the action not being
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recognized at common law, an obvious non-sequitur if the quoted refer-
ence meant what it seems to say.
Challenges to statutory remedies for wrongs or injuries not recognized
by the common law have not been successful on the ground that the
denial of a concurrent law remedy violates this section. The ground of
challenge customarily is that the statutory remedy, in limiting the
amount of recovery, or in other ways establishing conditions for recov-
ery more restrictive than those normally applicable to a common law
remedy, fails to provide the "certain remedy" that this section mandates.
Thus in Zostautas v. St. Anthony De Padua Hospital (23 111. 2d 326
(1961)), the parents of a child, whose death allegedly occurred because
of the negligence of a doctor and his attendants, sought to recover on
a common law claim of breach of contract which, they insisted, was
not barred, merged in or superseded by the Wrongful Death statutory
remedy limiting the maximum monetary recovery. The knotty issue
was whether the contract claim survived the death of the patient. In this
issue the law was in a state of utter confusion and conflict in other
jurisdictions, there being no precedent in Illinois. Against the parents'
claim that a denial of a common law action would violate Section 19 of
Article II, the Court held to the contrary, stating that since there was
no common law remedy (in Illinois) and since the Wrongful Death Act
provides, rather than abrogates such remedy, there was no violation
of the constitutional provision. Relying on Knierim v. Izzo (22 III. 2d
73 (1961)), the Court stated; "we are not required by Section 19 of Article
II of our constitution to recognize a remedy where the legislature has
already created one, even though the statutory remedy be limited as to
recoverable damages." (Zostautas v. St. Anthony De Padua Hosp., 23
111. 2d 326, 336 (1961).) To the same effect concerning this section is
Cunningham v. Brown (22 111. 2d 23 (1961)) involving the statutory
Dram Shop Act remedy, and Hall v. Gillins (13 111. 2d 26 (1958)) sus-
taining the limited monetary recovery under the Wrongful Death Act.
In all these cases the critical holding is that a statutory remedy which
fills the void of a nonexistent common law remedy supports rather than
violates the constitutional provision in question.
In McDaniel v. Bullard (34 111. 2d 487 (1966)) and Welch v. Davis
(410 111. 130 (1951)), the Court was able to avoid similar constitutional
challenges by a liberal construction of the Wrongful Death Act, establish-
ing in Welch a cause of action under that act for a beneficiary not liter-
ally within its terms, and in McDaniel preserving the action after the
death of the statutory beneficiary.
The provision of this section to the effect that a person ought to ob-
tain right and justice freely and without being obliged to purchase it
96 Art. II, § 19
has been productive of several decisions of interest. In Griffin v. Illinois
(351 U. S. 12 (1956)), the United States Supreme Court held that a
defendant could not be denied an appellate review of his conviction
where his inability to secure the necessary transcript of proceedings was
due to his destitute condition. Though the specific grounds of decision
are the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, the Court noted
the relevance of Section 19 of Article II of the Illinois Constitution.
Wilson 1'. McKenna (52 111. 43 (1869)) held invalid under the 1848
Constitution predecessor section, a statute requiring payment of taxes
as a condition to questioning a tax title on the land in question, its
effect being to require a person to purchase justice. To the same effect
in respect to a statute requiring the payment of redemption money
and interest as a condition to questioning the validity of a tax deed are
Reed v. Tyler (56 111. 288 (1870)) and Senichka v. Lowe (74 111. 274
(1874)).
On the other hand. City of Chicago v. Collin (302 111. 270 (1922))
sustained a statute which prohibited entry of a judgment involving title
or interest in land until the party holding the tax deed was fully reim-
bursed for his outlay, the Court distinguishing Wilson x'. McKenna and
Reed v. Tyler on the ground that the statutes in those cases prohibited
a resort to the courts to determine rights unless payment was made
before the right was determined.
In Williams i>. Gottschalk (231 III. 175 (1907)), a statutory provision
requiring the payment of a prescribed jury fee as a condition to a trial
by jury was held not to violate the right to trial by jury guaranteed by
Aritcle II, Section 5, of the Constitution of Illinois. The "purchase" pro-
vision of Section 19 of Article II was not mentioned. Of more relevance,
however, is People ex rel. Flanagan xl McDonough (24 III. 2d 178
(1962)) where a Chicago ordinance increasing the jury demand fee from
$12 to $100 for a twelve-man jury, and from $6 to $50 tor a six-man
jury, was sustained against a number of constitutional challenges, in-
cluding the "admonition of section 19 of article II . . . concerning the
purchase of justice." (Id. at 181.)
The standard practice of requiring the payment of taxes under protest
as a condition to a suit seeking recovery of such taxes is sometimes chal-
lenged but invariably dismissed as without merit. (Lakefront Realty
Corp. v. Lorenz, 19 111. 2d 415 (I960).)
Comparative Analysis
Only the constitutions of Louisiana, Maine and Arizona contain com-
parable provisions. 1*he Constitution of the United States has no such
provision nor does the Model State Constitution.
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Comment
The section in style and tone appears to be a pious, homiletic pro-
nouncement of incontestable verities. Yet, as shown, it has played an
important role in several instances. In all likelihood, statutory provisions
held invalid under this section could have been stricken under state or
federal due process and equal protection guarantees. As noted in the
Comparative Analysis, only three other states have a comparable provi-
sion. It would indeed be astonishing to find that persons in states lacking
this constitutional provision have suffered deprivations of rights as a con-
sequence. Notwithstanding, the section does have historic, political and
psychological significance. Since its abolition or change may be miscon-
strued, it may be good constitutional policy to preserve it.
Fundamental Principles
Sec. 20. A frequent recurrence to the fundamental principles of civil govern-
ment is absolutely necessary to preserve the blessings of liberty.
History
This section appeared in the 1818 Constitution and was unchanged
in the 1848 Constitution. The proposed 1922 Constitution combined
this section with Section 1.
Explanation
One commentator has included this section among several from dif-
ferent state constitutions as examples of "Constitutional Sermons." (See
R. Dishman, State Constitutions: The Shape of the Document 47-48
(1968).) He notes that in several states the constitution calls for counte-
nance of or adherence to justice, moderation, temperance, industry,
frugality, honesty, punctuality, and sincerity in some combination and,
in addition, calls for frequent recurrence to fundamental principles.
Four states, including Illinois, he notes, "are content merely to urge
a
'frequent recurrence to fundamental principles' without specifying
what these may be." (Id.) It is not surprising to find that the courts have
not found this section particularly significant as a restriction on govern-
mental action. In only two reported cases successfully attacking govern-
mental action. Commissioners of Union Drainage District v. Smith (233
111. 417 (1908)) and Wice v. Chicago ir Northwestern 'Raihvay (193 111.
351 (1901)), does it appear that the Supreme Court referred to Section
20, but in neither case did the section control the decision.
Comparative Analysis
Four states — Arizona, North Carolina, Utah, and Wasliington — have
substantially identical provisions. (Dishman apparently overlooked Utah.)
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Seven other states have similar but more extensive provisions. Neither
the United States Constitution nor the Model State Contitution con-
tains such a provision.
Comment
It is difficult to see what "right" is reserved by the people through
this section ot the bill of rights: it is equally difficult to see any harm
in preserving the section. It it is preserved, it could appropriately be
combined with Section 1 as was proposed by the 1922 Convention. As
pointed out in the Comment on Section 1 {supra, p. 9), there is respectable
constitutional theory for a provision making it clear that under our
system of limited government, the enumeration of specific rights reserved
by the people does not exhaust their reserved rights. Section 20, if it serves
any purpose, reinforces the social compact theory embodied in Section 1.
Frequent reference has been made to the relationship between the
Illinois bill of rights and the Bill of Rights in the Constitution of the
United States. In addition, it has been noted that a number of provisions
in the Illinois bill of rights are not included in the Model State Consti-
tution. It will be instructive and of interest to the delegates to examine
the Commentary to the Bill of Rights Article of the Model State Con-
stitution which deals with these matters. (Model State Constitution 25.)
Article III
DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS
The powers of the government of this State are divided into three distinct
departments — the legislative, executive and judicial; and no person, or collection
of persons, being one of these departments, shall exercise any power properly
belonging to either of the others, except as hereinafter expressly directed or
permitted.
History
This Article, in two sections and with somewhat more flowery language,
first appeared in the 1818 Constitution. It was carried over into the 1848
Constitution with the addition of the following concluding words: "and
all acts in contravention of this section shall be void." (The "section" was
the part of the present Article following the semicolon.) The Committee
on the Bill of Rights of the 1870 Convention reported the Article as it
now appears, but offered no explanation for the deletion of the words
that had been added in 1848. The Article was accepted without debate
or change. The proposed 1922 Constitution further shortened the pro-
vision to read:
"The legislative, executive and judicial departments shall be separate and no
one of them shall exercise powers properly belonging to another."
Explanation
This Article is the Illinois version of the principle of the separation
of powers. One of the earliest, and best, explanations of the principle
was given by Chief Justice Wilson in the early case of Field v. People
ex rel. McClernand:
"This is a declaration of a fundamental principle; and although one of vital
importance, it is to be understood in a limited and qualified sense. It does not
mean that the legislative, executive, and judicial power should be kept so entirely
separate and distinct as to have no connection or dependence, the one upon the
other; but its true meaning, both in theory and practice, is, that the whole power
of two or more of these departments shall not be lodged in the same hands,
whether of one or many. That this is the sense in which this maxim was under-
stood by the authors of our government, and those of the general and State gov-
ernments, is evidenced by the constitutions of all. In every one there is a theoret-
ical or practical recognition of this maxim, and at the same time a blending and
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admixture of different powers. This admixture in practice, so far as to give each
department a constitutional control over the other, is considered, by the wisest
statesmen, as essential in a free government, as a separation. This clause, then,
is the broad theoretical line of demarcation, between the great departments
of government." (3 111. 79, 83-84 (1839).)
Although there have been a great many instances ot invocation of
Article III in litigation and a great many jtidicial opinions concerning
the Article, its absence probably would not have changed the course of
litigation. Once a written constitution is adopted wherein there are
created legislative, executive and judicial branches, the stage is set lor
the delineation of the poAver of each and the interrelationships among
them, and for the interdiction of encroachments of one upon another.
An explicit statement of the principle of separation of powers adds little,
if anything, to the process of delineation and interdiction.
The statement of the attributes of the three great powers of government
is deceptively simple. The legislative power is simply the power to make
laws, to set down the rules governing the society. The executive power
is simply the power to administer, to enforce, to execute those laws. The
judicial power is simply the power to determine how a particular fact
situation fits within the laws or rules of the society. In the Anglo-Saxon
world, the judicial power also includes the administration of the great
body of rules of private relationships known as the common law, a body
of law that can be changed by either the judiciary or the legislature. In
the United States, operating under written constitutions, the jtidicial
power also includes the power to determine the legitimacy of the exer-
cise of legislative and executive power.
Althotigh each of the three branches of government can be described
in a manner that makes each appear completely different from the others,
there is in fact a great deal of overlapping. The Supreme Court once
put it this way:
"The legislative, executive and judicial powers are not to be kept so entirely
separate and distinct as to have no connection or interdependence. In every
constitution there is a blending and admixture of different powers. 'This ad-
mixture, in practice, so far as to give each department a constitutional control
over the others, is considered by the wisest statesmen as essential in a free govern-
ment as a separation.' (Field v. People, 2 Scam. 79; Sherman ik People, 210 111.
552.) In Cooley on Torts that author says (p. 375): 'Official duties are supposed
to be susceptible of classification under the three heads of legislative, executive
and judicial, corresponding to the three departments of government bearing the
same designations: but the classification cannot be very exact and there are
many officers whose duties cannot properly, or at least exclusively, be arranged
under either of these heads.' Certain administrative officers are frequently charged
with duties that partake of the character of all three of the departments but
which cannot be classed as belonging essentially to either. Administrative and
executive officers are frequently called upon, in the performance of their duties.
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to exercise judgment and discretion, to investigate, deliberate and decide, and
yet it has been held that they do not exercise judicial power, within the meaning
of the constitutional provision." (Illinois v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 246 111. 188,
230-31 (1910).)
A great many of the cases that appear to be matters of violation of the
principle of separation of powers are equally susceptible of invalidation
under another constitutional principle. For example, the legislature may
declare that a given fact is pri)na facte evidence of something (People
V. Beck, 305 111. 593 (1922)) but may not declare that a given fact is
conclusive evidence of something, because that is an invasion of the judi-
cial power. (Carolene Prods. Co. v. McLaughlin, 365 111. 62 (1936).) The
United States Supreme Court would say that such a conclusive pre-
sumption is a denial of due process of law. (See Tot v. United States,
319 U.S. 463 (1943).) For purposes of an analysis of Article III, therefore,
the discussion which follows will deal only with those instances that
are solely matters of separation of powers.
Legislative Encroachment: There have been relatively few instances
of judicial findings of true legislative encroachment on either of the
other two branches of government. This may be in part because of the
unusual constitutional theory expounded by Chief Justice Wilson in the
Field case quoted from at the beginning of this discussion. He said that
the "constitution is a limitation upon the powers of the legislative depart-
ment of the government; but it is to be regarded as a grant of powers to
the other department[s]. Neither the executive nor the judiciary, there-
fore, can exercise any authority or power, except such as is clearly granted
by the Constitution." (Field v. People ex rel. McClernand, 3 111. 79, 81
(1839).) This is not the occasion for indulging in a discussion of political
theory; suffice it to say that the Field theory increases the likelihood that
legislative action will not be found to be an encroachment on the powers
of the executive and judicial departments. (See Explanation of Sec. 1,
Art. V, injra, pp. 254-7, for discussion of Field case.)
The courts have protected their own power in several areas. They have
made it clear that, although the legislature may generally prescribe the
qualifications to practice professions and callings, only the judiciary may
prescribe the qualifications for engaging in the practice of law. {In re
Day, 181 111. 73 (1899).) The courts also assert the inherent power to
define the practice of law, and any legislation making the unauthorized
practice of law illegal and punishable is solely in aid of the judicial
power. (People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Goodman, 366 111. 346 (1937).)
The extent to which the legislature may control practice and procedure
in the judicial system is not clear. Neither the Judicial Article as adopted
in 1870 nor the current Article makes any reference to general judicial
rule-making power, and if anyone were to take the Field theory seriously,
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it could be argued that the absence of any such reference means that there
is no judicial rule-making power. (As to how seriously the Field theor)'
should be taken, see the Explanation of Sec. 1, Art. V, infra, pp. 254-
7.) Moreover, one of the enumerated cases of forbidden special legislation
under Section 22 of Article IV is
"regulating the practice in courts of
justice," which implies that the legislature has the power so to regulate
by general law. Whatever the basis in theory, the practice has been for
the legislature to adopt comprehensive rules of practice and procedure.
The Supreme Court has generally accepted this legislative practice,
stating, however, that there could be no infringement of the judiciary's
inherent powers. (Agran v. Checker Taxi Co., 412 111. 145 (1952).) But
until very recently, the only infringement that the courts found and
stopped were attempts by the legislatine to control the essence of the
judicial process — the rendering of judgments. (See the Agran case,
supra; People ex rel. Sprague v. Clark, 300 111. 583 (1921); People ex rel.
Lafferty v. Owen, 286 111. 638 (1919).)
In 1968, the Supreme Court held that its rule on admission to bail
pending appeal from a sentence of imprisonment overrode a subsequent
legislative amendment to the Code of Criminal Procedure that forbade
bail in the case of conviction for felonies involving the use or threat of
the use of force or violence. (People ex rel. Stamos v. Jones, 40 111, 2d 62
(1968).) The Court indicated, however, that it did not consider the various
references to limited rule-making power in the new Judicial Article to
represent any general revision of the relationship between the legislature
and the judiciary as it existed under the old Judicial Article. Moreover,
it is significant that serious constitutional issues of the right to bail would
have had to be met if the Court had not been able to rely on a specific
rule-making power granted to it under the new Article VI. (For a general
discussion of judicial rule-making power, see infra, p. 327.)
People V. Briiner (343 111. 146 (1931)) is primarily a case involving
the nature of trial by jury under Section 5 of Article II (supra, pp. 24-7),
but the case has a separation of powers side that should be mentioned.
In a criminal trial, the defendant's attorney asked for an instruction to
the jui-y that it was the judge of both the law and the facts. The in-
struction was refused. On appeal following conviction, error was charged
because a statute dating from 1827 stated that juries in criminal cases
were judges of both the law and the facts. The Supreme Court first
decided that trial by jury as guaranteed in the bill of rights was limited
to permitting the jury to determine the facts. That disposed of the case,
but the Court went further, perhaps because of the nagging fact that the
statute had been around over 40 years when the Constitution was adopted
in 1870. The Court said that interpreting the law was an inherently judi-
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cial function that the legislature could not exercise. This, the Court ap-
parently thought, would be the case if the 1827 statute were valid. An
accurate characterization would seem to be that the statute was an in-
valid attempt to delegate judicial power. But with such a characterization,
the Court might have puzzled over who was receiving the delegation.
The jury is part of the judicial process. Presumably, the Court meant
that the legislature was trying to interfere with judicial power by denying
to judges the exclusive right to interpret the law. All in all, the Bruner
case is more confusing than enlightening on separation of powers.
Legislative encroachment on the executive department, in the eyes of
the judicial^ at least, has been minor. Again, this may be in part the
result of the Field case discussed earlier. {Supra, p. 101.) It may also result
in part from the fact that, by virtue of the long ballot, executive power is
widely dispersed. (See discussion of Art. V, Sec. 1, injra, p. 256.) In any
event, whatever the reason, there appear to have been only two areas
of serious judicial concern over legislative encroachment on the executive
department. One area dealt with the extent to which the civil service
system could cover executive employees. In the case of People ex rel.
Gullett V. McCulIough (245 111. 9 (1912)), it was argued that the Civil
Service Law was invalid in that it limited the power of the elected state
officers to choose their own employees and thus constituted legislative
encroachment on the executive department. Three judges agreed with this
argument and three did not. The seventh judge agreed with the argument
in so far as the constitutional duties of the elected officers were concerned
but not as to those duties which were imposed by statute. Four years
later, a divided Court found that the Civil Service Law could cover em-
ployees of the elected clerk of the Supreme Court. No distinction was
made between constitutional and statutory duties of the clerk. (People
ex rel. Vanderburg v. Brady, 275 111. 261 (1916).) This later case probably
killed the peculiar distinction made by the "swing" judge in the earlier
case. In any event, the current Personnel Code exempts from civil service
all positions under the elected state officers other than the Governor, all
employees of the Governor at the Executive Mansion and on his im-
mediate personal staff, all positions under the Clerk of the Supreme
Court, and all officers and employees of the courts. (111. Rev. Stat. ch. 127,
§63bl04c (Supp. 1968).) The head of any of the exempted offices can,
however, request extension of civil service to his employees. (§63bl04b
(1967).) Thus, the present statutory schem£ is consistent with the argu-
ment unsuccessfully advanced in the McCulIough case.
An even stranger judicial finding of legislative encroachment on the
executive department was the case of Fergus v. Russel (270 111. 304
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(1915)), in which the Court ruled that an appropriation to the Insurance
Superintendent tor legal purposes could not be used to employ attorneys.
The ground was that the Attorney General constitutionally possessed the
pow'ers which the English Attorney General had had at common law, that
under English common law the Attorney General was tlie law officer oi
the Crown, and that, therefore, the separation ot powers doctrine forbade
any legislative shift of any of those powers to any other executive depart-
ment. (For further discussion of this strange case, see infra, pp. 256-7.) As
recently as 1956, the Supreme Court adhered to the position taken in the
Russel case. (People ex rel. Castle v. Daniels, 8 111. 2d 43 (1956).) The
characterization of the Russel case as
"strange" is based solely upon the
Court's unusual interpretation of Section 1 of Article V (see injra, })p.
256-7) and not on any theory that the legislature should be free to move
executive powers around willy-nilly. The Auditor of Public Accounts, for
example, has specific duties carefully spelled out in the Constitution and
the Court has rightly said that there can be no legislative encroachment
on those duties. (See People ex rel. State Bd. of Agr. v. Brady, 277 111.
124 (1917).)
Executive Encroachment: So far as has appeared, there has been no
executive encroachment on any other department except pursuant to a
statute. If the statute purports to give legislative power to the executive,
the question is one of whether or not the delegation is valid and not
whether the executive is "encroaching" on the legislature. The problem
of delegation of legislative power is discussed in connection with Section 1
of Article IV. (See infra, pp. 114-15.) A problem of vicarious encroachment
does arise when the legislature attempts to give the executive adjudi-
catory powers, for this can result in executive encroachment on the judi-
cial power. It is not appropriate, however, to attempt to analyze the
constitutional intricacies of this form of delegation at this time. For
one thing, such an analysis would embody much of the stuff of which
administrative law is made. For another thing, the delineation of the
limits of administrative adjudicatory power is as much a matter of proce-
dural due process of law as it is of separation of powers.
As a general rule, delegation to administrators or agencies of the quasi-
judicial power to adjudicate rights or to revoke privileges such as licenses
is not invalid so long as there is an opportunity for judicial review of
the administrative action. Such judicial review normally permits an
aggrieved party to contest the fairness of the procedure used, the con-
stitutionality of the substance of the regulatory statute and implementing
rules and regulations, the correctness of the administrator's interpretation
of the statute under which he operates, and whether or not his decision
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was arbitrary. In short, ii the judiciary is given an adequate opportunity
to review what has been done, the principle ot separation of powers —
or due process of law, if you will — is generally satisfied. There are, of
course, some judicial utterances at variance with this generalization, but
this is inevitable, particularly in an area of law that was once novel and
has grown in importance rather rapidly. For example, the Supreme Court
once said that it woidd violate Article III and due process to require the
judiciary to let an administrative adjudication stand if there were sub-
stantial evidence to siqjport it, for such a requirement would preclude
an independent judicial weighing of the evidence. (Commerce Comm'n
ex rel. City of Bloomington v. Cleveland, G. C. k St. L. Ry., 309 111 165
(1923); Otis Elevator Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 302 111. 90 (1922).) Shortly
thereafter, the Court said that all it had really meant in the earlier cases
was that the legislature could not tell courts hoio to weigh the evidence
if it gave the courts jDOwer to weigh evidence. (Nega v. Chicago Rys.,
317 111. 482 (1925).) Moreover, statutory language objected to in the
City of Bloomington case is still on the statute books and the courts are
following the legislative command to accept the administrative findings
if they have substantial foundation in the evidence. (See Champaign
County Tel. Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 37 111. 2d 312 (1967).)
Judicial Encroachment: In the nature of things, judicial "encroach-
ment" on the legislative and executive branches is almost impossible.
(This is not to deny that people make speeches and write articles, edit-
orials and letters alleging that the judiciary is usurping the law-making
function or unduly interfering with the executive function.) Since the
judiciary has the last word in interpreting the Constitution, the form
in which
"judicial encroachment" normally manifests itself is a refusal
by the judiciary to do something on the ground that to act would be
an encroachment. For example, the Supreme Court invalidated a pro-
vision of the divorce law that, in effect, recjuired the judge to be a mar-
riage counselor, a nonjudicial function imposed on the judge. (People
ex rel. Christiansen v. Connell, 2 111. 2d 332 (1954).) The Supreme Court
will determine whether a public utility rate imposed directly by legis-
lation or through the administrative process is confiscatory, but it will
not determine what the rate should be, for that would be encroaching on
the legislative function. (See Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. State Pub. Util.
Comm'n, 268 111. 49 (1915).) On at least two occasions when the legis-
lature, instead of limiting judicial review of administrative action, tried
to give an aggrieved party the right to a trial de novo, the Court refused
to accept the power because to do so would encroach on the executive
branch. (West End Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Smith, 16 111. 2d 523 (1959);
Borreson v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 368 111. 425 (1938).)
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There is, however, a form of indirect judicial encroachment on the
executive function. This occurs whenever the courts accept a legislative
delegation to them of the power to appoint executive officials to political
subdivisions. (See e.g., People ex rel. Lowe v. Marquette Nat'l Fire Ins.
Co., 351 111. 516 (1933).) This indirect encroachment is a fairly flexible
matter, for the courts can turn it on and off like a spigot, so to speak. The
1919 Annotation observed that the Supreme Court had made distinctions
between permissible and not permissible delegations of powers of ap-
pointment that the annotators found difficult to understand. (Annota-
tions 70.)
The courts recognize the significance of the principle of separation
of powers by their consistent refusal to issue a writ of mandamus, a writ
that commands action, directed to the Governor (People ex rel. Billings
v. Bissell, 19 111. 229 1857)), to a board or commission of which the
Governor is a member (People ex rel. Bruce v. Dunne, 258 111. 441 (1913)),
or to a department which can act in the circumstances only with the
Governor's approval (MacGregor v. Miller, 324 111. 113 (1926)). The
courts will, however, issue such writs against executi\e officers, including
constitutional officers, such as the Secretary of State, the Treasurer, and
the Auditor of Public Accounts. (People ex rel. Sellers v. Brady, 262 111.
578 (1914); People ex rel. Akin v. Rose, 167 111. 147 (1897).) The rationale
for this distinction appears to be that all duties of the Governor are
executive, that is, discretionary, whereas other officers have ministerial
duties, and mandamus will lie to compel a ministerial, that is, a non-
discretionary, act.
The courts will not issue writs of mandamus against the legislature,
but, separation of powers apart, the reason therefor is simply impossibil-
ity. In a civilized society, at least, there is no conceivable way to command
the legislature to act, in general or in a specific manner. For a long time,
this was part of the rationale by which the courts refused to meddle in
the problem of redistrictmg legislative seats, notwithstanding a con-
stitutional command to redistrict. (See Fergus v. Kinney, 333 111. 437'
(1928); Fergus v. Marks, 321 111. 510 (1926).) Once the United States
Supreme Court forced the issue (Baker v. Carr, 369 US 186 (1962)), the
courts had to act, and since they still could not effectively mandamus the
legislature, their only recourse was to do the job themselves, which was,
of course, a nonjudicial act. (See discussion of Sec. 8, Art. IV, infra,
pp. 142-3.)
Permitted Encroachment: Article III ends with the words "except as
hereinafter expressly directed or permitted." This clause is an un-
necessary but cautious recognition that other parts of the Constitution
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make exceptions to the strict separation of powers. The most notable of
these are the Governor's veto power over legislation and the Senate's veto
power over gubernatorial appointments. (Art. V, Sec. 16 and 10.) Lesser
examples are the judicial power of each house to punish for contempt
in its presence and of the Senate to try impeached officers. (Art. IV, Sec. 9
and 24). Many of these exceptions add to the system of checks and
balances that is part of the purpose of separation of powers.
The most interesting exception is one that is no\\' explicitly a dead
letter and probably was implicitly dead from the day the 1870 Constitu-
tion went into effect. Section 21 of Article V directs the Governor bien-
nially to transmit various reports to the General Assembly, including
"the reports of the Judges of the Supreme Court of defects in the Con-
stitution and laws." Section 31 of Article VI, as it existed prior to the
adoption of the new Judicial Article in 1962, provided that all judges
of courts of record were to report in writing each year "to the judges of
the Supreme Court, such defects and omissions in the law as their ex-
perience may suggest; and the judges of the Supreme Court shall . . .
report in writing to the Governor such defects and omissions in the Con-
stition and laws as they may find to exist, together with appropriate forms
of bills to cure such defects and omissions in the laws." (See Histoiy of
Sec. 21, Art. V, infra, pp. 315-16, for the origin of this unusual pro-
vision.) These provisions go far beyond the system of advisory opinions
obtaining in a few states. Since the courts are the final interpreters of
the laws, their advice to the Governor and General Assembly on the
"defects and omissions in the laws" would carry great weight and would
constitute a serious encroachment on the legislative branch.
In 1909, Governor Charles S. Deneen sought to rely on these sections
in obtaining advice from the Supreme Court, but the Court declined
to give the requested advice. The problem arose out of the difficulty
encountered by the legislature and the Governor in obtaining a valid
primary law. A statute passed in 1905 was invalidated in 1906. (People
ex rel. Breckon v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 221 111. 9 (1906).) At a
special session in 1906, another act was passed which was promptly in-
validated. (Rouse V. Thompson, 228 111. 522 (1907).) At a special ses-
sion in 1908, a third primary law was enacted, but this too was in-
validated. (People ex rel. Phillips v. Strassheim, 240 111. 279 (1909).) Pre-
sumably in despair at having struck out, Governor Deneen wrote to the
Supreme Court on July 14, 1909, reviewing the foregoing chronology
and, on the authority of the quoted portion of Section 31, requesting the
Supreme Court to draft a primary law that would be constitutional.
On August 23, 1909, the Court politely declined to act. It observed that
it was not set up in such a way that it could appropriately render ad-
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visory opinions. Notwithstanding the language of Section 31, the Court
stated that its duty was Hmited to pointing out omissions and detects
in the ordinary course ot litigation. Thus ended a novel constitutional
experiment in judicial "encroachment" on the legislative branch. (The
correspondence is set out in 143 111. 9-41. It is reported that in March,
1919, "justice James H. Cartwright oi the Supreme Coint sent two com-
munications, one his own, and the other that of Judge Charles .M.
Thomson, of the Circuit Court of Cook County, to the Governor, in-
dicating defects in the real estate and divorce statutes, together \\ith
bills embodying suggested remedies. These the Governor forwarded to
the General Assembly." See Annotations 180.)
Diial Office Holding: Section 3 of Article IV, (infra, p. 120) prohibits
dual office liolding under two circumstances: where one of the offices is
that of legislator and where one of the offices is of honor or profit under
the United States or a foreign country. On several occasions, the Attorney
General has relied on Article III to extend the prohibition to dual offices
not covered by Section 3. His reasoning was that it is a violation of
separation of powers to hold two offices, one of which is in one of the
three departments and the other in another department. For example,
a mayor of a city could not also be a county judge. (1912 111. Att'y Gen.
Rep. 1343.) The Attorney General also said that a justice of the peace
could not also serve as an alderman, village trustee, or town clerk. (1916
111. Att'y Gen. Rep. 788; 1914 111. Att'y Gen. Rep. 1157; 1915 111. Att'y
Gen. Rep. 789. He also ruled out combining justice of the peace and cir-
cuit clerk (1915 III- Att'y Gen. Rep. 782), but the separation of powers
argument is not particularly convincing in this instance.) On at least one
occasion, the courts have used the same separation of powers argument.
(People V. Bott, 261 111. App. 261 (1931) (police magistrate and town
clerk imcompatible offices).)
Article III has also been used as an additional argument in dual office
holding situations that may fall afoul of Section 3 of Article IV. For
example, the Attorney General ruled that a legislator could not be a
probation officer. (1916 111. Att'y Gen. Rep. 931.) In the case of Saxby
V. Sonnemann (318 111. 600 (1925)), the Supreme Court used Article III
to prohibit a member of the General Assembly from serving as deputy
or assistant to the Attorney General and from receiving any compensation
therefor if his services involved exercise of executive powers. It may be
that the Court did not rely on Section 3 of Article IV because of problems
arising from the meaning of the word "office." (See discussion of People
v. Capuzi, 20 111. 2d 486 (1960), mfra, pp. 122-3.)
Comparative Analysis
Four-fifths of the states specifically spell out the principle of separation
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of powers, and approximately 30 of them also recognize the principle
of checks and balances by an "except" clause similar to the one in Article
III. Separation of powers with checks and balances obtains in all the
other states, of course, even without a specific provision therefor. The
same is true of the United States Constitution and the Model State
Constitution, neither of which has an explicit provision comparable to
Article III.
Comment
As noted at the beginning of the Explanation (supra, p. 99), Article III
really is nothing more than an explicit statement of what is implicit in
all American constitutions. Article III could easily be dropped without
significant effect, but by the same token, it could be preserved without
significant effect. If preserved, it ought to be simplified in language.
The 1922 proposed language (quoted, supra, p. 99) is as good as any
concise formulation. (See also Cominent under Sec. 1, Art. V, infra, pp.
258-9.)

Article IV
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
General Assembly
Sec. 1. The legislative power shall be vested in a General Assembly, which
shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives, both to be elected by
the people.
History
The 1818 and 1848 Constitutions used the words
"authority of this
State" in place of the word "power," but otherwise the section was the
same as the present one. The section as proposed by the Committee on
the Legislature of the 1870 Convention was unchanged. A delegate
proposed to substitute "power" for "authority" in order to be consistent
with Article III, and the applicable sections of the Executive and Judi-
cial Articles. The Committee Chairman indicated that he preferred not
to change existing language unless there was some overriding necessity
for change and that he saw none. An extensive debate ensued on the
relative merits of using "authority" or "power." In the end, the decision
was to retain
"authority." (Debates 497-500.) The change was apparently
made by the Committee on Revision and Adjustment, evidently without
objection. The proposed 1922 Constitution retained the section substan-
tially unchanged. The words "both to be elected by the people" were
dropped, but this is hardly a change of substance. Indeed, the deletion
was proposed in 1870 and although the proposal was defeated, no strong
arguments for retention were advanced. [Id.)
Explanafion
The Legislative Power: Under traditional constitutional theory, the
basic
"sovereign" power of the state resides in the legislature. From this
it follows, again in theory, that there is no need to grant any power to
the legislature. All that need be done is to place such limitations as are
desired on the legislature's otherwise unlimited power. This is normally
done by a bill of rights, which is the ultimate "sovereign" people's reser-
vation of governmental power, and by distributing powers among the
three branches of government with accompanying checks and balances.
The 1818 Constitution was written in the traditional form. (The current
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Constitution of Connecticut essentially dates also from 1818 and is like-
wise in the traditional form.) In the last half of the Nineteenth Century,
however, two lines of constitutional development altered the traditional
forms of constitutions. One was the addition of further limitations on
legislative powers. Examples in Illinois are Section 22 of this Article,
prohibiting local and special legislation; Section 18, limiting the incur-
ring of debt; provisions in Article XI concerning street railways, banks,
and railroads; and some of the restrictions in Article IX on revenue. In
general, these limitations were the direct result of abuse of the relatively
unlimited legislative power under the early constitutions. It is important
to note, however, that these additional limitations are not inconsistent
with traditional constitutional theory. Rather, the people simply with-
drew more power from the legislature than is normally withdrawn by a
bill of rights.
The other line of development in the late Nineteenth Century and
well into the Twentieth Century was the great expansion of judicial
invalidation of substantive legislation as in violation of bill of rights'
limitations, particularly the prohibition against depriving any person
of "life, liberty or property, without due process of law." (See Art. II,
Sec. 2, supra, p. 9.) This is a long and complicated story in the political
and judicial history of the United States which cannot be set forth at this
point. Suffice it to say that, although in theory the courts were simply
interpreting the limitations on the legislature imposed by the people in
a bill of rights, the fact was that the course of decision tended to turn
the legislature into a branch of government with only those powers that,
so to speak, the courts graciously consented to recognize as having been
granted. (See discussion of police power below.) The result in many states,
including Illinois, was a tendency to place specific grants of power in
the constitutions. Examples are Sections 29, 30 and 31 of this Article, two
of which, Section 30 and Section 31 as amended in 1878, were the results
of limiting court decisions. (See inpa, pp. 239 and 241.)
The Police Power: By virtue of the judicial expansion of due process
referred to above, there developed a theory that the legislature's power
was, in effect, limited to legislating for the protection of the public health,
safety, morals and welfare. This is commonly called the "police power."
In a sense, the courts are dealing with two sides of a coin: If a matter is
within the police power, it is not a deprivation of life, liberty or property
without due process of law; or, if it is a deprivation, then it is not within
the police power. This way of looking at the matter could be considered
simply a matter of semantics, but the history of the development in-
cluded a tendency on the part of the courts- to require the state to demon-
strate that a given statute was in fact for the protection of the public
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health, safety, morals or welfare. For a good many years, the burden of
jiroof tended to be on the goverment, a burden hardly consistent with
the theory that the legislature has all power not withdrawn from it. More-
over, judges who were unsympathetic to government meddling in the
affairs of men might find it more difficult to be convinced that a given
regulation was within the police power than would a judge who was sym-
pathetic to government action.
If courts found legislative regulation outside the police power, the
only remedy, short of inducing the courts to change their minds, was to
amend the constitution by granting the legislature the power to act. This
was done in many states in such fields as workmen's compensation, mini-
mum wages, public housing, and the like. That it was not done so fre-
quently in Illinois may have been because of the difficulty of amending
the Constitution or because of a somewhat less restrictive judicial atti-
tude. This is fortunate for Illinois, for there is a built-in danger in the
indiscriminate spelling out of affirmative legislative powers. The very
fact of detailed powers reinforces the tendency to develop a theory of
granted power, and even when the courts adhere to the traditional theory
that the legislature has all power not withheld, there is a tendency to
limit a specific grant by inferring that what was not granted was meant
to be withheld. (For example, a court might infer that a grant of power
to set maximum hours of labor for women and children denied legislative
power to set maximum hours of labor for men.)
Over the past thirty years or so, state courts, led by the United States
Supreme Court, which drastically changed its interpretation of the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, have substantially reversed
their overall approach and today tend to uphold regulatory legislation
as within the police power if there is any reasonable basis for regulation.
The courts, in many instances, have not changed the language used in
older cases, but they have in fact upheld regulatory legislation that would
have been struck down half a century or so ago. The constitutional theory
that the legislature has all power not withheld from it may never have
been abandoned, but the course of judicial interpretation was incon-
sistent with the traditional theory. The courts have moved so far in the
recent past that, today, theory and practice tend to coincide. (For the
significance of the foregoing, see Comment, infra, p. 116.)
Classification: There are two technical meanings to "classification" in
the delineation of legislative power: one is related to the problem of
general versus special or local legislation, the other to due process and
equal protection of the laws. There is, of course, no provision in the
Illinois bill of rights comparable to the Fourteenth Amendment's equal
protection clause which provides that no state shall "deny to any person
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within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." This created no
difficulty in the days of expansive reading of the due process provision
of Section 2 of Article II, and creates no difficulty today, for the require-
ment for general legislation under Section 22 of Article IV affords a court
an adequate basis for striking down arbitrary classification. The fact is
that, with the exceptions of classifications for local government purposes
and for tax purposes under the uniformity requirement of Section 1 of
Article IX (infra, pp. 413), problems of classification in relation to the
prohibition of special legislation and to the bill of rights' protection
are essentially the same. For example, if the legislature restricts drivers'
licenses to persons 18 years of age and over, an attack on the law as
"special" fails because the classification is reasonable and a claim of denial
of due process or, in the name of the Fourteenth Amendment, of equal
protection fails, also because the classification is reasonable; but if the
legislature were to deny drivers' licenses to baid-headed men, the legis-
lation could be successfully attacked as special legislation since it would
arbitrarily single out one group of the population or it could be attacked
as a denial of due process or equal protection because the classification
would be unreasonable.
For purposes of determining the extent of the legislative power to
classify, the key word is "reasonable." In any but the simplest of societies,
it is inevitable that groups will be treated differently, and if there is to
be a constitutional limitation on different treatment, the only criterion
for judging the validity of differentiation is whether it is reasonable. In
general, the history of judicial review of the legislature's power to classify
is the same as the history of the police power. When courts were unsym-
pathetic to legislative regulation of private affairs, it was more difficult
to find "reasonable" classifications than it is today. (See Explanation of
Sec. 22, infra, p. 206, for further discussion of the problem of reasonable
classifications.)
Delegation of Power: The legislative power may be vested in the Gen-
eral Assembly, but the facts of life in this complex industrial society de-
mand a flexibility of adjustment to different situations that is not avail-
able to a legislature meeting for limited periods. The result has been the
growth of what has sometimes been referred to as a "fourth" branch of
government — the administrative agency. Whether independent, or quasi-
independent, of the executive, or simply an administrator responsible to
the executive, the administrative agency has been granted the legislative
power to issue rules and regulations in furtherance of a policy determined
by the legislature. This delegation of legislative power is limited by the
separation of powers doctrine embodied in Article III. The courts are
realistic enough to concede the need for some delegation of legislative
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power to administrators, but they recognize that the principle of separa-
tion of powers and, for that matter, common sense, prohibit unhmited
delegation.
There are various ways in which the courts express the limits of per-
missible delegation of legislative power. A court sometimes observes that,
while the legislature may not delegate its general legislative authority,
it may delegate to an administrative agency some legislative power so
long as it does not invest the agency with arbitrary powers. (See Depart-
ment of Pub. Works & Bldgs. v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 408 111. 41
(1950).) Or a court may say that, while the legislature cannot delegate
the power to make a law, it can delegate the power to determine the state
of facts which makes the law operative. (See People ex rel. Adamowski
V. Chicago Land Clearance Comm'n, 14 111. 2d 74 (1958).) Perhaps the
best formulation of the nUe of delegation is that the legislature must so
express the limits of its delegation that a court can tell whether the execu-
tive has acted within those limits. Thus, a court will invalidate a delega-
tion that is so vague that it is subject to arbitrary and capricious inter-
pretation and application. (See People ex rel. Schoon v. Carpentier, 2
111. 2d 468 (1954).)
There is also a general rule that legislative power may not be delegated
to private groups. There appear to be only two Illinois cases that clearly
follow this general rule. One case invalidated a statutory provision author-
izing owners of 60 per cent of street frontage to change the name of a
street. (People ex rel. Chicago Dryer Co. v. City of Chicago, 413 111. 315
(1952).) The other case was one of the ill-fated trio of primary cases dis-
cussed under Article III. (Supra, p. 107.) In Rouse v. Thompsoti (228 111.
522 (1907)), the Supreme Court found, in addition to other defects, an in-
valid delegation to political party central committees. In some instances,
an invalid delegation may become swallowed up in a broad invalidation
under the due process clause or as "special" legislation under Section 22
of Article IV. (See Schroeder v. Binks, 415 111. 192 (1953) (statute giving
master plumbers right to determine who may learn the plumbing trade
held invalid).) In other instances, it may be that a judicial determination
that a statute is not contrary to due process or "special" legislation may
cause a court to brush off a delegation to private parties. (See Kinsey
Distilling Sales Co. v. Foremost Liquor Stores, Inc., 15 111. 2d 182 (1958)
(Fair Trade Act under which manufactiner can make law applicable to
all by signing a contract with only one retailer held valid).)
Referendum: A referendum is a limited form of delegation of legislative
power, since it gives to someone else the determination of whether or
not the law shall be operative. The Supreme Court has held that, except
when required by the Constitution, the legislature may not submit gen-
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eral legislation to relerenclum by the voters. (Peojjle ex rel. Thomson v.
Barnett, 344 111. 62 (1931).) It is permissible, however, to provide lor local
option whereby a law dealing with local matters does not become opera-
tive in a given community imless accepted by the voters of the community.
{Id.)
Bicameralism: Section 1 lodges the legislative power of the state in a
General Assembly consisting of two houses, a Senate and a House of
Representatives. Thus, Section 1 commits the state to bicameralism.
Comparative Analysis
All states explicitly vest the legislative power in a legislature. In all
states except Nebraska, the legislature consists of two houses, one of which
is invariably called the senate, the other of which is usually called either
the house of representatives or tlie assembly. The single house in Nebraska
is called the senate. The Model State Constitution recommends a uni-
cameral legislature.
Comment
Bicameralism: An essay on the pros and cons of unicameral and bi-
cameral legislatines is not an apjjrojjriate part of this analysis, but it is
appropriate to note that this is a subject which the Convention will want
to consider.
Grants of Power: In the Exphnialion (supra, p. 1 1 1), it was pointed out
that, today, the courts really do accept the fact that legislatures have all
power not denied to them by the Constitution. The importance of this
to constitution-drafting is twofold. First, it is clear today that there is no
need to make any grant of power to the legislature to deal with substan-
tive police power matters. (It can also be asserted with confidence that
the courts will not revert to the limited view of the police power that
once prevailed.) Since there are dangers in unnecessarily granting un-
necessary powers to the legislature, eveiy effort should be made to keep
out any new grants and, if politically possible, to remove those presently in
the Constitution. The foregoing applies equally to commands to the
legislature to act on substantive matters. Apart from the fact that there
is no way to force the legislature to carry out a command to legislate, the
American tradition has been to limit the statement of the positive duties
of government to the preamble. (There is one major exception to this
tradition: a majority of the states make the provision of free public edu-
cation a positive duty of government. See Art. VIII, Sec. 1, infra, pp. 399-
402.) If constitution-drafters leave the legislature free to cope with society's
problems, people wiU see that tlie legislature acts. A constitutional com-
mand adds precious little to the voter's persuasivenesss, but such a com-
mand may encourage unnecessary litigation aftpr the legislature acts.
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If the decision is made to forgo unnecessary grants of power and
commands to legislate on substantive matters, it will be appropriate to
point out to everyone, and particularly to the courts, what that decision
means. This should be done by a provision much like that of the Model
State Constitution:
"The enumeration in this constitution of specified powers and functions shall
be construed neither as a grant nor as a limitation of the powers of state govern-
ment but the state government shall have all of the powers not denied by this
constitution or by or under the Constitution of the United States." (art. fl,
§2.01.)
Election— Vacancies
Sec. 2. An election for members of the General Assembly shall be held on the
Tuesday next after the first Monday in November, in the year of our Lord one
thousand eight hundred and seventy, and every two years thereafter, in each
county, at such places therein as may be provided by law. When vacancies
occur in either house, the Governor, or person exercising the powers of Gov-
ernor, shall issue writs of election to fill such vacancies.
History
This section is a combination without substantive change of two sec-
tions in the 1848 Constitution. Except for holding elections in a different
month, the 1818 Constitution sections were in substance the same as those
of 1848. The proposed 1922 Constitution transferred the rules for stag-
gered terms for senators from Section 6 of the 1870 Constitution to the
second sentence to read: "Vacancies shall be filled by special elections
equivalent of Section 2. The proposed Constitution also simplified the
called by the governor." (art. Ill, §26.)
Explanation
This section serves two purposes. It provides that elections for sena-
tors and representatives shall be held on the customary general election
day in even-numbered years and provides that vacancies shall be filled at
special elections called by the Governor. Notwithstanding the simple,
straightforward nature of this section, two serious questions have arisen.
One concerns whether or not the Governor may declare a vacancy when
a legislator enters upon the duties of another office which, by virtue of
Section 3 (infra, p. 120), he is forbidden to hold. An appellate court in
1908 said that the courts could determine the existence of such a vacancy
(People ex rel. Myers v. Haas, 145 111. App. 283 (1908)), notwithstand-
ing Section 9 (infra, p. 145), which provides that each house shall be the
judge of the qualifications of its members; but in 1916, the Attorney
General expressed doubt that the Governor could declare such a vacancy.
(1916- in. Att'y Gen. Rep. 135.)
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The second question concerned the discretion of the Governor in set-
ting the day for an election to fill a vacancy. In 1923, sometime after
adjournment of the General Assembly, a senator resigned his seat. Noth-
ing was done about filling the vacancy because the General Election Law
provided that no special election should be held unless the General Assem-
bly was in session or unless there woidd be a session before the next gen-
eral election. There were three general elections — November, 1923; June,
1924; and November, 1924 — before the next regular session. At the first
of those elections, two votes for a W. G. Anderson were written in, and
Anderson sought a writ of mandamus directing certification of election.
In affirming a denial of the writ of mandamus, the Supreme Court held
that, although only the Governor could issue a writ of election, a statute
could prohibit him from calling an unnecessary special election. The
Court further construed the statute to leave with the Governor the dis-
cretion to choose which general election to use for filling the vacancy.
(People ex rel. Anderson v. Czarnecki, 312 111. 271 (1924). See Comment
beloAv concerning the Governor's discretion.)
Comparative Analysis
Time of Election: A fairly large number of states set the specific day
for election of members of the legislature, a few states set the day but
permit the legislature to change it, and two states simply provide that the
date shall be set by law. About a third of the states evidently cover the
matter in a general provision on elections, for the Index Digest has en-
tries for time of election for the legislature for only 32 states. (Legislative
Drafting Research Fund of Columbia University, Index Digest of State
Constitutions 639- (2d ed. 1959) [hereinafter cited as Index].) The United
States Constitution leaves the time of election to the several states but
reserves to Congress power to act. The traditional first Tuesday after the
first Monday in November was first adopted by Congress in 1845 as the
day for presidential elections. (This presumably explains the adoption
of that date in the 1848 Constitution.) Congress in 1872 set the same day
for Congressional elections, effecti\e in 1876. The Model State Constitu-
tion provides that the legislature shall be elected "at the regular election."
This term is not defined. Presumably, it is covered in the Suffrage and
Elections Article by the command to the legislature to "provide for . . .
the administration of elections . . . ."
Vacancies: Almost half the states provide for a special election to fill
vacancies. In most of these instances the Governor has the power to choose
the time of election. In several states the manner of filling vacancies is
to be fixed by law. In a few states the vacancy is filled by appointment,
usually by the Governor. In many of the appointment provisions, the
appointing power is required to preserve the party alignment either by
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the terms of the provision or by accepting the recommendation of an
appropriate party committee. The United States Constitution requires
special elections to fill vacancies, but in the case of Senators permits a
"temporary" appointment by the Governor pending an election. The
Model State Constitution simply says that vacancies "shall be filled as
provided by law." (art. IV, §4.06.)
Comment
The method of filling vacancies highlights one of the problems of con-
stitution-drafting
— the balancing of principle and flexibility. On the
one hand, it can be argued that the people through their constitutional
convention or by constitutional amendment should decide as a matter of
constitutional principle whether vacancies in the legislature should be
filled only by the same people who normally choose the senator or repre-
sentative or should be filled in some other manner. On the other hand,
it can be argued that the method should be left to the legislature in order
to avoid the detail required to cover all contingencies
— for example, a
vacancy occurring within three months of the regular election for the
office. The Czarnecki case, discussed above, is a case in point. The Court
had no difficulty in accepting some statutory regulation of filling vacan-
cies. The new Constitution of Michigan explicitly provides for such regu-
lation. It states that the Governor shall issue writs of election to fill
vacancies but also provides that "any such election shall be held in a
manner prescribed by law." (art. V, §13.)
The Illinois Commission on the Organization of the General Assem-
bly recommended a constitutional change similar to the Michigan change
just referred to. (Commission on the Organization of the General Assem-
bly, Improving the State Legislature 9 (1967) [hereinafter cited as I.S.L.].)
The commission noted that it is important to fill vacancies because of
the constitutional requirement for passage of bills by a majority of those
elected. The custom in Illinois has been to leave house seats vacant and to
leave a senate seat vacant if the remainder of the term is less than two
years. In 1969, however, there was a partial departure from ctistom in
that special elections were called for one house and one senate vacancy.
This whole business can be taken out of the realm of custom by the
addition of the words "as provided by law" at the end of the last sentence.
(See also Comment on Sec. 12, infra, p. 160.)
It was noted above that the proposed 1922 Constitution simplified
the language of Section 2. One of the changes proposed was the elimina-
tion of the phrase "or person exercising the powers of Governor." This
change exemplifies two important drafting principles: consistency in
usage and avoidance of unnecessary wordage by a single definitive state-
ment. The latter principle is presumably covered in the sections dealing
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with succession in power to act as Governor. (See Sees. 17 and 19 of Art.
V, Infra, pp. 303 and 310.) If this is correct, then the phrase is unneces-
sary. If it is unnecessary but is in fact used in one place and not in an-
other, it can be argued that where not used only the Governor can exer-
cise whatever power is involved. It follows that if the phrase is used any
place, it must be used every place where a successor to the Governor may
act. Presumably, the drafters of the proposed 1922 Constitution had these
two principles in mind in simpHfying the vacancies provision.
One further comment concerning the 1922 proposal is in order for those
who are tempted to read too quickly. The proposed provision said that
vacancies should be filled in
"special elections." One quickly assumes
that a
"special" election is held at a time other than a "regular" or
"general" election. Upon reflection, it is obvious that the inclusion on
the ballot at a general election of candidates for an office that is not ordi-
narily voted upon at that election is something "special." "Every election
called to fill a vacancy is a special election, and the fact that it is held on
the same day as the general election does not change its character."
(People ex rel. Anderson v. Czarnecki 312 111. 271, 274 (1924).) Notwith-
standing this sentence, the Court used the term "special election" through-
out the rest of its opinion to mean an election held on a day other than
a regular election day.
Eligibility and Oath
Sec. 3. No person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained the age of
twenty-five years, or a Representative wlio shall not have attained the age of
twenty-one years. No person shall be a Senator or a Representative who shall
not be a citizen of the United States, and who shall not have been for five years
a resident of this State, and for two years next preceding his election a resident
within the territory forming the district from which he is elected. No judge or
clerk of any court, Secretary of State, Attorney General, State's Attorney, recorder,
sheriff, or collector of public revenue, member of either House of Congress,
or person holding any lucrative office under the United States or this State,
or any foreign government, shall have a seat in the General Assembly: Provided,
that appointments in the militia, and the offices of notary public and justice
of the peace, shall not be considered lucrative. Nor shall any person holding
any office of honor or profit under any foreign government, or under the
government of the United States, (except postmasters whose annual compen-
sation does not exceed the sum of three hundred dollars) hold any office of honor
or profit under the authority of this State.
History
Age, Residence and Citizenship: The 1818 Constitution required
United States citizenship, one year's residence in the county or district,
payment of a state or county tax, and a minimum age of 25 for senators
and 21 for representatives. In the 1848 Constitution, state residence of
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three years was added and the minimum ages were raised to 30 and 25,
respectively.
The section — i.e., the first two sentences of Section 3 — as proposed
in the 1870 Convention changed the minimum ages back to 25 and 21,
respectively, and increased residence requirements to five years in the
state and two years in the district. There was an extended debate on the
subject of age, some delegates favoring 30 and 25 and some favoring 21
across the board. There was also a proposal to reduce the minimum state
residence to three years. None of the several proposed amendments was
accepted. The proposed 1922 Constitution retained the age, residence and
citizenship requirements unchanged.
Dual Office Holding: It is to be noted, first, that this part of the sec-
tion covers dual office holding by members of the General Assembly and
also generally covers dual office holding "under the authority of this
State" where the second office is federal or foreign. Second, it is to be
noted that, as to members of the General Assembly, there is a prohibition
against dual office holding as to named offices and also in general. For
purposes of clarity, the history of this part of the section will be traced
separately as to each element.
Named Offices: The long list of named offices which a legislator can-
not also hold first appeared in the 1818 Constitution. The list differed
from the current Constitution only by reference to an "attorney for the
state" instead of "state's attorney" and by reference to a "register" instead
of a "recorder." The latter was the only change made in the 1848 Con-
stitution and the former, the only further change in 1870. The proposed
1922 Constitution dropped the list of named offices.
Legislative Dual Office Holding: The 1818 prohibition against lucra-
tive office holders also serving in the legislature did not mention foreign
government office holders and, in addition to the militia and justices of
the peace, excluded all postmasters from the definition of lucrative posi-
tions, but did not exclude notaries public. The 1848 Constitution struck
out the exception for postmasters but made no other change. The 1870
Convention added the foreign government office holder and the excep-
tion for notaries public. The proposed 1922 Constitution prohibited a
legislator from holding "any other lucrative public office or employment
(except as a militia officer or justice of the peace)." (It is worth noting
that the 1922 draftsmen were the first to put "other" in front of "lucra-
tive.") The proposed 1922 language was the broadest legislative dual
office holding prohibition in any of the. Constitutions. (Presumably,
notaries public were not mentioned on the theory that they are not
lucrative
offices.) The office of justice of the peace was abolished by the
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new Article VI adopted in 1962. (See Sees. 12 and 16 ol Art. VI, infra,
pp. 361 and 368.)
General Dual Office Holding: The 1818 and 1848 Constitutions differed
from the present provisions only in omitting the $300-a-year postmaster
exception and in not mentioning offices in foreign governments. In the
proposed 1922 Constitution this provision was moved quite properly from
the Legislative Article to an article on Public Servants. In the course
of re-drafting, the words "of honor or profit" were dropped, but there is
no indication that any change in substance was intended.
Explanation
Age, Residence and Citizenship: These qualifications are straight-
forward and have created no problems of interpretation. The cjualifica-
tions are exclusive, however, and the legislature cannot add to them. The
1905 Primary Election Act attempted to limit the number of candidates
from a single county in a multiple-county district. This, the Supreme
Court said, was an invalid extension of the residence qualification con-
tained in Section 3. (People ex rel. Breckon v. Board of Election Comm'rs,
221 111. 9 (1906).) It may be noted in passing that this section does not
require a legislator to be a registered voter and that Section 6 of Article
VII (infra, p. 394) also requires him to be a United States citizen.
Legislative Dual Office Holding: Until quite recently, the Supreme
Court had never addressed itself to the dual office holding limitation on
legislators. In 1960, in the case of People v. Capuzi (20 111. 2d 486 (I960)),
the Court considered several instances of local government officials who
also served in the legislature. The most difficult was the case of the presi-
dent of the Village of Elmwood Park who received a salary and partici-
pated in the municipal retirement fund. During legislative sessions he
took a leave of absence but continued to receive retirement credit. The
other legislators were all in appointive positions, namely: deputy county
coroner, and chief deputy clerk, deputy clerk, and deputy bailiff of the
Municipal Court of Chicago. All took oaths of office, posted bonds, parti-
cipated in a retirement system, and took leaves of absence during legisla-
tive sessions, but, unlike the village president, received no retirement
credit. None of these in appointive positTons had civil service status or
any specified term of "office."
The Court held that none of the legislators held another "office." The
Court's approach was to distinguish "offices" from other jobs, not so much
in terms of the distinctions attempted in Section 24 of Article V (infra,
p. 322), as in terms of the class deduced from the offices listed in Sec-
tion 3. In other words, a position not listed is an "office" only if the posi-
tion is of the same general nature as a judge, clerk of court, and so on
through member of Congress. On this theory, the Court disposed of the
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cases by noting that the defendants held relatively minor local ministerial
positions. The village presidency was held not to be an "office" because
the executive power in the town was in the hands of the town manager
and the presidency was largely honorary. The Court did not rule on
whether any of the positions were "lucrative," but did note that no one
drew double salaries and that only the village president earned double
retirement credits.
Prior to the Capnzi case, there had been a great many Attorney Gen-
eral opinions on this issue, but in the light of that case, it seems inad-
visable to rely on those opinions. In one lower court case it was held
that a member of the legislature could not also serve as a clerk of the
Municipal Court of Chicago, a decision consistent with Capnzi. (People
ex rel. Myers v. Haas, 145 111. App. 283 (1908).) In Saxby v. Sonnemanri
(318 111. 600 (1925), discussed siipra, p. 108), the Supreme Court held
incompatible under Article III the offices of legislator and deputy to the
Attorney General. In the Capnzi case, the Court distinguished Saxby on
the ground that as deputy, the legislator exercised executive functions
and observed that the Court in Saxby had implied that the result might
have been different had the duties been ministerial only.
General Dual Office Holding: As noted above in discussing the pro-
posed 1922 Constitution, this part of Section 3 has nothing to do with
the legislature and should be somewhere else in the Constitution. Indeed,
the juxtaposition of these two provisions has probably created difficul-
ties. A police magistrate who accepted a commission in the army argued
that a magistrate was the same as a justice of the peace and that since a
justice of the peace was not a "lucrative" office forbidden to legislators,
so a position of "honor or profit" in the United States Army should not
be inconsistent with the office of police magistrate. The Supreme Court
would not accept the argument. (People ex rel. Cromer v. Village of
Maywood, 381 111. 337 (1942). See also Fekete v. City of East St. Louis,
315 111. 58 (1924) (U. S. Army commission and city attorney positions
incompatible).) This juxtaposition has also created confusion. In the
case upholding the constitutionality of the Enabling Act for the 1970
Convention, the Supreme Court lumped the two types of dual office hold-
ing together, leading, in the eyes of the dissenting judges, at least, to an
erroneous analysis. (See Livingston v. Ogilvie, — 111.- 2d — (1969). The
case is discussed in detail under Sec. 1 of Art. XIV, infra, pp. 559-61.)
Once it is determined that two offices are incompatible, there is the
question of precedence of offices. The general rule is that acceptance of
the second office automatically vacates the first office. Illinois follows the
general rule. (Livingston v. Ogilvie, — 111. 2d— (1969); People ex rel.
Myers v. Haas, 145 111. App. 283 (1908).)
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Residency in State
Number of Years Number of States
One 5
Two 4 (5)*
Three 7 (1)*
Four 1 (1)*
Five (1)*
Six (1)*
Seven (1)*
*In five states the residency requirement is two years for the lower house and
longer for the upper house as indicated by the figures in parentheses. In North
Carolina, a senator must have resided in the state two years, a representative
one year.
Residency in District
Period Number of States
60 days 1
3 months 1
6 months 1
1 year 22
2 years 2 (1)*
4 years (1)*
*In New Jersey — two years for lower house, four years for senate. In one
state, New Hampshire, residency in the district is not required prior to time of
election. The same is true in Massachusetts and Vermont as to the upper
house only.
Under the United States Constitution, as is well known from the case of
the late Senator Robert F. Kennedy, residency is required only as of the
time of election. The Model State Constitution requires a legislator to
be a voter and a voter must have a minimum of three months' residence
in the state and can be required by law to have a local residency of not
exceeding three months.
Dual Office Holding (Legislators): The variations in dual office hold-
ing restrictions in the state constitutions are almost infinite. For example,
no other state appears to single out a "recorder" as does Illinois, but
Tennessee does single out a "register." Other singular dual offices noted
are
"receiver-general" in Massachusetts, and "sergeant" and "tax collector"
in Virginia. For comparative purposes, a generalized tabulation by the
Citizens Conference on State Legislatures will be used with the under-
standing that, as exemplified above in connection with the Capuzi case
(supra, p. 122), the precise constitutional language in each state may
provide significant exceptions. The Citizens Conference summarizes dual
office holding thus:
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Foreign Employment: "12 prohibit legislators to hold a job with a foreign
country."
Federal Employment: "43 forbid legislators to hold a job with the national
government."
State Employment: "38 state that legislators shall hold no position under the
state government."
County Employment: "3 forbid legislators to hold a position with a county
government."
Municipal Employment: "3 ban legislators from employment by municipal-
ities."
(State Constitutional Provisions Affecting Legislatures 19-20 (May 1967))
In the Citizens Conference tabulation, Illinois is included under the
first three categories but not under the last two.
The United States Constitution provides:
"No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he was elected,
be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United States, which
shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been encreased
during such time; and no Person holding any Office under the United States,
shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office." (art. I, § 6.)
The Model State Constitution is silent on dual office holding.
Dual Office Holding (General): About a dozen states prohibit state
officers from holding offices, usually of trust or profit, under any foreign
government. In several of these states, the prohibition also runs to any
other state government. Approximately 18 states extend the same pro-
hibition to United States offices, frequently with exceptions. The most
common is for service in the National Guard. A few states exclude
postmasters, but usually only those above a maximum compensation.
Some 15 states prohibit, in greater or lesser degree, dual office holding
within the state.
The United States Constitution prohibits any office holder from ac-
cepting any "present, emolument, office, or title, of any kind whatever,
from any king, prince, or foreign state" without the consent of Congress.
The Constitution also prohibits the President from receiving any emolu-
ment from any state. The Model State Constitution is silent on the
subject.
Comment
Age, Residency, Citizenship: In view of the fact that, under the United
States Supreme Court's "one man-one vote" rule, regular redistricting
will have to take place, consideration should be given to the problem
of the legislator who finds that, after redistricting, his residence has been
separated from the geographical area which he used to represent. If
such a legislator wishes to run for re-election, he has at least one problem
and possibly two. He has to run in a new district where he may not be
well known and he may be faced with running against a legislator who
Art. IV, § 4 1 27
has always been in the new district and is well known. In the proposed
1967 New York Constitution this eventuality was covered, though it must
be conceded that the drafting problem was most complex. The proposed
provision read as follows:
"Every member of the legislature shall be at least twenty-one years old and
eligible to vote in this state. He shall have been domiciled in the state for the
three years preceding his election and for the twelve months preceding his
election in his legislative district. If, however, any redistricting plan for senate
or assembly has been certified pursuant to section two of this article since the
last general election for the legislature, he shall have been domiciled for the
twelve months preceding his election in a county in which all or part of the
new district is located or in a county contiguous to such district if such district
be composed of a whole county and all or parts of another county or counties."
Dual Office Holding: This subject, as well as the related problem of
conflict of interest, was strong in the minds of the delegates to the 1870
Convention. One of the results of this concern was a proliferation of
different provisions. (In addition to Sec. 3, see Sees. 15 and 25 of this
Art., infra, pp. 176 and 230; Sec. 5 of Art. V and Sec. 4 of Art. VIII, infra,
pp. 267 and 409.) Consideration should be given to consolidating such
provisions as are to be retained in one section or, if legislators are
to be treated differently from other government officials, then in two
sections. (For some policy considerations on this subject, see the Com-
ment on Sec. 15, infra, p. 177-8.)
Disqualification for Crimes
Sec. 4. No person who has been, or hereafter shall be convicted of bribery,
perjury or other infamous crime, nor any person who has been or may be a
collector or holder of public moneys, who shall not have accounted for and paid
over, according to law, all such moneys due from him, shall be eligible to the
General Assembly, or to any office of profit or trust in this State.
History
The 1818 and 1848 Constitutions contained comparable provisions
concerning paying over public moneys due, and contained provisions
giving the legislature "full power to exclude from the privilege of . . .
being elected any person convicted of bribery, perjury or any other in-
famous crime." (The word "any" before "other" was omitted in 1848.)
In the 1870 Convention, the proposal as originally offered changed the
part concerning convicted persons from power to exclude by law to a
command to the legislature to exclude. A delegate suggested that the Con-
vention ought to make the decision and be done with it. Accordingly, an
amendment was offered embodying the suggestion. (Debates 572.) The
amendment was accepted and the Committee on Revision and Adjust-
ment combined it with the proposed section on accounting for public
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moneys. The drafters of the proposed 1922 Constitution created a new
article called "Public Servants," one of the sections of which consisted
of a simplified version of Section 4, the prohibition against dual office
holding in Section 3 (supra, p. 119), and the nioneys-in-default part of
Section 1 1 of Article IX (infra, p. 474).
Explanation
This straightforward section is designed to keep criminals out of. gov-
ernment and, apparently, to use the obtaining of a government position
as a collection device. The latter characterization may appear inappro-
priate, but any broader characterization would imply some sort of crim-
inal behavior and that would presumably be encompassed by the other
half of the section. The Supreme Court has held, however, that there
must be a proper determination, by a court or other competent author-
ity, that the moneys are in fact in default. (Cawley v. People, 95 111. 249
(1880).)
The Supreme Court has added two important glosses to this section. It
has held that the courts, not the legislature, ultimately decide what
is an "infamoi'is crime" for purposes of this section. (People ex rel.
Keenan v. McGuane, 13 111. 2d 520 (1958). See also People ex rel. Ward
V. Tomek, 54 111. App. 2d 197 (1964), where the crime was a misde-
meanor, but, significantly, was a conspiracy to defraud a township.) In
the Keenan case, the Supreme Court did not, of course, purport to have
the legislative power of definition; the judicial decision is to be made
"in the light of the common law as it existed when the Constitution was
adopted in 1870." (Id. at 533.) In the same case, the Supreme Court added
its second gloss by construing "conviction" to mean after trial and before
disposition of any appeals. If this construction were to be applied
literally, the disqualification upon conviction would remain, notwith-
standing subsequent reversal. It can be argued, however, that a reversal
— on the merits and not for a new trial — wipes out the conviction as if it
never existed. In any event, this question is an open one. (See also the
Explanation of Sec. 9, infra, p. 147, concerning judicial review of a
decision by the legislature to seat a person alleged to be ineligible.)
Comparative Analysis
Conviction of Crime: Approximately 30 of the states have some consti-
tutional disqualification for holding public office upon conviction of
stated crimes. Only a half dozen or so have one as sweeping as in Illinois.
In those states which limit the range of disqualifying crimes, the one
most commonly included is bribery. A few states simply authorize the
legislature to provide for disqualifications by law. In at least five states it
is possible to have the disqualification removed either by pardon or by
Art. IV, § 5 1 29
restoration of civil rights. Neither the United States Constitution nor
the Model State Constitution contains any provision on this subject.
Moneys in Default: About a third of the states have comparable pro-
visions. Most of them cover all public offices, but a few are limited to
eligibility to serve in the legislature. Neither the United States Con-
stitution nor the Model State Constitution contains any provision on this
subject.
Comment
It seems appropriate to note the permanence of the disqualification for
infamous criminal behavior. There is no room for the concept of a
single "payment of a debt to society" or for the concept of rehabilitation.
In this connection, it is interesting that the comparable section as re-
vised in the 1964 Michigan Constitution provides that the disqualifica-
tion is limited to convictions "within the preceding 20 years."
Oath of Office
Sec. 5. Members of the General Assembly, before they enter upon their official
duties, shall take and subscribe the following oath or affirmation:
"I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support the Constitution of the
United States and the Constitution of the State of Illinois, and will faithfully
discharge the duties of Senator (or Representative) according to the best of my
ability; and that I have not, knowingly or intentionally, paid or contributed
anything, or made any promise in the nature of a bribe, to directly or indirectly
influence any vote at the election at which I was chosen to fill the said office,
and have not accepted, nor will I accept or receive, directly or indirectly, any
money or other valuable thing, from any corporation, company or person, for
any vote or influence I may give or withold on any bill, resolution or appropri-
ation, or for any other official act."
This oath shall be administered by a judge of the supreme or circuit court in
the hall of the house to which the member is elected, and the Secretary of State
shall record and file the oath subscribed by each member. Any member who
shall refuse to take the oath herein prescribed shall forfeit his office, and every
member who shall be convicted of having sworn falsely to, or of violating, his
said oath, shall forfeit his office and be disqualified thereafter from holding any
office of profit or trust in this State.
History
The 1818 Constitution simply required that all public officers take an
oath to support the United States and Illinois Constitutions and an oath
of office. The Schedule of that Constitution provided that justices of the
peace could administer oaths until the legislature otherwise directed.
Both provisions were repeated in the 1848 Constitution and a new oath
was added: against dueling. In the 1870 Convention, debate on this
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section was extensive. The argument was over whether to strike from the
proposed oath the words following "ability." The vehemence with which
the longer oath was defended is some indication of the low repute in
which legislators were then held. There were three different attempts
to strike, but they all failed. The proposed 1922 Constitution left this
section unchanged.
Explanation
In addition to providing for the customary oath of office, this section
utilizes the oath-taking process to get at improper lobbying, special inter-
est influences, bribery and other means of corrupting the legislative
process. There has been no judicial interpretation of this section except
to note that the word "forfeit" in tlie first part of the last sentence of the
section means that an elected legislator has title to the office before
taking the oath. (People ex rel. Douglas v. Barrett, 370 111. 464 (1939).)
Comparative Analysis
There are, of course, a great many minor variations in the oath re-
quirements of the several states. The important point to note is that in
only a few states does the oath include detailed disclaimers of improper
influences. There appear to be three states — Nebraska, South Dakota
and Wyoming — that cover both pre-election and in-office improper in-
fluences and provide for disqualification from office. Two states —
Missouri and West Virginia — speak only to improper influences in
office and disqualification therefor. Three states — Montana, Oklahoma
and Pennsylvania — cover both pre-election and in-office improper in-
fluences but omit disqualification. Texas prohibits only pre-election
chicanery. Of these nine states, all except Missouri, South Dakota and
West Virginia include the detailed disclaimer in the general oath of
office. (For further comparison of oaths of office see discussion of Sec. 25
of Art. V, infra, p. 323.)
Comment
It is traditional to require an oath of office. Oath-taking is a ritual
of great solemnity and dignity, but it is debatable whether an oath serves
any purpose other than ritual. It is not traditional to utilize an oath of
office as either a device to ferret out previous wrong-doing or to exact
a promise against future wrong-doing. Nor is it traditional to use viola-
tion of an oath as the device for punishment of the wrong-doing. It was
noted above that there is no reported judicial review of this section.
Since it seems doubtful that no legislator has ever violated this oath of
office, one can speculate as to the usefulness of this detailed disclaimer.
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SENATORIAL APPORTIONMENT
State Senators
Sec. 6. The General Assembly in 1955 shall redistrict the state for the purpose
of electing state senators. There shall be fifty-eight senatorial districts. Cook
county shall have twenty-four of the districts. These twenty-four districts shall
be located as follows: Eighteen in the territory that is within the present corporate
limits of the city of Chicago; and six in the territory that is in Cook county
outside such corporate limits. The remaining one hundred and one counties
of the state shall have thirty-four of the senatorial districts.
All senatorial districts shall be formed of contiguous and compact territory.
In their formation, area shall be the prime consideration.
The senatorial districts shall be numbered one, two, three, and so forth, in-
cluding fifty-eight. Each such district shall elect one senator, whose term of
office shall be four years. Senators elected in districts bearing even numbers
shall be elected in 1956 and every four years thereafter; and senators elected in
districts bearing odd numbers shall be elected in 1958 and every four years
thereafter.
History
The 1818 Constitution called for four-year staggered terms for sena-
tors from districts fixed by the General Assembly and apportioned "ac-
cording to the number of white inhabitants." The number of senators
was "never to be less than one-third nor more than one-half of the num-
ber of representatives."
The 1848 Constitution continued four-year staggered terms, but fixed
the number of senators at 25. Districts were to be
"composed of contigu-
ous territory bounded by county lines; . . . Provided, that cities and
towns containing the requisite population [could] be erected into sepa-
rate districts." Districts were to be
"apportioned among the several
counties according to the number of white inhabitants." A state census
in 1855 and every tenth year thereafter was provided for, and redistrict-
ing was to take place every five years following each state and federal
census. There was also a technical direction for distribution of popula-
tion in the case of an excess in a single county.
The 1870 Convention included the classic debate over representation
— whether representation should be solely on the basis of people, whether
every county should have its own representation, whether the downstate
areas needed protection against Cook County, and so on. A special twist
was given to this problem by Joseph Medill, Chairman of the Committee
on Electoral and Representative Reform, when he offered his plan for
cumulative voting. Most of the debate centered on representation in the
lower house, however, and will be discussed in the History of Section 7.
{Inpa, p. 136.)
The proposal for the Senate as originally offered was in substance much
as Section 6 in the 1870 Constitution prior to adoption of the 1954 Amend-
ment. There were to be 51 senators, elected for staggered four-year terms.
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from districts "formed of contiguous and compact territory, bounded
by county lines," and containing, "as nearly as practicable, an equal num-
ber of inhabitants." A certain amount of jjopulation flexibility was pro-
vided for in a technical exception. (In the light of the one man-one vote
requirement promidgated by the United States Supreme Court, it seems
pointless to explain these technical provisions.) The General Assembly
w^s to redistrict the state after each Federal Census.
The only debate of significance was over a proposal to cut the size ot
the Senate from 51 to 37. (There is no indication in the Convention de-
bates where these magic numbers of 37 and 51 came from. For cumula-
tive voting in the House, Mr. Medill, of course, had to have a number
divisible by three, and the delegate who proposed 37 indicated that he
was thinking of a lower house of 100 or 101. W^Iiether he also thought
that 37 times 3 equals 101 is not known.) It should be noted that Mr.
Medill's committee originally proposed cumulative voting for senators,
which would have meant 17 districts electing three senators each. The
decision to limit cumulative voting to the House of Representatives was
made by Mr. Medill and his committee long after the original proposal
had been filed with the Convention. It is fairly clear from the debates
that a great many decisions on the representation problem were made
off the floor, and the decision to leave the Senate with single-member
districts may have been one of them.
The senatorial districting provision of the proposed 1922 Constitution
was one of several controversial products of the 1920-22 Convention. The
number of senators was set at 57, of which 19 were allotted to Cook
County and 38 to the rest of the state. Periodic districting was to be on
the basis, not of population, but of persons voting for governor. The
districting would be confined to realignment of the 19 districts inside
Cook County and of the 38 districts outside.
The last redistricting of the Senate called for under the original Sec-
tion 6 took place in 1901. As the years passed, the under-representation
of Cook County became more and more pronounced. And since repre-
sentatives were elected from senatorial districts, under-representation was
the same in both houses. After the 1922 Constitution was rejected, many
proposed constitutional amendments on legislative apportionment and
districting were offered in the General Assembly, but none passed. The
first effort to succeed was the compromise proposal in 1953 that became
Sections 6, 7 and 8 following approval in November, 1954. The com-
promise was, of course, to make senatorial representation geographical
and to limit population representation to the lower house. The United
States Supreme Court changed all that and there is today no valid
constitutional provision for senatorial districting.
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Explanation
In Germano v. Kerner (378 U.S. 560 (1964)), the United States
Supreme Court made it clear that Section 6 is unconstitutional. After the
74th General Assembly adjourned without redistricting the Senate, the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, where
the Germano case had been instituted, and the Supreme Court of Illinois,
which had retained jurisdiction over a like case in the state courts, co-
operated in the development of a districting plan. In People ex rel. Engle
V. Kerner (33 111. 2d 11 (1965)), this plan was promulgated with the in-
struction that all 58 senators were to be elected lor four years in 1966 and
in 1970.
One of the things that fell by the wayside as a result of the one man-
one vote requirement was the interesting argument that since Section 6
provides for a "one-shot" districting plan, the 1955 Act which created
the senatorial districts became, in effect, a permanent part of the Con-
stitution without following the amendment procedure. (See the majority
and dissenting opinions in People ex rel Engle v. Kerner, 32 111. 2d 212
(1965).)
Comparotive Analysis
Size: It may come as a surprise to many to learn that only Minnesota
(67) and Iowa (61) have more members in their Senates than has Illinois.
Ten states, including Illinois, have between 50 and 59 members; 12 be-
tween 40 and 49; 20 between 30 and 39; and six under 30. The foregoing
refers to actual members as of May, 1967. Only 19 states, including
Illinois, specify constitutionally the exact number of senators. The other
states set maximums and minimums, or have other criteria for size. Min-
nesota, for example, ties size of Senate to total population. Moreover,
the one man-one vote rule is a monkey-wrench thrown into the districting
system across the country and there may be instances where, with judicial
sanction, the actual size of a Senate may not conform to the constitutional
provision.
Terms: Illinois is one of a large majority of 38 states setting four-year
terms for the Senate. This includes unicameral Nebraska. The remain-
ing 12 have two-year terms. Most of the four-year-term states stagger
the elections as Illinois normally does. A few states have four-year terms
for both houses.
Apportionment: There is not much point in reviewing the constitu-
tional methods of apportionment in the several states. Not only have the
United States Supreme Court's rulings invalidated many provisions; states
which, as formerly the case in Illinois, required districting on the basis
of population frequently failed to redistrict after a decennial census.
It may be noted, however, that in theory some states provided that ap-
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portionment of both houses was to be by population, and that in states
apportioning only one house by population, it was frequently the Senate
that was to be so apportioned. As of the middle of 1967, 25 states chose
their Senates from single-member districts. Of the remaining 25, only two,
Florida and West Virginia, chose all senators from multi-member dis-
tricts. The other 23 had a mixture of single- and multi-member districts,
ranging from states where most members of the Senate are chosen from
single-member districts to states where most are from multi-member
districts.
United States Constitution: The United States Constitution provides
for two senators from each state, elected for six-year terms. Approxi-
mately one-third of the Senate is elected every two years, and, of course,
in each state the terms are staggered. (Thus, districts are multi-member,
but, except on some occasions involving an unexpired term, elections are
as if from single-member districts.) Article V further provides that no
state may be deprived of its representation in the Senate without its
consent. It is worth mentioning, perhaps, that the United States Senate
has been used as an argument against the concept that both houses of a
state legislature should be apportioned on a population basis. There is
a theoretical and a practical answer to the argument. The theoretical
answer is that the several states, as, in effect, sovereign nations following
dissociation from England, banded together in a federation under their
own terms. No local government within a state — county, city or town
— can stand on any such theory. The practical answer is that in most
states, tradition divides the two senators between the urban and rural
areas, or between the "big city" and the rest of the state, or on some other
geographic basis, and this has produced a senatorial cross-section that is
much more complex than the urban /rural division that would normally
obtain in a single state with geographic districting.
Model State Constitution: The Model State Constitution recommends
a unicameral legislature consisting of senators elected for two-year terms
from single-member districts, with a constitutional maximum and mini-
mum number of districts, but with the numbers left blank. An alterna-
tive recommendation for a bicameral legislature provides for a number
of senators not exceeding one-third the number of assemblymen, elected
from single-member districts for six-year staggered terms.
The Model's recommendation for districting is that each "district shall
consist of compact and contiguous territory. All districts shall be so nearly
equal in population that the population of the largest district shall not
exceed that of the smallest district by more than — per cent. In deter-
mining the population of each district, inmates of such public or private
institutions as prisons or other places of correction, hospitals for the in-
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sane or other institutions housing persons who are disqualified from
voting by law shall not be counted." (art. IV, §4.04.)
Comment
At the present time, apportionment and districting are so tightly con-
trolled by the United States Supreme Court that there is little leeway in
constructing constitutional rules for the guidance of those charged with
reapportionment and redistricting following an official census. In the
light of the United States Supreme Court's Kirkpatrick and Wells de-
cisions, discussed under Section 7 {infra, p. 139), even the percentage
variance in the Model State Constitution's provision quoted is not accept-
able. (The next edition of the Model will undoubtedly reflect this latest
constitutional command.)
Nevertheless, there are two possibilities from recent constitutional con-
vention experience which are worthy of consideration. One is the in-
genious open-ended provision adopted by Connecticut in 1965. After
specifying the maximum and minimum allowable number of senatorial
and assembly districts, all of which shall be contiguous, and with no
other specification except that a town (township or city in Illinois) shall
not be divided other than to make two or more assembly districts wholly
within the town, the Connecticut Constitution states: "The establish-
ment of districts in the general assembly shall be consistent with federal
constitutional standards." Thus, if the United States Supreme Court
modifies its one man-one vote rule or if the United States Constitution
is amended in some fashion that alters the rule, Connecticut, after the
next decennial census following such modification or alteration, can take
advantage thereof without an amendment of its constitution. In the same
year, Tennessee adopted an amendment achieving the same end as in
Connecticut but spelling out in some detail alternative criteria for dis-
tricting.
The other possibility worth considering is the proposed solution to the
problem of gerrymandering offered in the vnisuccessful 1967 New York
Constitution. The rubric, "compact, contiguous and as nearly equal in
population as is practicable," has not prevented gerrymandering. Sug-
gestions for inhibiting partisan gerrymandering have, in general, fol-
lowed two lines: one is to use additional criteria, such as following
natural geographic, political and social boundaries; the other is to pro-
vide for a wholly independent commission to do the redistricting. The
New York proposed solution was to include among the criteria for dis-
tricting the flat statement: "Gerrymandering for any purpose is pro-
hibited." This would have provided for judicial review of a districting
plan where the claim was that, even though the districts were compact,
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contiguous, and almost equal in population, the plan was in fact the re-
sult of partisan gerrymandering. (Up to now the United States Supreme
Court has not extended the equal protection rule to include gerryman-
dering as such, except in the case of Gomillioti -o. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339
(1960), Avhich involved gerrymandering for strictly racial purposes.)
Representatives
Sec. 7. The General Assembly in 1955 and in 1963, and every ten years there-
after, shall redistrict the state for the purpose of electing state representatives.
There shall be fifty-nine representative districts. In the 1955 redistritting Cook
County shall have thirty of the districts. These thirty districts shall be located
as follows: Twenty-three in the territory that is within the present corporate
limits of the City of Chicago; and seven in the territory that is in Cook Coimty
outside such corporate limits. In the 1955 redistricting, the remaining one liun-
dred and one counties of the state shall have twenty-nine of the representative
districts. In redistricting subsequent to the I960 census, and thereafter, the fifty-
nine representative districts shall be divided among (1) that part of Cook County
that is within the present corporate limits of the City of Chicago, (2) that part of
Cook County that is outside such corporate limits, and (3) the remaining one
hundred and one counties of the state, as nearly as may be, as the population
of each of these three divisions bears to the total population of the state.
Representative districts shall be formed of contiguous and compact territory,
and shall contain, as nearly as practicable, a population equal to the represent-
ative ratio; outside of Cook county, such districts 'shall be bounded by county
lines unless the population of any county entitles it to more than one represent-
ative district. The representative ratio for the entire state shall be the quotient
obtained by dividing the population of the state by fifty-nine. No representative
district may contain less population than four-fifths of the representative ratio.
Three representatives shall be elected in each representative district in 1956
and every two years thereafter. The term of office shall be two years. In all
elections of representatives aforesaid, each qualified voter may cast as many
votes for one candidate as there are representatives to be elected, or may dis-
tribute the same, or equal parts thereof, among the candidates as he shall see fit;
and the candidates highest in votes shall be declared elected.
History
The 1818 Constitution called lor two-year terms for representatives
from districts fixed by the General Assembly and apportioned "accord-
ing to the number of white inhabitants." The number of representatives
was to be not "less than twenty-seven, nor more than thirty-six, until the
number of inhabitants shall amount to 100,000." It was not stated what
was to happen after the population passed 100,000.
The 1848 Constitution continued two-year terms, but fixed the num-
ber of representatives at 75, "until the population of the state shall
amount to 1,000,000 souls, when five members may be added to the house,
and five additional members lor every 500,000 inhabitants thereafter,
until the whole number of representatives shall amount to 100; after
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which the number shall neither be increased nor diminished." Districts
were to be
"composed of contiguous territory bounded by county lines;
. . . Provided, that cities and towns containing the requisite population
may be erected into separate districts." Districts were to be "apportioned
among the several counties according to the number of white inhabi-
tants." It was further provided that not more than three representatives
could be elected from a single district and that if more than one county
comprised a district, all representatives for that district were to be
elected by the entire district. The five-year redistricting requirement and
the technical direction lor distribution of excess population applicable
to senators (see History of Sec. 6, supra, p. 131) also applied to repre-
sentative districts.
One of the most extensive debates in the 1870 Convention concerned
Sections 7 and 8 governing representative districts. The irony of it all
was that the voters were given the alternative of accepting Mr. Medill's
cumulative voting provision, described below, and they took it in pref-
erence to the carefully worked out Sections 7 and 8. The debate over Sec-
tions 7 and 8 was complex, partly because the sections themselves were
complex, so much so that at one point the Convention recessed for sev-
eral hours to permit the Committee on the Legislative Department to
redraft one of the sections. The members of the committee had demon-
strated on the floor that they themselves did not agree on the meaning of
what they had drafted. But behind the debate lay the classic rural-urban,
downstate-Cook County problem. Since the sections never went into
effect, it suffices to note that most counties would have been entitled to
representation and that population increases and shifts were partly to be
compensated for by increasing the size of the House every ten years. (Un-
der the formula, there would be at least 219 representatives today.)
Joseph Medill was Chairman of the Committee on Electoral and
Representative Reform and a member of the Committee on the Legisla-
tive Department. He addressed himself to the problem of minority
representation. His primary concern was not with rural-urban or down-
state-Cook County problems, but with the peculiar historical accident
that the northern half of the state was overwhelmingly Republican and
the southern half was overwhelmingly Democratic. Mr. Medill's theory
was that people who voted for the losing candidate ended up being un-
represented, and that this was inconsistent with the democratic process
as manifested in a traditional town meeting. His solution was the three-
member district with the privilege of cumulative voting. (See Debates
560-64.)
For reasons that do not appear in the Debates, the Committee Report
was not acted upon by the Convention sitting in Committee of the Whole.
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It was taken up by the Convention proper late in the session, at which
time Mr. Medill offered a substitute that omitted the Senate from the
minority representation plan. There was a minimum ot debate and the
substitute was accepted and referred to the Committee on Revision and
Adjustment. (Debates 1729.) It is reasonably clear that acceptance was on
the assumption that minority representation would be referred to the
voters as an alternative mode of representation in the lower house. (Id.)
In the special election on the Constitution, there were nine separate
votes, including one for or against the whole Constitution. The vote on
minority representation was much closer than on any other question. The
alternative Sections 7 and 8 provided that three representatives would be
elected every two years in each senatorial district. Each voter had three
votes which he could distribute as he wished.
The proposed 1922 Constitution abolished multi-member districts and,
perforce, cumulative voting. There were to be 153 representative districts,
compact and contiguous but following county lines. Districts were to con-
tain, as nearly as practicable, the same number of people who had voted
for governor in the last preceding gubernatorial election, but there was
a technical rule of distribution that gave a slight advantage to counties
of lesser population.
The compromise set of amendments proposed in 1953 and approved
in November, 1954, preserved the principle of representation by popula-
tion in the House of Representatives and multi-member districts with
cumulative voting. Since the new basis of representation for the Senate
was geographical, house districts could no longer be co-extensive with
senate districts. The number of house districts w'as increased to 59 and the
size of the House perforce became 177.
Explanation
Following the adoption of the 1954 Amendment, the 69th General
Assembly adopted a districting plan of 59 three-member districts, 23 in
Chicago, seven in the rest of Cook County, and 29 in the balance of the
state. This apportionment among the three areas of the state was as
directed in the amendment itself. After the 1960 Federal Census, the
73rd General Assembly attempted a new apportionment and districting
plan as directed by Section 7, but the Governor vetoed it. In accordance
with the requirements of Section 8 (iyifra, p. 141), a commission was
appointed, but it failed to act within the time specified and the House
of Representatives of the 74th General Assembly was elected at large. At
a Special Session held in 1964 prior to the election, the legislature aban-
doned cumulative voting for the election at large, but j^reserved minority
representation by providing that no party could list more candidates
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than a number equal to two-thirds of the total membership of the House.
(111. Rev. Stat. ch. 46, §8A-8 (1967).) The Supreme Court upheld the
arrangement. (People ex rel. Daniels v. Carpentier, 30 III. 2d 590 (1964).)
In 1965, the 74th General Assembly failed to apjDortion and district the
lower house, but the commission appointed pursuant to Section 8 was
successful. Under the plan now in operation, there are 21 Chicago dis-
tricts, nine Cook County "ex-Chicago" districts, and 29 for the balance
of the state. For the Chicago and Cook County districts, the commission
used the senatorial district boundaries promulgated by the Supreme
Court. (See Sec. 6, supra, p. 131.) The 1965 districting plan has not been
challenged in the courts.
The latest United States Supreme Court decisions on the one man-one
vote requirement create two questions about the wording of Section 7.
In Kirkpatrick v. Preisler (394 U.S. 526 (1969)), decided April 7, 1969,
the Court clearly stated that the requirement of equality of population,
"as nearly as practicable," from district to district is not met by adher-
ence to some minimum plus or minus variance from what in Section 7
is called the
"representative ratio." A good faith effort to attain mathe-
matical equality is required, and this would not likely be attainable if the
command to follow county lines outside of Cook County were to be
followed. On the same day, the United States Supreme Court handed
down Wells v. Rockefeller (394 U.S. 542 (1969)), in which it upset a
Congressional redistricting plan principally because the legislature first
carved seven
"homogeneous" sections out of the state and then produced
districts of almost identical population in each section, but ending up
with substantial deviation among all the districts, including the ten (out
of a state total of 41) which were not included in any of the seven "homo-
geneous" sections. In the light of the Wells case, it seems unlikely that
Illinois can continue to follow the two-step process of first apportioning
177 seats among Chicago, the balance of Cook County and the rest of
the state, and then districting on a population basis in each area either
according to the representative ratio, which is computed on a state-wide
basis, or according to a representative ratio for each of the three segments.
With reference to cumulative voting, it should be noted that in prac-
tice the need for cumulating one's votes is frequently obviated because
the majority party nominates only two candidates and the minority party
one. (Compare the statutory scheme for the at-large election of 1964
referred to above.) Since the purpose of cumulative voting is to assure
minority representation, such party nominating practice guarantees the
minority representation originally envisioned by Mr. Medill. Unfortu-
nately, such a practice effectively destroys the franchise of independent
and minor minority party members and partially destroys the franchise
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of the two major party members who cannot exercise any power except
in their own party's primai"y. The practice was approved by the Supreme
Court in People ex rel. Lindstrand v. Emmerson (333 111. 606 (1929)).
The principle of minority representation requires multi-member dis-
tricts, and presumably that is the only reason Illinois has them. But, as
noted'in the Coynpnratwc Analysis below, many states have them, usually
in a mix of single-member and multi-member districts. On July 28, 1969,
a three-judge Federal District Court held unconstitutional the present
multi-member districting scheme in Indiana. The Court said that multi-
member districts are valid only if all districts have the same number of
members. (Chavis v. Whitcomb, — F. Supp. — (S.D. Ind. 1969). See also
Banzhaf, "Multi-Member Electoral Districts — Do They Violate the 'One
Man, One Vote' Principle?" 75 Yale L.J. 1309 (1966).)
Comparative Analysis
Size: There are four states with a larger lower house than that of
Illinois, and one state, Connecticut, which also has 177 members. Seven
states have precisely 100 representatives, 19 states have fewer than 100,
and 17 states have more than 100 but fewer than 177.
Terms: All states except Alabama, Louisiana, Maryland, and Missis-
sippi have two-year terms for representatives. Those four states have
four-year terms for members of both houses. (Nebraska, of course, has no
lower house.)
Apportionment: For the reasons discussed under Section 6 (supra,
p. 131), there is no reason to review apportionment among the several
states. It should be noted, however, that 34 states have multi-member
districts in the lower house. In three of those states, including Illinois,
all districts are multi-member. In the other 31 states the lower house has
both single- and multi-member districts, in varying arrangements from
mostly single-member districts to mostly multi-member. No other state
has cumulative voting. It should be noted, moreover, that in some states,
the seats in a multi-member district are numbered so that Carp runs
against Bass and Doe runs against Buck and a voter cannot "vote for two,"
but must choose between each pair. (This also obtains in some of the
states with multi-member districts in the upper house.)
United States Constitution: Representatives are apportioned among
the several states on the basis of population with the provision that every
state is entitled to at least one representative. (There are five states with
only one representative.) Until the 1920 Census, Congress regularly in-
creased the size of the House of Representatives as the country's popu-
lation increased. Since then, the practice has been to retain the size of the
House at 435 and to reapportion after each Census. Since 1930, reappor-
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tionment has been automatic under a permanent formula. Congress can,
of course, change the present method at any time.
Model State Constitution: The Model recommends a unicameral
legislature, but provides akernative sections for a bicameral legislature.
The bicameral recommendation is for a lower house of single-member
districts with a constitutional maximum and minimum size, but without
insertion of maximum and minimum numbers. Terms are set at two years.
The recjuirement for districting is the same as for the unicameral senate.
(See quotation, supra, p. 134.)
Comment
If the Convention decides to preserve cumulative voting, districts will
presumably continue to have three members each. If cumulative voting
is abandoned, it would be tempting Fate to go to a system of mixed
single- and multi-member districts or all multi-member districts of un-
etjual numbers. United States Supreme Court watchers are not likely to
offer attractive odds that the Chavis case would be reversed. (See also
Comment for Sec. 6, supra, p. 135.)
Redistricting
Sec. 8. In performing its duties under Sections 6 and 7 of this amendment,
the General Assembly shall redistrict and reapportion in a single legislative en-
actment. If, however, the regular session of the General Assembly in 1955 as
to both senatorial and representative districts or in 1963, or any ten years there-
after as to representative districts, fails by the first day of July to redistrict
the state into such districts, then the redistricting shall be accomplished by a
commission. Within thirty days after such first day of July, the state central
committee of each of the two political parties, casting the highest votes for
governor at the last preceding gubernatorial election, shall submit to the
governor of the state a list of ten persons. Within thirty days thereafter, the
governor shall appoint the commission of ten members, five from each list. If
either of the state central committees fails to submit the list within the specified
time, the governor, within the specified time, shall appoint five members of his
own choice from the party of such committee. Each member of the committee
shall receive 325.00 a day, but not more than $2,000 for his service.
This commission shall redistrict the state into senatorial districts and into
representative districts in the manner specified above. This commission shall
file with the secretary of state a full statement of the numbers of the senatorial
and representative districts and their boundaries. No such statement shall be
valid unless approved by seven members of such commission.
After such statement is filed, senators and representatives shall be elected
according to the statement and the districts therein determined, until a re-
districting and reapportionment are thereafter made by the General Assembly
as provided in this amendment. If, however, the statement is not filed within
four months after the commission is appointed it shall stand discharged. There-
upon, all senators, scheduled for election at the next election for state senators,
and all state representatives shall be nominated and elected at the next election
from the state at large. Following such an election at large, the General Assembly
at its next regular session shall perform the duties specified in this amendment.
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But if such a General Assembly fails to perform these duties, tlien another com-
mission, as specified in this Section 8, shall be ap])()inted in like manner, with
like duties, and power, and with like effect; and so foriii until a valid senatorial
and representative rcdistricting and reapportionment are secured in this 1950
decade and each decade thereafter. But there can be only one valid senatorial
and representative redistricting and reapportionment during a particular decade.
History
This section was part of the amendment adopted in 1954. Tliere was
nothing comparable in any of the earlier Constitutions. The proposed
1922 Constitution did have a provision for action in case the General
Assembly failed to redistrict, as follows:
"If the general assembly fails to make any such apportionment it shall be the
duty of the secretary of state, the attorney general and the auditor of public
accounts to meet at the office of the governor within ninety days after the ad-
journment of the regular session of the year designated for that purpose and
make an apportionment as provided in section twenty-three of this constitution."
(art. Ill, § 24.)
Explanation
With one exception, nothing in Section 8 is affected by the one man-
one vote reqtiirement. The exception is that Section 8 does not inchide
senatorial redistricting after initial creation of senatorial districts. (See
People ex rcl. Giannis v. Carpentier, 30 111. 2d 24 (1964).) Under the one
man-one vote requirement, periodic redistricting of both houses will be
necessary.
In Williams v. Kerner (30 111. 2d 11 (1963)), the Supreme Court held
that the Governor's power of veto was part of the legislative process
involved in redistricting under Section 8.
Comparative Analysis
Traditionally, redistricting was confined to the legislature, and, tradi-
tionally, the job did not get done. Even before the United States Supreme
Court opened the door to judicial enforcement of redistricting, some
states had begun to experiment with ways of accomplishing redistrict-
ing in the face of obvious legislative reluctance to act. Indeed, Section
8 was adopted a good many years before the breakthrough in Baker v.
Carr (369 U.S. 186 (1962)). Now, of course, as state after state under-
takes the task of adopting new provisions to take the place of invalid
ones, attention is given to including some method for carrying redistrict-
ing forward if the legislature fails to act. There are at least seven states
besides Illinois which provide for an alternative procedure for redistrict-
ing. Another state, Colorado, used the sanction route of providing no
compensation to legislators and ineligibility for reelection after a given
period and until redistricting was accomplished. No other state appears
to have an "election at large" sanction.
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The United States Supreme Court's redistricting rulings have also
probably caused more states to take the route of by-passing the legislature
and providing for initial redistricting by some nonlegislative agency.
There are at least ten states that by-pass the legislature, several of which
antedate the Supreme Court's rulings. In some states, the Governor is
given the task, usually with an advisory group. In other states, there
is a redistricting commission of designated elected officials, and in some
states the commission is appointed, normally from lists submitted to the
Governor. A goodly number of states specifically include a constitutional
authorization for judicial review of any redistricting plan.
The United States Constitution is silent as to the process of appor-
tionment of seats in the House of Representatives. The current system,
as noted earlier (supra, p. 140), is to redistribute the 435 seats auto-
matically by statutory formula following the decennial census. The
Model State Constitution recommends the appointment by the Governor
of a board of cjualified voters to make redistricting recommendations
which the Governor must publish but may change with appropriate
explanations of the reasons for such changes. Original jurisdiction is
conferred on the highest court for judicial review, including power to
promulgate a revised plan, or an original plan if the Governor fails to
act.
Comment
There are two key problems in considering who should redistrict. The
first is whether the legislature should have a bite at the cherry at all.
The second is whether the bite, first or second, should be antiseptic —
i.e., nonpolitical and nonpartisan.
The arguments in favor of by-passing the legislature are fairly persua-
sive. Leaving aside for the moment the question of whether redistricting
is essentially political, the special problem facing a legislature under-
taking redistricting is the personal vested interest of the sitting mem-
bers. One of the conclusions drawn from an analysis of the Illinois ex-
perience in 1955 was expressed as follows:
"Redistricting proposals that dislodge a minimum number of sitting members,
irrespective of party, will be favored over proposals that do not take into ac-
count the sitting members. There is no evidence that in the 1955 redistricting
either party persisted in an attempt to improve the existing legislative strength
of the party by a favorable redistricting scheme. On the other hand, neither party
showed any disposition to give up any of its safe seats or sacrifice any of its
sitting members. In short, if it had been possible to achieve a redistricting that
would have satisfied the constitutional mandate without imperiling the seat
of any member, such a plan would have had virtually unanimous support in
the General Assembly. To the extent that future redistricting plans can approach
this goal, they will meet a minimum of opposition. Neither party nor principle
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nor region is more important tlian ;i legislator's colleagues." (G. Steiner and
S. Gove, Legislative Politics in Illinois 117 (I960).)
But districting is part ot tlie political process and it is argtiable whether
it is appropriate to attempt to insulate districting Irom that process. One
possibility is the use ot computers. This is a tricky business because, as
everyone lamiliar with computers knows, the resuk produced is no better
than the progranniied instructions. (In computer lingo, it's GIGO— gar-
bage in, garbage out.) An abstract plan based on compactness, contiguity,
equality ot population and nothing more coidd be led to a computer,
but the result, outside ot Chicago, could be statewide slices from border
to border, east and west or nortli and south.
It tollows that a great deal of thought must go into the preparation of
tlie program that is to be given to the computer. Such thought should be
political, not in any narrow, partisan sense, but in the sense tliat tlie
end sought is a system of fair representation in the political process of
law-making. Some balance must be struck between the use of knowledge-
able people who are likely to be highly partisan and nonpartisan people
who are not likely to be knowledgeable in practical, political realities.
It may very well be that the use of a computer could be the vehicle for
striking the balance. If the districting plan is prepared by hand, so to
speak, by a bipartisan group, there is a danger that it will engage in all
sorts of trade-offs on the basis of assumed short-range partisan advan-
tages. If the plan is prepared by hand by a nonpartisan group, there is
a danger that the result may retlect hidden prejudices that may or may
not be appropriate to the political process, or may produce a short-range
chaotic situation because too many delicate political balances are up-
set. But if the group charged with producing a districting plan has no
more to do than prepare the rules that guide a computer, a bipartisan
board or conmiission might be preferable.
It is arguable, of course, that even the rules that guide a computer
can be
"rigged," so to speak. One rule, for example, could be that tlie
maximum number of incumbents should be protected. But it is equally
arguable that a nonpartisan groiq) might adopt a rule that the maximum
number of incumbents should have their seats put in jeopardy.
In sum, there are three propositions that can be set down for the guid-
.ance of those who must decide who is to do the redistricting. First, for
the reasons set out earlier, the legislature is not the appropriate agency.
Second, there are many pros and cons for either bipartisan or non-
partisan boards or commissions, and the choice may approach a toss-iqD.
Third, in any event, no one need wander around with a lantern looking
for perfection in the world of politics.
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Organization Procedure
Sec. 9. The sessions of the General Assembly shall commence at twelve
o'clock noon, on the Wednesday next after the first Monday in January, in
the year next ensuing the election of members thereof, and at no other time,
unless as provided by this Constitution.
A majority of the members elected to each house shall constitute a quorum.
Each house shall determine the rules of its proceedings,^ and be the judge of
the election, returns and qualifications of its members; shall choose its own
officers; and the Senate shall choose a temporary President to preside when the
Lieutenant Governor shall not attend as President or shall act as governor. The
Secretary of State shall call the House of Representatives to order at the opening
of each new Assembly, and preside over it until a temporary presiding officer
thereof shall have been chosen and shall have taken his seat. No member shall
be expelled by either house, except by a vote of two-thirds of all the members
elected to that house, and no member shall be twice expelled for the same
offense. Each house may punish by imprisonment any person, not a member,
who sliall be guilty of disrespect to the house by disorderly or contemptuous
behavior in its presence. But no such imprisonment shall extend beyond twenty-
four hours at one time, unless the person shall persist in such disorderly or con-
temptuous behavior.
History
Sessions: The 1818 Constitution provided for biennial sessions in much
the same language as in the first paragraph of Section 9. The only differ-
ence was the beginning date of the first Monday in December. (The elec-
tion for senators and representatives was on the first Monday in August.)
The 1848 Constitution changed the meeting date to the first Monday in
January. (Election Day became the first Tuesday after the first Monday
in NoveiTiber under the 1848 Constitution.)
The first paragraph of Section 9, offered to the 1870 Convention as a
separate section, made the change to Wednesday after the first Monday
and specified noon as the magic hour. A proposal was offered to strike the
words following "thereof" and substitute the words "unless otherwise
provided by law or by this Constitution." This was actually an amend-
ment to a proposal to specify annual sessions which the proponent of
annual sessions accepted at the end of the debate on the subject. The de-
bate was spirited, but the final vote was only 16 for the amendinent with
33 against. (Debates 511-22.) The proposed 1922 Constitution made no
change of substance.
In 1963, by joint resolution, the General Assembly proposed an amend-
ment to Section 9, providing for annual sessions, one of which was to be
limited to budget matters. The first paragraph of the proposed amend-
ment read:
"The regular sessions of the General Assembly shall commence at 12 o'clock
noon, on the Wednesday next after the first Monday in January, in each odd-
numbered year; and on the first Monday in May of each even-numbered year.
146 Art. IV, §9
At its regular session in each even-numbered year, the General Assembly shall
consider only appropriation bills for existing functions of the State for the
succeeding fiscal year, revenue bills directly pertaining and restricted thereto,
and bills, motions and resolutions pertaining to the functions of the General
Assembly during such session; and shall consider no other matter."
The balance of the proposed amendment was unchanged from the
balance of Section 9 except for a technical adjustment to make it clear
that the Secretary of State's duty to call the House of Representatives to
order was limited to the sessions in odd-niunbered years. 7 he amendment
was defeated at the general election in 19(jl. The amendment was
favored by 63.1 per cent of those voting on the amendment, but the vote
was a little over 108,000 short of a majority of those voting in the election.
The provision for the Secretary of State to call the House of Repre-
sentatives to order was added by the Committee on the Legislative De-
partment. The debate on a motion to strike the provision reveals that the
committee had two precedents in mind: One was the confusion that
attended the organization of the 1870 Convention itself; the other was
an occurrence in 1857 when, according to one delegate, "there was actually
a fight between the officers of the late house of representatives and the
new members." (Debates 525-27.) The proposed 1922 Constitution made
one change in the organizational rubric. It was spelled out that the
temporary presiding officer was to preside until a speaker was chosen.
Quorum, Rules and Officers: The 1818 and 1848 Constitutions set a
cjuorum at two-thirds of the members of each house, but provided that a
smaller number coidd adjourn from day to day and could compel the
attendance of absent members. In the 1870 Convention, the Committee on
the Legislative Department proposed to set the quorum at a specific
number of senators and a specific number of representatives, the nimiber
in each house being approximately one-half of the membership. In the
course of debate, it became clear that the proposed change was in part
designed to avoid a situation that had arisen the year before in Indiana.
There, to avoid ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment, all of the D'^tv- "•-
cratic members of the legislature resigned and the remaining Repul 'ican
members construed the quorum recjuirement to be two-thirds of the re-
maining members. It was argued in the Convention that the words "a
majority of the members elected" would avoid the Indiana example and
the proposal was so amended. The change from two-thirds to a majority
was based on previous experience in Illinois when members absented
themselves to defeat a quorum. There was apparently no sentiment for
retaining the higher requirement. No question was raised about the
omission of the words authorizing a smaller number to adjourn and to
compel attendance. The proposed 1922 Constitution made no substantive
change in the quorum requirement.
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All three Constitutions and the proposed 1922 Constitution provided
that each house should determine the rules of its own proceedings and
all provided that each house should judge the qualifications and elec-
tions of its members. The 1870 Committee on the Legislative Department
added "returns" to
"qualifications and elections" and in the 1920-22
Convention, the Committee on Phraseology and Style took out "returns."
In neither case was there an explanation for the change.
All four documents provided that each house should choose its own
officers, excepting, of course, the presiding officer of the Senate. The 1870
Convention neglected to state that the presiding officer of the House of
Representatives is called the "Speaker," an omission noted in 1921 by the
Committee on Phraseology and Style which 'put the Speaker back into the
proposed 1922 Constitution. (There are, of course, references to the
Speaker in the 1870 Constitution. See Sec. 13 of this Art. and Sec. 19 of
Art. V, lufra, p. 160 and p. 310.)
Sanctions: The 1818 Constitution provided that either house could
"punish its members for disorderly behavior," including expulsion by a
two-thirds' vote, but only once for the same offense. The 1848 Constitu-
tion contained the foregoing and added "the reason for such expulsion
shall be entered upon the journal, with the names of the members voting
on the question." The provision as proposed to the 1870 Convention
omitted both the reference to disorderly behavior and to a journal entry
and changed the rec|uired vote from two-thirds to a "majority of all the
members elected to that house." (In neither the 1818 nor the 1848 Consti-
tution was it clear what the two-thirds' vote was measured by, though the
1848 journal entry language quoted above would imply that the measure
was of those present and voting.) A delegate pointed out that the dele-
tion of the journal entry requirement removed one of the two previous
safeguards against abuse and moved that the required vote be made two-
thirds. The amendment was accepted without debate. The proposed 1922
Constitution made no substantive change.
Both the 1818 and 1848 Constitutions provided for sanctions against
nonmembers, but limited their punishment to 24 hours. The pro-
posed change now in Section 9 was objected to in the 1870 Convention.
In reply, two delegates pointed out that without the change any un-
cooperative witness could spend his 24 hours in jail and avoid ever having
to testify. The proposed 1922 Constitution made no substantive change.
Explanation
Few questions have arisen in connection with this section. In 1935, the
legislature appropriated an amount equal to a biennial salary to the
widow of a veteran legislator who had died after the election but before
the legislature met. The Supreme Court stated that the act of appropriat-
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ing money was by implication a determination that the deceased had been
duly elected. (People ex rel. Douglas v. Barrett, 370 111. 464 (1939).)
In Reif v. Barrett (355 111. 104 (1933)), the Supreme Court upheld the
finality of legislative determination of the "election, returns and qualifi-
cations of its members." It was alleged that a man in default to the state
had run for the House of Representatives, had been elected, had taken
his seat, and had voted for the bill under attack in the litigation, and
that the bill passed by precisely the minimum majority required. It was
further alleged that the person in cjuestion was ineligible to serve by
virtue of Section 4 (supra, p. 127), that his vote for the bill should not
be counted, and that the bill did not pass since without his vote there
was no constitutional majority. This case was a traditional test case — in
this instance, to determine the constitutionality of the "sales tax" — and
as is customary, all alleged facts were admitted. Notwithstanding all these
admissions, the Court refused to invalidate the vote by which the bill
passed. The representative in question "regularly received his certificate
of election and qualified as a member of the house, and the House of
Representatives seated him as a member of that body. W^e are constrained
to hold that at the time he voted he was a member of the General Assem-
bly." (Id. at 129.) "No court has the right to review the decision of the
house .... When the house once acts upon the qualifications of its
membership the matter is beyond further controversy." (Id. at 127.)
The United States Supreme Court has ended any such blanket judi-
cial refusal to review legislative decisions on seating members. In Bond
V. Floyd (385 U.S. 116 (1966)), the Court overturned the refusal of the
Georgia House of Representatives to seat Julian Bond. The Court held
that it had jurisdiction to review the state legislative determination that
Bond was not qualified, and further held that such determination in the
circumstances actually represented a denial of Bond's right of free speech.
(See also Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969), where the Court held
that the United States House of Representatives could not refuse to seat
Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., in view of the fact that he was not ineligible
under any provision of the United States Constitution.)
On several occasions the Attorney General has issued rulings concern-
ing this section. He has stated that the decision by either house on seat-
ing or not seating a member may be made by a majority of those present
and voting, provided, of course, that a cjuorum is present. (1915 111. Att'y
Gen. Rep. 455.) He has also stated that only a member of the House of
Representatives is eligible to election as Speaker. (1915 III. Att's Gen.
Rep. 144.)
Section 9 provides for biennial sessions, but does not literally prohibit
more frequent sessions by the parliamentary device of not adjourning
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si7ie die. The first two legislatures to meet after adoption of the 1870 Con-
stitution each met twice, as did the 45th General Assembly in 1907 and
1908. The device was not utilized again until 1967, when the General
Assembly adjourned to a day certain on several occasions through 1967
and 1968, adjourning 5me die in January, 1969, just before the 76th Gen-
eral Assembly convened. In 1966, the Attorney General had rendered an
opinion to the effect that the procedure subsequently followed would be
constitutional. (See I.S.L. 133-38, app. D.) He also ruled that the state
could switch from a biennial to an annual budget. (Id. See Explanation
of Sec. 18, infra, p. 185.)
Comparative Analysis
Sessions: As a result of amendments adopted in 1968, a majority of the
states for the first time in this century have constitutional provisions for
annual sessions. There are now 27 states with such a provision. Three
states, Ohio, Tennessee and Vermont, joined Illinois in using the ad-
journment device to stay active dining the 1967-68 biennium. Of the 27
states with annual sessions, ten have general sessions with no limitation
on length, eleven have limitations, and six alternate general sessions with
sessions limited to adoption of a budget, but in all six the lengths of both
the general and the budget sessions are limited. A majority of the states
with biennial sessions also have limitations on their length. In Illinois,
June 30th is, of course, a traditional "required" adjournment date. (See
Sec. 13, infra, p. 160.) It is worth noting that in the many states with
limitations on session length, only one has a required adjournment date
later than June 30th. Both the Model State Constitution and the United
States Constitution call for annual sessions and permit them to be un-
limited in length.
Approximately three-fourths of the states specify in their constitutions
the date of convening of the session, usually a day early in January. Only
about a dozen include a specific hour, usually noon, but in a couple of
states 10 A.M. is the magic hour. Another half dozen states or so set the
time of convening but permit the time to be changed by law. Three states
appear to leave the whole business up to the legislature. The Model
State Constitution does the same. The United States Constitution calls
for Congress to convene at noon on the third day of January, "unless they
shall by law appoint a different day."
Quorum: Forty-four states set the quorum at a majority of all the mem-
bers and four states set it at two-thirds. Vermont requires a majority
except on bills raising taxes, in which case two-thirds of the members of
the lower house must be present. New Hampshire requires a majority for
a quorum, but if fewer than two-thirds of the members are present, then
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a measure must receive a two-thirds vote to pass. A majority is the quorum
in Congress and under the Model State Constitution.
Forty-three states provide that a smaller number ol members than a
quorum may adjourn from day to day and may compel attendance of
absent members. Illinois is, of course, one of the seven states without such
a provision. Both the United States Constitution and the Model State
Constitution contain the provision.
Rules: Strangely enough, two states, Georgia and North Carolina, do
not have a provision stating that each house shall determine its own
rules. The United States Constitution and Model State Constitution con-
tain the customary provision.
Qualification and Election of Members: Again, strangely, there are two
states, Connecticut and Missouri, that do not empower each house to de-
termine the qualifications of its members. Likewise, there are two states,
Missomi and Wyoming, that do not empower each house to determine
the election of its members. As noted in the Histoiy above, the word
"returns" was added in 1870 and proposed to be dropped in 1922. Among
the 48 states having a provision on determination of elections, there are
several variations. Thirty-two states join Illinois in giving each house
the power to judge the elections and returns of its members. (In Arkansas
it is "sole judge" and in Connecticut, "final judge.") Twelve states speak
only to elections, and three states refer to "election returns." (See the
Comment below concerning these variations in wording.) The United
States Constitution uses the traditional language while the Model State
Constitution drops the word "returns."
Officers: Most state constitutions provide, as in Illinois, that each house
shall choose its own officers. In two states, the provision is drafted with
precision by stating that such officers shall be so chosen except as other-
wise provided in the constitution. This takes care of the fact that nor-
mally a senate does not choose its presiding officer. Some states specify
what officers shall be chosen. In one state, Minnesota, it is provided that
each house shall choose its own officers as prescribed by law, a formula-
tion that theoretically permits the governor to participate in the process
of determining what offices shall exist. The United States Constitution
states that the House of Representatives shall choose "their Speaker and
other officers"; and that the Senate shall choose "their other officers, and
also a President pro tempore." The Model State Constitution states that
the unicameral legislature shall choose "its presiding officers from among
its members and it shall employ a secretary to serve for an indefinite
term. . . . The secretary of the legislature shall be its chief fiscal, ad-
ministrative and personnel officer and shall perform such duties as the
legislature may prescribe." The Commentary on the foregoing states:
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"The only novel feature of section 4.09 is the reference to a 'secretary of the
legislature' who is to be employed for an indefinite term to manage fiscal and
personnel matters. The purpose is to fill the need for better housekeeping in the
legislative branch with its increased career staffs in legislative reference, bill-
drafting and other services. The need for improved personnel and fiscal ad-
ministration has become evident. It might be added that reference to the secre-
tary of the legislature is not a constitutional necessity, for such an office could
be established by a legislature entirely without such express authorization. Its
inclusion, however, may prove useful." (Model State Constitution 53.)
Comment
Sessions: From the recent practice in Illinois and the close vote on the
1964 proposed amendment, it would appear that a proposal to sw^itch to
annual sessions will be high on the agenda in the Convention. Of all the
proposals for modernizing, streamlining, if you will, the legislative proc-
ess, the annual session proposal has had the most dramatic acceptance
in the last three decades. The change is shown by the following table:
Annual Sessions
Year Number of States
1941 4
1950 10
1960 18
1969 31*
*
Including the four biennial session states which used the adjournment device.
If the decision is made to go to annual sessions, consideration should
be given to the addition of words to make it clear that unfinished busi-
ness carries over from the first to the second session of a single two-year
legislature. Such a provision is not essential, of course, for Congress
operates by such a ride, but since the tradition in state legislatures has
been otherwise, specific coverage might be appropriate. Michigan adopted
the following in its new Constitution:
"Any business, bill or joint resolution pending at the final adjournment of
a regular session held in an odd numbered year shall carry over with the same
status to the next regular session." (art. IV, § 13.)
It should be noted, however, that the previous Michigan provision
stated explicitly that bills were not to be carried over from one session
to another.
The Model State Constitution provides that the legislature "shall be
a continuous body during the tenn for which its members are elected."
But as the Commentary to the Model makes clear, the purpose of this
provision is to permit the utmost flexibility. An accompanying provision
permits the legislature to meet in "regular sessions annually as provided
by law." The commentary states:
"Under these provisions it is not at all necessary that every session be a
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miniature of the prevalent annual or biennial session. Priority could be given
to those measures requiring consideration during the period the legislature hap-
pens to be convened. Action on local matters could be timed in accordance with
the fiscal year, tax-levying, budget-making or bond-issuing requirements of
localities. The state budget could receive ample consideration at one session
without crowding other measures on the calendar which could be taken up
subsequently. Committees could plan their work with preliminary hearings and
specific arrangements for further hearings at the next session or between ses-
sions. An orderly process of distributing the work over the 21-month term
would provide greater opportunity for adequate consideration and would quiet
the public's fear of hasty or ill-considered action." (Model State Constitution 51.)
Quorum: Presumably, no problem has arisen because of the absence of
the traditional authorization ior a smaller number than a cjuorum to
adjourn and to compel attendance, but it would be worth considering
whether it ought to be put back in.
Ofjicers: In connection with the Model State Constitution's recom-
mendation for a career secretary of each house of the legislature, it is to
be noted that the drafters concede that the position could be established
by legislation. Immediately following this concession, the Commentary
notes that the Model used to contain a constitutional requirement for a
legislative council. The Commentary then observes:
"Omission of the legislative council from the Model merely marks recognition
of the fact that the battle for legislative councils has largely been won, that
legislative councils may — and do — function well under authority of legislation
or legislative rules and may function even better given the flexibility of legis-
lative rather than constitutional authorization. Finally, the omission signifies
recognition that the creation and operation of legislative councils is essentially
a matter of legislative procedure which, particularly in the case of a con-
tinuous legislature, ought to be left to the legislature itself." {Id. at 54.)
Returns, Elections and Qualifications: Notwithstanding the fact that
there are variations among the states in the use of "returns and elections,"
"elections," and "election returns," the var-iations are probably of no
great significance. But it would probably be a mistake to drop "returns"
as was proposed in the 1922 Constitution. Presimiably, the drafters con-
sidered "returns" to be unnecessary because they are included in "elec-
tions." This seems a fair conclusion, but there is the usual difficulty that
a change in wording always opens the door to the argument that the
drafters of the change meant something thereby. It should also be noted
that the Bond case, discussed earlier, in no way justifies dropping, or
qualifying, the traditional statement of legislative control over seating
members.
Open Sessions — Adjournments — Journals
Sec. 10. The doors of each house and of committees of the whole shall be
kept open, except in such cases as, in the opinion of the house, require secrecy.
Neither house shall, without consent of the other, adjourn for more than
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two days, or to any other place than that in which the two houses shall
be sitting. Each house shall keep a journal of its proceedings, which shall be
published. In the Senate at the request of two members, and in the House at
the request of five members, the yeas and nays shall be taken on any question,
and entered upon the journal. Any two members of either house shall have
liberty to dissent from and protest, in respectful language, against any act or
resolution which they think injurious to the public or to any individual, and have
the reasons of their dissent entered upon the journals.
History
The provision for open meetings, btit with secrecy permitted, first
appeared in 1818, was continued in 1848, and was not changed in sub-
stance in the proposed 1922 Constitution. The limitation on adjottrn-
ment appears in all Constitutions, but the proposed 1922 Constitution
increased the period of non-agreed-upon adjournment from two days to
three. Likewise, the requirement for pubHcation of the journal appears
in all four Constitutions. In the 1818 and 1848 Constitutions, any two
members in either house could call for the yeas and nays. The require-
ment for five in the House of Representatives was added in 1870 and
continued in the proposed 1922 Constitution. Permission for any two
members to have their dissenting views entered upon the journal was
given in 1818 and continued in 1848, but in 1870 the requirement to use
respectful language was added. The proposed 1922 Constitution con-
tinued tlie permission and the respectful language requirements.
Explanation
In connection with serious problems tliat arise under Sections 12 and
13 (infra, pp. 156 and 160), the journal is an important document. So
far as Section 10 itself is concerned, not many problems of interpretation
have arisen. The Supreme Cotnt long ago announced that the officers
of the legislature did not have to sign the journal and that there was no
requirement that the journal clerk certify as to the accuracy of the jour-
nal. (Miller V. Goodwin, 70 111. 659 (1873).) Indeed, even though Illinois
is a
"journal entry rule" state (see Neiberger v. McCullough, 253 111.
312 (1912)), that is, a state that permits the use of the journal to show
that the constitutional requirements for passage of a bill were not met,
as opposed to an "enrolled bill rule" state, which does not permit such
evidence, there is no way to impeach the accuracy of the journal. In
Sangamon County Fair & Agricidtiiral Association v. Stanard (9 111.
2d 267 (1956)), the House Journal stated that the bill in litigation had
been read at large, but two members exercised their privilege to dissent
to the effect that the journal was in error, that in fact the bill had been
read by title only. Thus, there were contradictory statements in the jour-
nal. The Court refused to accept the dissent as proof that the fonnal
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journal entry was in error. Prcsunialjh, ihe CJourt was aware that "[b]y
connnon acquiescence and by fraud upon the journals of both houses this
constitutional requirement is avoided. Bills are read by title only but
the journal shows the bills are read at large." (Elson, "Constitutional
Revision and Reorganization of the General Assembly," 33 111. L. Rev.
15, 26 (1938).)
Although the Court will accept journal entries as written, it will
also draw inferences from the absence of entries. In a famous case arising
under the 1848 Constitution concerning the Governor's power to ad-
journ the legislature (see Histo)y of Sec. 9, Art. V, injra, p. 278), the
Court avoided the political thicket involved by relying on the journal.
There were no entries for a ten-day stretch and since the 1848 Constitu-
tion also prohibited adjournment of either house for more than two
days without the consent of the other, the Court concluded that the leg-
islature had adjourned sine die. (People ex rel. Harless v. Hatch, 33 111. 9
(1863). See also discussions of Sees. 12 and 13, infra, pp. 156 and 160.
For a comprehensive review of the journal entry problem, see Cohn, "The
Process of Legislation," 1963 U. 111. L.F. 27.)
Comparative Analysis
Public Sessions: Approximately three-fourths of the states call for open
sessions of the legislature, but almost all of them also contain an appro-
priate exception for secrecy. Neither the United States Constitution nor
the Model State Constitution
specifies public sessions.
Adjournment of One House: Of the 49 states with a bicameral legis-
lature, all except two limit the power of one house to adjourn without
the consent of the other. Most of the states limit such power to three
days. About 40 states also require consent to adjourn to another place.
The United States Constitution has the usual requirement for consent
to adjourn for more than three days or to another place. The Model State
Constitution has no comparable provision. This is obvious for its recom-
mended unicameral provisions, but not so obvious for its alternative pro-
visions for a bicameral legislature.
Journal: All of the states except Massachusetts appear to require that
a journal be kept and almost all require that it be published. A good
many states have a secrecy exception. The United States Constitution re-
quires that a journal be kept and that it be published from time to time,
except such parts as may require secrecy. The Model State Constitution
calls for a journal which shall be published "from day to day."
Yeas and Nays: All except four of the states have a requirement for
entering the yeas and nays in the journal upon demand. There is, how-
ever, wide variation in the number required to make the demand. In a
few states any one member can call for the vote. Louisiana has the high-
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est minimum required, one-fifth of the members elected. In ten states
one-fifth of those present is required. The next-hirgest number of states
with identical requirements is eight — at the desire of any two members
in eitlier house. The United States Constitution requires one-fifth of
those present. The Model State Constitution has the same requirement.
Protest and Dissent: There appear to be some 13 other states which
guarantee the privilege of entering a protest or dissent in the journal,
but only Minnesota joins Illinois in rec[uiring two members to exer-
cise the privilege. No other state conditions the privilege on the use
of respectful language. Neither the United States Constitution nor the
Model State Constitution extends the privilege of entering a dissent in
the journal. All dissents in Congress are 'preserved, of course, because
the debates are published.
Comment
All of the requirements of this section are normal and could very well
be preserved unchanged. What should be guarded against is a proposal to
add further recjuirements because of a past reluctance of the legislature
to adopt them in its rules. For example, some people advocate a state
equivalent of the Congressional Record, in part so that legislative "in-
tent" can be more easily determined and in part so that the news media
can report legislative activities more accurately. In the proposed 1967
New York Constitution, the issue was compromised. Each house was to be
required to keep a journal and a transcript of its debates, the former
to be published, the latter to be available to the public. It is certainly
sound to advocate that verbatim transcripts of debates be made and, at
the very least, that they be available to the public, but it should not be
necessary to put the recpiirement into the Constitution.
Enacting Clause
Sec. 11. The style of the laws of this State shall be: "Be it enacted by the
People of the State of Illinois, represented in the General Assembly."
History
The identical provision appears in both the 1818 and 1848 Constitu-
tions. The proposed 1922 Constitution changed the beginning to read:
"The enacting clause of laws shall be:" In another section the proposed
Constitution included the statement: "No law shall be passed except by
bill." (See History of Sec. 12 infra, p. 157.)
Explanation
In almost half the states there is a provision that laws may be enacted
only by a bill. In 1887 the Supreme Court relied on Section 11 to produce
the same effect by holding that a joint resolution cannot have the force
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oi law because it does not have an enacting clause, (liunitt v. Connnis-
sioners of State Contracts, 120 111. 322 (1887).) Because the section is a
simple and explicit statement ot torni, it is not surprising that the Attor-
ney General made a cautious but hypertechnical ruling that an act was
unconstitutional it the enacting clause varied in any respect from the
specified form. (1910 111. Att'y Gen. Rep. 77.)
Comparative Analysis
An enacting clause section is found in 15 ol the state constitutions.
Most of the clauses speak only in the name of the legislature, a few
include the people as does Illinois, and a few enact in tlie name of the
people only. Three of the five states which have no enacting clause
section — California, Pennsylvania, and Virginia — do have a recpiire-
ment that laws be enacted only by bills. The other two states — Delaware
and Georgia — have no such rec|iurement. The United States Constitu-
tion has neither an enacting clause section nor a requirement for en-
acting laws by bill only. The Model State Constitution has no enacting
clause section but does have a "law by bill only" provision.
Comment
Notwithstanding the nearly universal practice of setting forth the style
of enactment, it is obvious that such a provision is not indispensable.
It is important, how^ever, to provide clear rules governing what the legis-
lature can do alone and what requires the participation of the Governor.
A "law by bill only" provision nails down the distinction. (In this
respect the United States Constitution is not clear. Although it spells
out the procedure for "bills," it also states that "[ejvery Order, Resolu-
tion, or \'ote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and the House of
Representatives may be necessary . . . shall be presented to the Presi-
dent . . . ." (art. I, § 7.) Since Section 1 vests all legislative powers in
Congress, it can be deduced that any exercise of legislative power must
include the President.) By virtue of the Burritt case discussed above,
Section 1 1 serves as the vehicle for guaranteeing that a law can be en-
acted only by bill and only by including the Governor in the process..
This was reinforced recently when the Supreme Court held that the
Governor has the power of veto over a redistricting act enacted pursuant
to Section 8. (Williams v. Kerner, 30 111. 2d 11 (1963).)
Origin of Bills
Sec. 12. Bills may originate in either house, but may be altered, amended or
rejected by the other; and on the final passage of all bills, the vote shall be by
yeas and nays, upon each bill separately, and shall l)e entered upon the journal;
and no bill shall become a law without the concurrence of a majority of the
members elected to each house.
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History
The first clause of tliis section appeared in the 1818 Constitution, but
a separate section required revenue bills to originate in the House of
Representatives. The 1848 Constitution omitted the revenue bill section,
and except for the words "upon each bill separately," added the second
and third clauses as they now appear. These additional words were pro-
posed to the 1870 Convention and accepted by it without explanation or
debate. The proposed 1922 Constitution put the substahce of the first
clause in a separate section and added the sentence "No law shall be
passed except by bill." The substance of the balance of the section was
combined with elements of Section 13.
Explanation
Since Illinois has adopted the "journal entry rule" (see Explanation
of Sec. 10, supra, p. 153), constitutional procedural provisions such as
Section 12 are more than instructions to the legislature about how to en-
act laws. They are also quasi-substantive provisions which litigants may
rely upon in attacking the validity of legislation. (For an extended dis-
cussion, see Comment below.)
In general, judicial interpretations of a provision like Section 12 fall
into one of two categories: one is the nature of the proof required to
upset an enactment, the other is a matter of definition of terms used in
the provision. Even though Section 12 says that the yeas and nays shall
be entered on the journal, a recording of the yeas only will be accepted
if the number constitutes a required constitutional majority. (People
ex rel. Wies v. Bowman, 247 111. 276 (1910).) But if the journals indi-
case that a bill passed one house with an emergency clause, passed the
other without the clause, and neither journal exhibits a concurrence in
the other version, then the Court will invalidate the statute as not having
had the concurrence of a majority of both houses. (People ex rel. Oliver
V. Knopf, 198 111. 340 (1902).) Or, if the journal entries show passage
of a bill from the other house but with amendment followed by a
recorded yea or nay vote to rescind the amendment, this is adequate evi-
dence of conformance with the constitutional requirements for passage
(People ex rel. City of Springfield v. Edmands, 252 111. 108 (1911); but
the rescinding vote would have to be by a constitutional majority
(People ex rel. Reitz v. DeWolf, 62 111. 253 (1871)). In any of these evi-
dentiary journal questions, the burden of proof is upon him who would
upset the law. Thus, if the journal is ambiguous in the description of
amendments as a bill moved back and forth from one house to the other,
the Court will presume that both houses were adopting the same amend-
ments. (People ex rel. Badger v. Loewenthal, 93 111. 191 (1879).)
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On the matter of definition ol terms, the principal problem has con-
cerned the requirement oi a yea and nay vote "upon each bill separately."
Although the purpose oi this phrase seems to be to guard against voting
on a batch ot bills at once, the Coiut has had to beat down the claim
that the j^hrase rec]uires separate votes on separate parts of a single bill.
(See Hagler v. Small, 307 111. 160 (1923): .Mitchell v. Lowden, 288 III.
327 (1919).) A more reasonable argument can be made if separate parts
of a single bill are amendments of separate laws, but it does not appear
that the argument will prevail. (See Routt v. Barrett, 396 111. 322 (1947).)
Of course, such arguments are almost automatically also claims that the
act violates the one-subject requirement of Section 13. (Infra, p. 160.)
The Court has also determined that the title of an act is not an essen-
tial part of the legislation, at least to the extent that infirmities in the
voting on the title do not invalidate the act. (Johnson v. People, 83 111.
431 (1876) (constitutional majority did not vote on title); Larrison v.
Peoria, A &: D R.R., 77 111. 11 (1875) (two houses did not concur on
title); Plummer v. People, 74 111. 361 (1874) (same).)
Comparative Analysis
Origination of Bills: All states, except unicameral Nebraska, of course,
permit bills to originate in either house and to be amended in either
house, but only about half of the states so specify in their constitutions.
In 21 states, revenue bills may originate only in the lower house, and
in Georgia appropriation bills also must originate in that house. The
United States Constitution requires revenue bills to be introduced in
the House of Representatives. The Model State Constitution's alterna-
tive provisions for a bicameral legislature are silent on origin of bills.
Eleven states have some kind of prohibition on the introduction of bills
toward the end of the session.
Yeas and Nays: Thirty-one other states require the entry of the yeas
and nays iq^on final passage, and 13 of these specifically require that the
name of each member and his vote be entered. It was noted in the Com-
parative Analysis of Section 10 (supra, p. 154) that in all except four
states, a demand could be made for the yeas and nays on anv cpiestion.
Three of those four exceptions are included in the 31 that require entry
upon final passage, so that it either is mandated or is possible, with a
demand by the requisite number of members, to obtain entry of a yea
and nay vote on final passage in the journal in 49 states. (The excep-
tion is, of course, Massachusetts, which has no requirement that a journal
be kept.) The United States Constitution provides for entry of any vote
upon demand of one-fifth of those present and requires the entry, with
the names of those voting, on any vote to override a veto. The Model
Art. IV, § 12 159
State Constitution has no provision for yeas and nays upon final pas-
saoe, but does provide for a record vote on any question if demanded
by one-fifth of the members present.
Required Majority: The vote required for passage of a bill in the sev-
eral states is summarized in the following table:
Number
of
Vote Required States
Majority of members elected 26*
Majority of members to which each house is entitled 2
Majority of those present but not less than a
stipulated minimum 3
Majority of each house 3
Majority of those present 5
No majority requirement specified \\**
* Includes Illinois. The Model State Constitution requires a majority of "all the
members." (See Comment below.)
** The United States Constitution is also silent on the vote required to pass a bill.
Comment
Serious consideration should be given to the problems that arise in
Illinois because the courts have followed the "journal entry rule." By
virtue of this rule, anyone wishing to attack the validity of a statute,
in addition to arguing the merits of the constitutionality of the legisla-
tion, can search the journals of the two houses to see if there is any pro-
cedural error in the legislative process upon which to make a claim
that the act was not validly passed. All of this increases both the likeli-
hood and the complexity of litigation. The first question to ask is whether
or not the protection afforded by the journal entry rule is worth the
cost. It must be noted that the journal entry rule serves a real purpose
only in a case of either fraudulent or inadvertent signing of a bill by
either the Speaker of the House or the Lieutenant Governor, or other
])residing officer. It must be further noted that even a fraudulent or
inadvertent signing of a bill will survive if the journal has all the proper
entries. As the Sangamon County Fair case, discussed under Section
10 {supra, p. 153), and other cases discussed above demonstrate, the
courts do not question the accuracy of the journal entries. Thus, so
long as the journal clerks make all the "correct" entries, a bill is "home
safe." It follows that the journal entry rule does not protect people
against fraudulent or inadvertent signing by the presiding officer, but
against "sloppy" journal-keeping. Assuming that the foregoing is a con-
vincing argument against the journal entry rule, the question becomes
one of how to rewrite the section to insulate bill-passing from invalida-
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tioii lor procedural defects; in other words, how to shift Illinois to an
"enrolled bill ride" state, untler which the signing oi a Ijill by the pre-
siding officers oi the two houses would l)e conclusive proof that consti-
tutional procedures had been jMoperly loUoAved. One possibility woidd
be to use the language proposed in ilic Model State Constitution as part
of its section on confining bills to a single subject. The sentence reads:
"Legislative compliance with the requirements of this section is. a con-
stitutional responsibility not subject to judicial review." Another possi-
bility is to make a minor change some place which, while not conclu-
sive on its face, can be explained in Convention debates to be for the
purpose of ending the Illinois rule. An example would be the addition
of the following words to the requirement, now in Section 13, that bills
be signed by the presiding officers: "which signing shall constitute a
certificate that all procedural recjuirements for passage have been com
plied with."
A word is also in order concerning the constitutional requirement that
bills pass by a majority of the members elected to each house. It was
noted earliei* in connection with filling vacancies (see Comment on
Sec. 2, supra, p. 119) that the Connnission on the Organization of the
General Assembly recommended a constitutiona-l change to force the
calling of special elections. The principal reason for the recommendation
was the need for an absolute majority to pass a bill. The commission
noted that it had considered but rejected a recommendation to eliminate
the absolute majority requirement. (I.S.L. 9.) Notwithstanding the de-
sirability of requiring special elections, the constitutional majority prob-
lem could be met by using the wording of the Model State Constitution
—
"all the members" — instead of "all the members elected." It would,
of course, be advisable to explain in the official record of the Conven-
tion that the word "elected" was dropjjed in order to make the constitu-
tional requirement a majority of the sitting members, excluding vacan-
cies, and not a majority of the total number to which each house is
entitled.
Passage of Bills
Sec. 13. Every bill shall be read at large on three different days, in each
house; and the bill and all amendments thereto shall be printed before the vote
is taken on its final passage; and every bill, having passed both houses, shall be
signed by the Speakers thereof. No act hereafter passed shall embrace more than
one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title. But if any subject shall be
embraced in an act which shall not be expressed in the title, such act shall
be void only as to so much thereof as shall not be so expressed; and no law
shall be revived or amended by reference to its title only, but the law revived,
or the section amended, shall be inserted at length in the new act. And no act
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of the General Assembly shall take effect until the first day of July next after
its passage, unless, in case of emergency, (which emergency shall be expressed
in the preamble or body of the act), the General Assembly shall, by a vote
of two-thirds of all the members elected to each house, otherwise direct.
History
The 1818 Constitution contained only the requirement that every bill
be read (but not "at large") on three different days, and the require-
ment that the speakers sign every bill that passed. Three-fourths of a
house could vote to dispense with a reading "in case of urgency."
The 1848 Constitution preserved the foregoing and made two addi-
tions: a requirement that a private or local law embrace only one sub-
ject, to be expressed in the title; and a requirement that no public act
take effect until 60 days after adjournment, "unless in case of emergency
the General Assembly shall otherwise direct."
Perhaps the most interesting thing about this section in the 1870 Con-
stitution is that it was accepted by the Convention as proposed. There
Avas an effort to strike out the printing requirement on the ground that
it was an unnecessary, mandatory expense and there were several efforts
to amend the "one subject only" requirement. The debate on these
efforts was fairly confused and it is difficult to say whether the efforts to
amend were designed to strengthen or weaken the provision. In the end,
all efforts at amendment were beaten down. The Committee on Revi-
sion and Adjustment made several stylistic changes and one substantive
change that is rather interesting. The section as presented to the Con-
vention — or at least as printed in the debates — read in part "and no
law shall be revised or amended . . .
,
but the act revised or the section
amended . . . ." It appears thus at least five times in the Debates. (De-
bates 291, 393, 533, 916, 952.) When Article IV came back from the Com-
mittee on Revision and Adjustment, the word "revised" had become "re-
vived" and remained so.
The proposed 1922 Constitution split Section 13 into several sections
and made several changes. The bill-reading requirement was changed to
provide for reading by title on three different days but with a proviso
that tlie rules of either house could require reading "at greater length
on second and third reading." The printing requirement was retained,
but with a proviso that an amendment striking out an emergency clause
need not be printed. The requirement that after passage a bill be signed
by the presiding officers was retained and the following was tacked on:
"and the facts of printing, placing on the desks of members, signing
and presentation to the governor and the date of such presentation shall
be entered upon the journals." (art. III,*§ 41.) The single-subject re-
quirement was retained unchanged. The amendment-by-reference re-
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quirenient was modified to "overrule" the line of cases, discussed below,
tliat held that a completely independent act could iall aloul ol the
prohibition. The wording was:
"No act shall be revived by reference to its title only. An act expressly amend-
ing an act shall set forth at length the section or sections as amended." (art. Ill,
§ 3G. tmpliasis added.)
The provision concerning the eHective date oi legislation was changed
to provide that appropriation acts were to take effect on July 1 but all
other acts were to take effect 60 days after adjournment. The emergency
exception was retained unchanged in sid^stance.
Explanation
Bill Reading: The requirement that every bill be read at large three
times is as simple and clear a rule as coidd be drafted. It is hopelessly
inirealistic and, as noted earlier (supra, p. 154), such reading does not
take place, but the journals say it does and this satisfies the coiuts.
The only additional point that has arisen is whether or not amendments
have to be read at large on three different days. The answer is that they
do not. (People v. Lewis, 5 111. 2d 117 (1955).) Such unread amendments
must, however, be germane to the subject matter of the original bill.
(Giebelhausen v. Daley, 407 111. 25 (1950) (appropriation act invalidated
where unread amendment struck out everything after the enacting clause
and substituted appropriation for wholly different purpose).)
Bill Printing: Again, this is a requirement that is clear and specific.
Moreover, the requirement includes "all amendments thereto." It was
this requirement that was the cause of the most extreme Supreme Court
ruling under the journal entry rule. In Neiberger x'. McCullough (253
III. 312 (1912)), the question was raised whether journal entries of yea
and nay \otes in both houses to adopt a conference committee report that
included amendments was adequate evidence that the amendments had
been printed. The Cotnt held that unless the journal affirmatively stated
that the amendments had been printed, it woidd be presumed that they
had not been and that the statute was invalid for not having been passed
in accordance with the constitutional requirement. Three years later the
Court retreated from the Neiberger ruling and held that if there was
something in the journal that would permit an inference of printing,
such as an entry after second reading that the amendments "were ordered
printed and engrossed," printing would be presumed. (Dragovich v.
Iroquois Iron Co., 269 111. 478 (1915).)
In the relatively recent case of Peoples Gas Light & Coke Company x>.
City of Chicago (9 111. 2d 348 (1956)), the Siq^reme Court found another
means of mitigating the harshness of the Neiberger rule. In Peoples,
there was nothing in the journal of one house froin which to draw an
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inference of the printing of amendments adopted by a conference com-
mittee. Instead of invalidating the statute as in Neiberger, the Court
examined the amenchiients and conckided that it could not conclude
that the legislature would not have passed the act without the amend-
ments. By means of this "double negative" inference, the Court upheld
the act and invalidated only the amendments. This, in a way, is a re-
writing of the section, for it calls for the printing of the bill and amend-
ments. Moreover, there is conceptual confusion confoiuided, for Section
16 of Article V (itifra, p. 293) requires a bill to be presented to the
Governor. What was presented to him in the Peoples case was not the act
which the Court declared to be valid. The, Court must have concluded,
if it thought about the Governor at all, that he would have signed the
bill if presented to him without the amendments. (C/. People ex rel.
Dezettel v. Lueders, 283 111. 287 (1918), where an act was invalidated
because, through an engrossing error, the bill presented to the Governor
omitted amendments that had been adopted. See generally Cohn, "The
Process of Legislation," 1963 U. 111. L.F. 27, 44-46.)
Bill Sigfiing: Aside from noting that the drafters of the 1870 Constitu-
tion were in error in using the word "Speakers," there is little to explain
about the requirement. It can be suggested, however, that once the courts
decide to follow the journal entry rule, the principal reason for having
the bills signed has vanished. In a state following the enrolled bill rule,
the signature of the presiding officers is accepted as conclusive certifica-
tion that constitutional requirements have been met.
Title and Subject: Two flat assertions may be made about this require-
ment. One is that it is clear, simple, and imambiguous. The other is that
it has been involved in a bewildering and enormous amount of litiga-
tion which cannot be intelligently analyzed. The long and short of it is
that almost any act can be demonstrated either to consist of only one
subject or to consist of two or more subjects. One could, for example,
argue with a straight face that some outlandish combination of regula-
tions dealt with one subject: relationships among people. Likewise, one
could argue that an act prohibiting gambling and making it a crime to
gamble embraced two subjects: gambling and criminal behavior. The
foregoing may be sophistical, but the fact is that most of the litigation
involving multiple-subject legislation consists of each side making what-
ever argument it can. The case of multiple subjects which no one would
disagree with — e.g., an act to regulate roller coasters and to establish a
state-wide system of junior colleges — just does not arise.
Lest it appear that the foregoing is far-fetched, the following two cases
may be noted. In Sutter v. People's Gas Light ir Coke Company (284 111.
634 (1918)), a statute which gave the City of Chicago the power to sell
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surplus electricity and to regulate jirivate utility gas and electric rates
was held to embrace two subjects. In People x'. Sargejit (254 111. 514
(1912)), "An act defining motor vehicles and j^roviding tor the registra-
tion of the same and ot motor bicycles, and unilorni rules regulating the
use and speed thereof; prohibiting the use of motor vehicles without the
consent of the owner and the oiler or acceptance of any bonus or dis-
count or other consideration for the purchase of supplies or parts for
any such motor vehicle or for work or repairs done thereon by others,
and defining chauffeurs and providing for the examination and licensing
thereof, and to repeal certain acts therein named" was held to embrace
only one subject.
The problem of expressing the one permitted subject in the title em-
braces all of the foregoing confusion and a 1)1 1 more. Obviously, there are
two extremes in title-drafting. At one end, the title could simply repeat
everything contained in the statute. At the other end, some totally gen-
eral expression could be used, as for example, "An Act concerning motoj-
vehicles." The first extreme is far-fetched, to be sure, but for the other
extreme, consider Lamed xk Tiernan (110 111. 173 (1884)). The statute
in question permitted a person who lost money by gambling to sue for
recovery of his money. This was held to be embraced in the title "An
Act to revise the law in relation to criminal jurisprudence." The addi-
tional wrinkle comes if the title-drafters slip up and make the title a
bit too narrow. In Rouse v. Thompson (228* 111. 522 (1907)), the Court
held that the title, "An act to provide for the holding and the regulation
of primary elections of delegates to nominating conventions, for the hold-
ing of such conventions, filling vacancies and fixing penalties for the
violation of the provisions thereof," was not broad enough because the
act also covered nomination of candidates directly. The Court gave a
little lecture on the subject, noting that an "Act to define larceny" could
not include burularv, but that an "Act to revise the law in relation to
criminal jurisprudence" could cover both. (And a civil remedy for
gambling losses, too, for that matter.)
Section 13 includes the instruction to the courts to invalidate only
the part of an act not included in the title. This is a sensible instruc-
tion, but its usefulness is limited. One ot the purposes of a single-sub-
ject recjuirement is to prevent the tacking on of a rider not germane
to the principal legislation. The rule of limited invalidation would pro-
tect the principal legislation in such a case. But, as noted earlier, this is
not the type of legislation that shows up in courts because it does not
get passed in the first place. WHiat gets passed is legislation that the legis-
lature thinks, and hopes the courts will think, is embraced in one sub-
ject. When the courts decide otherwise, they are likely to conclude either
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that they do not know which of the two subjects that the legislature
thought was one subject is embraced in the title, or that both subjects
are embraced in the title. The statute is, accordingly, invalidated in
toto. (See Sutter v. People's Gas Light & Coke Co., 284 111. 634 (1918).)
On one point, at least, it is possible to be specific about the judicial
interpretation of the one title and subject requirement. It applies only
to acts of the General Assembly and not to municipal ordinances. (Chi-
cago Cosmetic Co. v. City of Chicago, 374 111. 384 (1940).) Indeed, an
ordinance need not even have a title. (City of Metropolis v. Gibbons,
334 111. 431 (1929).)
Revival and Amendment: The problem of revival can be disposed of
rather quickly. There is no problem because the legislature does not re-
vive a law by the simple device of reference to it. (Compare the historical
note, supra, p. 161, concerning "revised" and "revived.") This is the
case, in part, because violation of the constitutional command would
be so obvious. It is probably also partly because the legislating would
be unlikely to revive an old law ^vithout change. It should be noted,
however, that if Statute B repeals Statute A and Statute B is subse-
quently declared unconstitutional, Statute A is "revived," but this is a
matter of traditional constitutional theory and not related to the pres-
ence or absence of a revival provision. {See People v. Fox, 294 111. 263
(1920).) It can also be noted that the policy expressed in this section is
carried over as a public policy to municipal ordinances, and an ordinance
that attempted to revive a repealed ordinance by reference to section
numbers only was declared void. (City of Chicago v. Degitis, 383 111. 171
(1943). But, as noted above, the policy does not carry over so far as
title and subject are concerned.)
There really was no serious problem about amendment by reference
until after 1900. The prohibition against amendment by reference was
designed to prevent the enactment of a statute that might read some-
what as follows: "Section 1 1 of 'An Act to do thus and so' is amended by
inserting the word 'not' before the word "prescribe" and Section 12 there-
of is amended by deleting the word 'not' from the second sentence."
Whatever the merits of a constitiuional provision to prevent this sort of
nonsense, amendatory legislation can easily be drafted so that he who
reads knows what is being undertaken. But in 1900, the Supreme Court
threw a monkey wrench into the legislative process by stating that if the
purpose of an independent bill is in fact to amend an existing law or
to add to it, then insertion at length of the amended act is required.
(People ex rel. Stuckart v. Knopf, 183 111. 410 (1900).) This, naturally,
produces a guessing contest between the legislature and the courts, and
the courts always have the last guess.
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In 1913, the Supreme Court attempted to set lorth the guiding princi-
ples:
"(1) An act which is complete within itself and does not purport, either in
its title or in the body thereof, to amend or revive any other act, is valid even
thouHi it may by implication modify or repeal prior existing statutes....
"
(2) An act, though otherwise complete within itself, which purports to
amend or revive a prior statute h\ reference to its title only, and does not
set out at length the statute amended or revived, is invalid, regardless of all
other questions.. . .
"(3) An act which is incomplete in itself and in which new provisions are
commingled with old ones, so that it is necessary to read the two acts together
in order to determine what the law is, is an amendatory act and invalid under
the constitution, and it is unimportant, in such case, that the act does not
purport to amend or revive any other statute." (People ex rel. Cant v. Crossly,
261 111. 78, 98.)
One commentator recently quoted the foregoing and then observed:
"These principles are so difficult of application that it is often impossible to
predict with any degree of certainty whether or not an act will be held to offend
in this manner." (Nichols, "Legislative Bill-Drafting in Illinois," 41 111. B. J.
136, 138 (1952).)
There are a great many cases involving the amendment by reference
rules, but it seems useless to review them. As long ago as 1919, it was
noted that with the
"large mass of statutes in force at any given time, it
is possible to hold that practically any new piece of legislation is amend-
atory of earlier legislation . . . ." (Legislative Reference Bureau, Consti-
tutional Convention Bulletins 558 (1920) [hereinafter cited as Bulle-
tins].) That observation is much more apt 50 years later. Suffice it to say
that sometimes the courts find a statute void, sometimes not, and that
no amount of analysis of the cases advances one beyond the observation
of Mr. Nichols quoted above.
There is one minor aspect of amendment by reference that should be
mentioned. It has been pointed out that the prohibition "means that it
is frequently necessary to have several 'companion' bills to accomplish a
single purpose. For example, it took 70 separate bills at the 1961 session
to try to make 55 percent of full, fair cash value of property the assessed
valuation for property tax purposes." (Gove, "The Business of the Legis-
lature," 1963 U. 111. L.F. 52, 68.)
Into this lugubrious tale of the difficulties with amendment by refer-
ence, there are a couple of cheerful observations that can be inserted.
This prohibition does not extend either to explicit repeal of an existing
law, or to repeal by implication. (See People v. Borgeson, 335 111. 136
(1929).) Nor is Illinois saddled with a prohibition against incorporating
parts of other laws by reference. (New York has such a prohibition. In
order to allow New York taxpayers to use their federal income tax com-
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putations for purposes of computing their state income tax, it was neces-
sary to amend the Constitution. Otherwise, large chunks of the Internal
Revenue Code would have had to be inserted at length in the New York
income tax laws. Indeed, when the legislature subsequently adopted an
act enabling the City of New York to levy an income tax, the foregoing
amendment was found not to be applicable. The enabling act includes
an appendix of over 400 pages of provisions from the Internal Revenue
Code.)
Effective Date: The most important effect of the provision that, except
for emergency legislation, legislation goes into effect on the first day of
July following enactment, is that it puts a practical limit on the length
of the regular biennial session. This naturally produces a jam of legis-
lative activity towards the end of June. On occasion, the legislature has
a
"stop-the-clock" session in order to complete action "prior" to July 1,
but actually after midnight on June 30. Fortunately, courts will not
look beyond the journal and an affidavit by a legislator that the clock
was so stopped will be ignored. (Gouker v. Winnebago County Bd. of
Supervisors, 37 111. 2d 473 (1967).) The requirement is that passage take
place before July 1, and this has been construed to refer to the time of
legislative action and not to the date when the Governor signs the bill.
(People ex rel. Kell v. Kramer, 328 111. 512 (1928).) In those cases of
signature after July 1, the act takes effect immediately. (Id.) The legisla-
ture can, however, provide that an act become effective on a date later
than July 1. (People ex rel. Thomson v. Barnett, 344 111. 62 (1931).)
Section 13 allows immediate effectiveness of an act if there is an emer-
gency and if the bill passes both houses by a two-thirds vote. In Graham
V. Dye (308 111. 283 (1923)), the Supreme Court made it clear that a
simple statement that there is an emergency is insufficient, that the legis-
lature must include words sufficient to spell out the nature of the emer-
gency. Although the Court implied that the existence of an emergency
is an objective fact from which one might infer that the Court could
"second guess" the legislature, it seems more likely that the courts will
be satisfied with a recital describing the emergency. For example, the
Court has held that it was sufficient to state that a substantial amount
of money would be saved for the taxpayers if the statute went into effect
immediately. (People ex rel. Tuohy v. City of Chicago, 394 111. 477
(1946); People v. Chicago Transit Authority, 392 111. 77 (1945).) In
neither case is there any hint that evidence would be received to refute
the legislative finding of an emergency. (See Comment below for further
discussion.)
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Comparative Analysis
Bill Reading: Thirty-four states, including Illinois, require three
readings before passage, three states require two readings, and 13 states
have no requirement. In six states, including Illinois, such reading
must be at large on all three occasions. Two states say it must be at
large twice. Seven states say once, usually on third reading. A few
states call for reading by sections on various numbers of occasions. Of
those states (37) requiring readings, 33 require them to be on various
days, but eight of these either permit two of the readings on the same
day or empower the legislature to waive the different-day requirement by
a specified majority vote. A dozen or so states have provisions for
totally dispensing with a reading, such as in case of actual insurrection,
upon unanimous consent, or upon an extraordinary vote of two-thirds,
three-fourths or four-fifths Neither the United States Constitution nor
the Model State Constitution mentions bill reading.
Bill Priyiting: Approximately a half dozen states specifically cover
printing of both bills and amendments before final passage, and another
half dozen require printing of a bill before final passage under circum-
stances that would require printing of amendments. New York requires
bills to be printed and on members' desks in final form at least three
calendar legislative days prior to passage, but the governor may certify
an emergency recjuiring an immediate vote, and even then the bill in
final form must be on every member's desk before the vote is taken.
Michigan's new Constitution contains one small change in the bill-print-
ing requirement — the words "or reproduced" have been inserted after
the word
"printed." The United States Constitution has no printing
requirement. The Model State Constitution's provision is substantially
the same as New York's, but without the governor's power of waiver.
Bill Signing: Twenty-nine other states specify that the presiding
officers of each house shall sign a bill after passage, and in 20 of the
states the signing is to take place in the presence of the house. Two
states require the additional signatures of the clerks of the houses.
Sixteen states require that the fact of signing be entered in the journal.
Minnesota even covers the contingency of a refusal by the presiding
officer to sign a bill after passage. Neither the United States Constitution
nor the Model State Constitution speaks of bill signing.
Subject and Title: Some 40 other states limit a bill to one subject, and
almost all of them also specify that that subject be expressed in the
title. Fifteen states permit exceptions, generally either for appropriation
bills or statutory revisions, or both. Six of the nine states with no
"one subject" requirement are the New England states. The United
States Constitution has no such requirement. The Model State Consti-
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tution has a "one subject" provision with the two exceptions just men-
tioned, but also the following sentence:
"Legislative compliance with the requirements of this section is a constitutional
responsibility not subject to judicial review." (art. IV, §4.14.)
Revival and Amendment: Some 31 other states prohibit amendment
by reference and, in most cases, specify that the section amended be set
out in full. Some 15 other states have much the same prohibition on
revival of a statute, and some 13 states prohibit revision of a statute
by reference. Interestingly, none of the states prohibiting revision by
reference prohibits revival by reference, but all except two of the states
prohibiting amendment by reference also prohibit either revival or
revision but, of course, not both. (See the history of this word change,
supra, p. 161.) There appear to be three states prohibiting incorporation
of part of another statute by reference. Only one of these states. New
York, is not included among the amendment and revival/revision by
reference states. Neither the United States Constitution nor the Model
State Constitution has any kind of prohibition on legislative action by
reference.
Effective Date: Twenty-eight states, including Illinois, specify when a
law is to become effective; four specify that a law becomes effective either
when published (2), or as provided in the act (1) or both (1); and 18
states have no provision concerning an effective date. The 28 states have
specifications as follows:
Number
of
Effective Date States
90 days after end of session 13
60 days after end of session 3
20 days after end of session 1
3 months after end of session 1
90 days after passage 4
60 days after passage 1
40 days after passage 1
July 1 after passage 2
July 1 after end of session 1
June 1 after end of session 1
All of the 28 states have a provision for an exception to the specified
date of effectiveness. (The other 22 states have no need for an exception.)
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Number
of
Exception for Emergency States
Four-fifths of members voting 1
Two-thirds of members elected 16*
Two-thirds of members voting 1
Three-fifths of members elected 1
Majority of members elected 1
By declaration in statute 7
By governor's certification to the legislature 1
Not applicable to appropriation and/or money bills 12**
* In one of these states the governor may declare an act an emergency measure.
** These are inckided in the 28.
The United States Constitution has no provision concerning an effec-
tive date. The Model State Constitution provides that "no act shall be-
come effective until published as provided by law."
Comment
Bill Reading: Since the original reasons for this requirement — the
absence of printing and, on occasion, legislators who could not read —
are gone, the provision could easily be dispensed with. If this seems too
great a break with tradition, or if there is a wish to insure that the
legislature acts with all deliberate speed, then it would suffice to delete
the words "at large" and substitute "by title." This, at least, would make
the Constitution conform to reality. (This is the recommendation of the
Commission on the Organization of the General Assembly. I.S.L., p. 13.)
Bill Printing: In any well-run legislature, bills will be printed
— or
"reproduced" as Michigan now also permits — and it is highly unlikely
that removal of a requirement for printing would have any effect on the
practice of printing. By the same token, there is no reason for removing
a requirement that will in practice be followed — except, unfortunately,
for the journal entry rule and the consetjuence that a statute may be in-
validated through the inadvertence of not reprinting after a minor final
change or the even less crucial inadvertence of failing to make the ap-
propriate entry in the journal. Unless some such solution for ending
the journal entry rule as suggested in the Comment on Section 12 (supra,
p. 159) is adopted, it would be advisable to consider dropping the print-
ing requirement as a means of eliminating the possibility of a technical
journal entry error that can invalidate a statute.
Bill Signing: It would appear that this requirement either ought to be
rewritten in a manner that would serve to end the journal entry rule as
suggested in the Comment on Section 12 {supra, p. 159) or it ought to be
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dropped, for unless the signatures of the presiding officers serve the pur-
pose of certification of procedural conformance, they are an empty ritual.
Title and Subject: There is certainly nothing objectionable about the
principle of one bill-one subject-one title. (Even so, life goes on where
the principle is not followed, as in the United States Congress. Students
of federal jurisdiction know that the Urgent Deficiencies Act of 1913
provided for certain types of three-judge court litigation, notwithstand-
ing the fact that the title describes an appropriation act.) What is ob-
jectionable is the mischief wrought by litigants. There are two groups
of people for whom the rule is written. One is the legislators themselves;
the other is the general public or, to be niQre realistic, the legal profes-
sion. The litigants who seek to invalidate legislation on the basis of
violation of the one subject-one title rule are surely not legislators. They
are, obviously, members of the general public. But there probably has
never been a case where the litigation arose because the plaintiff: or de-
fendant, as a member of the public, or, realistically, his lawyer, behaved
as he did because he was misled by the title of the act or because he
missed a statutory requirement that was in an act principally dealing
with another subject. Without exhausive research, it is safe to assert that
almost every case involving the one subject-one title rule has been either
a case to test the constitutionality of a new law or a case in which the
litigant was really interested only in the substance of the legislation. In
both instances, one subject-one rule was thrown in for good measure.
There is, of course, the argument that the rule is designed to protect
the general public vicariously. This is the argument that the legislature
would never have passed the act in the first place if they had not been
misled by the title. Or it is argued that the general public must be pro-
tected from the log-rolling and other devices by which "bad" legislation
can be pushed through if there is no enforceable one subject-one title
rule. This is not unlike the United States Supreme Court's efforts
through exclusion of evidence to get police to change their methods. In
many instances, the police quickly find ways to get around the Court de-
cisions. Similarly, legislators can find ways of engaging in log-rolling
and achieving other questionable results even if the multiple-subject-
bill road is forbidden to them.
The Model State Constitution has solved the problem of preserving
the principle of one-subject bills without the accompanying misuse of
the principle by litigants. As noted above in the Comparative Analysis,
the following sentence is added to the one-subject bill section: "Legis-
lative compliance with the requirements of this section is a constitu-
tional responsibility not subject to judicial review."
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In explanation and justification for the reconunendation, the following
commentary is provided by the drafters of the Model State Constitution:
"The main provision is common to most state constitutions. It requires that
all laws be enacted by bill, i.e.. in a manner which gives notice to all legislators
and to the people that the legislature is not merely expressing a sentiment or
an opinion but is in fact passing a law in the prescribed and approved manner.
The section further provides that all bills, except the appropriation bills and
codified revisions and rearrangements of existing law, be confined to a single
subject. This has been considered a beneficial rule to avoid such abuses as log-
rolling, the attachment of special interest riders to bills to which they are not
germane and other devices whereby legislatures and the people may have to
accept an undesirable piece of legislation in order to get a useful and necessary
one or to avoid a situation in which the content of a particular piece of legis-
lation may be completely obscured or may be rendered incomprehensible by
the coupling of unrelated matter.
"While there is little disagreement over the desirability of limiting each bill
to a single subject, a great body of highly technical decisional law has grown
up explaining what is a 'single subject.' (Footnote: Millard H. Ruud, 'No Law
Shall Embrace More Than One Subject,' Minnesota Law Revieiv, 42 (January
1958), 389-452.] In its most restrictive applications, the so-called single subject
rule has resulted in the invalidation on essentially extraneous if not frivolous
grounds of perfectly sound legislation which misled neither the legislators nor
the people. In order to create what appears to be a desirable balance between
the necessity of affirming the value of the single subject rule and the undesira-
bility of having the rule operate as a basis for the invalidation of sound legis-
lation on merely technical grounds, the last sentence has been added. It is not
part of any state constitution. It provides that legislative compliance with the
technical requirements of this section is not subject to judicial review, though it
remains a constitutional responsibility of the legislature. In effect, this means
that the legislature will have to police the single subject rule in the first in-
stance and. if abuses should occur, then the governor's veto might be the proper
remedy in response to public pressure or on the basis of information received
from the state legislature itself. The unavailability of judicial review may en-
courage mischief which would then have as its sole corrective the normal
political processes and a prompt governor's veto. On balance this appears to
be wiser than to permit the courts, as has been the case under existing rules,
to invalidate a law, often many years after it has been passed, merely on the
basis of a technical infirmity where, in fact, no one had been misled. It might
be noted that similar considerations were persuasive in omitting the 'subject title'
rule which required not only that bills be confined to a single subject but that
the single subject be expressed in the title. The past history of the single title
rule leads to the conclusion that it is more creative of the mischief of highly
technical invalidations than beneficial to the achievement of its purposes."
(Model State Constitution 59-60.)
Revival and Amendment: As in the case of the one-stibject bill pro-
vision, a prohibition on amendment by reference is a perfectly good
principle. (But again, it may be noted that Congress does not follow the
rule.) The explanation of this provision {supra, p. 169) demonstrates
that the arguments set forth above in discussing the "one subject" rule
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are even more apt in the case of amendment by reference. Moreover, with
the existence of a Legislative Reference Bureau, the increasing accept-
ance of legislative staff assistance and the practice of preparation of
digests of bills, both official and unofficial, the need for a prohibi-
tion on amendment by reference to protect legislators against acting in
ignorance is hardly necessary. So far as the general public, and their
lawyers, are concerned, the existence of an up-to-date compilation of
statutes with annotations decreases, if it does not eliminate, the need
for covering a library table with many volumes in order to put together
a single statute. The revival and amendment requirement could be
dropped without harm.
ff, however, it is desired to preserve the requirement, one of two things
should be done. Either the Afodel State Constitution's approach, dis-
cussed above, should be followed, or the provision should be changed, as
recommended in 1922, to cover only an act expressly amending another
act. This should eliminate substantially all judicial review and should
leave the legislature under an injunction that would be easy to obey.
Effective Date: It would appear advisable to make some change in the
effective date provision. If the decision is made to go to annual sessions,
some of the end-of-session log jam will be alleviated but hardly enough
to justify preservation of the July 1 effective date. The 1922 proposal to
change to 60 days after adjournment on all bills except appropriations
would end the forced June 30 adjournment, but it is worth considering
whether any provision is required, whether a requirement that the effec-
tive date be no earlier than publication would suffice, or whether a
stated period of delay—30, 60, 90 days—should be computed from passage
rather than from adjournment.
If the decision is to preserve a constitutionally delayed effective date,
then, of course, there must be an- exception for "emergencies." It would
seem advisable to obviate the possibility of judicial second-guessing of
the
"emergency" by simply deleting the words "in case of emergency,
(which emergency shall be expressed in the preamble or body of the act)."
Privileges of Members
Sec. 14. Senators and Representatives shall, in all cases, except treason, felony
or breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during the session of the General
Assembly, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any speech
or debate in either house, they shall not be questioned in any other place.
History
Except for variations in punctuation, this section is identical with
provisions in the 1818 and 1848 Constitutions. The section was reworded
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in the proposed 1922 Constitution. The official explanation said that
"[t]his section is the same .... "(P.N.C. 32), but this is arguable. (See
Comment below.)
Explanation
This section serves two purposes — to protect legislators from harass-
ment and to protect freedom of debate from threats of libel actions.
Freedom of debate offers no difficulty. Indeed, the apparent absence
of reported cases probably indicates a general understanding that the
privilege is absolute.
Freedom from arrest is a different matter. Again, there are apparently
no cases on this but one can doubt that the matter is clear. A natural
assumption is that the exception to freedom from arrest for "treason,
felony or breach of the peace" leaves legislators with some protection
from criminal process. For example, in Section 4 of Article XII (infra,
p. 541), the same phrase appears as an exception to the freedom from
arrest of a militiaman under comparable circumstances. In an opinion
in 1915, the Attorney General ruled that militiamen arrested for assault
and drunkenness were under the "breach of the peace" exception. (1915
111. Att'y Gen. Rep. 229.) The implication of liis opinion is that militia-
men would be free from arrest for misdemeanors that do not constitute
"breach of the peace."
The question is whether the Illinois courts would ultimately follow
the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the same exception
in the United States Constitution. That Court held that the words
"treason, felony or breach of the peace" were well understood in 1787
to limit the privilege from arrest to the same privilege granted to mem-
bers of Parliament — namely, freedom from civil arrest. (Williamson
v. United States, 207 U.S. 425 (1908).) In other words, "breach of the
peace" was used in the sense of "any crime not a felony," rather than in
the sense of the common law offense of breach of the peace. Civil arrest
is relatively rare today but it was still common in the colonies at the time
of the adoption of the Constitution.
As noted below, some states include protection from civil process. The
Illinois Supreme Court has held that Section 14 does not deprive the
legislature of the power to provide such protection, but it effectively
destroyed the power by holding that an exemption from civil process
for legislators only was a prohibited special act under Section 22 of this
Article. (Phillips v. Browne, 270 111. 450 (1915).) Either the delegates
to the 1920 Convention were unaware of the Phillips case or did not
care to provide protection from civil process. In any event, there was
no debate on the matter.
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Comparative Analysis
Privilege Against Arrest: Some 40 states besides Illinois provide some
protection against arrest, the vast majority of the provisions closely re-
sembling Section 14. Some 13 states also include protection against civil
process and four states protect only against civil process. The new Mich-
igan Constitution has a unique provision protecting against "civil arrest
and civil process." This presumably was done to conform to In re Wil-
kowski (270 Mich. 687 (1935)), which construed "treason, felony or
breach of the peace" to exclude criminal process just as the United States
Supreme Court had done in the Williamson case. The language of the
United States Constitution is in substance the same as Section 14. The
Model State Constitution has no comparable provision.
Protection of Speech: Some 42 states besides Illinois protect legislative
speech, almost two-thirds of them using substantially the same language
as in Section 14. The two new states, Alaska and Hawaii, have adopted
modern language to cut back the breadth of "questioned in any other
place." Obviously, constituents and others can very well "question" re-
marks made on the floor. These two states provide that legislators are
"not to be held to answer before any other tribunal." (Alas. Const, art.
II, §6; Hawaii Const, art. Ill, §8.)
Comment
In the Comment on Article II, Section 16, it was suggested as a princi-
ple of constitution-drafting that traditional language ought to be left
alone. The equivalent of Section 14 in the proposed 1922 Constitution
is an example of the significance of this principle. That equivalent read:
"Except for treason, felony or breach of the peace senators and representatives
shall be privileged from arrest while going to, attending or returning from
sessions of the general assembly. They shall not be questioned elsewehere for
any speech in either house, (art. Ill, § 53.)
First, it is to be noted that in the first sentence the provision was
changed from "during the session" to "attending . . . sessions." If one
assumes that constitution-drafters choose their words carefully and
further assumes that a change in wording is made for good reason, then
one searches for the significance of the change. In the example here, it
would be logical to conclude that the protection against arrest is re-
moved during periods when a member is not in attendance — for ex-
ample, during a long recess, or while ill, and the like. To be sure, the
official explanation stated that the section is the "same" as Section 14,
and this would weigh heavily in litigation. The point is that an un-
necessary change is simply an invitation to litigation. The litigation
may be doomed to failure, but if no change is made, there probably
will be no litigation at all.
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The second sentence of the proposed provision had two changes — "in
any other phice" became "elsewhere" and "speech or debate" became
simply "speech." The "elsewhere" change seems harmless enough, but
the dropping ol "debate" clearly raises a question. Legislators make
what are customarily denominated "speeches"; they also engage in
"debate." Obviously, spontaneous debate needs more protection than a
carefully prepared speech and thus any distinction deduced irom the
proposed change would have been at cross purposes with the spirit ot
the protection. Nevertheless, the proposed change could have given rise
to litigation.
Section 14 is an excellent example ot the obverse of the foregoing. A
failure to change wording which has acquired a technical meaning wall
frequently be construed to mean that the drafters accepted the technical
meaning. For example, it is doubtful that the delegates to the 1920
Convention were aware of the civil arrest interpretation of the "treason,
felony or breach of the peace" exception. It may be that a discussion of
the matter would have resulted in preservation of the interpretation,
perhaps by such wording as Michigan used (see above), or would have
resulted in a change in wording in order to protect legislators against
certain limited criminal process.
Restrictions of Members
Sec. 15. No person elected to the General Assembly shall receive any civil
appointment within this State from the Governor, the Governor and Senate,
or from the General Assembly, during the term for which he shall have been
elected; and all such appointments, and all votes given for any such members
for any such office or appointment, shall be void; nor shall any member of the
General Assembly be interested, either directly or indirectly, in any contract with
the State, or any county thereof, authorized by any law passed during the term
for which he shall have been elected, or within one year after the expiration
thereof.
History
The 1818 Constitution simply prohibited the appointment of a legis-
lator, during his elected term, to any civil office under the state which
had been created or the emoluments increased during such term. The
1848 Constitution substituted a section that differs in only one respect
from the present Section 15. The 1848 provision included a prohibi-
tion against appointing a member of the legislature to the United States
Senate. The present Section 15 was accepted by the 1870 Convention
without change, but only after an extended debate over a proposal to add
a prohibition on railroad employees also holding public office and on
any legislator or other public officer holding a free railroad pass. The
proposed 1922 Constitution extended the civil appointment coverage to
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include county and local "lucrative" positions and the contract coverage
to include local governments as well as the state and counties.
Explanation
The first part of this section duplicates Section 3 (supra, p. 120) to
some extent, but in two respects goes beyond it. That section, it will
be recalled, covers named offices and other "lucrative" offices. This sec-
tion covers "civil appointments." Indeed, because of the potential
breadth of "civil appointments," it was necessary for the Supreme Court
to devise an intrepretation that would permit legislators to serve, with-
out salary, on commissions such as the Gettysburg Memorial Commission,
Golden Gate Exposition Commission, and New York World's Fair Com-
mission. The Court said that the prohibition was aimed at appointments
that are of a permanent nature and that lend themselves to personal ag-
grandizement with opportunity for private gain, pecuniary or otherwise.
(Gillespie v. Barrett, 368 111. 612 (1938).)
The second respect in which this section goes beyond dual office hold-
ing is the formulation that prevents a legislator from accepting a civil
appointment by resigning his legislative seat. (See 1921 III. Att'y Gen.
Rep. 167.) The purpose of this formulation is to prevent the Governor
from
"bribing" a legislator for a favorable vote or for a legislator
to "extort" a job from the Governor in return for a favorable vote.
The second half of the section is a straightforward prohibition of a
particular form of conflict of interest.
Comparative Analysis
Dual Office Holding: (See the Comparative Analysis of Sec. 3, supra,
p. 125.)
Contracts: Seven states have a comparable provision. Twelve states,
one of which is included among the seven, have a provision requiring a
legislator who has a personal interest in a measure to disclose that fact
and to refrain from voting on the measure. Neither the United States
Constitution nor the Model State Constitution has a comparable con-
flict-of-interest provision.
Comment
Paradoxically, there are two important principles, somewhat contra-
dictory, which should govern the drafting of a comprehensive dual office
holding provision. One is that careful consideration should be given to
precisely what purposes are served by the prohibition against dual office
holding, what types of positions should be covered, and how the prohibi-
tion is to operate. (That is, for example, whether a legislator can vacate
one office to take another, as under Section 3, or can not, as under Sec-
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tion 15.) The second principle is that the constitutional provision em-
bodying the precise purpose and coverage should not be too precise.
There are two reasons for this. One is that precision, entailing, as it must,
considerable detail, may soon be out of date. (Consider, for example, the
anachronism involved in distinguishing between postmasters on the
basis of annual compensation above and below $300, as in Section 3.)
The other is that precision either decreases judicial flexibility in de-
veloping a body of law designed to carry out the provision's purposes, or
results in an unsatisfactory body of law because the judiciary engages in
strained reasoning in order to preserve flexibility. The paradox can be
handled by a simple statement in the draft to be considered by the dele-
gates, accompanied by a comprehensive report that spells out the pur-
poses of the provision, the types of positions that are covered, the types
that are not covered, and the like. This becomes a
"legislative record"
that the courts can use in carrying out the purpose of the provision
through time and notwithstanding changes in job content and job
titles.
Conflict of interest is an equally vexing problem, but it is doubtful
that it can be solved in the manner suggested above. The difficulty is
that the entire subject is murky and any enforceable statement of general
principle is likely to produce as many injustices as it prevents wrong-
doing. A provision such as now appears in Section 15 is safe enough, but
it obviously is only a segment of the conflict-of-interest problem. The real
question is whether it is better to leave the entire problem on the statu-
tory level than to place only a partial solution in the Constitution.
There is, however, a special problem concerning conflict of interest
and the legislature. Experience has shown, most notably in the case of
Congress, that there is a natural reluctance on the part of legislators to
enact as strict conflict-of-interest rules applicable to themselves as they
enact for the executive department. Moreover, if the Constitution con-
tains conflict-of-interest restrictions on the legislature, there is little
doubt that it will see to it that the rest of the government is equally
restricted, and this obviates any need for sprinkling conflict-of-interest
provisions throughout the Constitution. A neat balancing act between
excessive detail and the need to prod the legislature to police itself is
called for.
Appropriations
Sec. 16. The General Assembly shall make no appropriation of money out
of the treasury in any private law. Bills making appropriations for the pay of
members and officers of the General Assembly, and for the salaries of the officers
of the government, shall contain no provision on any other subject.
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History
The second sentence of this section first appeared in substance in the
1848 Constitution. The first sentence was added in 1870. According to
the Chairman of the Committee on the Legislative Department of the
1870 Convention, the sentence was requested by the Auditor of Public
Accounts who had found that sometimes amendments appropriating
money had been tacked onto private bills. The proposed 1922 Constitu-
tion omitted the first sentence. The second sentence was changed in two
respects. The General Assembly portion of the sentence was made to
cover the pay of legislative employees in addition to members and
officers. So far as officers of the government were concerned, the proposed
section required that appropriations for the office of each of the seven elec-
tive state officers be in separate bills.
Explanation
Private Bills: As noted above, the primary purpose of the first sen-
tence of this section was to stop an earlier practice of tacking appropria-
tion amendments onto private bills. Since Section 13 {supra, p. 160)
prohibits multiple-subject bills and Section 22 {infra, p. 203) greatly
cuts down the passage of private acts, the appropriation prohibition has
not been of great significance. The only litigation invoking this sen-
tence appears to have been in the nature of a make-weight argument,
usually in a test case involving a general law. {See, e.g., Cremer v. Peoria
Housing Authority, 399 111. 579 (1948); Hagler v. Small, 307 111. 460
(1923).)
Pay: This sentence, analogous to the one subject-one bill rule of Sec-
tion 13 {supra, p. 160), has brought forth considerable litigation, in-
cluding some of the cases brought by the famous litigating taxpayer,
J. B. Fergus. In the first Fergus v. Russel case (270 111. 304 (1915)), the
Supreme Court dealt with what was called the "Omnibus Bill." It made
a number of appropriations for a number of different purposes. Included
were sums of money for the compensation of various people in various
positions. The claim was made that these appropriations violated the
second sentence of Section 16. The Court first had to dispose of a matter
of principle — namely, whether the concluding words "any other sub-
ject" really meant "any other subject than appropriations." All earlier
cases construing this sentence had involved appropriations mixed with
substantive legislation. The Court was unwilling to accept the prof-
fered distinction and ruled that the concluding words meant "any
other subject than pay of members and officers." The Court then went
through each of the items of appropriation for pay and decided on the
basis of the definition of officer in Section 24 of Article V {infra, p. 322)
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whether the position was that of officer or employee. (There were a great
many other constitutional problems involved in this landmark case, but
they are discussed in connection with other sections of this and other
Articles.) The third Fergus i>. Russel case (277 111. 20 (1917)) involved the
first sentence of this section and held that appropriations to pay claims
against the state were not "appropriations in a private law."
In one of the cases distinguished by the Court in the first Fergus case,
the Court had in fact construed appropriation language not to be an
appropriation but only a provision for the amount to be paid to an
officer from an appropriation. (People v. Joyce, 246 111. 124 (1910).) Some
years later, in a case which did not refer to the Joyce case, the Court
quite consistently held that such a provision did not entitle an attorney
to payment of his salary where the Governor struck the item therefor
from the "members and officers" appropriations bill. (People ex rel.
Millner v. Russel, 311 111. 96 (1924).)
Tlie recent case of People ex rel. Coons t. tlowlett (33 III. 2d 304
(1965)) involved this section, at least in the eyes of the dissenting judge.
It appears that the legislature passed an amendment to the regular com-
pensation of legislators provision increasing salaries from S6,000 to
$7,500 per annum. The Governor vetoed the bill. The appropriation act,
passed after the compensation amendment and on the assumption that
it Avould not be vetoed, provided a sum for legislators' salaries at the
rate of $7,500 per annum. The Supreme Court refused to issue a writ
prohibiting payment of the larger salary. "The later law constitutes an
amendment by implication and its provisions must prevail." {Id. at 308.)
What happened to amendment by reference? Neither the opinion of the
Court nor the dissent discusses the matter. (See discussion of Sec. 13,
supra, p. 160.) The dissenting judge argued that to allow an amendment
by implication in an appropriation act was a violation of the second
sentence of Section 16. He also argued that an appropriation act, cover-
ing, as it does, only two fiscal years, can hardly be a "law" under the
rubric of Section 21 —
"compensation as shall be prescribed by law."
{Injra, p. 200.)
Comparative Analysis
Private Bills: No other state appears to have a comparable provision.
Two states forbid appropriations for private purjDoses, a prohibition
found by the courts in Illinois to be the thrust of Section 20. (See Com-
ment on Sec. 20, infra, p. 199.) The absence of such a specific prohibition
in other state constitutions does not mean that appropriations for private
purposes are permitted. Most state courts would invalidate an appro-
priation for a purely private purpose. Four states permit appropriations
for private or local purposes but only by a two-thirds' vote of the
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membership of each house. But here again, such permission is probably
of a Hmited nature. In New York, for examjjle, a two-thirds' vote is
required for state grants to local governments, but another provision
comparable to Section 20 effectively prohibits truly private appropria-
tions. The United States Constitution has no comparable prohibition.
The Model State Constitution has a limited prohibition on private laws.
(See Comparative Analysis of Sec. 22, iyifra, p. 223.)
Pay: The Nebraska Constitution (1875) and the West Virginia Con-
stitution (1872) have a limitation in almost the same wording as the
second sentence of Section 16. Two states include in the limitation both
salaries and other current expenses of the state. Three states simply
specify that appropriation bills should not have extraneous riders at-
tached. The United States Constitution does not prohibit riders and, in
fact, Congress frequently includes substantive legislation in appropria-
tion acts, sometimes germane to the appropriation, sometimes totally
irrelevant. The Model State Constitution limits appropriation bills to
appropriations, but states that the recjuirement is not subject to judicial
review. (See Comment on Sec. 13, supra, p. 170.)
Comment
As noted in the Explanation above, there is some question whether
the first sentence of this section serves any purpose. The only purpose
served by the second sentence presumably was to prevent the legislature
from forcing an unwanted appropriation on the Governor who would
have had to deny pay to himself and all other state officers if he were to
veto the bill. But this eventuality was obviated by the item veto amend-
ment to Section 16 of Article V. (Infra, p. 293.) Any legislative matter
other than an appropriation could as easily be stricken under the one-
subject rule of Section 13 {supra, p. 160) as by this sentence in Section
16. In this connection, it should be noted that the Model State Con-
stitution exempts appropriation bills from the one-subject rule but pro-
vides that appropriation bills must be limited to appropriations.
Treasury Warrants — Duty of Auditor
Sec. 17. No money shall be drawn from the treasury except in pursuance
of an appropriation made by law, and on the presentation of a warrant issued
by the Auditor thereon; and no money shall be diverted from any appropriation
made for any purpose, or taken from any fund whatever, either by joint or
separate resolution. The Auditor shall, within sixty days after the adjourn-
ment of each session of the General Assembly, prepare and publish a full
statement of all money expended at such session, specifying the amount of each
item, and to whom and for what paid.
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History
The 1818 Constitution provided that no money should be drawn Ironi
the treasury except in consequence ol an aj^propriation made by law.
That Constitution also provided that "[a]n accurate statement of the re-
ceipts and expenditures of the public money shall be attached to and
published with the laws, at the rising of each session of the General
Assembly." The 1848 Constitution made no substantive change in the
foregoing. The present version of Section 17 was accepted by the 1870
Convention without explanation or debate. The proposed 1922 Consti-
tution retained the first half of the first sentence and the substance of the
second sentence. The second halt of the first sentence was omitted as a
repetition, in effect, of the first half. (See State of Illinois, journal of the
Constitutional Convention 1920-1922 at 363-64 (1922) [hereinafter cited
as Journal].)
Explanation
The first half of the first sentence is a peculiar combination of two
distinct propositions. One is the imiversal principle that money that
flows into the treasury gets paid out only pursuant to appropriations.
The second makes the Auditor of Public Accounts, not the Treasurer, the
state's chief disbursing officer, and thereby indirectly adopts the principle
of an independent pre-audit of public expenditures. The second half of
the sentence is, as the 1920-22 Convention recognized, simply repetitious.
This is so because by virtue of Section 11 {suprn, p. 155), a law requires
an enactment clause and separate and joint resolutions do not have one.
There have been a number of cases and opinions of the Attorney Gen-
eral under the appropriation portion of the first sentence of this section.
With one exception, the cases and opinions all say that the sentence
means what it says. {See, e.g., People ex rel. Board of Trustees v. Bar-
rett, 382 111. 321 (1943); Burritt v. Commissioners of State Contracts,
120 111. 322 (1887); 1917 111. Att'y Gen. Rep. 40; 1914 111. Att'y Gen Rep.
194.) The one exception is Antle x>. Tuchbreiter (414 111. 571 (1953))
where the Supreme Court quite sensibly held that social security taxes
withheld from state employees pursuant to an Enabling Act could be
paid over to the United States without the necessity of an appropriation.
There are two other recent cases which, if read too hastily, appear to
permit disbursements without an appropriation, but which, when read
carefully, are revealed to have subtle rationales. In People ex rel. Conn xk
Randolph (35 111. 24 (1966)), attorneys representing indigent defend-
ants in murder trials ran up expenses and provided legal services far in
excess of a statutory maximum for indigent representations. The Court
pointed out that the indigents were constitutionally entitled to repre-
sentation at the expense of the state, and that the state could hardly
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defeat this constitutional requirement by tailing to provide adequate
funds to meet the requirement. Under some circumstances, the result
might have been that the lawyers had a just claim against the state
which they would have had to j^rosecute. In the Conn case, however,
the Court was able to find the money. The accused were prisoners and
the murders had occurred in the course of a prison riot. The Court
noted that the Department of Public Safety was responsible for the
prosecution of crimes committed in prison, and that such prosecution
could not take place unless the accused were provided with counsel. The
Department had a fund for contingencies, and the Court simply stated
that payment should be made from that fund. The other case involved
the not uncommon situation of having to decide whether or not a spe-
cific proposed expenditure could be brought under one of the more gen-
eral line items in an appropriation. Here taxpayers sought to enjoin the
construction by the University of Illinois of a television station. The
University appropriation for ordinary and contingent expenses con-
sisted of a small number of general items under classifications estab-
lished by law, and the Court had no difficulty in finding that that appro-
priation included a television station. (Turkovich v. Board of Trustees,
11 111. 2d 460 (1957).)
It should also be noted that it is possible under certain circumstances
to operate without an appropriation if the required funds are obtained
directly and do not have to be paid into the treasury. {See Elliott v. Uni-
versity of 111, 365 111. 338 (1936).)
As noted above, the first sentence also sets forth the constitutional
duty of the Auditor of Public Accounts to be the state's disbursing offi-
cer and by implication to conduct a pre-audit of every expenditure from
state funds in the treasury. This pre-audit duty of the Auditor of Pub-
lic Accounts indirectly expressed in the first sentence is the only con-
stitutional auditing duty spelled out in the Constitution. (To be sure,
Sees. 7 and 20, Art. V, infra, pp. 273 and 313, require executive account-
ing, but accounting is not auditing.) Over the years, many nonauditing
and nondisbursing duties were given to the Auditor of Public Ac-
counts, and other agencies were given pre-audit powers which were, of
course, in addition to the Auditor's constitutional power. Following the
notorious scandal involving the Auditor of Public Accounts in the period
1953-56, a number of statutory changes were made. The situation today,
in brief, is that the Auditor of Public Accounts retains his disbursing
function, his pre-auditing function, and general supervision of some
municipal and county auditing, but almost none of his nonauditing func-
tions. As of January 1, 1958, a Department of Audits under the command
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of an Auditor General took over all of the post-audit activities formerly
handled by the Auditor of Public Accounts.
The second sentence of Section 17 refers only to money expended by
the General Assembly in the course of operating the legislative session.
During the 1920-22 Convention, the Committee on Phraseology and
Style inquired of the Auditor of Public Accounts concerning the am-
biguous wording of the sentence. He replied to the effect that, from the
beginning, the Auditor had construed the sentence to cover only the
legislature's expenditures for its own purposes and not all money ex-
pended as a result of the session. (Journal 364.)
Comparative Analysis
Most states either provide specifically that no money shall be drawn
from the treasury except pursuant to an appropriation made by law, or
provide by some indirect language for an ecjuivalent restriction. A few
states permit interest on the state debt to be paid without a specific ap-
propriation therefor. About a third of the states have a provision calling
for warrants. Nebraska and West Virginia follow Illinois in having the
Auditor issue the warrant. In tliree states the issuing officer is the Comp-
troller. In Missouri, the Comptroller must certify for payment and the
State Auditor must certitfy that the expenditure is within an appropria-
tion and that there is an adequate unexpeiided balance thereof. Some
half dozen states require that the warrant be drawn by the "proper
officer." Both the United States Constitution and the Model State Con-
stitution contain the traditional restriction on withdrawal of money
from the treasury, but neither has any language covering the issuance
of warrants.
Mississippi and Nebraska appear to have copied the Illinois require-
ment that the Auditor prepare a statement of the expenses of the legis-
lative session. No other state has a comparable provision. The United
States Constitution and the Model State Constitution have no com-
parable provision. (But see the quotation from the Model concerning
the secretary of the legislature, supra, p. 150.)
Comment
The second sentence of this section seems to be a minor matter hardly
of constitutional significance. The repetitious part of the first sentence
could easily be dropped. The point has been made from time to time
in the Comments that care must be taken not to give rise to the infer-
ence that some substantive change is intended by an omission. In this
case the addition of the words "No law shall be passed except by bill"
in an appropriate section as recommended elsewhere (see Comment to
Sec. 11, supra, p. 156) would justify the dropping of the repetitious
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language.
Considerable thought should be given to financial controls, particu-
larly the extent to which a particular pattern of control should be
frozen into the Constitution by virtue of detailed language. It is also
important to analyze the effect on the distribution of power of different
formulations of financial controls. As a rough generalization, a system
of controls that virtually guarantees that no money will ever be illegally,
improperly or foolishly spent is incompatible with effective and prompt
administration. This is so because the paperwork and the double-check-
ing slow everything down, and speed in taking action is frequently
the effective and sometimes even the less expensive alternative. In
devising a constitutional framework for financial controls, a balance
must be struck between these incompatible objectives. In striking the
balance, consideration shoidd be given to the degree of flexibility that
the Constitution should permit. In other words, consideration shoidd
be given to the extent to which the legislature should be left free to
alter the control system from time to time.
It is clear that an audit after the fact, a post-audit, does not inhibit
efficient administration. It is also clear that the agency charged with
such an audit shoidd be independent of the agencies whose books are to
be audited. The United States, by statute, achieves this result by making
the General Accounting Office an arm of the Congress and by setting the
term of office of the Comptroller General at 15 years. The Model State
Constitution recommends that the auditor be appointed by the legis-
lature to serve at its pleasure. He would conduct post-audits as pre-
scribed by law. The two newest states, Alaska and Hawaii, have adopted
this recommendation, except that Hawaii gives the auditor an eight-year
term, subject to removal for cause by a two-thirds' vote of the legisla-
ture. Another dozen or so states provide for legislative appointment of
the auditor, but in most cases the auditor is not a constitutional officer.
Appropriations for State Expenditures
Sec. 18. Each General Assembly shall provide for all the appropriations neces-
sary for the ordinary and contingent expenses of the government until the
expiration of the first fiscal quarter after the adjournment of the next regular
session, the aggregate amount of which shall not be increased without a vote
of two-thirds of the members elected to each house, nor exceed the amount of
revenue authorized by law to be raised in such time; and all appropriations,
general or special, requiring money to be paid out of the State treasury, from
funds belonging to the State, shall end with such fiscal quarter: Provided, the
State may, to meet casual deficits or failures in revenues, contracts debts, never
to exceed in the aggregate two hundred and fifty thousand dollars; and moneys
thus borrowed shall be applied to the purpose for which they were obtained,
or to pay the debt thus created, and to no other purpose; and no other debt.
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except for the purpose of repelling invasion, suppressing insurrection, or de-
fending the State in war, (for payment of wliich the faith of the State shall be
pledged), sliall be contracted, unless tiie law authorizing the same shall, at a
general election, have been submitted to the people, and have received a majority
of the votes cast for members of the General Assembly at such election. The
General Assembly shall provide for the publication of said law for three months,
at least, before the vote of the people shall be taken upon ilic same; and pro-
vision shall be made, at the time, for the payment of the interest annually, as
it shall accrue, by a tax levied for the purpose, or from other sources of revenue;
whidi law, providing for the payment of such interest by such tax, shall be ir-
repealable until such debt be paid: And Inovided, further, that the law levying
the tax shall be submitted to the people with the law authorizing the debt to
be contracted.
History
The 1818 Constitiilion contained no restrictions on either the appro-
priations process or the incurring of debt. Under the 1818 Constitutiton,
the legislature incurred considerable indebtedness in furtherance ol such
internal improvements as the Illinois-Michigan Canal and the laying
down of railroads. In the great depression years of the middle 1 830's the
state was threatened with bankruptcy. {See Debates 298-300.) The 1848
Constitution reflected this experience. A section was inserted in the Leg-
islative Article that differs from the present Section 18 in only three re-
spects: (1) appropriations were for the period ending with adjournment
of the next legislature instead of at the end of a fiscal quarter follow-
ing adjournment; (2) the lapsing of appropriations was not covered;
and (3) the temporary deficit debt limit was only |50,000. Section 18 does
not differ in substance from the section as proposed to the 1870 Conven-
tion. There was extensive debate, and several amendments were offered,
mostly designed to restrict the legislature further, but all were defeated.
The proposed 1922 Constitution contained a number of technical and
simplifying changes in the appropriations and debt provision, but only
two changes of substance: the temporary deficit limit was increased to
$1,000,000 and bonds for the Illinois Waterway were exempted from the
referendum recjuirement. This latter change was solely for the purpose
of consistency, since the proposed canal section authorized a bond issue
of $10,000,000 for the waterway. (The technical changes are discussed
below in the course of the ExpUnuttioi}.)
Explanation
Appropriations: The provision for appropriations is fuzzy and indef-
inite, but if the unexpressed assumptions of the drafters of the 1848 and
1870 Constitutions are considered, it is reasonably clear what was in-
tended. In 1848, it was assumed that the General Assembly would
appropriate enough money to run the government until the next Gen-
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eral Assembly could again appropriate money to run the government.
The drafters ot the 1870 Constitution modified the earlier provision
on the assumption that appropriations for running the government
would be for a two-year period beginning July 1. This came about be-
cause Section 13 (supra, p. 160) made legislation effective July 1, and
the delegates assumed that the General Assembly would normally finish
its regular session prior to April 1. (See Debates 540.) The extra fiscal
quarter was designed to provide a two-year "budget." (It has been
noted elsewhere (see Explanation of Sec. 7, Art. V, infra, p. 273) that
the delegates to the 1870 Convention anticipated, perhaps unwittingly,
modern budgeting.)
Over the years, regular sessions got. longer and June 30 became the
normal adjournment target. Thus, the "expiration of the first fiscal
cjuarter" after adjournment became an "overlapping" quarter in which
the previous bienniinn's appropriations and the new biennium's ap-
propriations were available. The proposed 1922 Constitution sought
to clear iqj this confusion by provididng that appropriations were for
a two-year period from July 1 to June 30, but that money obligated be-
fore June 30 could be paid up to September 30.
The fuzzy language of Section 18 made it possible recently for the
Attorney General to advise the Chairman of the Commission on the
Organization of the General Assembly that not only could the legisla-
ture turn itself into an "annual session" body (see Sec. 9, supra, p. 145),
it could adopt annual appropriation acts. (See I.S.L. 133-38, app. D.)
In his opinion dated October 19, 1966, the Attorney General discussed
the ambiguity of the appropriations language of Section 18 and noted
that the legislature had long since specified that appropriations expire
on June 30 of the second year of the biennium. (Section 25 of the
State Finance Act, 111. Rev. Stat. ch. 127, §161 (1967). Section 27 of the"
State Finance Act authorizes payment, not until September 30, but
"until the expiration of the first fiscal quarter after the adjournment
of the General Assembly held next after that at which the appropriation
was made." 111. Rev. Stat. ch. 127, §163 (1967). This would seem to
mean that, since the 75th General Assembly did not adjourn until Jan-
uary, 1969, payments could be made until June 30, 1969, on obligations
incurred prior to June 30, 1967, under appropriations made by the 74th
General Assembly.) The Attorney General concluded that this long-
standing statutory resolution of the ambiguity of the length of the
overall appropriation period would be accepted by the courts.
It is not clear why the Attorney General discussed the ambiguity of
the length of the appropriation period. It may be that he wanted to stress
the literal absurdity of the indefinite appropriation period in justifica-
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tion of steps to regiilari/e the appropriation process. Or it may be that
he wanted to nail down the validity of the specific 24-month period be-
fore deciding that it could be divided into two equal twelve-month
periods. In any event, after discussing the ambiguity of the appropria-
tion j)eriod, the Attorney General addresseed himself to the principal
question, thus:
"Although the General Assembly must make appropriations for the biennial
period as set forth in Section 18 of Article IV, the Constitution does not state
that the General Assembly might not make annual appropriations in order to
discharge its duty.
'A state constitution is not a grant of power but is a limitation on legislative
power, and the legislature may enact any law not expressly or inferentially pro-
hibited by the state or national constitution....
"I can find nothing in the Constitution which expressly or inferentially pro-
hibits the making of annual appropriations. Although the General Assembly
must make appropriations for a certain period, there is no requirement that
such appropriations cannot be made one year at a time." (I.S.L. 136.)
The foregoing leaves open the question of whether or not the second
annual appropriation bill must be passed by a two-thirds' vote. The
Attorney General, after quoting the operative words from Section 18 —
"the aggregate amoinit of which shall not be increased" — said:
"The word
'aggregate' means the entire number, sum, mass, or quantity of
anything. (Bauer v. Rusetos ir Co., 306 111. 602, 609). The words 'of which,'
which follow the words
'aggregate amount,' can mean nothing except the entire
amount of the appropriations made for the period for which the General
Assembly is under a duty to make appropriations, i.e., for the two-year period
from July 1st of an odd-numbered year to and including June 30th of the next
odd-numbered year. Appropriations made for this period would not be subject
to the two-thirds rule if increased by the same General Assembly which made
the original appropriation. However, if the increase were made by the new
successor General Assembly, a two-thirds vote would clearly be required, since
there would be an increase in the aggregate amount of the appropriations
provided by the previous General Assembly which was responsible primarily
for making appropriations for tlie period in question." (Id at 138.)
There are three things to be said about the appropriations portion
of the Attorney General's opinion. One is that his conclusions are diffi-
cult to square with the debates of the delegates to the 1870 Constitution.
The changes in the proposed 1922 Constitution appear to represent a
formulation of the way the appropriation process was originally sup-
posed to operate. The second thing to be said is that, fortunately, the
1870 drafters used ambiguous language that permits a shift to anntial
budgeting. Finally, there is only a limited area for judicial review of
this question. Certainly, the courts could hardly invalidate the first-year
appropriation acts. Thie only question which could arise over second-
year appropriation acts is whether a two-thirds' \ote is required. It
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seems most unlikely that the courts would disagree with the Attorney
General's opinion, considering the chaos which would ensue if such acts
were invalidated and in view of the fact that to require a two-third's
vote would be a technical matter, since a second one-year appropriation
is not the second-guessing at which the restriction on increases in aggre-
gate amounts is aimed. In any event, for the first time, the budget pre-
sented on April 1, 1969, was for one fiscal year, beginning July 1, 1969.
Section 18 provides that the aggregate amount appropriated shall not
exceed the amount of revenue authorized. This provision is unenforce-
able, and for this reason it was omitted from the proposed 1922 Con-
stitution. It is unenforceable because, as discussed above, the period of
time covered by appropriations is not definite, and because it is literally
impossible to know until long after the event whether revenues are
adequate to cover appropriations. An argument was once made that
"revenue" should be construed to cover only amounts raised by direct
taxation, but the Supreme Court rejected the argument in favor of the
ordinary meaning of total income from whatever source. (Fergus v.
Brady, 277 111. 272 (1917).) Notwithstanding unenforceability, the
Supreme Court has relied on the provision to invalidate indefinite ap-
propriations, on the ground that otherwise it would not be possible to
know whether or not appropriations exceeded revenues. Thus, an ap-
propriation of "such sums as may be necessary" for a stated purpose was
held void. (Fergus v. Russel, 270 111. 304 (1915) (but also held void
under Art. V, Sec. 16, requiring "amounts in distinct items," infra, p.
293).)
It was noted earlier that the requirement that appropriations lapse at
the end of "such fiscal quarter" has been implemented by statute to pro-
vide that the power to use an appropriation lapses on June 30 of the
biennium, but authority to pay continues to the end of "such fiscal
quarter." This precludes continuing appropriations. (People ex rel.
Millner v. Russel, 311 111. 96 (1924).) And, of course, payments after the
end of the "fiscal quarter" are absolutely prohibited. (People ex rel.
Polen V. Hoehler, 405 111. 322 (1950).) Nevertheless, if an appropriation
lapses and a person through no fault of his own fails to get paid, a valid
claim exists that will be recognized by the Court of Claims. (See, e.g..
King V. State, 11 111. Ct. CI. 577 (1941); Riefler v. State, 11 111. Ct. CI.
381 (1941).)
Debts: In contrast to the fuzzy appropriation language, the restric-
tions on incurring debt are precise and definite. (The concept of "debt"
is another matter. See discussion of revenue bonds below.) There has
been litigation, of course, but usually these have been test cases to settle
the constitutionality of a bond issue, an important adjunct to the sue-
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cessliil marketing of bonds. As is customary in such test cases, every con-
ceivable argument is offered and the result is a series of cases that, in a
way, simply imderscore the obvious. Thus, the requirement that the
legislature provide for publication of the law to be voted upon can be
met by a provision in the law itself, by a separate law, or by resolution.
(Mitchell V. Lowden, 288 111. :;27 (1919).) Likewise, there is no need
for separate laws, one to create the debt and one to provide a tax for
repayment of interest. One law can cover both and one vote can be sub-
mitted to the people. {Id. But, of course. Sec. 18 does not retjuire a
special tax; "other sources of revenue" may be used.) And when the
matter is sidimitted to the voters, a simple proposition suffices, notwith-
standing the wording of Section 18 calling for submission of "the law"
lo the voters. (Routt v. Barrett, 396 111. 322 (1947).) Perhaps the most
incredible argument made in any of the test cases was the claim that
the requirement that a bond issue receive "a majority of the votes cast
for members of the General Assembly" was to be read literally. Since
every voter normally votes for three representatives and half of the voters
normally vote for a senator, a majority of all those votes would be more
than the total nimiber of voters who could vote for the bond issue and a
bond referendum could never j^ass. Needless to say, the Supreme Court
said the majority required is of those persons voting for members of
the General Assembly. (Mitchell v. Lowden, 288 111. 327 (1919).)
The determination by the United States Supreme Court that the
Fourteenth Amendment requires equality of voting — the "one man-one
vote" rule — has raised questions about the constitutionality of the ma-
jority required to approve a bond issue. The argument, in brief, is that
a person casts a vote against the bond issue if he votes for members of
the General Assembly even though he does not vote on the bond issue at
all; that a person can cast "two votes" against a bond issue by voting
for members of the General Assembly and against the bond issue; and
that a person can cast "two votes" for a bond issue by refraining from
voting for members of the General Assembly while voting for the bond
issue.
This c|uestion is in litigation in Illinois in an action in the Cir-
cuit Court of Cook County contesting the announced result of the
referendum on the Natural Resources Development Bond Act at the
November, 1968, election. The State Electoral Board found that 1,656,000
favorable votes and 1,216,814 unfavorable votes were cast on the bond
issue, but that, under the requirement of Section 18, the issue failed
because 4,267,956 votes were cast for members of the General Assembly,
and the required majority would have been 2,133,979.
In Illinois, as in many other states, a simple but expensive device has
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been used to get around bond limitations. This is the device of creating
a public authority to issue revenue bonds which do not involve the faith
and credit of the state, but, consequently, carry a higher interest rate.
The first use of state public authorities for this purpose was the Illinois
Armory Board, created in 1935. The board was empowered to obtain
land and construct or purchase buildings to be used as National Guard
Armories. It would issue bonds, the payment of principal and interest
for which was obtained from rentals to the state. Apparently, no attack
on this operation was made until after the Greening case, discussed be-
low, was decided. In Loomis v. Keehn (400 111. 337 (1948)), the Supreme
Court held that Section 18 was not violated by the Armory Board Act
because there was no irrevocable obligation on the state to use the build-
ings and pay rent therefor and provision was made for the board to
lease to others if the state failed to pay its rent.
In 1941, the Illinois State Public Building Authority was created to
perform a similar function for state buildings generally, but in 1943
the Supreme Court invalidated this Authority in People ex rel. Greening
V. Green. (382 III. 577 (1943).) The principal difficulty was that the mem-
bers of the Authority consisted of all of the elected state executives plus
a member of the Supreme Court, and this was simply too transparent to
support a claim that the Authority was not the state. Not until 1961 was
a new Illinois Building Authority created with a membership of seven,
none of whom could be an elected official. With this change, and others
that met technical objections raised in the Greening case, the new
Authority was upheld. (Berger v. Howlett, 25 111. 2d 128 (1962).)
There are, of course, other public authorities engaged in making capi-
tal expenditures financed by revenue bonds for such purposes as toll high-
ways, college dormitories, and recreational facilities in state parks. These
are much easier to defend than the State Building Authority, for the
money received is from third persons utilizing the facilities rather than
from the general taxpayer through appropriations for rent.
In summary, it may be noted that the debt limitation applies only to
debt for which the state pledges its credit. Revenue bonds are outside the
limitation because the state's credit is not pledged. In the case of state
office buildings, the arrangement approaches a fiction because, what-
ever the technicalities involved, the real source for payment of the "debt"
is the taxing power to raise the rent which the state pays to the authority,
and as a practical matter the state's credit is involved. Since the state's
credit is not legally pledged, the interest rate on the bonds is higher.
Comparative Analysis
Appropriations: There is a vast range of constitutional provisions con-
cerning the appropriations process. There are a few states which have
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adopted an executive budget system which gives the governor consider-
able control over the appropriations process through restricting the
power of the legislature to make changes in the executive budget. In
most of the other states, constitutional provisions generally consist of
specific limitations designed, principally, to preserve the integrity of the
appropriations process. Some of these limitations appear in other sec-
tons in the Illinois Constitution and the appropriate comparisons ap-
pear elsewhere. (See Sees. 13, 16 and 17, supra, pp. 160, 178, and 181; and
Art. V, Sec. 16, infra, p. 293.)
Approximately a fifth of the states have a provision that, in one way or
another, specifically prohibits deficit financing. Many other states in-
directly prevent deficit financing through limitations on the incurring
of debt. Several states, including states with a formal executive budget,
prohibit the passage of supplementary or special appropriations until
after the general appropriation act is passed. About a dozen states limit
the life of appropriations, but at least two states have specific provisions
permitting certain continuing appropriations. A few states specifically
provide that payment may be made during a period, usually two years,
after the oblgation has been incurred and the appropriation has lapsed.
The United States Constitution has only one limitation on appropria-
tions, the restriction on appropriating money to "raise and support"
armies for more than two years. (Three states have copied this limitation
for their state militia.) The purpose of this limitation is to prevent the
creation of a standing army, and in the light of that purpose the two-year
limitation actually covers only such items as pay and other current ex-
penses. Congress regularly makes "no-year" appropriations which are
available until spent, "one-year" appropriations which must be obligated,
that is, committed, before the end of the fiscal year, and appropriations
for a specific period beyond one year. In all cases, a distinction is made
between
"obligation" and "payment." Limitations on the life of ap-
propriations are related to obligation, or commitment, of funds. Payment
can be made at any time.
The Model State Constitution provides:
"The governor shall submit to the legislature, at a time fixed by law, a budget
estimate for the next fiscal year setting forth all proposed expenditures and
anticipated income of all departments and agencies of the state, as well as a
general appropriation bill to authorize the proposed expenditures and a bill
or bills covering recommendations in the budget for new or additional revenues."
(art. VII, § 7.02.)
Debt: States can be divided into roughly four groups in regard to power
to incur debt: (1) states with no significant constitutional limitations;
(2) states with absolute limitations; (3) states with no limitations but
requiring voter approval by referendum; and (4) states requiring refer-
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endum approval but still retaining a maximum debt limit. There appear
to be only six states in the first category, four of which are in New
England. One of the six, Delaware, requires a three-fourths' vote in each
house to create any debt other than to meet casual deficits or defense
needs, or to refund existing debt. A seventh state, Maryland, has no limi-
tation, but does require the enactment of a special tax to cover interest
and repayment of the debt within 15 years. Approximately 23 states
fall in the second category of absolute limitations. Most of these states
have exceptions of one sort or another, but the most common exceptions
— to meet casual deficits, repel invasion, or suppress insurrection
— are
not significant. The most common form of limitation is a percentage,
frequently one percent, of the assessed value of taxable property. There
are about 17 states in the third category of states with no limitation, but
requiring approval by referendimi. Three states join Illinois in requir-
ing a majority of those voting in the election. South Carolina requires
a two-thirds' majority of those voting on the question. In the fourth cate-
gory, there are four states requiring a referendum on incurring debt
within the stated limitation.
The United States Constitution simply empowers Congress to "borrow
money on the credit of the United States." The Model State Constitution
simply states:
"No debt shall be contracted by or in behalf of this state unless such debt
shall be authorized by law for projects or objects distinctly specified therein."
(art. VII, §7.01.)
Comment
Appropriations: There are a great many signs pointing to annual
sessions of the legislature and, naturally, annual budgets and annual
appropriations. Even if the decision is not to require annual sessions, it
seems unlikely that they will be prohibited. In either event, redrafting
of the first part of Section 18 will be appropriate, particularly to remove
the present fuzzy language. Before new language is drafted, however,
there are several crucial decisions to be made. The budgeting and appro-
priations process is an intricate business, and thought should be given
to the advisability of limiting the constitutional language to a simple and
flexible provision. But if the decision is to introduce details of control, care
must still be taken that the desired control does not have an undesirable
consequence in some other area of the budgeting process. For example, the
requirement in Section 16 {supra, p. 178) that appropriations for pay
for officers of the government be in a separate bill, whatever its supposed
value, certainly increases the legislative task of relating appropriations
to the budget. It would also be appropriate to weigh the pros and cons
of such matters as continuing appropriations, longer-than-one-year ap-
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propriations, and the federal rule that all that expires with an appro-
priation is the avithority to obligate, not the authority to pay. It is not
necessary, of course, to put decisions on all these matters into the Con-
stitution. It may be acceptable to leave some or all of them to legislative
decision. But if that is the decision, care must be taken not to draft
language that will lead courts to impose unintended restrictions on the
budgeting and appropriations process.
Debt: There is much respectable argument for the proposition that
debt limits are both ineffective and expensive and for the proposition
that participatory democracy in the complicated business of rational
financing of government is not particularly rewarding. (See, e.g., the
Model State Constitution's Commentary, especially the explanation for
dropping the referendum requirement of previous Models. Model State
Constitution 91-92.) The political realities are such, however, that the
wholesale abandonment of debt limits is probably not a practical pro-
posal. Instead, consideration will probably have to be limited to (a)
whether to keep the casual deficit limit and if so, at what sum in place of
the unrealistic $250,000; (b) whether to liberalize the referendum voting
requirement for debt above the casual deficit limit; or (c) whether to sub-
stitute a maximum debt limit for casual deficit and the referendum. It
should be noted, however, that the more difficult full faith and credit bor-
rowing is made, the more expensive borrowing becomes. By one means
or another, methods of essential financing will be found, all more ex-
pensive than regular state bonds. It should also be noted that the most
common form of debt limitation is a percentage of assessed valuation of
property. In today's world, this is a poor measure of wealth or financial
capacity. A novel, but economically sound, measure would be a per-
centage of the Illinois Gross "National" Product.
Two minor points of style and arrangement should be made. Appro-
priation procedure and debt rules should be in separate sections and
both should be in an article on finance that would replace the article on
revenue.
Unauthorized Compensation and Payments Prohibited
Sec. 19. The General Assembly shall never grant or authorize extra compen-
sation, fee or allowances to any public officer, agent, servant or contractor, after
service has been rendered or a contract made, nor authorize the payment of
any claim, or part thereof, hereafter created against the State under any agree-
ment or contract made without express authority of law; and all such unauthor-
ized agreements or contracts shall be null and void: Provided, the General
Assembly may make appropriations for expenditures incurred in suppressing
insurrection or repelling invasion.
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History
The first part of this section, down to the words "nor authorize," first
appeared in the 1848 Constitution. The balance of the section was added
in 1870. There was no debate or explanation for the addition. The pro-
posed 1922 Constitution retained the substance of the section.
Explanation
This section serves two distinct purposes: the first part states the
traditional rule against payments of money without consideration, and
the second states the traditional rule that agents of the government must
have express authority in order to bind the government. Since they are
traditional rules, they would probably have developed in the absence of
Section 19 in somewhat the same manner as the courts have construed the
section. This is to say, in general, that the courts have ruled that an em-
ployee or contractor who has struck his bargain cannot later get more
for his services, and that he who contracts with the state must ascertain
at his peril that the agent of the state has the authority to act and that
there is an appropriation therefor. (See e.g., Gholson v. State, 12 111. Ct.
CI. 26 (1941); Amick v. State, 1 1 111. Ct. CI. 625 (1941); and Mandel Bros.
V. State, 10 111. Ct. CI. 448 (1939). For the latter, see the leading case of
Fergus v. Brady, 277 111. 272 (1917).)
In relatively recent times, the courts have had problems with this sec-
tion in connection with pension plans. Almost any politically feasible
pension plan has elements of retroactivity in it, and against an argument
that pension payments will be made in part for past service, the courts
have had to find an answer. The answer, taken from J. Dillon, Municipal
Corporations, Section 430 (5th ed. 1911), has been that pensions
"
'are in the nature of compensation for services previously rendered for which
full and adequate compensation was not received at the time of the rendition
of the services. It is, in effect, pay withheld to induce long-continued and faith-
ful service, and the public benefit accrues in two ways:' By encouraging com-
petent employees to remain in the service, and by retiring from the public
service those who have become incapacitated from performing the duties as well
as they might be performed by younger or more vigorous men." (People ex rel.
Kroner v. Abbott, 274 111. 380, 384-85 (1916).)
The foregoing somewdiat ingenuous argument suffices to get around
giving credit for past service, but it is of no value in the case of an effort
to increase the pensions of those already retired. Such efforts have been
invalidated under Section 19 in the case of noncontributory pensions
and compulsory contributory pensions. (See Raines v. Board of Trustees,
365 111. 610 (1937); Porter v. Loehr, 332 III. 353 (1928).) The rule is
different, however, in the case of a voluntary contributory pension plan.
There, the courts argue, a contractual relationship is created and the
legislature can amend the contract for retired persons. Thus, a retired
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teacher was allowed to pay a small additional contribution to the pension
fund and have his annual pension increased irom .^lOO to ^GOi). (Raines
V. Board of Trustees, 365 111. (ilO (1937).)
A related problem in compensation for services already rendered
arose in the case of the soldiers' bonus after World War I. The Sujireme
Court said that Section 19 did not stand in the way since soldiers and
sailors were not, in the words of the section, oflicers, agents, servants or
contractors. (Hagler v. Small, 307 111. 460 (1923).) Interestingly enough,
the same argimient was used on behalf of a jjension increase for the
widow of a retired fireman, but the Court would not accept the argument.
(People ex rcl. Schmidt v. Yerger, 21 111. 2d 338 (1961). See also Coyn-
ment below.)
Comparative Analysis
Approximately half of the states have a restriction on extra payments
for services rendered by officers and employees, or for contractors and
agents after performance or service rendered. Four states permit over-
riding the restriction by a two-thirds' vote of the legislature. Two states
make an exception for increases in pension payments, but in one of them
a three-fourths' vote is required.
Only about a third of the states specify the necessity for express author-
ity to obligate the state. Four of these states permit overriding the re-
striction by a two-tliirds' vote of the legislature, and three states join
Illinois in providing an exception for insurrections.
The United States Constitution has no comparable provision, but the
standard rule against implied authority to obligate the government is
followed. There are also strict criminal statutory rules against over-
obligating appropriated funds. The Model State Constitution provides
that no
"obligation for the payment of money [niay] be incurred except
as authorized by law."
Comment
It seems likely that the delegates to the 1870 Convention would have
been astounded if some one had argued that Section 19 would preyent
the state from increasing the pensions of retired employees. The dele-
gates probably would have been unable to conceive of the state's having
an obligation to provide for pensions at all. It is even jwssible that
around the turn of the century the courts, in the absence of a Section 19,
would have held a proposed increase in pensions of retired employees
to be the
"application of tax money for other than public purposes" and,
therefore, "a deprivation of property without due process of law." (See
cpiotation from the Sclnder case, injra, p. 199.) By 1961, a dissenting
judge argued in the Yerger case, cited earlier, that since widows of retired
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employees do not come within the express terms of Section 19, the
section ought not to stand in the way of helping widows faced with a
"decreasing" pension relative to the increase of the cost of living. (It is
only fair to note that public pension plans involve more legal problems
than those arising out of Section 19. See Cohn, "Public Employee Retire-
ment Plans - The Nature of the Employees' Rights," 1968 U. 111. L.F. 32.)
There are two morals in this story of pensions. One is that it is dif-
ficult to foresee the effects of rigid constitutional restrictions in a chang-
ing society. A second is that it is difficult to find words to prohibit out-
rageous "giveaways" without also prohibiting justifiable "giveaways."
Assumption of Debts Prohibited
Sec. 20. The State shall never pay, assume or become responsible for the
debts or liabilities of, or in any manner give, loan or extend its credit to, or in
aid of any public or other corporation, association or individual.
History
The 1848 Constitution forbade the state to give its credit "to or in aid
of any individual, association or corporation." There were two similar
proposals that wound their way through the 1870 Convention to the last
week of the Convention when the Chairman of the Committee on Re-
vision and Adjustment obtained unanimous consent to eliminate one of
thein. The eliminated section forbade the legislatme to pay or assiune
any debt of "any county, town or township, or of any corporation what-
ever." The section which was substituted, now Section 20, had been
proposed by the Committee on State, County and Municipal Intlebted-
ness. The Chairman urged the substitution on the grounds that one
section was a little broader than the other and that two sections would
be repetitive. The only debate over either section concerned whether or
not it was necessary to specify "public or other" corporations. One or two
of the lawyers argued that courts usually ruled that the generic tenn
"corporations" did not include municipal corporations and on the
strength of these argmnents, the section was revised to specify "public"
as well as all other corporations. The proposed 1922 Constitution re-
tained the substance of Section 20, but included the introductory
words
"Except as otherwise j^rovided in this constitution." The "other-
wise provided" referred to such things as a new section authorizing
loans to farmers, and a provision authorizing the state to share the cost
of some of the activities of drainage districts.
Explanation
It would appear that this section was aimed at two mid-Nineteenth
Century problems arising from the drive for internal improvements —
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particularly, railroads and canals. One was tlie use of state credit or finids
to assist private entrepreneurs engaged in building such improvements.
The other was tear that the slate niioht be induced to bail out local
governments that had gotten deeply into debt, usually in connection
with internal inij)rovements. As noted in the History above, there was
an extensive debate in 1870 over the wording necessary to insure cover-
age of municipal corporations. Mr. .\Iedill, whose proposed substitute
language was essentially the language of the present Section 20, noted
that local indebtedness in 1870 aggregated $40,000,000, and went on to
say:
"I can see, like a creeping shadow on the wall, the time approaching when a
log-rolling scheme will be brought into some near future Legislature, to saddle
on the State of Illinois the assumption of that §40,000,000, perhaps twice, aye!
thrice told." (Debates 220).
Over the years there have been a great many court cases in which
someone has invoked Section 20, but, by and large, none have been situ-
ations approaching either of the original purposes of the section. Indeed,
there appear to have been only three successful invocations of Section
20, and two of them are rather indirect. The only straightforward case
is that of Schiller v. Board of Education (370 111. 107 (1938)), where
the Sujjreme Court upset an agreement between a school board and a
private junior college for joint use of a library and laboratory equip-
ment to be paid for with pidolic funds. The two indirect uses of Section
20 were in Chicago Motor Club v. Kinney (329 111. 120 (1928)), where
the Court said that to permit a refund for a tax paid indirectly woidd
be a payment for a private purpose, and Fergus xk Riissel (270 111. 304
(1915)), where the Court said that to pay the expenses of a legislative
committee for work done' after adjournment siy^e die woidd be to make
payments to private individuals.
Over the years, government has entered many new areas and has
adopted new ways of utilizing private and local organizations to carry
out its functions. As noted above, except in the Schuler case. Section 20
has not stood in the way. For example, the state has been permitted to
aid a private college as a means of assuring an adequate supply of public
school teachers (Boehm v. Hertz, 182 111. 154 (1899) (the institution
in question was technically "private" but in reality "public")); to assist
a public housing authority (Cremer v. Peoria Housing Authority, (399
III. 579 (1948)); to assist the Chicago Regional Port District (People ex
rel. Gutknecht v. Chicago Regional Port Dist., 4 111. 2d 363 (1954)); and
to assist local governments in road construction (Martens v. Brady, 264
111. 178 (1914)). In short, if the money is spent for a public purpose,
the utilization of a public or other corporation is not likely to be for-
bidden through a rigid reading of Section 20.
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Comparative Analysis
Most states have restrictions on the extension of state credit to pri-
vate groups. Ahnost a majority of the states have some sort of restriction
on gifts or grants for private purposes. Section 20 does not in specific
terms prohibit such gifts or grants, but the section has been so con-
strued by the courts. (See Comment below.) Only about ten states refer
to assumption of debts. In many of the states with one or more of the
foregoing restrictions, there are exceptions which, in many cases, were
undoubtedly designed, either in advance or after the fact, to avoid overly
restrictive judicial interpretations of the restrictions. For example, sev-
eral states prohibit grants and loans except to assist the poor; or to the
sick and the poor; or to institutions for support of orphans, dependent
children, and aged poor; or to orphans, dependent children, the blind,
the physically handicapped, and veterans. Georgia has an exception to
permit the legislature to provide |250,000 to the first person or company
to bring in a commercial oil well. Neither the United States Constitu-
tion nor the Model State Constitution has any comparable restriction.
Comment
There are two observations to be made about this section. The first
is that it is aimed at a specific problem of a bygone era, but the restric-
tions are so broadly expressed that they can create difficulties in coping
with completely different problems today. The Nineteenth Century prob-
lem was that of free-wheeling entrepreneurs financing grandiose schemes
with public money. In today's complex society, it appears inevitable
that there will be an increase in the use of public subsidies to private
groups to help solve public problems. If Section 20 were followed liter-
ally, such public subsidies would not be permissible.
The second observation is that the courts have effectively rewritten
Section 20. In short, the courts look not to whom money or credit goes,
but to the purpose for which the money or credit is to be used. In the
Cremer case, cited above, the Court said:
"The fundamental principle of the unconstitutionality of appropriating public
funds for a private purpose is stated in a more forthright manner in section 20
of article IV...." (399 111. 579, 586-87 (1948).)
Another formulation of the principle appears in the Schiiler case,
also cited above:
"We have expressly decided that the application of tax money for other than
public purposes is a deprivation of property without due process of law."
(370 111. 107, 109 (1938).)
From the foregoing it may be argued that if Section 20 were deleted,
the courts could continue, as they do now, to distinguish between the
use of public funds for private purposes and for public purposes, striking
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down the former and upholding the hitter. There woukl be no loss of
protection of the public fisc. The gain would be in the elimination of a
sternly worded command that of necessity cannot be followed literally.
Compensation of Members
Sec. 21. The members of the General Assembly shall receive for their services
the sum of five dollars per day, during the first session held under this Con-
stitution, and ten cents for each mile necessarily traveled in going to and return-
ing from tlic seat of government, to be computed by the Auditor rtf Publit
.\ccounts; and thereafter such compensation as shall be prescribed by law, and
no other allowance or emolument, directly or indirectly, for any purpose what-
ever; except the sum of fifty dollars per session to each member, which shall be
in full for postage, stationery, newspapers, and all other incidental expenses
and perquisites; but no change shall be made in the compensation of members
of the General Assembly during the term for which they may have been elected.
The pay and mileage allowed to each member of the General Assembly shall
be certified by the Speakers of their respective houses, and entered on the jour
nals, and published at the close of each session.
History
The 1818 Constitution had no provision of any kind covering legisla-
tive salaries tand expenses. The 1818 Constitution set members' pay at
two dollars per day for the hrst 12 days' attendance and one dollar per
day thereafter, plus a travel allowance of ten cents a mile. The Speaker
of the House of Representatives received an additional dollar a day. The
1848 Constitution contained substantially the same language concern-
ing certification as now appears in the last sentence of Section 21.
The subject of compensation for legislators evoked considerable de-
bate in the 1870 Convention. There was imanimity only on the neces-
sity for forbidding any indirect means of increasing compensation. Thus,
all versions considered by the Convention included the flat ^50 expense
allowance and the rec|uirement that the Auditor of Public Accounts
compute mileage allowances. There were two views on the means of com-
puting compensation: one argument was that a flat sum for a biennium
might tempt the legislature to do a hasty job and adjourn quickly; the
other argument was that per diem compensation would tempt the legis-
lature to stretch out the session in order to increase their pay. On the
fundamental principle of legislative compensation, there were three
points of view. One delegate, who may very well have been a minority
of one, argued that the 1818 Constitution, which was silent on the sub-
ject, had worked well, and that the best solution was to leave compensa-
tion up to the legislature. The opposite view was that nobody else in
government fixed his own salary and that only the people speaking
through their Constitution should fix legislators' compensation. The
middle ground was the proposal that a legislature could determine the
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compensation to be enjoyed by the next legislature. This was the view
which prevailed by a vote ol 35 to 24. (See Debates 540-55.)
The proposed 1922 Constitution went the full route of allowing the
legislature to set both compensation and allowances, but provided that
an increase could take effect only after the second regular session fol-
lowing enactment. The requirement of certification and entry in the
journal of each member's pay and allowances was retained.
Explanation
This section has three significant operative provisions concerning
compensation: It allows (1) the legislature to set its own compensation;
(2) but only for future legislatures; and (3) prohibits indirect increases
through the device of allowances for expenses. Two of the famous
Fergus v. Russel cases struck down efforts to get around the section's
restrictions. In the first case (270 111. 304 (1915)), an appropriation of
|2,500 to the Secretary of State "for telephone toll for members of the
General Assembly" was held invalid under the |50 expense allowance
limitation. In the second case (270 111. 626 (1915)), a joint resolution
allowed reimbursement at the rate of two cents per mile for 21 round
trips between home and Springfield for each member from the contingent
expense funds of the legislature. The Court held that if this were con-
sidered an expense reimbursement, it ran afoul of the $50 limitation,
and if it were not so considered, then it was an increase in compensation
for sitting members and ran afoul of the restriction on an increase
"during the term for which they may have been elected."
At the 1870 Convention, on the occasion of the final vote on Article
IV, the following exchange took place:
"Mr. CHURCH. ...
"It occurs to me here, without stopping for much reflection, that at all times,
if a law shall have been proposed either to decrease or increase the pay, there
will be under this Constitution, a portion of one house of the General Assembly
in being, whose term will not have expired, and that the inconsistency may
result of there being one portion of the General Assembly drawing one kind of
pay, and another portion drawing another kind of pay. . . .
"Mr. UNDERWOOD. Mr. President: I understand that the law will not take
effect for two years after its passage.
"Mr. CODY. Mr. President: This matter was fully discussed in the Convention
upon that very view of it, and it was understood that no provision made by the
General Assembly with regard to the pay of members, should apply to the mem-
bers of either the house of representatives or the senate, until after the expiration
of their terms of office — that it shall apply to their successors." (Debates 1780.)
The language of Section 21 does not literally recjuire a two-year delay
in the effective date of a salary change and the custom has been other-
wise. For example, the 75th General Assembly increased legislative com-
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pensation to 1 12,000 per year and Hlteen cents j^er mile. By virtue of the
redistricting case (People e\ rel. Engle v. Kerner, .S3 111. 2d 1 1 (H)()5)), all
Senate seats were filled at the 19(i(} election lor lour-year terms. For the
7fith General Assembly, all Representatives were elected in 1908 and
are receiving .'> 12,000 per year in 19()9 and 1970, but all Senators are
receiving only $9,000 per year. (See also the discussion ol the Coons case
under Sec. 16, supra, p. 180.)
Comparative Analysis
There appear to be 14 states which set legislative salaries in their con-
stitutions and another five states which set maximum salaries. With
three exceptions, all other states permit the legislature to determine
their own pay. The three exceptions, Massachusetts, Vermont and Wis-
consin, have no salary provision of any kind. Within the past three
years, eight of the 19 states with constitutional salary provisions ap-
pear to have amended their constitutions to increase salaries. There
appear to be 23 states, including Illinois, which prohibit an increase in
salary during the term for which a legislator is elected. All except one of
these states are among the states which authorize legislative determina-
tion of salary. The exception is a "maximum salary" state.
Approximately 38 states have a constitutional provision concerning
legislators' ex}jenses. Seven states leave it up to the legislature to provide
for
"compensation" without distinguishing between salary and expenses,
and five have no provision of any kind. 7 here appear to be only four
states with restrictions comparable to the Section 21 limit of $50. Dela-
ware has a limit of $25 per regular session and SIO per special session
for stationery and other supplies; Nevada has a limit of $60 per regular
or special session for express charges, newspapers and stationery; Mary-
land forbids purchase of any book or other printed matter not pertinent
to the business of the session; and West Virginia has prohibitive lan-
guage nuich like that of Section 21 without even a permissible $50.
Whether by constitutional provision or by statiue, all states directly
or indirectly reimburse legislators for travel expenses, usually on a flat
mileage rate, but in some 20 states only for one round trip per session.
Almost three-fourths of the states provide a per diem living allowance,
and a few additional states provide a flat allowance large enough to cover
living expenses.
The United States Constitution provides that compensation shall
be "ascertained by law." It is of interest to note that the original batch
of amendments to the Constitution, which resulted in the first ten com-
monly known as the Bill of Rights, actually included two that were not
ratified. One of the two that failed provided that no law changing com-
pensation "shall take effect, until an election of Representatives shall
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have intervened." The Model State Constitution provides that the legis-
lature determine its own salaries and allowances, "but any increase or
decrease in the amount thereof shall not apply to the legislature which
enacted the same."
Comment
It seems fairly obvious that the 1870 Convention made a sound decision
when Section 21 was so drafted that legislators' salaries could be in-
creased by statute. At first blush it would appear that to have limited
reimbursement of expenses so severely was inconsistent. But at the time
there was no income tax, and it was reasonable to prevent legislatures
from hiding their pay increases by increasing their expense perquisites.
For example, if the amount normally required for postage, telegrams,
and the like were $50 a session per legislator and the allowance were
$500, this would be a hidden pay increase. Today, many decisions are
vitally affected by income tax rules, and in the light of those rules it is
illogical to compensate a legislator for deductible expenses by an in-
crease in salary. To use the same example, if today the amount normally
required for postage, telegrams and the like is $500 and the $50 limita-
tion stands, a salary increase must exceed $450, for a legislator must pay
an income tax on the salary and he ends up with less than enough to
cover his expenses. (See also the Cotntnent on Sec. 11 of Art. IX, infra,
p. 476, concerning the general problem of salary changes.)
Special Legislation Prohibited*
Sec. 22. The General Assembly shall not pass local or special laws in any of
the following enumerated cases, that is to say: For —
(1) Granting divorces;
(2) Changing the names of persons or places;
(3) Laying out, opening, altering and working roads or highways;
(4) Vacating roads, town plats, streets, alleys and public grounds;
(5) Locating or changing county seats;
(6) Regulating county and township affairs;
(7) Regulating the practice in courts of justice;
(8) Regulating the jurisdiction and duties of justices of the peace, police
magistrates, and constables;
(9) Providing for changes of venue in civil and criminal cases;
(10) Incorporating cities, towns, or villages, or changing or amending the
charter of any town, city or village;
(11) Providing for the election of members of the board of supervisors in
townships, incorporated towns or cities;
(12) Summoning and impaneling grand or petit juries;
(13) Providing for the management of common schools;
(14) Regulating the rate of interest on money;
(15) The opening and conducting of any election, or designating the place
of voting;
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(16) The sale or mortgage of real estate belonging to minors or others under
disability;
(17) The protection of game or fish;
(18) Chartering or licensing ferries or toll bridges;
(19) Remitting fines, penalties or forfeitures;
(20) Creating, increasing, or decreasing fees, percentage or allowances of
public officers, during the term for which said officers are elected or ap-
pointed;
(21) Changing the law of descent;
(22) Granting to any corporation, association or individual the right to lay
down railroad tracks, or amending existing charters for such purposes.
(23) Granting to any corporation, association or individual any special or
exclusive privilege, immunity or franchise whatever.
In all other cases where a general law can be made applicable, no special
law shall be enacted.
* Note: For purposes of discussion, item numbers have been given to the
enumerated cases. These numbers are not official.
History
The 1818 Constitution had no prohibition on special legislation. The
1848 Constitution nibbled at the edges of the problem. There was a
specific prohibition against legislative divorces and against the "sale of
any lands or real estate belonging in whole or in part to any individual
or individuals." That Constitution also recommended creating private,
but not municipal, corporations by general law, but did not actually
prohibit private corporate charters. (See History of Sec. 1 of Art. XI,
infra, p. 515.) By negative implication, the 1848 Constitution prohibited
local legislation creating a township organization in a county. (See History
of Sec. 5 of Art. X, infra, p. 496.)
By the time the 1870 Convention met, the problem of local and special
legislation had become alarming. Some indication of the magnitude of
the problem is given in the Municipal Home Rule Bulletin prepared for
the 1920 Convention:
"The total mass of special legislation is indicated in the increasing volume
of state laws. In 1857 the private laws formed a volume of 1,550 pages. By 1867,
the private laws were published in three volumes of more than 2,500 pages,
of which 1,050 related to cities, towns and schools. In 1869 there was a further
increase to four volumes of 3,350 pages, of which 1,850 pages related to cities,
towns and schools." (Bulletins 384.)
It is small wonder that the Committee on the Legislative Department
of the 1870 Convention presented a section not differing too much from
what became Section 22. The debate on the section opened with a pro-
posal to substitute an absolute prohibition on passing "any local or
special law in any case whatever." Several delegates supported this blanket
prohibition, including one who observed that some of the itemized
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prohibitions covered subjects on which he had never known any private
or special legislation to be passed. The principal argument for the
"laundry list" approach was made by Mr. Medill of Chicago, a member
of the committee. He said, in part:
"The members of the committee considered in detail all the objects of special
legislation of which the people have complained for a quarter of a century
or more, and we carefully provided against every instance of that kind. We went
through the similar provisions in the Constitutions of other States, and copied
all the best things we could find therein.
". . .It would be probably unsafe and imprudent to foreclose every contingency
that might arise in the future, requiring some special act to be passed. There
are some things that no Legislature can provide for, by general laws, in advance
of the event or necessity. There are contingencies that may arise requiring a
particular act for a local and particular purpose. . . . No human wisdom can
foresee all the necessities and contingencies of the future." (Debates 583.)
Some delegates supported Mr. Medill's opposition to the blanket
prohibition while other delegates indicated that they favored more free-
dom for the legislature than was provided by the committee proposal.
Presumably, these two groups joined hands in voting. In any event, the
blanket prohibition was voted down by voice vote and the Convention,
sitting in Committee of the Whole, turned to a consideration of each
clause of the section.
One and a half days were devoted to consideration of Section 22, about
a third of which time concerned the foregoing effort to prohibit all special
and local legislation. The balance of the debate, a full day, was mostly
devoted to one enumerated case —
"Incorporating cities, towns or villages,
or changing or amending the charter of any town, city or village."
Here the Cook County delegates were the principal opponents of the
prohibition. (For their arguments, see History of Sec. 34, infra, p. 247.)
At the end of the debate on the charter prohibition, all efforts at amend-
ment were defeated by voice vote.
Most of the other enumerated cases proposed by the Committee on the
Legislative Department were accepted as written or with a slight change,
and in either case without extended debates. Two or three enumerated
cases were offered from the floor and accepted, again without extended
debate. There were one or two proposals to weaken prohibitions, but
all were turned away. At the very end of the debate, the concluding "In
all other cases" sentence was offered from the floor and accepted. When
the section was considered by the Convention proper, the work of the
Committee of the Whole was accepted without change. The Committee
on Revision and Adjustment made some style changes, moved one pro-
hibition to the article on corporations ("Sec. 1 of Art. XI, infra, p. 515),
and dropped a prohibition on extending a term of office by special act,
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since Section 28 of Article IV {lufia, p. 2^56) is a total prohibition on such
extensions.
The proposed 1922 Constitution preserved the "laundry list" lormat
of this section with several changes, one of which is particularly in-
structive. To the enumerated
"protection of game or fish" were added
the words "unless by reasonable classification of waters." (See discussion
below, p. 220, concerning the necessity for this exception.) Several items
were omitted because they were adequately covered by other provisions.
For example, at the time of adoption in 1870, the "county seat" removal
enumeration was unnecessary by virtue of Section 4 of .Article X. (Infra,
p. 494.) Presumably, the 1922 drafters thouoJu that locating a county seat
for a new county would not arise. In any event, they omitted the pro-
hibition. The other omissions were rules of practice in courts, changes
of venue, and jurisdiction of justices' courts; elections of members of
boards of supervisors; and the prohibition on increasing or decreasing
fees and allowances. All of these were covered elsewhere. The prohibition
on creating private corporations by special act was taken out of the article
on corporations and placed in the "laundry list" section. The catch-all
sentence at the end of Section 22 was made a separate section.
Explanation
Introduction: In general, it has been possible in preparing this
analysis of the Illinois Constitution to include references to those court
cases that have contributed significantly to the meaning or under-
standing of the section. In a way, a rather stripped-do^vn annotation
has been provided. It is not feasible to do this with Section 22. There
are too many cases involved and, for reasons spelled out below, the cases
cover almost the entire range of government activity, so that a compre-
hensive discussion of the cases would approach a discussion of the con-
stitutionality of almost everything other than levying taxes that the
legislature has attempted to do in the last hundred years. In what follows,
there is a general discussion of local and special legislation and the
problem of classification; a reference, as appropriate, to cases concerning
each of the 23 enumerated cases; and a discussion of the catch-all pro-
hibition on special legislation.
In General: Any discussion of this complicated subject of special and
local legislation requires a primer-like exposition. To begin with, there
is a clear-cut distinction between "local" and
"special" legislation, but,
unfortunately, the terms are used loosely and, as is so often the case,
situations arise which do not fit the distinction neatly. A local law is one
which applies only to the government of a portion of the territory of
the state, and a special law is one which applies only to a portion of the
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state — its people, its institutions, its economy
— in some sense other
than geographical. A general law is one which applies universally. Local
and special laws are known as "private laws" and general laws as "public
laws." It must be pointed out that, in addition to the imprecise use of
these terms, the accepted practice of classification, discussed below,
results in "universal" laws which in fact have only a "local" application;
and that, by use of Section 22 as the equivalent of an equal protection
clause, general laws that are invalidated are said to be "local or special
laws." Moreover, even an effort at precision in the use of the terms is
difficult. For example, a general law may provide for local government
charters under the mayor-council, the commission, or the city manager
system. If one of the three forms of government is permitted to do
something denied to the others, and a court invalidates the permission
under Section 22, it is a neat question whether the problem is one of a
"local law" or a
"special law." In one sense, the matter deals with a
limited geographical area, but in another sense, the distinctions are
state-wide, and the problem hinges on the special way in which one of
three groups is treated. (In another context, a recent case involving this
very distinction is discussed below, pp. 211-12.)
Normally, in the law as elsewhere, the obvious violation of a rule not
only creates no problems, it rarely occurs. This is true of local and special
legislation. An obvious example of local legislation would be a statute
proposing to permit the city of Onetown to have five dog-catchers, not-
withstanding a general law that limited all cities to four dog-catchers.
Another example would be a law which permitted Onetown to annex
North Onetown, whether or not there was a general law setting forth a
procedure for annexation. An obvious example of special legislation
would be a bill granting a divorce to John Doe from his wife, Dosie.
Another example would be a law granting a corporate charter to Tom,
Dick and Harry for the business of operating an employment service.
In order to keep the problem of local and special legislation in perspec-
tive, it is appropriate to mention briefly the reasons for prohibiting it.
The major reason, at least in the middle of the Twentieth Century, is that,
if it is permitted, an inordinate amount of legislative time is taken up with
local and special legislation. Connecticut, for example, until the adoption
of a new constitution in 1965, permitted local and special legislation, and
the common practice, particularly in the area of local legislation, was to
solve any local problem by getting the local legislator to introduuce
a private bill. Under such a system, legislators are normally interested
only in their own private bills, and passage is relatively easy. Moreover,
many legislators can achieve high status as easily by their attention to
208 Art. IV, § 22
the support of local and special legislation as by their qualities as legis-
lators concerned with the problems of the state as a whole.
In the case of special legislation, there are two significant dangers. One
is that the influence of special interests is greatly increased and the likeli-
hood of corruption, "honest and dishonest,", is accordingly increased. If
there is public concern, as there usually is, over the influence of special
interests in protecting themselves from the effect of general legislation,
such concern would be much greater if special legislation were freely
permitted. The other danger is that some special legislation, particularly
in the case of corporate charters, can create vested rights that cannot be
taken away easily. Much of the Nineteenth Century crusade against spe-
cial legislation was directed at the effective "sale" of permanent privi-
leges and the corruption that "greased" the way for such "sales."
One final point in the story of the history of local and special legislation
is that, by and large, legislators imder a system permitting such legis-
lation dislike it. But for obvious reasons, they find it most difficult to
resist the requests of their constituents. It borders on irony that those
students of constitutional theory who oppose restrictions on the power
of the legislature generally support a prohibition on special and local
legislation. (See the Model State Constitution's provision in the Com-
parative Analysis below.) It also borders on irony that legislators prob-
ably do not object to such a constitutional restriction on them, for there
is surely no easier way to turn away an insistent constituent than to point
to a prohibition in the Constitution. Perhaps t^\o ironies make a right.
The reasons for prohibiting local and special legislation may be
exemplary, the examples of the evils may be delineated in blacks and
whites, and yet the realities of a complex society quickly introduce ex-
ceptions and circumlocutions that produce borders of gray. And the
controversies, the litigation, naturally fall in the gray area. The gray-area
problems of local legislation differ, however, from the problems of spe-
cial legislation. Moreover, in the case of special legislation, for reasons
discussed below, rules have been imported into the gray area that are
actually irrelevant to the real evil of special legislation. The portman-
teau word that carries within it all these grays is "classification."
In the case of local legislation, a simple black and white example of
five dog-catchers for Onetown was given above. But suppose that One-
town were the only city in the state which bordered on an uninhabited
wilderness in which there were packs of wild dogs. It would make great
sense to permit Onetown to have more dog-catchers than other cities in
the state. (If it is asked why the state concerns itself with the number of
dog-catchers anyway, it can be assumed that experience has taught that
the job of dog-catcher is a traditional sinecure for faithful party workers
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and that without a state limit, many cities would end up with dozens o£
dog-catchers who drew pay but did no work.) This assumed example
demonstrates the means by which general legislation can be constructed
which is applicable only to one locality. Instead of passing a bill allowing
Onetown to have five dog-catchers, the legislature amends the general law
by including an exception for any city bordered by an uninhabited
wilderness. The exception purports to be general, but in fact applies
only to Onetown. (There is a special problem in drafting, discussed
below in connection with Professor Kales' article, which would make
it advisable to include after the word "wilderness" such words as "con-
ducive to the harboring of packs of wild dogs which prey on such bor-
dering city.")
From the foregoing analogy, it is easy to see that there are innumerable
matters of justifiable state concern, even with acceptance of maximum
home rule, in which the impact of legislation on Chicago should be dif-
ferent from the impact on any other city in the state. In most instances,
the reason for this is that Chicago is different because it is so large. The
classification solution is simply to pass a general law applicable to cities
with a population in excess of 500,000. Again, the assumption must be
that the classification is reasonable in relation to the purpose of the legis-
lation. It would be difficult to support a classification applicable to cities
in excess of 500,000 if there were three large cities with populations of
468,000, 493,000, and 531,000, respectively. But if the third city was the
only one on a lake and if the purpose of the statute was related in some
way to the presence of a lake, then a classification of coverage of cities
over 500,000 bordering on a lake would be a rational one. There have
been occasions in some states when the legislature goes to the other ex-
treme. Instead of passing what is a legitimate general law tailored to a
special local problem, the legislature tries to pass a purely local law by
the device of an artificial classification. For example, a bill applicable
to cities over 95,000 but under 100,000 in population would be suspect,
for there can hardly be a legitimate purpose for singling out such a
narrow population spread. (For an Illinois example of a classification by
description found to be too narrow, see Pettibone v. West Chicago Park
Comm'rs, 215 111. 304 (1905).)
In 1906, Albert M. Kales, a noted legal scholar, wrote an article in the
Illinois Laiv Reviexv, now the Nortlnvestern Law Revieio, under the title
"Special Legislation as Defined in the Illinois Cases." (1 111. L. Rev. 63.)
Professor Kales was an authority in a completely different field of law,
and the explanation for his article appears to be simply that he was
rather annoyed with a broadside attack on constitutional prohibitions
against local legislation which had appeared the previous year. {See Hub-
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bard, "Special Legislation lor Municipaliiies," 18 Har\. L. Rev. 588
(1905).) In any event, Kales carefully analyzed the Illinois cases, mostly
involving local legislation, or more accurately, local problems treated
on a selective basis by the classification device. Kales pointed out at the
beginning of his article that he was not in any way concerned with general
regulatory legislation that was called special legislation because the courts
disagreed with the legislative basis for determination of whom or what
to regulate. (See discussion of special legislation below.)
After analyzing the local legislation cases in Illinois to the date of his
article, Kales extracted three principles, as follows:
"First: 1£ there is a rational ground for legislating in behalf of the objects
to which the Act applies and not for others of the same general sort, and if the
rationale of the distinction is embodied in the Act's description of the objects
themselves to which it applies, then the Act is not 'local or special' law. (Kales.
"Special Legislation as Defined in the Illinois Cases," 1 111. L. Rev. 63, 66-67
(1906).)
"Second: If there be no rational ground of distinction, on any view of the
facts, upon which some objects are legislated for and others of the same general
sort are not, the Act is a 'local or special' law. (Id. at 70.)
"Third: Even if there be one or more rational grounds for legislating in behalf
of the objects to which the Act applies and not for others of the same general
sort, yet ;/ 7W rational ground is einbodied in the Act's description of the objects
to which it applies then the Act is held to be 'local or special.'
"
{Id. at. 76.)
There are three comments to be made about these three principles.
The first comment is that the first two principles are neither startling
nor earth-shaking. They represent the careful, scholarly formulation of
the two sides of the obvious proposition that a good reason is required
to support "general" legislation that is not universally applicable. It
is Kales' third principle that is a key to acceptable classification. Kales
is saying, in effect, that if the legislature has a reason for classification,
it must state what the reason is and the courts will judge the rationality
of the classification by the stated reasons, not by any conceivable basis
that someone might dream up. The importance of this formulation is
that it may explain the invalidation of legislation which appears to
have a rational basis for classification. It is this type of invalidation
that causes people to throw up their hands in despair at understanding
the theory of classification.
In order to put some meat on the Kales' skeleton, it is appropriate to
review the examples that he used to demonstrate his third principle. His
principal one is People ex rel. Gleeson t'. Mcecli (101 111. 200 (1881)),
where the Supreme Court invalidated an act which said that justices of
the peace should have county-wide jurisdiction except in Cook County
which was to be divided into two districts, one consisting of Chicago and
the other of the balance of the county. Suppose, Kales suggested, the
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act had said that every county should have one district except a county
containing a city with a population in excess of 100,000, in which case
there should be two districts. The point Kales made was that the actual
statute singled out Cook County, whereas his suggestion separated coun-
ties into two classes on a basis that on its face was rational.
He drove his point home by contrasting two cases that involved statutes
passed as a result of the Chicago fire. One case involved the Burnt
Records Act which dealt with establishing land titles in any county whose
land records had been destroyed by fire. The act was upheld. (Bertrand
v. Taylor, 87 111. 235 (1877).) The other case involved a statute of limited
duration authorizing a county with a population in excess of 100,000
to issue bonds for the construction of a courthouse on a site "heretofore
used for that purpose." The act was held invalid. (Devine v. Board of
Comm'rs, 84 111. 590 (1877).) Kales noted that the first statute applied only
to Cook County but by its terms would apply to any other county which
ever lost its land records by fire, whereas the second statute in fact simply
permitted Cook County to issue bonds for a new courthouse. Presumably,
though Kales was not this explicit, if the legislature had authorized any
county which lost its courthouse by fire to issue bonds for a new court-
house, the statute would have been upheld. It might even have been
possible to qualify the fire as one causing a specified amount of destruc-
tion in the county seat in order to limit the authority to a situation where
special power to issue bonds would be essential. Kales concluded his
article by conceding that the distinctions made were a matter of form,
but he maintained that form is important if the courts are to be able to
determine that there is a reasonable basis for classification.
The second comment to be made about the Kales' principles is that
with all their precision, they had an accordion word throughout —
"rational." One man's "rational" is another man's "irrational," and judges
are men. It is likely that any group of lawyers could sit around a table
reviewing all the local legislation cases of Illinois and agree on the
controlling principles of decision while disagreeing on whether the courts
followed the principles.
The third comment is a corollary to the foregoing. The process of
deciding whether a given classification is or is not rational is sufficiently
subjective that the milieu in which the problem arises may influence the
course of decision. For example, in the recent case of In re Struck (41 111.
2d 574 (1969)), the Supreme Court decided that the provision of the
Municipal Code that permits the recall of elective officials under the
commission form of government is invalid under Section 22 because
"there is no reasonable relation between the objectives sought to be ac-
complished by the recall procedure and the differences in the various
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tonus oi municipal government. Either the recall procedure should
apply to none, or all forms of municipal government should be free to
adopt it." (Id. at 579.) The interesting point about the facts of that case
is that the alleged ground for wanting the officials removed was that
they had voted for ordinances that they knew the voters opposed. The
ordinances were the Uniform Housing Code and Uniform Building Code
Short Form, the State Plumbing Code, a national Fire Prevention Code,
and the National Electrical Code. Although simply disagreeing with
policy decisions is an acceptable reason for recall, one can speculate
whether the Court would have read the problem of classification different-
ly in a case where the petition alleged bribery, corruption and embezzle-
ment rather than opposition to ordinances of a type generally believed
worthwhile. In any event, it is certain that the judicial process of
determining when a classification is acceptably rational is one in which
the governing principles may be crystal clear but the prediction of deci-
sions imder the principles is difficult. (Compare the discussion of
"Revival and Amendment" under Sec. l.H, supra, p. 160.)
This discussion of local legislation may be summarized thus: (1) The
purpose of a ban on local legislation is to prevent the state legislature
from concerning itself with a purely local problem. (2) But, a state
problem does not affect all parts of the state in the same way, and the
legislature is entitled to classify parts of the state in order to produce
a reasonable solution to a state problem. (3) In steering a course between
(1) and (2), a court should demand that the legislature so draft its statutes
that the rationality of the classification is explicit. (4) Notwithstanding
the clarity of the principles involved, there is such latitude in applying
them that the courts have considerable freedom, and there is little
assurance that accurate predictions can be made — by legislature or
litigants.
The story of special legislation is quite different. As noted earlier,
there is little difficulty in recognizing a blatant bit of special legislation,
and, in fact, legislatures do not pass that kind of bill. The difficulty
arises because it is almost impossible to legislate on a truly universal
basis. Any statute, explicitly or implicitly, excludes somebody or some-
thing. Even the fundamental proposition that anyone born in the United
States is a citizen has an explicit exception. The Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution includes the phrase, "and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof," thereby excepting, for example, children born
of parents who have diplomatic immunity. Thus, courts enforcing a
prohibition on special legislation are constantly faced with an argument
that the general law before the court is really a special law because of
some exclusion from coverage.
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Out of all this grows the body of rules of classification. The short
statement is that a law remains general so long as the basis for inclusion
and exclusion under the law is reasonable. But, as in the case of reason-
able classification for local laws discussed above, the statement of principle
is of limited value, for reasonable men frequently disagree about what is
reasonable. Moreover, as discussed earlier in connection with Section 1
of this Article (supra, p. Ill), reasonableness of classification has been
used by the courts in the same manner as they use the due process and
equal protection clauses. That is, .the determination of reasonableness
becomes, to some extent, an expression of opinion on the soundness of the
legislature's action.
One fairly recent case, Monmouth v. Lorenz (30 111. 2d 60 (1963)),
will suffice to demonstrate the complexity of classification as an element
in the judicial process. The case involved the Prevailing Wage Law
(111. Rev. Stat. ch. 48, §§ 39s-I to 39s-12 (1967)), which requires the pay-
ment of wages at the prevailing area rate to craft workers on public
works construction projects. One of the specific issues in the case was
the validity of the requirement that such prevailing wages had to be paid
to construction employees of government bodies as well as to construction
workers employed by private contractors building public works. The law
"in effect made a single classification of all employers of laborers, work-
men and mechanics engaged in the construction of public works whether
the employer be a contractor or a public body." (City of Monmouth v.
Lorenz, 30 111. 2d 60, 65-66 (1963).)
The Court continued:
"It is well established that equal protection of the law is not violated as long
as the selection of objects for inclusion and exclusion within the class, upon
which the legislation acts, rests upon a rational basis. . . . Here the legislation
has put into a single class public bodies and construction contractors which are
for most purposes two entirely different classes. It is true that each class may
employ laborers, workmen and mechanics for the construction of public works
and that the legislation in question deals only with this common characteristic
of the two classes. Labels may be deceptive, however, and labeling the two classes
as employers of workmen for the construction of public works does not cover
the vital and real differences between the two classes of employers and their
respective employment relationships with their employees. Government employ-
ment is generally of a steady nature and entails fringe benefits, whereas employ-
ment by a private contractor is unusually seasonal and does not carry like fringe
benefits. These disadvantages of seasonal employment and lack of fringe benefits
are compensated, of course, by the payment of higher wages. The workmen
employed by the public body may do as well as or better in the long run than
the workmen employed by a private contractor although his rate of pay be not
as high. The object of the legislation in question is to insure that workmen
on public projects receive the same economic benefits as workmen on projects
of a similar nature by regulating the rate of pay they are to receive but rate of
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pay is jusl one lactor in determining ihc economic benefits to be derived from
employment, and where, as here, the two classes of employers are by their very
nature in such a position that they cannot and do not confer similar economic
benefits on their employees exclusive of the rate of pay, an act requiring both
classes to pay their employees on construction at the same rate violates the ecjual
protection clause of both the fourteenth amendment to the Federal constitution
and section 22 of article IV of the Illinois constitution." (Id. at 67-68.)
The foregoing quoted excerpt from the Monmouth case serves as a
demonstration of the somewhat subjective nature of the determination
of the reasonableness of a given classification, as a demonstration of the
complexity of the concept of classification, and as an example of the dif-
ficulty of trying to cover in this Explanation the entire range of consti-
tutional decisions on reasonableness of classification.
The words "somewhat subjective" are used because, following the
initial sentence setting forth the general principle of classification, the
Court's opinion is simply a well-reasoned argument for not requiring the
payment of prevailing construction wages to government employees. It is
a wise argument that should have been made to the legislature and one
that many people would think should have prevailed. But wisdom aside,
it is not easy to see how a legislature can be labeled irrational for deciding
that all people who work on public construction should be paid the
prevailing wage.
The Monnwuth case also demonstrates the complexity of classification.
Consider, first, the initial sentence of the quoted portion of the opinion.
It speaks of "equal protection," not of "general legislation." It speaks of
"objects for inclusion and exclusion within the class," not of "exclusion"
only. Thus, the sentence prepares the ground for invalidating the legis-
lation under Section 22 on the ground that two things that are different
are treated alike. Conceptually, this is understandable in the context of
equal protection of the laws, but it is most difficult to conceive of a law
as
"special" because it is universal rather than limited in its application.
Once it is recognized that the prohibition on special legislation has
been used by the courts for purposes far beyond the particular evils which
the drafters of the 1870 Constitution had in mind, it is clear that no
comprehensive annotation can be undertaken here. In the Annotation to
Section 22 by Smith-Hurd there are over 180 headings, of which ap-
proximately 85 deal with the 23 enumerated cases. Most of the rest of the
headings deal either with the general principles of classification or with
different businesses, occupations, and other specific subjects. One heading,
"Classification for legislative purposes—In general," (Smith-Hurd, Illinois
Annotated Statutes, Constitution, arts. I-V at 643 (1964)), includes two
paragraphs simply listing cases, in the one instance of those in which
the classification was held void, and in the other of those in which the
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classification was sustained. A third paragraph cites a couple ot cases for
the proposition:
"The classification of objects of legislation is not required to be scientific,
logical or consistent, if it is reasonably adapted to secure purpose for which it
is intended, and is not purely arbitrary." (Id.)
The general principle is clear; the application, case by case, is not.
The Specified Prohibitions:
(1) Granting Divorces: Apparently, the legislature has never tried to
violate this prohibition. Two court cases have, however, referred to it.
In one case, a rather far-fetched attack was made on a statute permitting
waivers of a 60-day waiting requirement in divorce actions under which
individual judges could differ in deciding what facts justified a waiver.
The Supreme Court gave short shrift to the claim that a special law
granting divorces was involved. (People ex rel. Doty v. Connell, 9 111. 2d
'^90 (1956).) In the other case, a statutory effort to provide different
procedures for divorce actions in counties of over 500,000 population was
invalidated under the local law rule discussed earlier, but was held not
to be a special law under this specific prohibition. (Hunt v. County of
Cook, 398 111. 412 (1947).)
(2) Changing Names: No cases and, presumably, no special laws. Ob-
viously, it is necessary on occasion to change the name of a place. This
prohibition simply forces the legislature to delegate the power to make
changes. (See, e.g., 111. Rev. Stat. ch. 105, §8-9 (1967), giving the govern-
ing board of a park district the power to change the name of a park.)
(3) Laying Out Roads: An act attempting to validate an administrative
selection of a road route appears to be the only truly special act invali-
dated under this prohibition. (Watts v. Department of Pub. Works Sc
Bldgs., 328 111. 587 (1928).) Other cases involving roads have been
cases of local versus general legislation. For example, it was held not
permissible to make highway commissioners in nontownship counties
personally liable for negligence in not keeping roads repaired while
leaving commissioners in township counties not liable. (Kennedy v.
McGovern, 246 111. 497 (1910).) (See also discussion on Vacating Roads
below.)
(4) Vacating Roads: In a few instances of these specific prohibitions,
it is evident that in fact action can be taken only on a case-by-case basis
and that the legislatvue has to adopt a general law that delegates to
someone the power to act. In 1870 there was no state highway system,
and presumably the prohibition was aimed at preventing the legislature
from superseding local governments. But somebody must have the power
to vacate a single road, and the courts have recognized that a general
law which delegates such power to a subordinate agency is no violation
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ot the prohibition. {See People t-.v rel. Hill v. Eakiii, -^8:^ 111. '^83 (1943);
People ex rel. Franchere v. City of Chicago, 321 111. 466 (1926).)
(5) County Seats: No cases and undoiiljteclly no special acts. Indeed,
so tar as changing county seats is concerned, this prohibition was redun-
dant from the beginning by virtue of Section 4 of Article X, covering
removal of county seats. See iufra. p. 494.)
(6) Regulating County Affairs: There- are many cases involving statiues
regulating county and township affairs, but they all appear to deal witli
validity of the classification under a general law. As a matter of fact,
any local or special law purporting to be a general law within the cover-
age of any of the 23 specific prohibitions falls as a specifically prohibited
act once the classification is found to be unreasonable. To put it an-
other way, in one sense there are no local laws under this specific }jrohi-
bition because there have been no laws regulating the affairs of County
A by name or Township B by name; but in another sense, there have
been such laws because the courts have refused to accept the purported
classification.
(7) Practice in Courts: It is not clear whether this prohibition was
aimed primarily at preventing a special act giving John Doe a one-shot
procedural favor
—
e.g., a cause of action notwithstanding the running of
the statute of limitation — or at preventing a special act covering prac-
tice in one specific court
—
e.g., the time to answer is extended Irom
20 days to 30 days in a particular circuit court. It seems doubtful that
the prohibition was aimed at any of the types of legislation that have
fallen afoul of it. For example, the Sujireme Court once said that a
statute setting forth the weight to be gi\en to an administrative adjudi-
cation under workmen's compensation was a special la^v regulating the
practice of courts. (Otis Elevator Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 302 111. 90
(1922). The Court also said that the provision was in violation of
separation of powers under Article III and contrary to due process.
See discussion ot Art. Ill, supra, p. 99.) Relatively recently, the Supreme
Court struck down a provision under the school code which allowed
only ten days in which to appeal one type of administrative decision
while other types could be appealed within 35 days. (Board of Educ. v.
County Bd. ot School Trustees, 28 111. 2d 15 (1963).) Statutes such as are
involved in cases like these purport to be general laws, and the question
raised is the reasonableness of the "classification," normally in the sense
of due process or equal protection of the law.
There are other cases involving court practice in which the classifi-
cation problem is the traditional geographical local law situation dis-
cussed earlier. For example, a requirement for the payment of a jury
fee is reasonable, even if in fact applicable only to Cook County. (Hunt
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V. Rosenbaum Grain Corp., 355 111. 504 (1934). The Court also said
that
"juries" were not included under "practice in courts.") But a popu-
lation classification of counties for the purpose of appointment of
administrators of estates of nonresidents was held not reasonable. (Strong
V. Dignan, 207 111. 385 (1904). As to the question of general legislative
power over rules of practice, see Explanation of Art. Ill, supra, p. 99.)
(8) Jurisdiction of Justices: One of the cases on classification. People
ex rel. Gleeson v. Meech (101 111. 200 (1881)), discussed earlier in con-
nection with Professor Kales' article {supra, p. 210), was invalidated as a
local law regulating the jurisdiction of justices of the peace. In view
of the abolition of justices of the peace and police magistrates under the
new Article VI, tliis specific prohibition is now presumably a dead letter.
(9) Changes of Venue: As in the case of other specific prohibitions,
the original purpose of this change of venue restriction was probably to
stop the legislature from passing private legislation such as shifting
John Doe's suit to a different county notwithstanding the general venue
statute. The only cases that appear to have arisen involved general venue
matters. In one instance, special venue rules were proposed for the
inunicipal courts of Chicago, but the statute fell because venue was not
considered to be within the scope of permitted local legislation under
Section 34 [infra, p. 246), and, paradoxically, part of a law which had
been tailored to Chicago's special court system could not stand because
Section 34 did not authorize a venue variation. (Feigen v. ShaefFer, 256
111. 493 (1912).) In the other instance, the Supreme Court gave short
shrift to an argument that a venue differentiai between town courts and
circuit courts was prohibited by Section 22. (People ex rel. Norwegian-
American Hospital, Inc. v. Sandusky, 21 111. 2d 296 (1961).)
(10) Special Municipal Charters: This prohibition was one upon which
the delegates in 1870 were most insistent. The speediest way to induce
proliferation of local legislation is to allow special municipal charters,
because subsequent amendments will also be by local law. But, as noted
earlier (supra, p. 207), genuinely universal general laws are not prac-
ticable, and classification of one sort and another becomes a common
practice. The earlier extended discussion on classification is applicable
here.
Nevertheless, it is important to note that the prohibition is limited to
"town, city or village." It is possible, therefore, to create a "municipal
corporation" by special act. (See People ex rel. Coutrakon v. Lohr, 9
111. 2d 539 (1956).) Of course, such a "municipal corporation" would not
be available to regulate county and township affairs ((6) above), or
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managenicni oi coiunion scliools ((13) below). (See also discussion of
final sentence of Sec. 22, infra, p. 222.)
It has been noted from time to time in this discussion, that courts use
"special legislation" as a way to get at general hnvs that, in the eyes
of the court, violate concepts ol due process and ecjual protection. The
same judicial manij)idation ol the concept ol "local legislation" has
been indidged in. In Krcnncvs v. C//)' of West (^hicao^o (IOC) 111. 51()
(1950)), the Supreme Court was faced with a statute which set a state-
w^ide maximum rate for a library tax lor cities, towns and villages. The
computation of the maximum was tied to a figure for an earlier year in
such a manner that the maximum possible levy would vary "irration-
ally" from town to town. The Coint held the statute invalid. Such a
statute does not appear on its face to be a local law "changing or amend-
ing the charter." But the Court said that it a statute purporting to be a
"general law is to establish dissimilarity in the powers and modes of
different municipalities in the le\y and collection of taxes, then, since
the laws conferring such powers and prescribing such modes become a
part of the charters of the municipalities, it will be regarded as witliin
tlie prohibition of [this section prohibiting local or special laws for in-
corporating municipalities or changing or amending municipal charters]."
(Id. at 552.) It is also noteworthy that the statute in question was as
"general" as it could be — one formula universally applicable. Unfortu-
nately, it was a bad formula. (Compare tlie discussion of the Monmouth
case, supra, p. 213.)
(11) Election of Supervisors: No cases and presumably no questionable
statutes.
(12) Summoning Juries: There have been a few cases that referred to
this prohibition, but none dealt with the literal meaning of it, which
woidd seem to be designed to cover special acts which summoned and
impaneled specific grand and petit juries out of the ordinary comse of
judicial administration. The cases that have arisen generally appear
to have involved statutes classifying counties according to population so
that Cook County had different rules for juries. In one case, a section
providing a louver maximum age for jmy service in Cook County was
held invalid, but all other parts of the statute were upheld. (People v.
Bain, 358 III. 177 (1934). Incidentally, the jiay commissioners in Cook
County had ignored the age differential and no one had been "injured"
by the law.)
(13) Management of Schools: The key word in this prohibition is
"management." Local laws concerning schools are prohibited only if
they deal \vith "management." Two early cases stated that this referred
only to conduct of the schools in imparting instruction. (Fuller v. Heatli,
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89 111. 296 (1878); Speight v. People ex rel. County Collector, 87 111. 595
(1877).) Both of these early cases concluded that laws concerning raising
revenue for schools were not within the specified prohibition. Likewise, a
law concerning the filling of vacancies on certain types of school boards
does not come under the prohibition. (People ex rel. Peterson v. Pollock,
306 111. 358 (1922).) It follows that many local laws concerning education
may be passed. {See, e.g., Land Comm'rs of the Commons v. President h
Trustees of the Commons, 249 111. 578 (1911).)
Nevertheless there are a great many cases involving school legislation,
and some of them invalidate legislation which purports to be general.
In almost all cases, invalidity was based on the "exclusive privilege" pro-
hibition. {See, e.g.. People ex rel. Board of Educ. v. Read, 344 111. 397
(1931). See (23), infra, p. 221.)
(14) Interest: A handful of cases involved attacks on legislation deal-
ing with interest, but in all instances the legislation survived. The ground
was either that the classification was reasonable {<^-g-, Meier v. Hilton,
257 111. 174 (1912)), or tliat the "interest" was actually a penalty, as in
delinquency in payment of taxes {e.g.. People ex rel. Johnson v. Peacock,
98 111. 172 (1881)).
(15) Elections: It is sometimes unclear what evil produced one of
these specific prohibitions, but, presumably, the evil was one of special
ad hoc legislation. In the case of elections, the presimiption would be
that the type of act to be prohibited would be one changing the general
law for one specific election for some specific political advantage. If this
presumption is correct, it can be said that the legislature does not appear
to have passed any such law. The reported cases have concerned general
laws under attack on some argument of improper classification. {See, e.g.,
Heimgaertner v. Benjamin Elec. Mfg. Co., 6 111. 2d 152 (1955); Larven-
ette V. Elliott, 412 111. 523 (1952).)
(16) Realty of Minors: The purpose of this prohibition is obvious.
Many instances arise when land cannot be conveyed because someone
with an interest therein is under a disability. It would be tempting, if
permissible, to get the land transferred by legislative fiat. As the History
above notes, this sort of legislation was forbidden inider the 1848 Con-
stitution. Except for two cases prior to 1890, neither of which seems
particularly relevant today, no question appears to have arisen under
this specific prohibition.
(17) FisJi and Game: Whatever the original reason for inserting this
prohibition, the principal result was a disastrous judicial holding that
caused the drafters of the 1922 Constitution to modify the prohibition.
{Supra, p. 206.) An act required a license for fishing with a hoop net or
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seine in any state waters except Lake Michigan. The exclusion of Lake
Michigan was held lo make it a special act void under tliis prohibition.
(People V. ^Vilcox, 237 111. 421 (1908).) Three judges dissented on the
grounds ot reasonableness ot the classification, and ii appears probable
thai the Court would now [ollo\v the dissenters. [See People v. Diekmann,
285 111. 97 (1918).)
(18) Ferries and Toll Bridges: No charters or licenses for ferries or
toll bridges appear to have been granted by special act, or if tliey Avere,
no one appears to have objected by way of a lawsuit.
(19) Remittance of Fines: The Supreme Court once pointed out that
the purpose of this prohibition was to prevent the legislature from re-
mitting a particular fine or penalty. (Compare the History of Sec. 23,
infra, p. 226.) The court went on to note that the legislature could au-
thorize courts to remit fines. (People v. Heise, 257 111. 443 (1913).) Not-
withstanding a judicial explanation of the purpose of the provision, the
Supreme Court some years later invalidated a law, limited by classifica-
tion to Cook County, under which delinquent taxes could be paid in
installments. The Court said it was a local law remitting fines, penalties
and forfeitures. (People ex rel. Clarke v. Jarecki, 363 111. 180 (1936).)
The Court could have said that the act was a local law regulating county
affairs ( (6) above), or even a special law granting an exclusive privilege
( (23) beloAv), on the theory that only Cook County taxpayers had the
exclusive privilege of paying delinquent taxes on the installment plan.
Apparently, litigants and courts are not overly fastidious about which
local and special law slot they use. (See also discussion below concern-
ing exclusive privileges.)
(20) Changing Compensation: This prohibition was probably redun-
dant when adopted in 1870 and is certainly so under judicial interpreta-
tion of other sections of the Constitution. It would appear that anyone
who could be covered by a local or speciaj law would be covered by one of
the other sections prohibiting compensation changes by general law.
(See the discussion of Sec. 11 of Art. IX, infra, pp. 473-7.)
(21) Changing Law of Descent: This is a prohibition, like granting
divorces, changing names, selling real estate, and remitting fines, aimed at
private bills that are designed to allow a John Doe to inherit property
contrary to the general rules of descent. Only two cases appear to have re-
ferred to the prohibition and both of them dealt with general laws. {See
Jahnke v. Selle, 368 111. 268 (1938): \Vunderle v. Wunderle, 114 111. 10
(1893).) The Wunderle case is noteworthy, however, because the situation
is conceptually comparable to the Kremers case discussed under (10) above.
In Wunderle, the general law prohibited any nonresident alien from
acquiring real estate by descent, but certain treaties of the United States
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permitted such acquisition. The Supreme Court would not go beyond
the general law to consider its actual operation.
(22) Railroad Tracks: This prohibition was aimed at one aspect of the
internal improvement abuses of the middle of the Nineteenth Century.
The whole business is substantially dead today. Indeed, except for an early
case in 1874, only one case appears to have referred to this prohibition,
and that was a traditional action to determine the constitutionality of
a new authority. {See People v. Chicago Transit Authority, 392 111. 77
(1945).) Resort to the railroad track prohibition was a makeweight and
so treated by the Court.
(23) Special Privileges: It has been noted in several instances above
that the original purpose of an enumerated prohibition was lost sight of
long ago. This is particularly true of this last specific prohibition.
The evil of special legislation which the 1870 delegates had in mind was
the act that gave John Doe or the John Doe Corporation an exclusive
franchise or privilege of some sort. In some manner that cannot be
traced here — if it can be traced at all — the special privileges prohibition
became a constitutional vehicle for attacking discriminatory legislation.
The prohibition is, in effect, Illinois' version of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's equal protection clause. Indeed, the Supreme Court has said as
much:
"This provision supplements the equal-protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment to the federal constitution and prevents the enlargement of the
rights of one or more persons in discrimination against the rights of others."
(Schuman v. Chicago Transit Authority, 704 111. 313, 317 (1950).)
For the reasons set forth at the beginning of this Explanation, it is
not feasible to cover all of the many examples of discrimination in legis-
lative treatment of individuals, associations or corporations — those found
valid and those found invalid. Nor is there any need to discuss the
general principles involved, for they are set out in the introductory dis-
cussion of special legislation. (Supra, pp. 212-15.) There is, however, one
technical interpretation of the prohibition that should be noted. The word
"corporation" is limited to private corporations. Exclusive privileges not
otherwise invalid may be granted to public corporations. (See People
ex rel. Greening v. Green, 382 111. 577 (1943).)
From the discussion up to now, particularly the relatively detailed
analysis of several cases, it should be clear that there is almost no limit
to the way in which an argument of discrimination can be' turned into
one of exclusive privilege. For example, if a law classifies counties or cities
on a basis which the courts do not deem reasonable, and if the subject
matter cannot be pushed under one of the first 22 prohibitions, it prob-
ably can be called an exclusive privilege. If the law is burdensome, the
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counties or cities not covered have a privilege denied others; if the law
confers a benefit, the counties or cities covered have a privilege, denied
the others. If a
"general" law affects some people and not others, and if
courts consider the differentiation unreasonable, one group or the other
has an exclusive privilege, dei^ending on whether the law is beneficial
or burdensome. Even in cases where the law treats all alike and the
courts think that it is unreasonable not to differentiate, it may be possible
to argue that some part of "all" gets a privilege denied to the rest of "all."
There may be occasions when it is not possible to find an exclusive
privilege, but this need not stop the courts. Consider the Monmouth case
discussed above. (Supra, p. 213.) That case, it will be recalled, struck down
a requirement that both public bodies and private contractors pay pre-
vailing wages to construction workers on public works. It is difficult to
find an exclusive privlege here or any other specific prohibition that fits.
But then the Court apparently did not either. It simply said that the
act violated Section 22.
It is probably safe to say that by now the equal protection /special
legislation rule is so firmly established that there is no longer a need
to be precise in relating an alleged local or special act to one of the
specific prohibitions. If the relation is obvious, that is all to the good.
But of it is not obvious, a demonstration of unreasonable classification
or discrimination will undoubtedly suffice.
In All Other Cases: In the light of the preceding paragraph, it is para-
doxical to mention two flat statements that the courts consistently make.
One is that there is no absolute prohibition against a local or special
law on any subject not included in the 23 enumerated cases. (See
Foutch V. Zempel, 332 111. 192 (1928).) The other statement is that the
admonition to act by general law whenever applicable is addressed
to the legislature and not to the courts. If the legislature passes a local
or special law not otherwise prohibited, the courts consider such passage
a conclusive and unreviewable finding by the legislature that a general
law cannot be made applicable. (Wilson v. Board of Trustees, 133 111.
443 (1890).)
Paradoxical or not, there is good reason for the first of these rules.
There are a great many occasions when a local or special act is the proper,
perhaps the only, way to solve a legislative problem. The way must be
cleared by a judicial affirmation that the last sentence of Section 22
means that sometimes local and special laws are permissible. (The word
"local" does not appear in the last sentence, but there is no reason to
believe that the 1870 Convention meant anything by this omission. In
any event, the courts do not appear to have considered the omission
significant). If some local and special laws are permissible, the only
Art. IV, § 22 223
logical way to accept them is to say that they may cover any subject
not excluded by the 23 enumerated cases. Indeed, the last sentence begins
"In all other cases . . . ."
Once the courts have come to this conclusion, it is easy for them to
embrace the second rule. The assumption is that the Constitution has
covered all the serious local and special legislation evils. Why then, the
courts might ask themselves, should we "knock ourselves out" trying to
determine "in all other cases" whether or not the legislature could have
handled some problem by a general law? Moreover, the courts might
sense that once they agree to review such acts, the legislature will start
dressing them up in tortured language of generality. (See further dis-
cussion in Comynent below.)
Perhaps the best way to explain tjie paradoxes of Section 22 is to
reclassify the types of laws which may be involved. Using "local" in the
geographical sense and "special" in the nongeographical sense, there are
the following types of laws that can get involved with Section 22:
(a) A local law which is prohibited by one of the enumerated cases.
(b) An artificial general law which is actually a local law in a pro-
hibited area.
(c) A local law which is not prohibited.
(d) A special law which is prohibited by one of the enumerated cases.
(e) A special law which is not prohibited.
(f) A general law which the courts find unconstitutionally discrim-
inatory and therefore call "special."
(Note that there is no artificial general law which is actually special.
So long as the courts use Section 22 to strike at discriminatory general
laws, an artificial general law would fall in that category.)
Comparative Analysis
Approximately 36 states have some general prohibition against the
enactment of local and special laws. Fourteen states, including most of
the New England states, do not. Some of these 14 states may, however,
have limited local or special law prohibitions. For example, two of the
14, Delaware and New York, prohibit legislative divorces. The new
Connecticut Constitution for the first time contains an article on home
rule. The local law prohibition reads:
"After July 1, 1969, the general assembly shall enact no special legislation
relative to the powers, organization, terms of elective offices or form of govern-
ment of any single town, city or borough, except as to (a) borrowing power,
(b) validating acts, and (c) formation, consolidation or dissolution of any town,
city or borough, unless in the delegation of legislative authority by general law
the general assembly shall have failed to prescribe the powers necessary to effect
the purpose of such special legislation." (Conn. Const, art. X, § I.)
(The Constitution was effective at the end of 1965. The July 1, 1969,
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effective date for prohibiting local legislation was necessary to give the
General Assembly adequate time to adopt the necessary general laws.)
It is not essential to compare every one ot the 23 enumerated cases with
other states, but a significant sampling seems appropriate:
Changing names (2) 31 states
County seats (5) 24 states
County affairs (6) 19 states
Change of venue (9) 25 states
Municipal charters (10) 20 states
Juries (12) 22 states
Interest rates (14) 23 states
Property of minors (16) 27 states
Law of descent (21) 24 states
Exclusive privileges (23) 31 states
(Citizens Conference on State Legislatures, State Consti-
tutional Provisions Affecting Legislatures (May 1967).)
The United States Constitution has no comparable restriction and
Congress regularly passes special acts. The equal protection clause in
the Fourteenth Amendment applies only to the states, but the United
States Supreme Court has made the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment, which is applicable to Congressional action, serve as an
equal protection clause. Thus, the United States Supreme Court has
found a substitute, just as the Illinois Supreme Court found a substitute
in Section 22.
The Model State Constitution has the following recommended pro-
vision:
"Special Legislation. The legislature shaff pass no special or local act when
a general act is or can be made appficabfe, and whether a general act is or can
be made applicable shall be a matter for judicial determination." (art. IV, § 4.1 1.)
(See also the home rule provisions of the Model quoted in the Com-
parative Analysis of Sec. 34 of this Article and Sec. 5 ot Art. X, injra,
pp. 251 and 498.)
The Commentary to the Model states, in part:
"Tlie distinction between general and special laws may be far from clear in
any given case.
"But, even tliough the question as to what is a special law may not be capable
of a categorical answer, it is not the major question under the common consti-
tutional provison that no special law be passed when a general one is or can be
made applicable. Rather, the problem has been when is a general law applicable
and wlio is to determine, finally, wliether or not sucli a general act is or can be
made applicable.
"In the absence of specific constitutional directions, state courts have divided
on the issue as to which branch of government is to malte this determination.
Some have held that this is not open to judicial review but can be decided only
by tlie legislature, while others have held that the question is initially for the
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legislature but that the courts may set aside the legislative judgment when the
determination of the legislature is arbitrary, unreasonable or clearly an abuse
of discretion. Still others hold the question to be a purely judicial one. In any
event, it has been troublesome in some jurisdictions where the courts have
wavered in the holdings from case to case." (Model State Constitution 56.)
It shotild be noted that the observations above (supra, p. 222) con-
cerning the Illinois Supreme Court's rule that legislative determinations
"In all other cases" are not reviewable is not necessarily inconsistent
with the foregoing Commentary. In the absence of a large number of
enumerated prohibitions, the Model's approach is the only one that
assures some control over a legislature bent on evading the constitutional
restriction.
Comment
It seems fair to begin by observing that Section 22, with its hundreds
of judicial offspring, is a "mess." Unfortunately, in this imperfect world,
it is a lot easier to criticize than it is to offer a blueprint for perfection.
The way to proceed is not at all clear, and suggestions can only be
tentative.
First, it seems feasible to abandon the "laundry list" approach. A con-
stitution is supposed to be a fundamental document, and if a limitation
on legislative power is appropriate, it ought to be possible to express
the limitation in the form of a statement of principle. Moreover, some
of the 23 enumerated cases probably were not necessary in 1870, and even
more are probably so unlikely today that it would no longer occur to a
legislator to propose legislation on the subject. (The Commission on the
Organization of the General Assembly made the same recommendation.
I.S.L., p. 13.)
Second, it seems appropriate to try to entice the courts away from
using Section 22 as a substitute for or supplement to equal protection
and due process. These are two fundamental rights that belong in the
bill of rights. If the words "No person shall be denied the equal pro-
tection of the laws" are added to the bill of rights, either as a separate
section or as an addition to Section 2 thereof {supra, p. 9), a first step
will have been taken.
Third, it would be advisable to keep "local" and "special" legislation
separated to the maximum extent possible. If an article on local govern-
ment is to be prepared, combining county government and new material
on other local governments, all with an eye to greater home rule, then
a prohibitory section on "local" legislation, using that word and not
"special," would be appropriate. Such a prohibitory section could take
any of many forms — there are a number of "models" around. The only
suggestion to be made here is to keep it simple. It should be either
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a flat prohibition with a mininuiin ol exceptions as in the Connecticut
example quoted above, or a general statement as in the Model provision
concerning "special" legislation quoted above, or as in a flat prohibition
with a proviso that the legislature may provide for different treatment
on the basis of reasonable classification of local governments.
Finally, there remains the problem of real special legislation. One
would like to believe that this sort of legislation would not be revived
if there were no prohibition, but it probably is not safe, or in any event
not worth the gamble, to experiment with this sort of legislative free-
dom. (The point here is that real special legislation has not been a
problem since 1870, whereas local legislation in artificial classification
disguises has. If there were no restraints on the latter, the legislature
might stop struggling with classifications and simply pass local legislation
from time to time, but they might not do the same in such areas as grant-
ing divorces, changing names, changing the law of descent, and transfer-
ring real property—cases of real special legislation.) The cautious solution
is a provision like that of the Model quoted above, including the words
of subjecting applicability of general laws to jtidicial determination.
There is, of course, no assurance that the courts would not gallop through
such a hole, dragging the old pseudo-special legislation rules with them.
(One can rest assured that litigants would try to get the courts to do
just that.) But if the problem of local and special legislation is handled
in a comprehensive fashion as suggested here, with a well-documented
explanation of the four interrelated steps— (1) abandonment of enumer-
ated cases, (2) substitution of equal protection, (3) coverage of local legis-
lation in the Ipcal government article, and (4) the limited general pro-
hibition on special legislation — the courts might go along.
Release of Nonstate Debts Prohibited
Sec. 23. The General Assembly shall have no power to release or extinguish,
in whole or in part, the indebtedness, liability, or obligation of any corporation
or individual to this State or to any municipal corporation therein.
History
This section dates from 1870. Notwithstanding the breadth of the sec-
tion, the debate on it in the Convention revealed that the section was
aimed at one specific abuse. It was argued that tax collectors, instead
of remitting collections promptly, would retain the money and use it im-
properly. If through such use it was lost, the collectors ^\ould fraudu-
lently establish a robbery and then seek relief for themselves and their
sureties by private bill. Several delegates protested that the proposed
section was too harsh, for, it was argued, there would be no relief for
the collector who was in fact robbed through no fault of his own. These
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arguments were to no avail and all proposals to provide for exceptions
were defeated. It should be noted, however, that the delegates were aware
that the section was broader than the abuse at which it was aimed. (See
Debates 634.)
The proposed 1922 Constitution retained this section in a much simpli-
fied form. In the article on Public Servants of the proposed Constitu-
tion, a provision was included stating that no statute of limitation could
begin to run in favor of a public officer until an audit of his accounts
had been made.
Explanation
The principal problem with this section is that it prevents the adop-
tion of a statute of limitation that runs against the state or any muni-
cipal corporation. It was this problem that presumably led the 1920-22
Convention to narrow the provision so that it approached in coverage the
matter about which the 1870 delegates were worried.
Over the years, a great many attempts have been made to rely upon
this section in litigation, but in only two cases does it appear to have
been effective. In 1931, a taxpayer sent in his check for fuel tax collected,
but the bank failed before the state could deposit the check. The state
filed a claim with the bank receiver and then, it was alleged, the Director
of Finance canceled the taxpayer's surety bond. In a subsequent action
on the bond, the taxpayer's defense of cancellation was turned aside on
the ground that state officials had no power to release the obligation.
(People ex rel. Ames v. Marx, 370 111 264 (1938).) In 1949, the Supreme
Court relied on the Marx case to hold that one Attorney General's con-
sent to settlement of an action for refund of taxes paid under protest
without a judicial determination of liability was no bar to his successor's
reviving the issue. (Massell v. Daley, 404 111. 479 (1949).)
Notwithstanding the foregoing cases, it appears fairly clear that the
courts are not anxious to push Section 23 to its literal extreme. In
People V. Evamik (320 111. 336 (1926)), the claim was made that the
legislature did not have the power to permit a judge to set aside a bail
bond forfeiture after judgment where the surety subsequently produced
the defendant. The Supreme Court held that all the statute did was to
change the circumstances under which the obligation finally became an
obligation. Another section of the same statute permitted the County
Commissioners or Board of Supervisors to compromise such a judgment.
In an action attacking a compromise of $100 on a $5,000 bond forfeiture,
the Supreme Court had a more difficult time with the statute, but con-
cluded that since such fines went into a fund to pay the state's attorney's
salary with any surplus going into the school fund, the obligation was not
really an obligation of the state and, therefore, the legislature could
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permit a settlement lor a smaller sum. (People ex rel. Marcus v. Swan-
son, 340 111. 188 (1930).) It should also be noted that a compromise ol
a doubtlul claim is not prohibited by Section 23. (Binr v. City of Car-
bondale, 76 111. 455 (1875).) Nor is the section a bar to the release of a
claim for a consideration believed to be of equal or greater value. (City
of Chicago v. Pittsburgh, C, C. R: St. L. Ry., 244 111. 220 (1910).)
Comparative Analysis
Nine states appear to have a comparable section. Three other states
with a comparable provision exempt taxes delinquent for a specified
period: ten years in two cases, the jjeriod of prescriptive rights in the
third case. Two states are content with an extraordinary vote for any
bill releasing a state claim. Eleven states simply prohibit release by
private or local act. Neither the United States Constitution nor the
Model State Constitution has a comparable provision.
Comment
It would seem appropriate to take a leaf from the 1920-22 Convention
and then go a little further and drop this section entirely. The need for
flexibility in providing general statutes of limitation and means of com-
promise and settlement of state claims far outweighs the danger that on
some occasion the legislature may propose the release of a good claim
and the Governor may not veto it.
Impeachment
Sec. 24. The House of Representatives shall have the sole power of impeach-
ment; but a majority of all the members elected must concur therein. All im-
peachments shall be tried by the Senate; and when sitting for that purpose, the
Senators shall be upon oath, or affirmation, to do justice according to law and
evidence. When the Governor of the State is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside.
No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of the Sen-
ators elected. But judgment, in such cases, shall not extend further than removal
from office, and disqualification to hold any office of honor, profit or trust under
the government oi: this State. The party, whether convicted or acquitted, shall,
nevertheless, be liable to prosecution, trial, judgment and punishment according
to law.
History
The impeachment provisions in the Legislative Articles of the 1 81 8 and
1848 Constitutions included, in substance, most of what is now in Sec-
tion 24 and the sentence now appearing as Section 15 of Article V.
Neither Constitution provided for the Chief Justice to preside at a trial
of the Governor. In the 1818 Constitution, a simple majority of the mem-
bers present was required to impeach, and a two-thirds' vote of senators
present was required to convict. The change to votes of the members
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elected was made in 1848. In all other respects the substance of Section
24 is the same. The proposed 1922 Constitution combined Section 15 of
Article V and Section 24. No changes were made except in punctuation.
Explanation
The impeachment process is an historic means of removing someone
from office. In some cases, such as state-wide elected officers, it is the
only means of removal unless, of course, another constitutional provi-
sion provides for removal. Under Section 30 of the original Judiciary
Article, for example, judges could be removed by a three-fourths' vote
of all elected members of each house of the legislature. The present
Article VI provides a method for the judiciary itself to remove a judge
for cause. (Sec. 18, infra, p. 372.)
Impeachment is a rare event and it is not at all clear what its limits
are. It seems likely, however, that the legislature can remove any state
official through the impeachment process, notwithstanding any other
method of removal provided by constitution or law. In addition to re-
moval of judges by the impeachment process, it seems clear that the
House of Representatives could impeach and the Senate try an officer
appointed by the Governor, notwithstanding the Governor's removal
power. (See Sec. 12 of Art. V, infra, p. 285.)
The one exception to impeachment is legislators themselves. Section
9 (supra, p. 145) gives each house the power to expel members. It seems
most unlikly that the Senate would try one of its own members following
a purported impeachment by the House of Representatives, or that the
House would impeach one of its o^vn members for trial by the Senate.
(For definitional purposes, it is to be noted that "impeachment" is
analogous to an indictment.)
Comparative Analysis
There are a great many variations in impeachment procedures among
the several states. Only Oregon has no provision for impeachment. (See
Comment below.) In Alaska, the senate impeaches and the lower house
tries. In all other states, except unicameral Nebraska, the lower house
impeaches and in most states the senate tries. In Nebraska and Missouri
the highest court tries, except when one of its own members is impeached,
in which case a different group of judges is used. In New York, the judges
of the highest court join the senate for the trial.
About a third of the states require a majority of all members of the
house to impeach, a few require a two-thirds' vote, and a large number
of the states are silent on the required vote. Almost all of the states re-
cjuire a two-thirds' vote to convict, ajid a majority of them require that
the two-thirds be of all the members of the senate. It is customary to
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have the Chief Justice preside when the Governor is on trial, in a feu-
states also when the Lieutenant-Governor is on trial, and in some states
in all cases, except, ot course, when he hiniseli is on trial. Equally
customary are the limitation on the judgment that can be rendered and
the liability lor trial for any crimes alleged to have been committed.
Most stales and the United States except impeachment convictions from
pardons, and a majority of the states except such convictions from com-
mutation. Illinois is silent on this jjoint. (See Sec. 13, Art. V, infra, p. 287.)
The United States Constitution provides for impeachment in much the
same manner as Illinois except that no specific vote is called for in the
House of Representatives and the two-thiids \oie in the Senate is of the
members present. The Model State Constitution calls for a two-thirds vote
of all members to impeach and provides that trials shall be as provided
for by law.
Comment
Impeachments are relatively rare, but it is a matter of important
constitutional principle either to preserve the impeachment process — at
least for constitutional officers — or to provide, as Oregon does, that "in-
competency, corruption, malfeasance or delinquency in office may be
tried in the same manner as criminal offenses, and judgment may be
given of dismissal from office . . . ." (Ore. Const., art. VII, § 6.)
State Contracts
Sec. 25. Tfie General Assembly shall provide, by law, that the fuel, stationery,
and printing paper furnished for the use of the State; the copying, printing,
binding and distributing the laws and journals, and all other printing ordered
by the General Assembly, shall be let by contract to the lowest responsible bidder:
but the General Assembly shall fix a maximum price; and no member thereof,
or other officer of the State, shall be interested, directly or indirectly, in such
contract. But all such contracts shall be subject to the approval of the Governor,
and if he disapproves the same there shall be a re-letting of the contract, in such
manner as shall be prescribed by law.
History
The first sentence of this section first appeared in the 1848 Constitu-
tion, but without the words "printing paper." Those words were in-
cluded in the proposed section as stibmitted to the 1870 Convention. The
section sailed through without discussion or debate until the day when
the section was to be enrolled in the Constitution. At that time a motion
was made to suspend the rules for the addition of what is now the second
sentence of Section 25. The Chairman of the Committee on Revenue
supported the motion, observing:
"I am satisfied such a provision is necessary to the operation of this clause with
any benefit to the State. It would liave saved thousands of dollars heretofore.
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and will save thousands of dollars in the future to the State." (Debates 1780.)
The rules were suspended and the sentence added. The section was
omitted from the proposed 1922 Constitution.
Explanation
This is the most limited in coverage of the several conflict-of-interest
provisions. (See Sec. 15, supra, p. 176, and Sec. 4 of Art. VIII, infra,
p. 409.) Only two cases appear to have arisen under this section. In
Dement v. Rokker (126 111. 174 (1888)), the Supreme Court held that a
contract that was the result of collusion among printers would be void.
In Callaghan & Co. v. Smith (304 111. 532 (1922)), the Supreme Court
invalidated an act authorizing a named concern to compile and publish
the statutes of the state. The act was ylso.held to be special legislation
invalid under Sec. 22. (Supra, p. 203.)
Comparative Analysis
There appear to be 15 states with comparable provisions. Some are
more limited in coverage, such as printing only or stationery only, and
some are broader, such as covering lights in addition to fuel. West Vir-
ginia's provision is the same in substance and so close in language to
Section 25 that it must have been copied by the drafters of the 1872 West
Virginia Constitution. Michigan deleted a comparable provision in its
recent revision. The United States Constitution and Model State Con-
stitution are silent on the subject.
Comment
Even though 15 states have comparable provisions, it seems obvious
that this is a minor matter of no constitutional significance. To be sure,
corruption in government contracting, for printing or anything else, is
important, but there is a limit to how far the people can go in trying to
prevent corruption by constitutional fiat. Moreover, there is a danger in
trying to ptit too many controls into a constitution. The legislature, for
example, takes a dim view of the executive control over legislative
printing that has been facilitated by Section 25. The Commission on the
Organization of the General Assembly recommended that Section 25 be
deleted so that the legislature can control its own printing. (I.S.L. 11-12.)
Suit Against State Prohibited
Sec. 26. The State of Illinois shall never be made defendant in any court of
law or equity.
History
The 1848 Constitution stated that the "General Assembly shall direct,
by law, in what manner suits may be brought against the State." The
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Comniittee on the Legislative Department proposed the following to the
1870 Convention:
"The State of Illinois never shall be made defendant in any court of law or
equity; but the General Assembly may provide, in any case that they may deem
it advisable, for commissioners or arbitrators to investigate and report any claims
against the State, subject to review of the General Assembly; and the General
Assembly shall provide means for the payment of all just claims against the State."
When the section was brought tip in the Connnittee ot the Whole, a
delegate inmiediately moved to strike everything after the word "equity"
on the ground that the "General Assembly have all the power that is
attempted to be conferred upon tliem by this provision." (Debates 612.)
Without debate and by a vote of 25 to 21, the motion was passed. (It was
also agreed to transpose "never shall" to "shall never." Id.)
At a subsequent session an effort was made to put the stricken material
back in. The principal argument was that the Constitution ought to
spell out how creditors of the State "may seek their remedy." {Id. at
961.) Many delegates appeared to be afraid that any invitation to set up
something like a court of claims would be abused. (There was a great
deal of concern about the "Macalister and Stebbins bonds" and, appar-
ently, a fear that anything except a prohibition against suing the state
might open the door to another such situation. A brief description of
the Macalister and Stebbins bonds will be found in Bulletin No. 10,
Bulletins 865.) In the end, the original decision w^as sustained. The
proposed 1922 Constitution omitted the section.
Explanation
The doctrine of sovereign immunity is traditional and would be ap-
plicable in Illinois in the absence of Section 26. (In Molitor v. Kaneland
Community Unit District, 18 111. 2d 11 (1959), the Supreme Court
on its own abandoned common law immunity as to tort actions involv-
ing political subdivisions of the state. The legislature can, of course,
grant sovereign immunity to such subdivisions, totally or under certain
limitations.) The only significance of the section, therefore, is that it
prohibits the state from legislating permission to be sued. (See People
el rel. Greening v. Green, 382 111. 577 (1943).) The state is not pro-
hibited, however, from paying just claims against it (Fergus v. Russel,
277 111. 20 (1917)) or creating an "advisory" agency, a court ot claims,
to determine the justness of claims against the state. {See Dinwiddie v.
Sielkin, 299 111. App. 316 (1939).)
Notwithstanding sovereign immunity, there are several ways in which,
in effect, the state can be sued. A suit against a state official is not a
suit against the state if the allegation is that the official is operating
outside his authority or that the authority conferred is unconstitutional.
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(See People ex rel. Freeman v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 368 111. 505
(1938).) Likewise, one can sue an official to compel him to carry out a
mandatory duty. {See People ex rel. First Nat'l Bank v. Kingery, 369 111.
289 (1938).) The state may also create instrumentalities that act on be-
half of the state but that have shed enough attributes of the sovereign
to permit suit. {See People v. Illinois Toll Highway Comm'n, 3 111. 2d
218 (1954).)
It should also be noted that the legislature grants a right of judicial
review of many administrative determinations and adjudications. In-
deed, in many situations, the courts have required such right as a matter
of due process of law. (See Explanation of Art. Ill, supra, p. 99.) In
such cases of judicial review, the state is the defendant, whether the
action is viewed as at law or ecpiity — in theory, it has to be one or the
other — but the courts do not consider these cases as precluded by Sec-
tion 26. Here, as in some other areas of the law, there is a semantic fog
and the courts are sometimes no better than the rest of us in describing
the course taken.
To complete the judicial circle, it must be noted that although illegal
and unconstitutional acts of the state can usually be stopped by suit
against an official, it is not possible to sue the state by purporting to
sue an individual who is legally acting for the state. {See Schwing v.
Miles, 367 111. 436 (1937).) There are also technical problems that
arise in involved litigation. For example, on one occasion the Attorney
General was not permitted to intervene in a condemnation proceeding,
under circumstances that would make the state a "defendant" (People
V. Sanitary Dist., 210 111. 171 (1904)), but on another occasion a person
sued by the state was permitted to file a cross-bill against the state.
(Brundage v. Knox, 279 111. 450 (1917).)
Comparative Analysis
There appear to be only two states, Alabama and Arkansas, that join
Illinois in prohibiting all suits against the state. West Virginia prohibits
all suits against the state except where the state or a subdivision is
made defendant in garnishment or attachment proceedings. Some ten
state constitutions provide that the legislature may prescribe the manner
in which suits may be brought against the state, and another four say
that the legislature shall do so. Three states cover the problem by per-
mitting suit, but not permitting the entry of enforceable judgments.
The United States Constitution has no comparable restriction, and the
United States has waived sovereign immunity by statute in certain areas.
The Model State Constitution has no comparable provision.
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Comment
As noted in the History above, Section 26 was inserted in 1870 in an
abundance of caution as the resuk ot a specific state bond dispute that
had arisen earUer. It would seem appropriate to drop the section as un-
necessary. Indeed, in view of the steady increase in the impingement of
government on the daily activities of people, it is more likely that some
will argue that a provision should be inserted guaranteeing the right
to sue the state.
Lotteries Prohibited
Sec. 27. The General Assembly shall have no power to authorize lotteries
or gift enterprises, for any purpose, and shall pass laws to prohibit the sale of
lottery or gift enterprise tickets in this State.
History
This denial of legislative power was first introduced in the 1848 Con-
stitution in a provision that, curiously, included in the middle of the
sentence a denial of power to charter certain banks. (See discussion of
Sec. 5, Art. XI, infra, p. 520.) In 1870 the words "or gilt enterprises"
were added by motion on the Hoor ot the Convention. There was no
explanation of the phrase, no debate, and adoption, apparently, was by
voice vote. (Debates 612.) Presumably, the delegates knew the generally
accepted meaning of the phrase — a scheme whereby a merchant sells
wares at the market value but by way of inducement gives the purchaser
a ticket for a prize-drawing. The proposed 1922 Constitution changed the
section to read; 'Totteries and gift enterprises are forbidden." The official
explanation said the proposed section was the same as Section 27, in-
dicating, presumably, a belief that an unenforceable command to the
legislature to pass laws is a meaningless constitutional provision. (P.N.C.
31. See the Comment on Sec. 32 of Art. IV, inp-a, p. 245.)
Explanation
It should be noted first tliat this section prohibits only lotteries, not
all gambling. A lottery is understood to liave three controlling ingre-
dients: a consideration, or price, to participate; a prize; and a deter-
mination of the winner by pure chance. (In the current wave of con-
tests through the mail, in gasoline service stations, and elsewhere, the
"no purchase necessary" part is the means of trying to avoid a lottery.)
Prior to 1932, there apparently had been no judicial construction of
Section 27. In that year, the Supreme Court decided that pari-mutuel
betting in horse races is not a lottery. (People v. Monroe, 349 111. 270
(1932). [Could the legislature authorize bookmaking?]) Since then there
has been litigation concerning how close one can get to making the dis-
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tribution of tickets "free" while still keeping some strings on the dis-
tribution. There has been no interpretation of "gift enterprises." Gen-
erally, a gift enterprise is considered covered by a statute prohibiting
lotteries.
Comparative Analysis
Over 35 states have constitutional prohibitions of lotteries and approx-
imately 14 of them add a prohibition of "gift enterprises." A few states
prohibit gambling, but in most of these, exceptions have been added
by amendment. New York, lor example, has a strict gambling provision
to which an exception for pari-mutuel horse racing was added in 1939,
an exception for nonprofit bingo in 1957, and an exception for a state
lottery for education in 1966. (Thus, the gambling provision has grown
from approximately 45 words to approximately 450 words.) With the
exception of Rhode Island, no New England state has a gambling or
lottery provision in its constitution. Neither the United States Consti-
tution nor the Model State Constitution has a gambling or lottery pro-
vision.
Comment
Gambling has been one of the frailties of men that has plagued societies
for centuries. Probably the greatest efforts to suppress gambling have
been carried on in countries with a strong Protestant, Puritan tradition.
In the middle of the Nineteenth Century there was a nation-wide move-
ment against lotteries culminating in widespread adoption of provisions
like Section 27. It is obvious, however, that such constitutional provisions
and accompanying statutory prohibitions have not been particularly
successful in stopping lotteries. "Policies" or "numbers" games are wide-
spread and because of their illegality constitute one of the main supports
for organized crime. Presumably, it is partly the recognition of the
pervasiveness of the weakness for gambling that has caused states to
make exceptions to gambling prohibitions and two states, New Hamp-
shire and New York, to sponsor state lotteries.
Notwithstanding the ineffectiveness of a constitutional gambling
prohibition, it is one of the more controversial provisions in a state
constitution and one that a convention is not likely to remove. Cogent
arguments can be adduced to demonstrate that protection of the people
against the temptation of gambling is hardly one of the fundamental
principles of limited government for which constitutional protection is
necessary. Nevertheless, delegates to a convention are not likely to wish
to appear to be in favor of sin and a decision to delete Section 27 could
be so characterized. (Ironically, a more accurate characterization would
be that Section 27 must be preserved because of a fear that the legislature
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might some day be in favor ol "sin" — i.e., gambling.) Fortunately, the
limited nature ol the restriction of Section 27 preserves Illinois from the
difliculties encountered in states such as New York Avhich have had to
amend their constitutions from time to time to permit exceptions to a
prohibition against all gambling.
Extension of Term of Office Prohibited
Sec. 28. No law shall be passed which shall operate to extend the term of any
public officer after his election or ap])oiiUnient.
History
This section first appeared in the 1870 Constitution. It was explained
on the floor of the Convention that the section "was intended to meet
such a case as happened in 1 865, when the Legislature extended the term
of the school conmiissioners for two years beyond the time for which
they were elected." (Debates 744.) The proposed 1922 Constitution re-
arranged the words to read thus: "No public officer shall have his term
extended by law after his election or appointment." The section was
moved to a new article called "Public Servants."
Explanation
This straightforward prohibition, especially in the improved language
of the 1922 proposal, is self-explanatory. Its purpose is equally obvious:
to prevent a partisan protection of incumbents likely to be ousted at
the next election. There lias been some litigation involving this section,
but in general it has simply confirmed that the section means what it
says. {See, e.g., People ex re I. Bua v. Powell, 39 111. 2d 202 (1968).)
Comparative Analysis
Only a handful of states — eight besides Illinois
— have a comparable
provision. Georgia, for completeness, has a provision prohibiting length-
ening or shortening terms except under certain circumstances. Neither
the United States Constitution nor the Model State Constitution fias a
comparable provision.
Comment
As indicated above, this is the sort of prohibition that gets into a
constitution because of some specific prior abuse. The relative rarity of
the provision among the states indicates that it is not a necessary or tra-
ditional limitation of legislative power. As is frequently the case with
a prohibition of legislative abuse of power, the ability to act properly is
also prohibited. One can think of any nimiber of circumstances in which
an extension of term of office would be salutary, would solve some prob-
lem, or would simply be a minor aspect of some far-reaching change.
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{Compare People ex rel. Bua v. Powell, 39 111. 2d 202 (1968).) In the
heat of outrage at some legislative abuse, there is frequently a failure
to consider the consequences of withholding all power to act.
Protection of Miners
Sec. 29. It shall be the duty of the General ^Assembly to pass such laws as
may be necessary for the protection of operative miners, by providing for ven-
tilation, where the same may be required, and the construction of escapement
shafts, or such other appliances as may secure safety in all coal mines, and to
provide for the enforcement of said laws by such penalties and punishments as
may be deemed proper.
History
This bit of legislative material was reported early to the 1870 Con-
vention and apparently was the first substantive provision adopted by
the delegates. It may be for this reason that the debate was so extensive.
In the end, the section was adopted with only one dissenting vote. The
dissenter had indicated earlier that he believed the Convention was act-
ing too hastily. {See Debates 264 - 276, esp. 275.) The proposed 1922
Constitution retained this section. The official explanation stated that
the section was unchanged (P.N.C. 33), but this is questionable. From
the 1870 debates, it is clear that the delegates meant to require legislation
for ventilation of all mines, but "escapement shafts" for coal mines only.
The 1922 language omitted the word "coal."
Explanation
This section is, in effect, a dead letter. There appears to have been
only one judicial reference to the section since 1920. In 1967, it was
stated that mine safey legislation must be liberally construed in order
to comply with the constitutional mandate of Section 29. (Freeman Coal
Mining Corp. v. Ruff, 85 111. App. 2d 145 (1967).) The case concerned
only alternative constructions of an ambiguous statutory provision. No
constitutional issue was considered.
The current insignificance of Section 29 can be demonstrated by the
history of the problem of providing washrooms for coal miners. In 1906,
the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a requirement that coal mine
operators provide washrooms. The Court said that Section 29 could not
be relied upon because the section mandated legislation for the "safety"
of miners, not for their "health and safety." (The Court refused to con-
sider the 1870 Convention debates on the ground that Section 29 was
unambiguous. The debates make it clear that the delegates were con-
cerned about both health and safety. {See Debates 264-276.) Once Section
29 was disposed of, the legislation fell under the special legislation
238 Art. IV, § 29
prohibition of Section 22, on the ground that the health of miners who
would have to trudge home in wet clothes was no different from the
health of other workmen who would have to trudge home in wet clothes
but whose employers were not required to supply washrooms. (Starne v.
People, 222 111. 189 (1906).) In 1913, an act was passed recjuiring wash-
rooms in every "coal mine, steel mill, foundry, machine shop, or other
like business in which employees become covered with grease, smoke,
dust, grime and perspiration to such an extent that to remain in such
condition . . . will endanger their health . . . ." The Court upheld the act.
(People V. Solomon, 265 111. 28 (1914).) In 1919, the Court held that
the act did not cover railroad roundhouses. (People v. Cleveland, C, C,
& St. L. Ry., 288 111. 523 (1919).) In 1931, "railroad" was inserted after
"machine shop," and so far it appears that no railroad has questioned the
amendment. (111. Rev. Stat. ch. 48, §98 (1967).)
If the foregoing demonstrates the failure of the 1870 mandate to go
far enough, the case of Fowler v.. Johnston City ir Big Muddy Coal
& Mining Company (292 111. 440 (1920)) demonstrates the futility of
mandating legislation. In that case, the claim was made that there
should be an escapement shaft to match every main shaft, even though
tlie legislature had permitted a connecting passageway between two mines
to suffice where one mine had such an escapement shaft. The Court
refused to rewrite the statute and thrust aside the argument that the
statute was unconstitutional because it did not properly carry out the
constitutional mandate. (But see Comment on Sec. 32, injra, p. 245.)
Comparative Analysis
There appear to be four states besides Illinois that specifically man-
date legislation for the protection of miners. All except one of them
cover both "health" and "safety" of miners. Another five states have
such a mandatory provision but include one or more additional indus-
tries, such as railroads, smelters and "factories." Again, all except one of
the five cover both health and safety. Three states have negative state-
ments: that is, declarations that nothing else in the constitution shall
be deemed to deny the legislature the power to protect the health and
safety of employees. Neither the United States Constitution nor the
Model State Constitution has a comparable provision.
Comment
If, as noted above, this section is, in effect, a dead letter, one would
assume that the section could easily be removed. But there is always the
interest of those who feel, rightly or wrongly, that they may lose some-
thing if the section is dropped. At the least, an effort should be made,
in this case as well as in others, to convince those directly interested that
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in the long run the abiHty of the legislature to solve the day-to-day
problems of Illinois is facilitated if the Constitution does not appear to
set priorities on problem-solving.
Establishing Roads and Cartways
Sec. 30. The General Assembly may provide for establishing and opening
roads and cartways, connected with a public road, for private and public use.
History
In 1866 the Supreme Court in two cases, Nesbitt v. Trumbo (39 111.
110 (1866)) and Crear v. Crossley (40 111. 175 (1866)), held that the
due process clause of the 1848 Constitution prohibited the state from
condemning an easement over one man's property in order that another
man might have access to a highway. The purpose of Section 30 was
to get around these two decisions. There was an extended debate in the
1870 Convention revolving principally around two important questions:
(1) who should pay for the easement -- the man who needed access to
the highway, the public, or both? and (2) if the state exercised its power
of condemnation, could the resulting easement remain a private road?
(The practical significance of the second question is whether the man
for whose benefit the easement existed could put up a gate at the junc-
tion with the highway or only at his own property line at the opposite
end of the easement.) The consensus of the delegates appears to have
been that if the state were to exercise its power it must do so for the
benefit of the public and that, therefore, the easement must be public;
and if this were so, that the cost of condemnation should not be borne
wholly by the owner who needed access to the highway. This consensus
was developed by abandoning a majority committee report after many
floor amendments and substituting therefor a minority committee report
containing the language of Section 30.
In the proposed 1922 Constitution, Sections 30 and 31 were combined
and new matter related to Section 31 was added. The operative words
for purposes of Section 30 were that the legislature could provide for
"opening private roads to communicate with public roads."
Explanation
In 1924, the Supreme Court confirmed the understanding of the dele-
gates to the 1870 Convention. (Road District No. 4 v. Frailey, 313 111.
568 (1924).) The Court said in effect that the state cannot condemn the
land of "A" for the sole use of "B," but that it can do so if the public also
participates in the use. Since the stretch of road in question in that
case was less than 300 feet, it is fairly clear that the public-use aspect
was more theoretical than real. Moreover, the condemnation award was
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$140.00 of which $115.00 was to be paid by the property owner and only
$25.00 by the road district. In short, one nuist always use the rubric
"private and public use" and be sure that some small part of the con-
demnation award is assessed against the public. (Actually, the award was
set aside for a procedural error not pertinent to this discussion.)
The clarity of the foregoing paragraph is snuidged a bit by the case
oiLibbee v. Imhoff. (11 111. App. 2d 344 (1956).) Unfortunately, only
an unofficial abstract of the case is published and nothing is known of
the facts except that the county superintendent of highways refused to
lay out a road. The abstract says:
"The Appellate Court lield that a roadway to provide access to land isolated
from any public road would be solely for the benefit of owner of sudi land and
those having business with him and that hence such road could not be laid out
under statute authorizing public authorities to lay out roads for private and
public use, since to do so would amount to the taking of private property for
private use in violation of Constitution." (Libbee v. Imhoff, 137 N.E. 2d 85,
85-86 (1956).)
The only relevant speculation about this abstract is what kind of
business the landowner was in that "those having business with him"
were not the
"public." It is relevant, however, to observe that the court
might not have ruled the same if the superintendent of highways had
laid out the road.
Comparative Analysis
No other state appears to have a provision precisely like Section 30.
A dozen or so states specifically permit the opening of a private road
provided that there is a necessity therefor. In some of these cases, it
is made clear that the cost of condemnation is to be borne by the land-
owner who benefits. Neither the United States Constitution nor the
Model State Constitution has a comparable provision.
Comment
Section 30 is an example of a constitutional provision made necessary
by a bad judicial decision. As the Frnilcy case discussed above demon-
strates, the problem is more theoretical than real. It would seem obvi-
ous today that a property owner who cannot reach the highway and
cannot purchase an easement therefor at a reasonable price should be
able to enlist the aid of the state to exercise the right of eminent domain
to enable him to have access to the highway and the public to have
access to him. It may be that the 1866 cases that created the problem
in Illinois were badly handled or that something lay behind the disputes
that does not appear in the opinions. If this is not the case, one can
only conclude that the judges comprising the majority in those cases
read
"public use" in much too narrow a sense.
Art. IV, § 31 241
The problem arises, however, whether it is advisable to remove what
should be an unnecessary provision. In many instances (see the dis-
cussions ol Sec. 29, supra, p. 237, and Sec. 31, below, ot this article
and ot Art. XIII, infra pp. 545), the removal of a grant of powers creates
no problem, for the legislature has all the powers ot government not
denied to it. Unfortunately, the grant of power in Section 30 was made
necessary by a judicial ruling based on a traditional denial of power.
If Section 30 were omitted, someone some day could argue that the
power to condemn land for a connection to a highway had been lost.
But if the essence of Section 30 is to be retained, it probably ought to
be included as part of the eminent domain section.
Drains and Ditches
Sec. 31. The General Assembly may pass laws permitting the owners of lands
to construct drains, ditches and levees for Agricultural, Sanitary or mining pur-
poses, across the lands ot others, and provide for the organization of drainage
districts, and vest the corporate authorities thereof, with power to construct and
maintain levees, drains and ditches, and to keep in repair all drains, ditches and
levees heretofore constructed under the laws of this State, by special assessments
upon the property benefited thereby.
History
Section 31 dates from 1870 and originally read as follows:
"The General Assembly may pass laws permitting the owners or occupants
of lands to construct drains and ditches for agricultural and sanitary purposes,
across the lands of others."
It was proposed as a section of the Bill of Rights Article by a delegate
who argued that the Nesbitt and Crear cases, Avhich had been the occa-
sion for adopting Section 30 (supra, p. 239), would also invalidate exist-
ing drainage laws. The Committee on Revision and Adjustment moved
the section to Article IV.
The present Section 31 was adopted in 1878 as the first amendment
to the Constitution. In 1876, the Supreme Court had held that since
Section 31 did not mention "levees," the state could not authorize a
drainage district to condemn land tor a levee, and had also held that
no drainage district could be authorized to finance itself by special
assessment since Section 9 of Article IX (infra, p. 460) limited special
assessment powers to "cities, towns and villages." (Updike v. Wright,
81 111. 49 (1876).) The amendment was designed both to cover the
problem of levees and to overcome the restriction of Section 9 of Article
IX. Interestingly enough, one delegate in 1870 had suggested that per-
haps some language covering levees ought to be included and expressed
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hope that more time would be given to the examination oi the problem.
He was followed by a delegate who doubted the necessity of any pro-
vision granting power to tlie legislature but conceded that it others
thought such a provision was necessary, it was perhaps advisable to
accept it. He moved the previous question, the section was adopted as
written, and the problem of inchuling levees was apparently forgotten.
(Debates f589.) The proposed f922 Constitution retained this section
in a simi^iified version, but witli some sul)stantive changes. The principal
changes were to make it explicit tfiat drainage districts liad the power
of eminent domain and that the state could give them financial aid.
In addition to cfearing up the ambiguity of whether a grant of one
power negates other powers, it was finther provided that the proposed
section should not be construed as a limitation on the powers ot the
legislature.
Explanation
In one of the Bulletins prepared by the Legislative Reference Bureau
for the f 920-22 Convention, the subject of drainage districts was intro-
duced by the statement: "The drainage laws ot Illinois present a higlily
complex and contusing body of legislation." (Bulletins 1030.) That
statement continued to hold until the Drainage Code was adopted in
1955. In some measine, the complexity and confusion were the result of
constitutional limitations, but not particularly limitations in Section 31
itself. Presumably, the codification of the many drainage acts has ended
the confusion. Since 1947, at least, the courts have apparently had no
constitutional question involving Section 31.
Roughly speaking, there are two types ot drainage districts, using
the term as a catchall. One is a district formed at the instance of land-
owners for their own benefit. The other is a governmental agency formed
at the instance of voters for the benefit of the public. The first type
is organized pursuant to a statute enacted in conformance with Section
31, and the second type is organized pursuant to a statute enacted under
the general police power.
Section 31 districts are quasi-municipal corporations. They can raise
money only by assessments against the land benefited and onfy to the
extent of the benefit to the land. For example, in North Wichert Drain-
age District v. Chamberlain (340 HI. 644 (1930)), Drainage District "A"
engaged in drainage work ot benefit to District "B" and pursuant to
statute obtained a judgment against "B" tor the cost of such work.
Objection was raised that an assessment against all of the landowners
of "B" would be unconstitutional because not every landowner neces-
sarily benefited from the work done. 7 he Supreme Court construed the
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statute to require the Commissioners of District "B" to allocate the
amount of the judgment by assessment against landowners in "B" accord-
ing to the benefit received. Another case which exemplified this fun-
damental limitation on the fiscal powers of a Section 31 district was
Marsftall v. Commissioners of Upper Cache Drainage District (313 111.
1 1 (1924)), where the Court invalidated a statutory provision that author-
ized the county court, in the course of dissolving a district, to assess the
costs of the unsuccessful attempt against the landowners. Since the
project failed, there were no benefits, and without benefits there could
be no assessment.
Section 31, it should be noted, goes further than simply to permit the
formation of a drainage or levee district. The legislature is empowered
to provide for a method whereby a property owner can run a drain
through the property of another. (111. Rev. Stat. ch. 42, §§ 2-2 to 2-7
(1967).) Landowners may also mutually establish drains or levees by
agreement. (111. Rev. Stat. ch. 42, §§ 2-8 to 2-11 (1967).)
When a district is created, in the words of Section 31, there is a "cor-
porate authority" which has the power to levy assessments. In the early
days under the amended Section 31, the courts apparently were not
concerned about the significance of the fact that, normally, "corporate
authorities" are persons selected by the people affected or by a method
to which they assented. When faced with districts created by special
act, the analogy to municipal corporations was relied upon to require
some form of consent by affected landowners in order to have a valid
district whose commissioners could levy assessments. (See Funkhouser v.
Randolph, 287 111. 94 (1919); Herschbach v. Kaskaskia Island Sanitary
& Levee Dist., 265 111. 388 (1914). See also discussion of corporate author-
ities under Art. IX, Sec. 9, infra, p. 460.)
Districts which are for the benefit of the general public are not Section
31 districts. This means that they may raise necessary funds by taxation
rather than assessment. This important principle was settled in the
landmark case of Wilson v. Board of Trustees of Sanitary District (133
111. 443 (1890)). Such districts are not covered by the Illinois Drainage
Code, but are part of the chapter on drainage under the head of "Sani-
tary and Other Districts." Sanitary districts may be organized for purposes
of flood control or sewage disposal or both. Other types of districts pro-
vided for are river conservancy districts and surface water protection
districts.
Comparative Analysis
Only about ten states have a comparable drainage district authoriza-
tion. Michigan deleted one in its recent constitutional revision. In most
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cases, the provision appears to have been designed either to meet an
asserted lack of eminent domain power or lack of special assessment
power, or both, as was the case in Illinois. The Model State Constitution
has no comparable provision.
Comment
It would appear safe to delete this section. There is no inherent re-
striction on the power of the legislature to create apjiropriate districts
except as courts narrowly construe the power of eminent domain or
except as a presumably inadvertent restriction on taxing power gets into
the Constitution. The former is unlikely these days, and the Convention
can avoid the latter.
Homstead and Exemption Laws
Sec. 32. The General Assembly shall pass liberal Homestead and Exemption
laws.
History
This section was first added to the Constitution in 1870. It was first
proposed to the Convention, sitting in Committee of the Whole, as a
detailed article which "made very few modifications of our present statute
law." (Debates 895.) Over four hours of debate ensued, including a
great many proposed amendments. When the article came before the
Convention proper, the amending process started all over again. Some
delegates became alarmed at the rigidity of the article, and efforts were
made to insert 'some flexibility by giving the legislature power to act.
What is now Section 32 was offered on the floor as a flexible substitute
that raised no problem of any kind. The section was quickly adopted.
(Debates 1689-92.) The proposed 1922 Constitution preserved it un-
changed.
Explanation
This is a simple, straightforward, unenforceable command to the legis-
lature to pass homestead and exemption laws — laws to preserve one's
home and, sometimes, other defined property, from being taken in satis-
faction of one's debts. Homestead and Exemption laws have been passed
pursuant to this command. Whether they are liberal is another question.
Since any exemption law is more "liberal" than none, it is difficult to
see how a court could judge compliance with the constitutional com-
mand. An appellate court has, however, stated that such laws should be
"liberally" construed. (Perkins v. Perkins, 122 111. App. 370 (1905).)
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Comparative Analysis
Two states, Colorado and Montana, have provisions substantially
identical with Section 32. Some 25 other states have actual exemptions
written into the constitution. (It is of interest to note that no state east
ot Indiana and Michigan and north of the Mason and Dixon line has
any provision concernng homestead and exemption laws.) In many states
there are provisions of great detail, including, for example, the max-
imum allowable value of a homestead to be exempted. Michigan is a
case in point. In 1943 the amount was increased by amendment from
$1,500 to $2,500. In the 1963 revision the applicable provision was
changed to read: "A homestead in the amount of not less than $3,500 . . .
as defined by law, shall be exempt from forced sale on execution or
other process of any court." (Mich. Const, art. X, § 3.) Neither the
United States Constitution nor the Model State Constitution mentions
the subject.
Comment
So long as courts accept the theory that the legislature has the power
to pass laws covering any subject in any manner iniless the power is
denied in the Constitution, a provision like Section 32 is an unnecessary
grant of power. The command to the legislature to pass "good" laws
adds nothing because, as noted above, there is no way to force the legis-
lature to act and no likely way to eliminate a law on the grounds that
it is not
"good" enough. The most that can be said is that if the legisla-
ture repealed an existing homestead exemption law and did not replace
it with any exemption, an arginiient could be made that Section 32
implicitly denies to the legislature the power to take away an exemption
once given. An intriguing question is whether such an argument could
be made against any change in the law that reputedly decreased the
homesteader's rights. Nevertheless, if one believes that there should be
something in the Constitution concerning homestead and exemjition
laws, then a provision like Section 32 is to be preferred to a provision
that establishes the substance of the homesteader's rights.
State House Expenditures
Sec. 33. The General Assembly shall not appropriate out of the State treasury,
or expend on account of the new capitol grounds, and construction, completion,
and furnishing of the State House, a sum exceeding, in the aggregrate, three and
a half millions of dollars, inclusive of all appropriations heretofore made, without
first submitting the proposition for an additional expenditure to the legal voters
of the State at a general election; nor unless a majority of all the votes cast at
such election shall be for the proposed additional expenditure.
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History
This section was first added to the ('constitution in 1870. On the floor
of tlie Convention the proposal was offered with a ceiling of $4,()()(),0()().
The leading elder statesman in the Convention announced that he had
made a study of the cost of the state house and found that it would
be less than $3,000,000. After discussion, the matter was referred to
committee. (Debates 1320.) In the end, the Convention split the differ-
ence. The proposed 1922 Constitution deleted the section.
Explanation
This (juaint section puts a ceiling on the expenditures for the state
house and surrounding grounds under the normal appropriations
process, but permits additional expenditures if approved at a referen-
dum. Notwithstanding an 1880 case that held that new grounds added
to the capitol groun^fs after 1870 were covered by this section (People
V. Stuart, 97 111. 123 (1880)), it seems likely that Section 33 is now a dead
letter. In 1948, the Supreme Court made it clear that the limitation
applies only to the capitol at Springfield and not to other state office
buildings. (Owens v. Green, 400 111. 380 (1848).) Presumably, anything
done at the state house today would be construed as repair, replace-
ment, maintenance, or something other than "construction, completion
and furnishing."
Comparative Analysis
There is no comparable state provision. Three states — Colorado,
Montana, and Washington — forbid expenditures prior to the determi-
nation by the people of the permanent capital city, but those provisions
serve a different purpose. Indiana has a provision forbidding the sale
or lease of certain capitol grounds. There are, of course, many con-
stitutional requirements for referenda in connection with the expendi-
ture of money, both in general and for specific purposes.
Comment
In the light of some of the famous scandals connected with the build-
ing of state capitols and other public building, this section may very
well have been prudent in 1870. It could surely be dropped now without
fear.
Special Laws for City of Chicago
Sec. 34. The General Assembly shall have power, subject to the conditions
and limitations hereinafter contained, to pass any law (local, special or general)
providing a scheme or charter of local municipal government for the territory
now or hereafter embraced within the limits of the city of Chicago. The law
or laws so passed may provide for consolidating (in whole or in part) in the
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municipal government of the city of Chicago, the powers now vested in the
city, board of education, township, park and other local governments and author-
ities having jurisdiction confined to or within said territory, or any part thereof,
and for the assumption by the city of Chicago of the debts and liabilities (in
whole or in part) of the governments or corporate authorities whose functions
within its territory shall be vested in said city of Chicago, and may authorize
said city, in the event of its becoming liable for the indebtedness of two or more
of the existing municipal corporations lying wholly within said city of Chicago,
to become indebted to an amount (including its existing indebtedness and the
indebtedness of all municipal corporations lying wholly within the limits of said
city, and said city's proportionate share of the indebtedness of said county and
sanitary district which share shall be determined in such manner as the General
Assembly shall prescribe) in the aggregate not exceeding five per centum of the
full value of the taxable property within its limits, as ascertained by the last
assessment either for State or municipal purposes previous to the incurring
of such indebtedness (but no new bonded indebtedness, other than for refunding
purposes, shall be incurred until the proposition therefor shall be consented
to by a majority of the legal voters of said city voting on the question at any
election, general, municipal or special); and may provide for the assessment of
property and the levy and collection of taxes within said city for corporate
purposes in accordance with the principles of equality and uniformity pre-
scribed by this Constitution; and may abolish all offices, the functions of which
shall be otherwise provided for; and may provide for the annexation of territory
to or disconnection of territory from said city of Chicago by the consent of a
majority of the legal voters (voting on the question at any election, general,
municipal or special) of the said city and of a majority of the voters of such
territory, voting on the question at any election, general, municipal or special;
and in case the General Assembly shall create municipal courts in the city of
Chicago it may abolish the offices of justices of the peace, police magistrates and
constables in and for the territory within said city, and may limit the jurisdiction
of justices of the peace in the territory of said county of Cook outside of said
city to that territory, and in such case the jurisdiction and practice of said muni-
cipal courts shall be such as the General Assembly shall prescribe; and the
General Assembly may pass all laws which it may deem requisite to effectually
provide a complete system of local municipal government in and for the city
of Chicago.
No law based upon this amendment to the Constitution, affecting the muni-
cipal government of the city of Chicago, shall take effect until such law shall be
consented to by a majority of the legal voters of said city voting on the question
at any election, general, municipal or special; and no local or special law based
upon this amendment affecting specially any part of the city of Chicago shall
take effect until consented to by a majority of the legal voters of such part of
said city voting on the question at any election, general, municipal or special.
Nothing in this section contained shall be construed to repeal, amend or affect
section four (4) of Article XI of the Constitution of this State.
History
Chicago was first organized as a town under a general act for incorpora-
tion of towns. It received a special town charter in 1835 and a special
city charter in 1837. A second special charter was enacted in 1851 and a
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third in IHti.'i. In between enacinicnt oi these charters there were num-
erous amendments by special act.
At the 1870 Convention, as noted above in connection with Section 22
{supra, p. 203), some of the delegates Irom Chicago argued that it would
not be practicable to handle all municipal charter problems, particularly
ol large cities, by means of general legislation. The Chicago delegates
were also worried about charter changes not to the liking of the citizens
of the city. A Cook County delegate offered a proposal which, he said
he believed, had the approval of all other Cook County delegates. The
proposal would have permitted special legislation concerning original
municipal charters but, in the case of changes or amendments, only if
the voters of the community had the power of veto by referendum. There
was an extended and rather discursive debate which, among other things,
showed that the delegates generally did not have much of a theory
about home rule. In the end, the strong bias against special legislation
evidently won out, for the delegates retained the prohibition on any
special legislation incorporating cities, towns or villages, or changing
or amending such charters.
In 1872, a general act was passed to cover municipal incorporation.
Chicago adopted the new law in 1875. (With the prohibition on special
legislation, it was not possible, of course, to obtain amendments to an
existing special charter.) The Cook Coimty delegates had been right,
however, and it soon became evident that Chicago could not operate
satisfactorily under the general act. Section 34, the sixth amendment to
the Constitution, adopted in 1904, was the proposed answer to Chicago's
problem.
The 1920-1922 Convention made another stab at the special problem
of Chicago. In place of Section 34, it produced 16 sections in a 34-section
article on Local Governments. The first of these sections opened with the
following expansive expression of home rule:
"Except as expressly prohibited by law the city of Chicago is hereby declared
to possess for all municipal purposes full and complete power of local self-
government and corporate action. This grant of power shall be liberally con-
strued and no power of local self-government or corporate action shall be denied
the city by reason of not being specified herein." (art. VIII, § 178.)
There followed in that section and in many of the succeeding 15
sections various withholdings of power, reservations of control in the
hands of the legislature, requirements for referendum approval of cer-
tain actions, and detailed instructions for consolidation of overlapping
governmental units. The several sections as a whole added up, however,
to more home rule than that afforded by Section 34. For present purposes
only some of the more important sections need be summarized. The most
important limitation on Chicago was in the sentence immediately fol-
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lowing the grant of power quoted above. The sentence read: "The city
however may impose taxes and borrow money only as authorized by the
general assembly or by this article." Since "this article" did not authorize
any taxes, the legislature retained all power for the authorization of
taxes. (The legislature's power was, of course, circumscribed by the reve-
nue article.) The article did provide, however, that no municipal corpo-
ration (other than a county) exercising taxing power inside the city
could be created or have its taxing power enlarged without the city's
consent. Borrowing power was to be limited to 7 per cent of the value of
taxable real property. (This was not an increase over the 5 per cent in
Section 34, for that limitation included personal property.) Approval by
referendum was required.
Chicago was given power to create its own city charter but only by an
"elective convention." The voters had to approve the calling of a con-
vention and to approve any charter adopted by the convention. Like-
wise, amendments had to be approved by the voters. One interesting
proviso was that the charter and any ordinances passed under it would
"prevail over state laws so far as the organization of the city government,
the distribution of powers among its official agencies and the tenure and
compensation of its officers and employees are concerned." But there
followed another proviso stating that compensation, employment and
promotion "in the classified civil service" should be in accordance with
a general plan recognizing "merit and fitness as controlling principles."
The legislature was authorized to pass special legislation for Chicago,
but only with the city's consent.
One of the more ingenious proposals in the 1922 Constitution was an
authorization to issue unlimited bonds on the city's faith and credit for
transportation or water purposes provided that a tax for repayment of
principal and interest was to be levied but not collected if enough money
was set aside from revenues to make the necessary repayment. This
device would have allowed bonds to be floated at a lower rate of interest
than would be required for revenue bonds.
A final portion of the Chicago home rule proposal worth discussing
is the authorization for consolidation of all other local governments or
other authorities wholly within the city and that part of any town within
the city. (The latter authorization went beyond Section 34.) The city was
also authorized to take over the Sanitary District and the Forest Preserve
District, or either of them, but only with the approval"of a majority vote
"both in the district and the city." The authorization further provided
that, after consolidation, no taxing power would exist outside the city
limits and that the city would not make any charge outside the city
for sewage service in existence at the time of the take-over.
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It should be noted that in the Cook County portion of the proposed
1922 article on local government, there was an authorization for the
legislature to propose consolidation of the city and that part of the county
^\•ithin the city limits, but only with the approval by referendum of the
voters in the city and the voters in the county outside Chicago.
Explanation
The need that was considered most pressing at the time Section 34
was adopted was a reorganization of the local court system. For this
reason, in part. Section 34 contains detailed authorization for legislative
alteration of the then-existing judicial system. In part, however, this
detail was necessary because, in effect. Section 34 had to "amend" Article
VI as it then existed. Shortly after adoption of Section 34, the Supreme
Court had to rule on whether Section 34 was validly adopted in the light
of the then-existing restriction on amending more than one article of
the Constitution at a time. Section 34 was upheld. (City of Chicago v.
Reeves, 220 111. 274 (1906).)
Shortly after adoption, a municipal court system was established by
statute and the required approval by referendum was obtained. Over
the years there was extensive litigation concerning the municipal courts,
but since, with the adoption of the new Article VI, the municipal court
system has been superseded, there is no need to discuss the judicial
interpretations of that part of Section 34.
For the most part, Section 34 has not been used as a home rule author-
ization for Chicago. Shortly after the section was adopted, Chicago pro-
posed a new charter, but after it was amended by the legislature, Chicago
rejected it. A second charter passed the General Assembly but was
vetoed by the Governor. A third effort was rejected by Chicago. (See
Bulletins 940-41.) In the meantime, the legislature adopted the practice
of enacting general legislation applicable to cities over a given population
so that the law would apply only to Chicago. (The figure now used is
500,000 but in earlier days was smaller.) The courts have held that
Section 34 is in no way exclusive and that general legislation affecting
Chicago but not "based upon this amendment" is not subject to the
referendimi requirement of Section 34. (See Alexander v. City of Chicago,
14 111. 2d 261 (1958).) Normally, the courts determine that an act is not
based upon Section 34 by the absence of a provision for a referendum.
(Id.) In 1941, an optional act under Section 34 was passed and in Novem-
ber, 1947, Chicago by referendum opted to operate under the act. (111.
Rev. Stat. ch. 24, §§21-1 to 21-49 (1967).) No changes under that act
can be made, of course, without referendum approval by Chicago voters.
Section 34 has a parenthetical clause to the effect that new bonded
indebtedness is subject to a referendum. The Supreme Court has ob-
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served that this
"provision becomes operative only in the event that the
legislature provides a consolidated government for the city of Chicago."
(People ex rel. Gutknecht v. City of Chicago, 414 111 600, 623 (1953).)
The legislature can, of course, require a referendum on a bond issue.
(See 111. Rev. Stat. ch. 24, § 8-4-1 (Supp. 1968).) It is worth nothing that
the proposed 1922 Constitution made a referendum on any new bond
issues mandatory, (art. VIII, § 191.)
Comparative Analysis
No other state constitution has a single section dealing with a single
city in the combination of powers and restrictions contained in Section
34. Several states have provisions dealing with the principal large city
in the state. Examples are St. Louis, Denver, New Orleans, Baltimore,
and, in Pennsylvania, two large cities, Philadelphia and Pittsburgh. These
may be grants of power to adopt local charters or power to consolidate
city and county, or both. In each case, the provision is, as in Illinois,
tailored to the specific problem of the municipality.
The varations in municipal home rule provisions in the various state
constitutions are too great for a detailed comparative analysis. Not quite
half of the states prohibit special acts of incorporation. Many, but not
all, of those states specifically state that the legislature shall provide
by general law for the incorporation of municipalities. In some states,
this takes the form of a limitation on the powers of the legislature; in
other states, the language is that of a grant of power to the legislature
to provide for home rule which, of course, is no guarantee of home rule.
The Model State Constitution provides for the organization of local
governments as set forth in the Comparative Analysis of Section 5 of
Article X. {Infra, p. 498.) This is followed by a "limitation of powers"
section as follows:
"Powers of Counties and Cities. A county or city may exercise any legislative
power or perform any function which is not denied to it by its charter, is not
denied to counties or cities generally, or to counties or cities of its class, and is
within such limitations as the legislature may establish by general law. This grant
of home rule powers shall not include the power to enact private or civil law
governing civil relationships except as incident to an exercise of an independent
county or city power, nor shall it include power to define and provide for the
punishment of a felony." (art. VIII, § 8.02.)
Comment
It is obvious that Section 34 should be dropped. What should take its
place is a complicated matter. It would appear inadvisable to adopt the
approach of the 1920-22 Convention of a detailed local government
article with some 16 sections devoted to Chicago alone. It may be appro-
priate to say something about Chicago, but in general, a minimum of
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•substantive detail is the goal. It is important to spell out who has power
to make decisions in what areas — the people through denial of power
to any government, the state through denial ol power to local govern-
ment, local voters through reservation of referendum rights, or the
local government. It is equally important to avoid making substantive
decisions in tlic Constitution.
Article V
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
Officers— Terms
Sec. I. The executive department shall consist of a governor, lieutenant
governor, secretary of state, auditor of public accounts, treasurer, superintendent
of public instruction and attorney general, who shall each hold his office for the
term of four years from the second Monday of January next after his election and
until his successor is elected and qualified. They shall, except the lieutenant
governor, reside at the seat of government during their term of office, and keep
the public records, books and papers there, and shall perform such duties as may
be prescribed by law.
History
This section dates from 1870. In the earlier constitutions, the various
elective officials were covered in different sections of the article on the
executive department. Thus, the first half of the first sentence of Section
1 simply makes exphcit what was implicit before. Likewise, in the
1848 Constitution, the designation of the time of beginning and ending
of the terms of Governor and Lieutenant Governor was explicit, but
partially implicit as to other elected officers. (For the length of terms
of office, see Histoiy of Sees. 2 and 3, infra, pp. 260 and 262.) The
second sentence, as an all-inclusive statement, also dates from 1870.
In the 1848 Constitution, only the Governor was required to reside at
the seat of government and only the Secretary of State, the Auditor of
Public Accounts and the Treasurer were to have duties as prescribed by
law. (It is to be noted, however, that the Superintendent of Public
Instruction was first added in 1870, and that the Attorney General who
had been provided for in 1818 was omitted from the 1848 Constitution.)
The proposed 1922 Constitution preserved the substance of Section 1
in the course of splitting it into several sections. One substantive
change was made. The executive department was stated to consist of
the named elected officers "and such other officers as provided by law."
In a section concerning performance of duties as prescribed by law, all
officers of the executive department, not just constitutional officers, were
covered.
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There was a technical amendment to Section 1 in 1954 as part ot the
proposal to increase the term of the Treasurer to four years. The change
was simply the deletion of words that had excepted the Treasurer from
the clause prescribing the length of term of the executive officers.
Explanation
Executive Power: In the beginning, one might say, there was Field v.
People ex rel. McClernand. (3 111. 79 (1839).) This monumental case-
in length, 105 pages, if nothing else — is of such historical importance
in the development of constitutional theory in Illinois that a fairly
full statement of the case is warranted. Under the 1818 Constitution,
the Governor appointed the Secretary of State, subject to Senate con-
firmation. There was no stated length of term. A. P. Field was appointed
Secretary of State in 1829 by Governor Ninian Edwards, following the
resignation of the incumbent Secretary. Secretary Field served under
two succeeding Governors and was still in office when Thomas Carlin
was elected in 1838. Governor Carlin nominated John A. McClernand
to be Secretary of State, but the Senate rejected the nomination and,
by a vote of 22 to 18, adopted a resolution to the effect that consent was
not given because there was no vacancy in the office of Secretary of State.
(Id. at 154.) After the legislature adjourned, the Governor removed
Field and appointed McClernand to fill the vacancy. The lawsuit
followed.
It is clear from the opinions that the case was a political hot potato.
(Each of the three sitting justices wrote an opinion, one of which was a
dissent. The fourth member, a relative of McClernand, declined to sit.)
The decision was that the Governor had no power to remove the Secre-
tary of State, a decision that the 1870 Convention subsequently "over-
ruled" by the addition of Section 12. (See infro, p. 285.) Moreover, the
Field decision was ignored. At the next session in 1840, Governor Carlin
nominated Stephen A. Douglas, who had been one of the principal
counsel for McClernand. A Senate motion not to consent on the ground
that no vacancy existed was defeated. A motion to advise and consent
to Douglas* nomination was then adopted. Apparently, Field accepted
this, for Douglas took office the same day.
The importance of the Field case lies in the broad constitutional
doctrine enunciated by Chief Justice Wilson. (In passing, it is inter-
esting that the Chief Justice was speaking only for himself. Neither the
dissenting nor the concurring justice agreed with the Chief Justice's con-
stitutional theory. Yet, presumably because his opinion was printed
first, the theory therein expressed became the theory of the "Court.")
The doctrine is:
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"The constitution is a limitation upon the powers of the legislative depart-
ment of the government; but it is to be regarded as a grant of powers to the other
department[s]. Neither the executive nor the judiciary, therefore, can exercise
any authority or power, except such as is clearly granted by the Constitution."
{Id. at 81.)
It is difficult to point out how Chief Justice Wilson's sweeping state-
ment affected the course of constitutional development in Illinois. The
case has been cited for this theory many times. (For the most recent,
see In re Estate of Quick, 333 III. App. 573, 579 (1948).) But because
of its fundamental nature, the theory is influential in a general, un-
expressed way. To put this rather difficult thought another way, if the
concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Lockwood had been the opinion of
the Court, one assumes that the concept of executive power would have
developed differently because he carefully limited his remarks to the
question of whether or not removal of a constitutional officer at will
was an inherent part of the executive power. Under his theory, there
was some inherent executive power, and if he had spoken for the Court,
no one could have cited the Field case for the proposition that the
executive and the judiciary have only powers "clearly granted by the
Constitution." It is simply not possible to point to any particular deci-
sion and state categorically that the decision would have gone the other
way under Mr. Justice Lockwood's theory. The most that a student
of the subject can say is that some aspects of constitutional development
in Illinois appear to have been influenced by Chief Justice Wilson's
pronouncement. (See, e.g., Explanation of Art. Ill, supra, p. 99.)
There have, of course, been cases in which the argument was made
that the legislature was luiconstitutionally interfering with executive
powers. These cases are discussed in connection with the separation of
powers doctrine embodied in Article III. (See supra, p. 101.) The im-
portant point about those cases is that the courts were not concerned
with alleged interference with inherent executive power, but interference
with the executive power as "granted" by the Constitution. Those cases
are in no way inconsistent with the Field theory. Indeed, aside from the
power of removal, now amply covered by Section 12 (infra, p. 285), there
are very few ways in which the question of an inherent executive
power over and above specific constitutional grants can arise. In the
case of the United States, the President has asserted, and the courts have
recognized, inherent executive power in the conduct of foreign affairs.
(See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation, 299 U.S. 304
(1936).) Other presidential attempts at action in the absence of statu-
tory authority have not fared so well. (See Youngstown Sheet &: Tube
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). For a discussion of the power of
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removal, see Explanation of Art. Ill, supra, j). 99. Sec also Comment
below.)
Executive offices: Illinois has what is called the "long ballot." The
problems connected with this are discussed in the Cotnment below. For
present purposes, it is sufficient to note that the courts have said that
the legislature may not take away any constitutional j30wers or duties
of a constitutional executive officer. [See American Legion Post No.
279 V. Barrett, 371 111. 78 (1939); People ex rel. State Bd. of Agr. v.
Brady, 277 111. 124 (1917).) The rule that constitutional powers and
duties may not be taken away from constitutional officers is in itself
unobjectionable. There are, however, very lew specific constitutional
powers and duties set forth in the Constitution for officers other than the
Governor. (For the Auditor of Public Accounts, see Sees. 17 and 21 of
Art. IV, supra, pp. 181 and 200; and for the Secretary of State, see Sec. 9 of
Art. IV, supra, p. 145, and Sees.- 16 and 22 of Art. V, infra, pp. 293 and 318.
The Lieutenant Governor is really an executive officer only when he is
acting as Governor.) In the case of the Treasurer, Attorney General, and
Superintendent of Public Instruction, constitutional powers and duties
can be only such as necessarily flow from the title of the office. Moreover,
Section 1 specifically states that the officers of the executive department
"shall perform such duties as may be prescribed by law."
From the foregoing, one would normally assinne that the legislature is
relatively free to parcel out powers and duties in the executive depart-
ment. Such an assumption is clearly wrong in the case of the Attorney
General. In Fergus v. Russel (270 111. 304 (1915), also see supra, p. 103),
the Supreme Court decided that the Attorney General had all the powers
that the English Attorney General had at common law. Since there was no
Attorney General provided for in the 1848 Constitution, and in the Sched-
ule to the 1818 Constitution, only an authorization to the legislature to
appoint an Attorney General whose duties could "be regulated by law," it
is difficult to believe that the drafters of the 1870 Constitution had any
such understanding of the title "Attorney General." But the really strange
thing about the case is that the Court used the words "such duties as may
be prescribed by law" to back up its argument that the 1870 drafters
meant to clothe the Attorney General with the powers of the English
common law Attorney General. In a feat of masterful legerdemain, the
Court took words that appear to allow the legislatme to take away
common law powers, assuming such an original meaning, and converted
them into words that establish the
"original" meaning. It should be
conceded that the Supreme Court has taken the same approach to
legislative efforts to curtail the power of the sheriff (see Explanation
of Sees. 7 and 8 of Art. X, infra, pp. 501, 505), but at least in that instance
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there is no reference to "duties as may be prescribed by law." It might
also occur to someone that the legislature's lack of power over the
Attorney General and his duties is a little inconsistent with the Field
theory. The Fergus Court had a ready answer to that. Field, it seems,
was different because the Governor was not an official known to the
common law! (See also Comment below.)
Comparative Analysis
Executive Power: There does not appear to be any state constitution
that expresses a theory of executive power such as that of Chief Justice
Wilson discussed above. Whether any other state Supreme Court adopted
such a theory is rather difficult to ascertain. The traditional expression
of executive power in a state constitution is in a provision comparable
to Section 6, and the Comparatix'e Analysis of that section, together with
the Comparative Analysis of Section 12 on removal power, will serve as
a comparison with other states. (Fnfra, pp. 271 and 286.)
Executive Offices: Three states — Idaho, Kansas, and Montana — list
precisely the same seven elected constitutional officers as those comprising
the executive department. Approximately 17 other states have an "execu-
tive department" provision, listing anywhere from five to 12 officers,
most of whom are elected constitutional officers.
The presence or absence of an "executive department" provision is
not, however, a guide to the presence or absence of a long ballot, which is
a matter of the number of elected executive officials, whether or not
grouped together under the title of the "executive department." The
following is a summary tabulation of elective constitutional executive
offices with any elective statutory offices included in parentheses. (Not
included are multimember boards and commissions. For example, Illi-
nois elects nine statutory university trustees. In Michigan, there are
three different constitutional governing boards, each consisting of eight
elected members.)
Number of States
2
2
4
2
4
3
7
3
1
1
8
1
er of Elective Offices
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effects of his theory. It follows that there is no way that the Convention
could safely draft anything designed explicitly to eliminate the Field
theory. Any formulation of a theory of government beyond the separation
of powers expressed in Article III (supra, p. 99) would probably usher in
a new period of constitutional confusion. The fact is that there is a theory
of constitutional government in the United States, a sort of "brooding
omnipresence in the sky," that in a general way runs throughout the
country. Chief Justice Wilson represents an aberration, a man out of
step, and as time passes, citation of his theory probably means less and
less. The Illinois courts will undoubtedly move along the same road
that constitutional decisions across the country take.
Nevertheless, it would be advantageous if the Illinois courts would
forget Mr. Chief Justice Wilson's theory. For one thing, aberrations in
the law are of no value except when they are the first step in a shift
in the law, which is certainly not the case with Field. For another thing,
the political process is a matter of balancing interests, of effecting com-
promises among forces. The process is a delicate one, and a categorical
theory that the legislature is "top dog" except to the extent that the Con-
stitution says otherwise, is not a delicate theory of balancing interests.
Having said all of this, there are only two suggestions that seem appro-
priate. One is that in the course of considering Article III and its rela-
tionship to Articles IV, V, and VI, the Convention could make a legis-
lative record to the effect that the Convention adheres to the traditional
constitutional theory of separation of inherent powers and not to the
Field theory. The other suggestion is that a scholarly article developing
more fully the presentation made here might convince the Illinois courts
to drop the Field theory.
Executive Offices: In any constitutional convention, the long versus
the short ballot is an important policy question. It is not appropriate
here to spell out the whole range of policy considerations relevant to
reaching an informed decision. It should be noted, however, that the
"long ballot-short ballot" controversy has two facets, only one of which
is particularly relevant to Section 1. It is argued that voters cannot exer-
cise their choices intelligently if they are confronted with too many
elective offices to fill. In the case of Section 1, this side of the problem
becomes a matter of five people, not seven, since the Treasurer and
Superintendent of Public Instruction are elected in the "off" even-
numbered year. (See Sec. 3, infra, p. 262.) If the Convention were to join
the current trend of having voters vote for Governor and Lieutenant
Governor as a team (see infra, p. 263), the number of state-wide executive
offices to be filled could drop to four in one election. Moreover, by a
judicious arrangement of elections and by small decreases in elective
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offices at various levels ol government, the ballot could be shortened con-
siderably.
The facet of the "long ballot-short ballot" controversy that is relevant
here is exemplified by the sign President Truman had on his desk: "The
buck stops here." The "short ballot" proponents would argue that a
similar sign cannot be put on tlie desk of the Governor of Illinois. The
proj)onents add, obviously, thai such a sign belongs on the Governor's
desk. The argument of the proponents of the long ballot is simply that
it avoids giving one man too nnich power. (See also Comments on Sees.
6 and 21, infra, pp. 272 and 318.)
If the Convention decides to keep some or all of these elective
officers, it would seem appropriate, and, it is to be hoped, not too con-
troversial, to do something about the Fergus v. Russel determination
concerning the Attorney General. There is a simple drafting change that
will introduce adequate flexibility in allocating legal work within the
Executive Department. The change is to use the words of the 1818
Schedule — "whose duties may be regulated by law" — in place of "per-
form such duties as may be prescribed by law." Such a change would
require a recasting of the second sentence of the section, but it is such
a hodgepodge as it is that recasting is necessary anyway.
Whether the Convention should adopt some version of a "20 depart-
ment" section depends on whether it is believed that the legislature
cannot be expected to permit rational ordering of the executive depart-
ments or that the legislature cannot be trusted to leave a rational order-
ing alone, or both. There is no reason in constitutional theo-ry for a
"20 department" provision. Anyone who is champing at the bit to
force a good organization chart on the Executive Department might well
pause to consider who else is champing at the bit to put in his pet
project. All good men will not agree on what is essential in a constitu-
tion, but all good men ought to agree that once the door is opened to
"good" nonessentials, "bad" nonessentials will slip in, too. A "20 depart-
ment" provision is a good nonessential.
Treasurer
Sec. 2. The treasurer shall hold his office for the term of four years, and until
his successor is elected and qualified, and shall be ineligible to said office for
four years next after, the end of the term for which he was elected. He may be
required by the governor to give reasonable additional security, and in default
of so doing his office shall be deemed vacant.
History
The 1818 Constitution provided for the appointment of a treasurer
every two years by the joint vote of the two houses of the legislature.
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The 1848 Constitution continued the two-year term but made the office
elective. The 1870 Constitution added the prohibition against a treas-
urer succeeding himself and the requirement that he give "reasonable
additional security" it so required by the governor. By Amendment in
1954 the term was extended to tour years. Through a Schedule accom-
panying the amendment, the first four-year term began with the election
of the treasurer in 1958. The proposed 1922 Constitution increased the
term of office to four years, but otherwise retained the substance of
the section.
Explanation
A separate provision for the treasurer was originally required because
of his two-year term, all other constitutional executive officers having
four-year terms. A separate section was and is still required to cover
the treasurer's ineligibility to succeed himself and the requirement for
"additional security." As to the latter, see Comment below. As to the
former, it was observed by a delegate to the 1870 Convention: "Now,
there is a good reason why the Treasurer of the State should not be
eligible to a second term. There ought to be, with reference to the
custodian of the public treasury, a change, in order that we may have
an actual account — an actual, as distinguished from a constructive
accountability — with regard to the funds in the treasury . . . ." (Debates
762.) There has been only one case construing this section, Fairbank v.
Stratton (14 111. 2d 307 (1958)), and that simply made the obvious
point that the legislature cannot deprive the treasurer of his constitu-
tional powers.
Comparative Analysis
The treasurer is elected by the voters in 40 states. In four states the
treasurer is elected by the legislature and in three states, he is appointed
by the governor. Three states have no treasurer. The states are approxi-
mately equally divided between two- and four-year terms. About 13
states limit immediate succession as treasurer and another seven or so
have a less stringent restriction on length of service as treasurer. Some
seven state constitutions specify some requirement for bonding, but no
other state has a provision for "additional security." The treasurer is
not a constitutional officer under the United States Constitution or
the Model State Constitution.
Comment
The last sentence of Section 2 is one of the more curious provisions in
the Illinois Constitution. There is an assumption that the treasurer gives
a bond upon taking office, but there is no constitutional requirement
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for the initial bond. In the debates of the 1H7() Convention, it was noted
that existing statutes required an initial bond and additional security
"[b]ut before the committee there was a doubt whether the Legislature
woidd have the power to confer such a discretion upon the Governor
without a constitutional provision . . . ." (Debates 809.) What the doubt
really was was whether the legislature could enforce the requirement
for additional security by declaring the office vacant upon default.
Election and Terms of Office
Sec. 3. An election for governor, lieutenant governor, secretary of state,
auditor of public accounts, and attorney general, shall be held on the Tuesday
next after the first Monday of November, in the year of our Lord 1872, and
every four years thereafter; for superintendent of public instruction, and treas-
urer, on the Tuesday next after the first Monday of November, in the year 1958,
and every four years thereafter at such places and in such manner as may be
prescribed by law.
History
This section, a composite statement of terms of office and times of
election, first appeared in 1870. Under the 1818 Constitution the Gov-
ernor and Lieutenant Governor were elected by the voters for four-year
terms. The Secretary of State was appointed by the Governor subject to
Senate confirmation. The Treasurer was chosen by joint vote of the
two houses of the General Assembly for a two-year term, fn the Schedule
of the 1818 Constitution it was provided that the General Assembly
could appoint an Auditor, Attorney General, and "such other officers for
the State as may be necessary." (§ 10.) It is said that the original plan
of the 1818 Convention was to have the appointing power in the Gover-
nor but that when the members of the Convention learned that the man
who was expected to be elected Governor was not going to appoint as
Auditor a man favored by the members, the original plan was abandoned
and the section quoted from was inserted in the Schedule. {See E.
Anthony, The Constitutional History of Illinois 39-40 (1891).) In the
1848 Constitution, the Secretary of State and Auditor of Public Accounts
were made elective with four-year terms corresponding to the terms of
Governor and Lieutenant Governor. The Treasurer was made elective
but the two-year term was continued. In 1870, the Attorney General
and Superintendent of Public Instruction were made elective with four-
year terms, but the Superintendent's election was to be in the
non-
gubernatorial even-numbered year. By amendment adopted in 1954, the
Treasurer's term was extended to four years, effective in 1958, so that
his term coincides with that of the Superintendent. The proposed 1922
Constitution preserved the election of the Superintendent of Public
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Instruction in the off even-numbered year but included the Treasurer
with the other four-year-term offices.
Explanation
This section is self-explanatory. The only judicial comment appears
to have been the observation that the election day referred to does not
necessarily govern any election for offices not named in the section.
(Bilek v. City of Chicago, 396 111. 445 (1947).)
Comparative Analysis
In 39 states, including Illinois, the governor is elected for four years.
In 11 of those states, he cannot succeed himself and in another 12
he is limited to two consecutive terms. Pennsylvania is in transition.
The present governor cannot succeed himself, but future governors will
be eligible for one additional term. Two states have an absolute limit
of two terms, consecutive or otherwise. One of the 11 states with two-
year terms limits consecutive terms to two and another by statute
prohibits nomination for a third consecutive term. Wisconsin switches
from two to four years in 1971.
Of the 39 four-year states, 11, including Illinois, hold gubernatorial
elections in presidential years. Twenty-four hold their elections in
the other even-numbered year. Five states hold their elections in an
odd-numbered year. All two-year states elect governors in even-numbered
years. The Model State Constitution calls for four-year terms, election
in an odd-numbered year, and has no limitation on re-election.
One of the more popular changes in recent years has been the adoption
of the President-Vice President team system. In at least nine states,
voters cast one vote for a governor-lieutenant governor team (secretary
of state in Alaska), so that succession will be within the same political
party. A little over a decade ago. New York was the only state with a
team system.
In general, in states electing treasurers and state school superintend-
ents, election takes place at the same general election at which the
governor and other state officers are chosen. In no state does it appear
that the treasurer is elected in an off-year. In Wisconsin the superin-
tendent is elected for four years at the election for members of the
Supreme Court, which must be on a day other than, and not within 30
days of, the election for any other state or county office.
Comment
If the State School Superintendent is to be elected, it may make sense
to elect him apart from the other state-wide offices on the theory that
education ought to be nonpartisan. It is difficult to justify the election
of the Treasurer, if he is to be elected, in an off-year.
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Canvass of Election Returns— Contests
Sec. 4. The returns of every election for tlie aliove named officers shall be
sealed up and transmitted, by the returning officers, to the Secretary of State,
directed to "The Speaker of the House of Representatives," who shall, immedi-
ately after the organization of the House, and before proceeding to other busi-
ness, open and publish the same in the presence of a majority of each House
of the General Assembly, who shall, for that purpose, assemble in the hall of the
House of Representatives. The person having the highest number of votes for
either of said offices shall be declared duly elected; but if two or more have an
eciual, and the highest, number of votes, the General .\ssemljly shall, by joint
ballot, choose one of such persons for said office. Contested elections for all of
said offices shall be determined by both houses of the General Assembly, by joint
ballot, in such manner as may be prescribed by law.
History
The 1818 Constitution contained the substance of the foregoing in
the section providing tor the election ol a Governor. (Except tor a
Lieutenant Governor, no other state official was elected. In the section
providing for a Lieutenant Governor, it was stated that lie should be
chosen at
"every election for governor" and "in the same manner.")
No change was made in 1848. (Although the Secretary of State, Auditor
and Treasurer were made elective in 1848, returns for their election were
handled according to the law concerning election of United States
Representatives. (Schedule, § 17).) In 1870, the Secretary of State was
named as recipient of the returns, the hall of the House of Representa-
tives was designated as the meeting place, and the timing — "immediately
after the organization of the House, and before proceeding to other
business" — for the canvass was spelled out. The 1870 Constitution also
added the words
"by joint ballot" to the last sentence of the section.
The proposed 1922 Constitution had a considerably rephrased section
but did not change the substance. In the course of such rephrasing the
rare use of "either" as one of more than two was abandoned and the
word
"up" w-as omitted. It is interesting to recall from the 1870 Con-
vention that on the occasion of tlie adoption of the Executive Article in
its final form, the following took place:
"Mr. PEIRCE. Mr. President: I move to strike out the word
'up' in the first
line. I consider that if the returns are sealed, they will be sealed up. The expres-
sion is unnecessary and inelegant.
"A division was ordered. The Convention divided, when, there being twenty-
four in the affirmative, and twenty-five in the negative, the motion of Mr.
Peirce to strike out was not agreed to." (Debates 1781.)
Explanation
This section serves three purposes: It provides (1) a method for can-
vassing the election returns and determining who has been elected;
(2) a means for brealcing a tie; and (3) a system for settling election
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contests. These purposes are served, however, only as to the offices named
in Section 3. Canvassing, breaking ties, and setthng contests for elections
of other officials are governed wholly by statute.
In the applicable chapter of the Election Code there is a section on
procedure to be followed in contesting the election of any of the named
officials. The section follows the language of the Constitution and thus
leaves the entire issue in the hands of the legislature. (111. Rev. Stat,
ch. 46, § 23-1 (1967).) One can speculate whether this was done to keep
control in legislative hands or in the belief that the Constitution so
requires. It is to be noted that the Chairman of the Committee on the
Executive Department stated to the delegates of the 1870 Convention
that the provision concerning contests "is substantially the law of the
State at the present time; and while a mode is pointed out here, it does
not take away the right of contesting elections in the courts of law,
which would also have jurisdiction of such cases." (Debates 747.) The
Chairman presumably represented the intent of the Convention, but
the language used is difficult to square with such intent. There do not
appear to have been any reported cases or other pronouncements on
election contests.
In 1913, the outgoing Governor wrote to the Attorney General on
January 15th inquiring whether he, the Governor, should continue in
office in view of the fact that the House of Representatives had not yet
organized and so the General Assembly had not been able to announce
the election of his successor. The Attorney General assured the Governor
that he remained in office until his successor qualified and that this
could not occur until the General Assembly followed the procedure
called for in Section 4. (1912 111. Att'y Gen. Rep. 1237.) On January
22nd of the same year the Secretary of the Senate inquired whether it
could conduct business while waiting for the House to organize. The
Attorney General replied that the restriction on proceeding to other
business applied only to the House of Representatives. (1912 III. Att'y
Gen. Rep. 1240.)
Comparative Analysis
Just under half of the states provide that the determination of the
election for governor shall be handled by the legislature. In seven states
the canvassing procedure is specified but the group named is not the
legislature. Eight states leave canvassing to be determined by law and,
presumably, the same obtains in the states that have no provision for
canvassing the votes for governor. About 20 states direct the legislature
to deal with contests for election of governor, four specify that the
method be prescribed by law, and one state specifies that the highest
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court settle contests. Presumably, in the other states, the matter is
handled by legislation. About three-quarters ol the states direct the
legislature to break a tie in the election ol governor. Kentucky directs
choice by lot. In general, each state applies the same rules to canvassing,
contests and ties lor other state offices. But there arc exceptions as,
lor example, in Maryland where the Governor breaks the tie in the case
ot the election tor attorney general and in Connecticut where the canvass
is done by the Secretary ot State, Treasurer, and Comptroller except
that in the canvass of each of those three the other two do it. The United
States Constitution covers the matter through the Electoral College. In
the absence of a majority vote for one person, the election shifts to
the House of Representatives. This would cover a tie, of course, as was
the case in 1800, though that was a tie vote between Thomas Jefferson
and Aaron Burr ot the same party. The Twelfth Amendment eliminated
this particular tie-vote problem by requiring that the elector designate
which person was to be President and which to be Vice President. The
Constitution is silent as to election contests. The Model State Constitu-
tion simply provides that the legislature shall provide for the adminis-
tration of elections.
Comment
It is obvious that detailed provisions for canvassing votes, breaking
ties, and determining contests are traditional and that placing control
in the liands of the legislature is also traditional. But it is questionable
whether there is any value in retaining such an anachronism. With
modern equipment and rapid commimications, election results are known
within a short time after the polls close. It seems unnecessary to hold
all official action in abeyance for almost two months. This is particu-
larly a problem in Illinois, where the official ritual may be delayed by
the inability ol the House ol Representatives to organize. It is also
questionable whether the handling ot contests should be left to the
legislature. The contest is essentially legal and evidentiary, and courts
are best equipped to handle that kind ot dispute. Moreover, tlie stakes
are political and the legislature, a political body by definition, is more
likely to make a political decision than a judicial one. Furthermore,
the contest cannot be handled by the legislature until after the results
are known and this, under Section 4, is after publication in the House
of Representatives. Under a normal procedure, the contest could be
started in the courts soon after Election Day.
Nevertheless, traditional rituals have tenacious life and it may be
better to concentrate on changes more crucial to the operation of the
state. After all, the occasions when the existing ritual is likely to
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create an inconvenience are rare indeed. In any event, it is advisable
to preserve the right oi the legislature to break a tie. It is certainly
not appropriate to choose a Governor by tossing a coin.
Elective State OflRcers— Eligibility
Sec. 5. No person shall be eligible to the office of Governor, or Lieutenant
Governor, who shall not have attained the age of 30 years, and been, for five
years next preceding his election, a citizen of the United States and of this
State. Neither the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Auditor of Public Accounts,
Secretary of State, Superintendent of Public Instruction nor Attorney General
shall be eligible to any other office during the period for which he shall have
been elected.
History
The 1818 Constitution required the Governor to be at least 30 years
of age, a United States citizen for at least 30 years, and to have resided
in the state for two years "next preceding his election." In the 1818
Schedule, Section 14, the requirement of 30-year citizenship for Lieu-
tenant Governor was removed, notwithstanding the section in the Execu-
tive Article which said that the Lieutenant Governor should have "the
same qualifications" as the Governor. There was no reference to eligi-
bility to any other office, but the Governor could serve for only four
years out of any eight-year period. In the 1848 Constitution the mini-
mum age was raised to 35, the citizenship requirement was reduced to
14 years, and the residency requirement was increased to ten years, but
with no words of "next preceding his election" accompanying residency.
The Lieutenant Governor was now required to meet the same qualifi-
cations as the Governor. (It is not clear, but it was probably intended
that the "four in eight year" limitation applied to the Lieutenant
Governor.) The 1848 Constitution also provided that the Governor was
not eligible "to any other office until after the expiration of the term
for which he was elected." (It is not clear, but it would seem that the
"any other office" limitation did not apply to the Lieutenant Governor.)
In 1870, age was dropped back to 30, United States citizenship to five
years, and residency to five years, but "next preceding his election" came
back in. The limitation on successive terms was dropped. Everybody
except the Treasurer came under the "any other office" ban. In 1922,
it was proposed to increase the age requirement back to 35 and the
residency back to ten years but to retain "next preceding his election."
(Actually, the 1922 provision changed "preceding" to "before.") In the
official explanation the foregoing age changes were pointed out. It was
not noted that the Treasurer now came under the
"any other office" ban.
(P.N.C. 35.)
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Explanation
The first sentence ol tliis section is sell-explanatory. The second sen-
tence is not. There was an extended debate in the 1870 Convention on
this sentence, but the debate turned principally on whether to limit the
named elected officers to one tour-year term in every eight. In the
course ol the debate it was indicated that none ot the named officers
could run lor any other office while serving, including, though this is
not crystal clear Irom the debates, another office at the general election
just preceding the end ot his term ot office. (Del^ates 773.) One delegate
moved to change "shall be eligible to" to "shall hold" but the motion
was not agreed to. Thus, the thrust ot the sentence was clearly aimed
at using one office as a stepping stone to another office and not at dual
office holding. Dual office holding is, however, prevented by the "eligible
to" fornuilation.
At no point in the dcl^ates was there an explanation for the omission
of the Treasurer from the list of those who coiUd not run for another
office. The most plausible explanation is that the drafters overlooked
liim because he is covered by a different section. The drafters apparently
also overlooked the fact that Section 6 of Article VII (infra, p. 394)
requires United States citizenship for any elective office, thus making
part of the first sentence superfluous.
There have been several reported cases involving a claim of dual
office holding. The cases uniformly held that Section 5 does not prohibit
additional duties to one of the named officers. (Baro v. Murphy, 32
111. 2d 453 (1965) (Governor ex ofjicio member of State Parks Revenue
Bond Commission); People v. Illinois Toll Highway Comm'n, 3 111. 2d
218 (1954) (Governor ex ofJicio member thereof); People ex rel. Graham
V. Inglis, 161 III. 256 (1896) (Superintendent of Public Instruction ex
officio trustee of state normal school).)
By virtue of the definition of "office" in Section 24 {infra, p. 322), it is
clear that anv of the named officers can run for federal office durin^ the
term for which he is elected. By virtue of the last sentence of Section 3
of Article IV (supra, p. 120), he would be prohibited from retaining his
state office if elected to federal office.
Comparative Analysis
Qjialifications: In some 35 states besides Illinois, the minimum age
for governor is 30. A couple of states have a higher (31 and 35) and
four states have a lower minimum (25). Eight states have no minimimi.
About 40 states specify that the governor must be a citizen of the United
States. Almost half of these specify no minimum number ot years. Of
tlie others, the number of years ranges from two to 20. More states
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(seven including Illinois) choose five as the appropriate minimum than
any other number ot years. Residency (or state citizenship) require-
ments also vary widely from no minimum up to ten years. The most
common minimum is five years (18 states, including Illinois). Not all
states combine the governor and lieutenant governor in the same qualifi-
cation sentence as does Illinois. Generally speaking, the requirements
are much the same lor the two offices. The United States Constitution
requires that the President be native born, 35 years old and 14 years a
resident. By implication the same recpiirements must be met by the
Vice President. The Model State Constitution requires only that the
governor be a qualified voter ol the state but includes a minimum age
requirement with the number ol years left blank.
Dual Office Holding: Only about half of the states have dual office
holdina^ restrictions on executive officers set forth in connection with
qualifications for their office. In most of those states, the limitation
appears to run only against the governor, and most of them prohibit
"holding" another office. Only a handful of states, principally Arkansas,
Delaware, Montana, Nebraska and West Virginia, follow the Illinois
provision of declaring most elective executive officers ineligible for any
other office. It does not appear that any of those states specifically omit
a constitutional officer as the treasurer is omitted in Illinois. Nebraska,
it is interesting to note, amended its constitution in 1962 to provide an
exception to allow the lieutenant governor to be a candidate for gover-
nor. Neither the United States Constitution nor the Model State Con-
stitution has any comparable restriction.
Comrtient
There are good reasons for prohibiting dual office holding, but the
formulation of a policy needs to be thought through carefully. The
most important restrictions are those concerning legislators and judges
as discussed elsewhere. [Supra, p. 120, and injra, p. 368.) Insofar as con-
stitutional executive officers are concerned, it seems appropriate to pro-
hibit dual office holding even though in a large industrial state it probably
is not necessary. In such a state, any of the constitutional offices, except
perhaps that of lieutenant governor, is so obviously a full-time position
that as a practical matter it seems unlikely that anyone would attempt
to hold down a second job, public or private. Moreover, in the absence
of a constitutional prohibition, litigation of the type set out above
(p. 268) would be avoided. But if a prohibition is to be retained, careful
consideration should be given to the distinction between "ineligibility
for" and
"holding" any other office. The underlying policy against
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dual office holding is cjiiite difierent Iroin the underlying policy against
permitting a person holding one office to run tor another office.
Governor — Supreme Executive Power
Sec. 6. The Supreme executive power shall be vested in tlie Governor, who
shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed.
History
The substance of this section appeared in two sections of the 1818
Constitution which were continued unchanged, except tor punctuation,
in the 1848 Constitution. In the course of creating this section, the
1870 Convention added the word
"Supreme" and dropped the words
"of the state" after
"power." The jjroposed 1922 Constitution left this
section unchanged in substance.
Explanation
The most important point to be made in explanation of this section
is that it is not accurate. Leaving aside for the moment the significance
of the word
"Supreme," it is obvious that the executive power of the
state is not vested in the Governor. There are, according to Section 1
of this Article (supra, p. 253), six other elected officers in the executive
department, five of whom have executive duties. The Lieutenant Gov-
ernor presumably has no executive duties except when acting as Governor
pursuant to Section 17. (Infra, p. 303.) The other elected officers have
both express and implied executive duties. The Secretary of State is
specifically given custody of the state seal by Section 22 (infra, p. 318),
and the Auditor is specifically given power to control every state expendi-
ture by Section 17 of Article IV. (Supra, p. 181.) The other three elected
officers. Treasurer, Superintendent of Public Instruction, and Attorney
General, and the Secretary and Auditor as well, have implied executive
powers by virtue of their titles. Thus, the executive power is divided up
and vested in a half dozen people, all independent of each other. More-
over, the Supreme Court, as mentioned earlier (supra, pp. 103 and 256),
has held that the Attorney General's implied powers are so solid that the
legislature cannot pry any of them loose for transfer elsewhere in the
Executive Department. So far, the Court has not frozen any pow-ers of
the other named officers.
It is possible that the word "Supreme" was added on the theory that
some special recognition should be given to the Governor as the one who
had all the executive power not parceled out to the other elected execu-
tives. (The more likely reason is that it is traditional. See Comparative
Analysis below. But also see the quotation from the 1870 Debates in
the Histoiy of Sec. 21, infra, p. 315.) There have been judicial opinions
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that refer to this section, but in general tlie point of the litigation has
in fact been the theory of separation of powers enunciated in Article III.
It is clear that the courts will not issue a writ of mandamus to compel
the Governor to act (People ex rel. Bruce v. Dunne, 258 111. 441 (1913)),
but will issue the writ to compel other constitutional executive officers
to act. (People ex rel. Mosby v. Stevenson, 272 111. 215 (1916); People
ex rel Sellers v. Brady, 262 111. 578 (1914); People ex rel. Akin v. Rose,
167 111. 147 (1897).) This distinction lies in part in the fact that in this
section the Governor is singled out for the vesting in him of executive
power. (See also the Explanation of Art. Ill, supra, p. 99.)
The second part of the section commanding the Governor to take care
that the laws are faithfully executed is a truism taken, directly or in-
directly, from the United States Constitution.
Comparative Analysis
Executive Power: All states except Arizona, Minnesota and Utah
explicitly state that the executive power is vested in the governor.
Thirteen of them are without a qualifying adjective, six make it the
"chief" executive power, and 27 join Illinois in using the adjective
"supreme." Michigan, it is interesting to note, had "supreme" in its
first (1835) constitution, removed it from the second (1850) constitu-
tion, put "chief" in the third (1908) constitution, and removed it from
the fourth (1963) constitution. (Citizens Research Council of Michigan,
A Comparative Analysis of the Michigan Constitution, at vi-9 to vi-10
(1961) [hereinafter cited as C.A.M.C.]; Mich. Const, art. V, § 1.) It is
also to be noted that the three states that really do vest executive power
in their governor by virtue of having no other elected executive officers
— Alaska, Hawaii and New Jersey — are among the states that have no
qualifying adjective. (Strictly speaking, Alaska has left a loophole in
executive power by providing for the election of a secretary of state who
has such duties as are delegated to him by the governor or "as may be
prescribed by law." There is no lieutenant governor in Alaska, voting
for governor and secretary of state is by joint ballot, and the secretary
of state acts for the governor in his absence arid succeeds him for the
balance of his term when necessary. The election of a potential suc-
cessor to the elected governor is, of course, most appropriate. The
Alaskan practice may develop so that the secretary of state remains a
minor official comparable to the lieutenant governor in most states, but
the language quoted above permits a diffusion of executive power.) The
United States Constitution vests executive power in the President, and
the Model State Constitution vests it in the governor.
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Execution of the Laivs: Almost all oi the states enjoin the governor
to take care that the laws be laithtully executed. The two new states,
Alaska and Hawaii, state that he is responsible tor their faithtul execu-
tion. Massachusetts and New Hampshire are silent on the subject.
South Carolina rather endearingly enjoins him to take care that the laws
are
"faithfully executed in mercy." (S.C. Const, art. IV, § 12.) The
United States Constitution uses the traditional language and the Model
State Constitution uses the same language as in Alaska and Hawaii.
(See also Comment below.)
Comment
See the Comment for Section 1 of this Article for a general discussion
of executive power. (Supra, p. 253.) It is to be noted here only that if
executive power is to be diffused as it now is by virtue of Section 1, it is
appropriate to put in a qualifying adjective such as "chief" or "supreme"
if it is made clear in convention debate or committee report that the
adjective is designed to enhance the executive power of the Governor.
If a decision is made to go the route of the short ballot, consideration
might be given to the Model State Constitution's implementation of
gubernatorial power to see that the laws are faithfully executed. The
Model provides:
"The governor shall be responsible for the faithful execution of the laws. He
may, by appropriate action or proceeding brought in the name of the state,
enforce compliance with any constitutional or legislative mandate, or restrain
violation of any constitutional or legislative power, duty or right by an officer,
department or agency of the state or any of its civil divisions. This authority
shall not authorize any action or proceeding against the legislature." (art. V,
§ 5.04 (a).)
The Commentary on the foregoing provision explains it as follows:
"As a further device for enhancing the governor's powers, the section author-
izes him to take appropriate action in the name of the state to enforce compliance
with constitutional or legislative mandates and to restrain violations of consti-
tutional or legislative powers and duties by state officers or instrumentalities.
This provision, derived from an earlier edition of tlie Model State Constitution,
has been incorporated into the recent constitutions of Alaska and New Jersey.
Its effect is to enable the governor to initiate proceedings or to intervene in pro-
ceedings on behalf of the people of the state or on behalf of any individual,
even in situations where the interest of the state is not directly involved. It gives
the governor "standing to sue" even in cases where he might previously not
have had it by reason of the fact that, either as a matter of procedure or sub-
stance, the state itself had nothing to lose or gain in consequence of such liti-
gation. The provision makes the governor, the only statewide elected official,
a spokesman for all of the people." (Model State Constitution 69.)
If the decision is to preserve the long ballot with executive power
diffused, such a provision would be inappropriate, for it would allow
the Governor to interfere with his constitutional equals.
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Governor— Powers and Duties
Sec. 7. The Governor shall, at the commencement of each session, and at the
close of his term of office, give to the General Assembly information, by message,
of the condition of the State, and shall recommend such measures as he shall
deem expedient. He shall account to the General Assembly, and accompany
his message with a statement of all moneys received and paid out by him from
any funds subject to his order, with vouchers, and, at the commencement of
each regular session present estimates of the amount of money required to be
raised by taxation for all purposes.
History
The 1818 Constitution simply enjoined the Governor to give the
legislature information on the state of the government, from time to
time, and to recommend such measines as he deemed expedient. The
1848 Constitution made no changes in the section. The 1870 Constitution
added the specified times for messages, including a farewell message,
lire details about accounting for funds and the hint of an executive
budget were added at the same time. Tlie proposed 1922 Constitution
preserved the message requirements, greatly shortened the accounting
requirement and deleted the hint of an executive budget.
Explanation
It is traditional to expect the Governor to send a "state of the state"
message to the legislatine at the beginning of the session. It is not
so common to require a farewell message. Altliough the present Consti-
tution specifies the times of message as contrasted witli the 1818 and
1848 Constitutions wliich simply said "from time to time," presumably
no one has argued that the Governor is stopped from sending up mes-
sages wlienever lie wishes.
In the light of the requirement that no money be drawn from the
treasury except on a warrant issued by the Auditor, a requirement also
added in 1870, it is difficult to see the significance of the detailed account-
ing called for from the Governor. It appears from the 1870 debates that
the accounting was of the Governor's own expenditures and not of all
of the executive departments. "Heretofore, the method has been to
make appropriations to the Governor for his use and benefit. . . . The
people have a right to know what becomes of all moneys appropriated,
and the uses to which they are applied." (Debates 747.) This is borne
out by the Governor's biennial messages. For example, in 1927, Governor
Small's message included the following:
"For a statement of the expenditures made by me for this department from
funds subject to my order, your attention is directed to the Biennial Report of
the Auditor of Public Accounts for the period ending September 30, 1926.
Vouchers for all such expenditures have been filed in the Auditor's office."
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Precisely tlie same wording appeared in Governor Deneen's message
in 1911. (See also the discussion ol Sec. 20, infra, p. .SI 3. It may be that
the Governor was supposed to account lor his expenditmes under Section
7 and not under Section 20.)
Since deficit financing is in theory prohibited by virtue of Section 18
of Article IV {supra, p. 185), an estimate by the Governor at the begin-
ning of a regidar session of the moneys recjuired to be raised by taxes
is tantamount to an operating i:)udget for the biennium. Only by the
preparation of such a budget can the Governor make a realistic estimate
of revenues required. Today, this is not a startling thought, but in
1870 this indirect approach to a single executive budget for the whole
state was not so common. Indeed, it was not until 1921 that the Fedeial
Government adopted an executive budget. In all fairness, it must be
noted that for a long time Illinois governors did not in fact carry out
this implied recjuirement for an executive budget. The first such formal
presentation of an executive budget was made in 1913, not much earlier
that the Federal Government's adoption of an executive budget. Prior
to 1913, each executive officer sent up his own estimates. {See N. Garvey,
The Government and Administration of Illinois 182-83 (1958).)
Comparative Analysis
Almost every state constitution calls for messages and recommenda-
tions from the governor to the legislature. The only exceptions are
Alabama, which calls for a message and no recommendation; Vermont,
which calls for recommendations but no message; and Massachusetts,
New Hampshire, New Mexico and Rhode Island, which say nothing
about messages. Many states make it clear that the governor can send
up a message whenever he wants to, sometimes in addition to the
requirement of a message at the beginning of the session, sometimes
with no mention of timing. Only five states besides Illinois call for a
message at the end of the governor's term of office. Seven states besides
Illinois call for an accounting of monies paid out, and five require
estimates of revenues required. Several state constitutions require the
governor to send up a budget message. The United States Constitution
commands the President "from time to time" to give Congress "Infor-
mation on the State of the Union," and to recommend "such Measures
as he shall judge necessary and expedient . . . ." (art. II, § 3.) The
Model State Constitution conmiands the governor to give information
and reconnnendations to the legislature at the beginning of each session
and permits him to give information at other times. The Model State
Constitution also provides for a budget message as follows:
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"The Budget. The governor shall submit to the legislature, at a time fixed
by law, a budget estimate for the next fiscal year setting forth all proposed ex-
penditures and anticipated income of all departments and agencies of the state,
as well as a general appropriation bill to authorize the proposed expenditures
and a bill or bills covering recommendations in the budget for new or additional
revenues." (art. VII, § 7.02.)
Comment
In any large industrial state the vast majority of significant govern-
ment policies are fiscal matters. The level ot government expenditures,
the extent ol services to the populace, the formulas for state aid to
local governments, grants from the Federal Government, the distribution
of tax burdens among the population and between state and local taxing
units — all these have a greater impact on the life of inhabitants than
the regulatory activities of state government. It would seem more im-
portant to provide for a comprehensive budget message along the lines
called for in the Model State Constitution than to call for "state of
the state" messages. There is no reason to drop the traditional message
requirement, but it would seem appropriate to simplify it and to substi-
tute a comprehensive budget message. In any event, it seems appropriate
to drop the requirement that the Governor account specially for his own
expenditures. The quotation from Governor Small's message shows
how meaningless the requirement is.
Special Sessions
Sec. 8. The Governor may, on extraordinary occasions, convene the General
Assembly, by proclamation, stating therein the purpose for which they are
convened; and the General Assembly shall enter upon no business except that
for which they were called together.
History
The 1818 Constitution gave the Governor power to call special sessions
and instructed him to tell the legislature, when assembled, why he had
called them together. In the 1848 Constitution, he was required to give
the reason for the call in his proclamation and for the first time the
legislature was forbidden to transact any other legislative business.
No substantive change was made in 1870 except to excise the word
"legislative" from in front of "business." The proposed 1922 Constitu-
tion transferred this section from the Executive to the Legislative
Article. It preserved the substance of Section 8 but gave the Governor
the power to add to the business to be considered "in one additional
message . . . during the session."
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Explanation
The courts, governors and attorneys general have all agreed that this
section means what it says. The Supreme Court has said that the Gov-
ernor's decision that an "extraordinary occasion" exists is final. (Herz-
berger v. Kelly, 366 III. 126 (1937).) The Governor has vetoed as
unconstitutional legislation on a subject not mentioned in his procla-
mation but passed at the special session. (Veto Messages 1911 at 31,
33.) The Attorney General has ruled that the Governor can add to the
subject matter for a special session, but only by issuing a new procla-
mation for another special session and not by amending the proclamation
for the special session already called. (1912 Att'y Gen. Rep. 964.)
According to the Attorney General, it the second proclamation arrives
while the legislature is in session pursuant to the first proclamation, the
two sessions should run along concurrently with all entries made in a
single legislative journal. (Id. at 966.)
Comparative Analysis
In all states the governor has the power to call special sessions. In
North Carolina he does so
"by and with the advice of the Council of
State," consisting of named constitutional elected executive officers.
In Louisiana, he has to have the consent of three-fourths of the mem-
bers of each house of the legislature to call a special session within
30 days of the beginning of a budget session or within 30 days after
adjournment sine die. In approximately nine states, the legislature,
sometimes by simple majority, sometimes by an extraordinary vote, can
call itself into session or require the governor to issue a call. A dozen
or so states authorize the governor to call the senate into session alone.
In Alaska he may convene either house.
Approximately 19 states limit the special session to the subject matter
specified by the governor. With one exception, these are states in which
no one else can call for a special session. In that one exception, Arizona,
the governor may convene the legislature specifying the subject matter,
but two-thirds of the members of each house can force a special session
with no limitation on subject matter. The President of the United
States may "qonvene both houses, or either of them," but he has no
power to limit the subject matter to be discussed. Under the Model
State Constitution, a special session may be called by the governor or
by the presiding officer upon the written request of a majority of the
members.
Comment
There are three important policy decisions to be made in considering
special sessions of the legislature. One concerns an automatic or semi-
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automatic return after adjournment to act on vetoes. (See discussion
under Section 16, infra, p. 293.) The second is whether to permit the
Governor to control the agenda absolutely as in Illinois, with some
qualifications such as allowing an extraordinary majority ot the legis-
lators to broaden the agenda, or not at all as in many states. The third
is whether to give the legislature any power to convene itself. (The
Commission on the Organization of the General Assembly recommended
that the presiding officers of the two houses be empowered to call a
special session upon the written request of two-thirds of the members
of both houses. I.S.L. 8.) The second and third policy decisions involve
intricate practical political considerations. For example, if the Governor
controls the subject matter, he need not hesitate to meet any emergency;
but if he has no such control, he must weigh the emergency against the
Pandora's Box that he opens. In this connection an exchange during
the 1870 Convention is instructive:
"Mr. TINCHER. . . .
The beauty about this is, that these gentlemen come around and get informa-
tion a little before hand as to when the Governor is going to call an extra
session, so that they can all tome down and get everything they want embraced
in the subject of the call.
Mr. SKINNER. Mr. Chairman: The gentleman may have been nearer the
throne than myself. I never knew the session was to be called till it was all
fixed up.
Mr. TINCHER. Then, Mr. Chairman, all I have to say is, that the gentleman
should get nearer the throne. [Laughter.]
I saw it announced that there was to be an extra session called a year or two
ago. A correspondent got the news weeks ahead; and I think these corres-
pondents, sir, are a valuable part of this government, for they will give notice
of such things. I came down to see the Governor, sir, and got some little railroad
matters I was interested in included in the- call." (Debates 775-76.)
It is also appropriate to give some thought to the change proposed in
1922. It is obvious that the change was designed to eliminate the arti-
ficial device of issuing additional proclamations. It is not so obvious
that the proposed language would have prevented the Governor from
issuing a new proclamation once he had exhausted his one additional
message privilege. In any event, the proposed language demonstrates
two interrelated unsatisfactory practices of constitutional conventions.
One is to look at a problem narrowly instead of broadly. The other is
to provide a precise and limited solution to a problem created by a
precise and limited provision. It would seem more appropriate to con-
sider the basic policy question of whether the Governor is or is not to
control the agenda. If the decision is to give the Governor control, then
the drafter should use language that creates no other problem. For
example, "The Governor may, on extraordinary occasions, convene the
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General Assembly; but the General Assembly shall enter upon no busi-
ness except such as the Governor recommends for consideration." Two
further thoughts are in order. In a convention debate, it is likely that
some one will observe that under the ioregoing "loose" language, a
governor could keep the legislature in session indefinitely. So he could.
Kut this is an example ol the "parade oi horribles" debating technique
and should be coimtered with the argument that a constittition is a
document for all men for all seasons, and that an attempt to limit pos-
sible but unlikely abuse will inevitably restrict probable and proper
action. Finally, it must be conceded that the j^olitical process — and a
constitutional convention is a proper part of the political process — is
oiled by compromise. On occasion only by compromise can a consensus
be reached. Sometimes, this produces a bad constitutional provision.
The most that one can ask for is that all concerned strive to keep their
eye on the fundamental issue and compromise on that level, rather than
to get entangled in details and compromise on that level.
Adjournment of Houses in Case of Disagreement
Sec. 9. In case of a disagreement between the houses with respect to the time
of adjournment, the Governor may, on the same being certified to him by the
house first moving the adjournment, adjourn the General Assembly to such time
as he thinks proper, not beyond the first day of the next regular session.
History
In the 1818 and 1848 Constitutions the substance of Section 9 was the
same except for the certification requirement. It appears that, during the
regular session in 1863, a disagreement on adjournment arose between
the two houses and before the disagreement could be worked out, the
Governor exercised his power to declare the legislatine adjourned.
Apparently this was not what the legislature, or at least one of the
political parties, wanted and litigation ensued. The Supreme Court
found that the legislature acquiesced in the action of the Governor and
avoided a decision on the correctness of the Governor's action. (People
ex rel. Harless v. Hatch, 33 111. 9 (1863).) The certification language
was added to meet the defect. (See Explanation below.) In the proposed
1922 Constitution, the section was moved to the Legislative Article and
changed to permit the Governor to act upon a certificate from either
house rather than only from the house first moving the adjournment.
(Such a change was suggested during the debates in the 1870 Convention,
but no one so moved. Debates 778.)
Explanation
In reporting to the 1870 Convention, the Chairman of the Committee
on the Executive Department explained that "disagreement" is an
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accepted term of parliamentary usage with a precise technical meaning,
to wit: after a motion by one house to adjourn to a set time and an
amendment by the other house, if (1) the first house non-concurs,
(2) the amending house insists, (3) the first house insists, (4) the amend-
ing house adheres, and (5) the first house adheres, then there is dis-
agreement. (Debates 748.) During debate it was noted that, in the
Htigation that followed the 1863 mix-up, the Court did not use the
parliamentary meaning of "disagreement." (Debates 778.) Presumably,
it was for this reason that the drafters introduced the certification con-
cept, thereby permitting the legislature to follow technical steps to "dis-
agreement" before the Governor could act.
In 1911, the Governor recjuested an opinion from the Attorney General
on what he should do with a certificate of disagreement. It appeared
that the Senate on October 26 moved to adjourn sijie die on November
9. The House did nothing until November 9, when it moved to adjourn
to November 14. Upon receipt of the House proposal, the Senate voted
not to concur and instructed its officers to prepare a certificate of
disagreement. The Attorney General assured the Governor that he had
the power to adjourn the legislature, that his action would not be
reviewable in the courts, but declined to say whether the Governor
should act. (1912 111. Att'y Gen. Rep. 73.) The Attorney General
quoted from the 1870 Convention debates, including the five technical
parliamentary steps, and then observed: "I have referred to, and quoted,
the debates in the constitutional convention, not for the purpose of
indicating the construction which should be adopted, but solely for the
purpose of affording information which may be of assistance to your
Excellency in reaching a conclusion as to whether or not, as a matter of
fact, there is a disagreement within the meaning of the constitution."
{Id. at 79.) In the same opinion he told the Governor that if he set
the day before the next regular session as the adjournment day he could
still call a special session if need be.
In 1963, the Governor adjourned the legislature following receipt of a
certificate of disagreement. On June 28 the House adopted a joint
resolution to adjourn that day sine die and a resolution stating that
it was ready to adjourn and asking the Senate if it had anything more
for the House to consider. The House heard nothing from the Senate.
A second joint resolution was adopted proposing to adjourn sine die
no later than 9:00 P.M. This was delivered to the Senate at 8:56 P.M.,
but the Secretary of the Senate refused to accept it. The House then
adopted a resolution at 9:30 P.M. reciting a disagreement and directing
the Speaker so to certify to the Governor. At 10:45 P.M. the Speaker
read to the House a proclamation from the Governor adjourning the
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legislature. The House adjourned .sine die. The Senate recessed and
reconvened the next day and pinported to conduct business.
In People ex rel. Myers v. Lewis (32 111. 2d 506 (1965)), the Supreme
Court confirmed the effectiveness of the Governor's proclamation of
adjournment. No reference was made to the technical meaning of "dis-
agreement,
"
and from the natine of the Court's discussion it would
not appear that the issue was even raised. Apj^arently, the principal
argument against effectiveness was that the Senate Journal did not
recite receipt of the Governor's proclamation on June 28 and that
therefore the proclamation ^vas not eftecti\e. The Coiut gave the argu-
ment short shrift.
Comparative Analysis
Twenty-two states besides Illinois authorize the governor to adjourn
the legislature in case of disagreement. Five states besides Illinois re-
quire a certificate of disagreement, but only Oklahoma calls for a certifi-
cate from the house first moving adjournment. In Colorado, it is the
house last moving adjournment; in Alaska and Rhode Island, either
house; and in Arkansas, both houses. In most of the 22 states the gover-
nor is limited only by the requirement to adjourn not beyond the next
regular session, but in a few states there are specific limitations such as
not exceeding four months. The President of the United States, in the
case of a disagreement, may adjourn Congress "to such time as he shall
think proper." There is no comparable provision in the Model State
Constitution.
Comment
Although it is obvious that a gubernatorial power to adjovnn the
legislature is not absolutely essential, it is not inappropriate to provide
for the rare contingency of disagreement. It seems appropriate also to
provide for a certificate of disagreement. The proposal in the 1922 Con-
stitution that either house could make the certification seems preferable
to the present language which gives one house a tactical advantage over
the other.
Appointments
Sec. 10. The Governor shall nominate and, by and with the advice and con-
sent of the Senate, (a majority of all the Senators elected concurring, by yeas
and nays), appoint all officers whose offices are established by this constitution,
or which may be created by law, and whose appointment or election is not other-
wise provided for; and no such officer shall be appointed or elected by the
General Assembly.
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History
The 1818 Constitution contained a comparable provision, differing
only in the absence of a specified majority vote for confirmation and
in the absence of the prohibition on appointment of officers by the
General Assembly. In fact, the 1818 Constitution provided for the ap-
pointment by the General Assembly of a treasurer and public printers
and authorized the legislature to appoint an auditor, attorney general
and "such other officers for the state as may be necessary." The 1848
Constitution added, in substance, the majority of elected senators re-
quirement and the appointment prohibition. In the 1870 Convention,
the only debate over the section concerned the breadth of the concluding
prohibition. As noted in the History of Section 24 {jnpa, p. 322), that
definitional section was drafted in lieu of amending Section 10. The
proposed 1922 Constitution put the substance of the concluding pro-
hibition into the article on the legislature and combined the substance
of the balance of the section with Section II. (See infra, p. 283.)
Explanation
This rather convoluted section really has only two constitutionally
operative provisions: (1) the legislature may not appoint any officers;
and (2) consent of the Senate, when called for, must be by yeas and nays
and a majority of those elected must concur. (Even (1) is not strictly
true, for Sec. 9 of Art. IV {supra, p. 145) allows each house to choose its
own
officers.) Beyond this, the section does not settle any matters of
gubernatorial power of appointment. First, there are no offices "estab-
Hshed by this constitution" except ones whose election is "otherwise
provided for." Even if "established" is stretched to include filling the
vacancies under Section 20 (infra, p. 313), "appointment" is otherwise
provided for, since Section 20 says the Governor shall fill the vacancy.
Thus, Section 10 is operative only as statutes are passed which establish
offices and which provide for nomination by the Governor and appoint-
ment by and with the consent of the Senate. But by the very language
of Section 10, it is clear that offices may also be created by statutes which
provide for appointment by the Governor without Senate confirmation,
or which provide for appointment by someone else. (See, e.g., People v.
Chicago Transit Authority, 392 111. 77 (1945); People v. Evans, 247 111.
547 (1910).) It should also be noted that "officers" in this section refers
only to state officers and not local officers. (See Ramsay v. Van Meter,
300 111. 193 (1921); People v. Evans, 247 111. 547 (1910).)
Comparative Analysis
As an easy generalization, it can be said that the usual rule among
the states is the same as in Illinois — appointments are made by the
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governor by and with the advice and consent of the senate. But there are
so many quahfications to the generalization that it is relatively meaning-
less. To begin with, many states have much the same provision as in
Section 10 to the effect that the section is operative only to the extent not
otherwise provided for by constitution or law. In a great many states there
are constitutional officers, from adjutant general to wildlife and fish-
eries commissioners, whose appointments are covered by specific reference
in the constitution. In most of these cases the governor makes the ap-
pointment, sometimes with confirmation required, sometimes without.
In a couple of states the chief administrative officer of an operation is
chosen by the policy-making board or commission, and in one of those
states. New Jersey, the power of approval may be given to the governor.
In one state, Connecticut, there is no constitutional provision of any
kind concerning appointments. Moreover, the important point is the
extent to which the governor has the power to appoint the chief ad-
ministrative officers in the executive department, and this need not be
a constitutional matter. Apart from elective offices, which are discussed
elsewhere {Comparative Analysis of Sec. 1, supra, p. 257), there are a
great many variations among the states.. Some states follow Illinois' prac-
tice of requiring senate confirmation of most department heads. Some
states, notably neighboring Indiana and Iowa, do not require legislative
confirmation of the governor's appointments. Most states have one or
more departments headed by a board or commission that in turn appoints
an administrative head, subject, in some cases, to gubernatorial approval.
In the new Michigan Constitution there is a unique provision on senate
confirmation, as follows:
"Appointment by and with the advice and consent of tfie senate wfien used in
this constitution or laws in effect or hereafter enacted means appointment sub-
ject to disapproval by a majority vote of the members elected to and serving
in the senate if such action is taken within 60 session days after the date of such
appointment. Any appointment not disapproved within such period shall stand
confirmed." (art. V, § 6.)
The Model State Constitution provides:
"The governor shall appoint and may remove the heads of all administrative
departments. All other officers in the administrative service of the state
shall be
appointed and may be removed as provided by law." (art. V, § 5.07.)
The second sentence of the model provision is based on the assumption
that most such officers will be under the civil service system that the
Model State Constitution mandates.
The United States Constitution provision on presidential appoint-
ments is, of course, the model for the many states that call for legis-
lative confirmation. The second clause of Section 2 of Article II reads
in part:
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"[A]nd he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges
of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Ap-
pointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established
by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior
Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or
in the Heads of Departments."
Comment
Once in a while — one is tempted to say once in a lifetime — a really
new idea enters the world of constitution-drafting. The Michigan pro-
vision on advice and consent quoted above is an ingenious new idea. It is
analogous to the device of permitting the President (or Governor) to
reorganize executive departments subject to veto by the legislature within
a specified period of time. Whatever its origin, the Michigan provision
is an interesting solution to one of the criticisms of senatorial confirma-
tions. The stated purpose of advice and consent is to make sure that
incompetent people are not appointed. This purpose is met by the Mich-
igan provision. The potential evil in the traditional provision is that
the necessity for affirmative action may compel the executive to make
trades in order to obtain confirmation. Moreover, the power of appoint-
ment can almost be nullified by a tradition of senatorial courtesy such
as is followed in the United States Senate, whereby a nomination is
killed by a Senator's statement that a nominee from the Senator's state
is personally obnoxious to him. The Michigan provision does not wholly
preclude any such misuse of the confirmation process, but it certainly
makes misuse more difficult.
Vacancies— Temporary Appointments
Sec. 11. In case of a vacancy, during the recess of the Senate, in any office
which is not elective, the Governor shall make a temporary appointment until
the next meeting of the Senate, when he shall nominate some person to fill such
office; and any person so nominated, who is confirmed by the Senate (a majority
of all the Senators elected concurring by yeas and nays), shall hold his office
during the remainder of the term, and until his successor shall be appointed and
qualified. No person, after being rejected by the Senate, shall be again nominated
for the same office at the same session, unless at the request of the Senate, or be
appointed to the same office during the recess of the General Assembly.
History
The 1818 Constitution had a simple provision permitting the Governor
to fill appointive vacancies occurring during a recess of the General
Assembly, such recess appointment to expire at the end of the next
session. This included those offices for which the power of appointment
was vested in the legislature. The 1848 Constitution provided, in the
Judiciary Article for some strange reason, that all vacancies of elective
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(except the Secretary of State) and appointive offices should be filled as
provided by law. The Governor was empowered to fill a vacancy in
the office of Secretary of State without the advice and consent of the
Senate.
In the 1870 Convention, the Chairman of the Committee on the
Executive Department stated that the first sentence, offered as a separate
section, was "as in the present Constitution." (Debates 748.) This is
curious, for, as noted above, the 1848 Constitution left the method of
filling vacancies to be prescribed by law. He noted that the second
sentence, also offered as a separate section, was new. (Id.) The two sections
were adopted by the Convention without change and subsequently com-
bined into one section by the Committee on Revision and Adjustment.
The proposed 1922 Constitution combined the first part of Section 10
(supra, p. 280) with Section II. In the course of revision by the Com-
mittee on Phraseology and Style, the words "in any office which is not
elective," were changed to "where the appointing power is vested in the
governor subject to the consent of the senate." In all other respects the
substance remained unchanged.
Explanation
The change in the proposed 1922 Constitution, referred to above,
made explicit what is only implicit in Section 1 1; namely, that the section
is operative only in the case of a vacancy in an office which is filled by
an appointment subject to confirmation by the Senate. So limited, the
section is substantially self-explanatory. It is, in short, simply a means
of preventing the Governor from getting around the requirement for
confirmation of his appointees. The only questions that appear to have
arisen are (1) What about an office that has never been filled? (2) What
about an office with a term that expires during a recess but with the
usual provision that the incumbent holds over until his successor is ap-
pointed and qualified? and (3) What about the failure of the Senate
to act as opposed to rejection? As to (2), the Attorney General has said
there is no vacancy (1910 111. Att'y Gen. Rep. 172): and as to (3), he has
said that Section 1 1 permits a reappointment after adjournment of the
Senate. (1925 111. Att'y Gen. Rep. 331.) As to (1), a case under the 1818
Constitution held that a position could not be filled initially during a
recess of the Senate. (People ex rel. Ewing v. Forquer, 1 111. 104 (1825).)
It has been pointed out, however, that the 1818 wording was sufficiently
different from Section 11 to raise doubts that the Forquer case would be
followed today. (Annotations 138.) It was also pointed out that the legis-
lature customarily provides in the appropriate case that if the Senate
is not in session when an act takes effect, the Governor is to make a
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temporary appointment as in the case ot a vacancy. (Id. See, e.g., 111. Rev.
Stat. ch. 144, § 182 (1967).)
Comparative Analysis
Approximately ten states appear to have no constitutional provision
for the filling of vacancies in appointive positions. Of the remaining
states, approximately 17 have provisions generally comparable to Sec-
tion 1 1 in that they are designed in one way or another to back up the
requirement for legislative confirmation of appointees. The rest of the
states require that vacancies not otherwise provided for in the consti-
tution shall be filled by the governor, shall be filled as provided by law,
or shall be filled by the governor unless otherwise provided by law.
The United States Constitution provides that the President "shall
have power to fill up all vacancies that may happen during the recess
of the senate, by granting commissions which shall expire at the end of
their next session." Since the Model State Constitution gives the governor
unrestricted power to appoint and remove officers, he obviously has the
power to fill vacancies. (The applicable section is quoted in the Com-
parative Analysis of Sec. 10, supra, p. 281.)
Comment
It is worth emphasizing that Section 1 1 precludes reappointment of
a nominee only if the Senate rejects him. Compare this with the Michigan
advice and consent definition discussed in the Comment on Section 10.
{Supra, p. 283.)
There is no question but that Sections 10 and 11 could be greatly
shortened and combined somewhat along the lines of the proposed 1922
Constitution.
Removal from Office by Governor
Sec. 12. The Governor shall have power to remove any officer whom he may
appoint, in case of incompetency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office; and
he may declare his office vacant, and fill the same as is herein provided in other
cases of vacancy.
History
In the course of presenting Article V to the 1870 Convention, the
Chairman of the Committee on the Executive Department said, with
reference to this section:
'The [twelfth] section is a new section, and gives power to the Governor to
remove any officer he may appoint, in case of incompetency, neglect of duty,
or malfeasance of office.... Under the present Constitution the Governor may
appoint a person to an important office, and when appointed he has no power
whatever to remove him, though he may be incompetent. . . . The executive
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should liave some power as well as responsibility, and he should have power
enough, at least, to execute the laws; and if he is first to appoint men and be
held responsible for his appointments, and then, in case they should prove
failures, not have the power to remove then [sic], what a ridiculous spectacle
would be presented. This power of removal is for the benefit of the people and
for their security, and not for the glory of the executive." (Debates 748.)
The section was accepted without ciebate and without change. The
proposed 1922 Constitution preserved the substance of the first half of
the section but dropped the second half as unnecessary.
Explanation
Although the 1870 delegates may have considered the quoted reasons
adequate justification for Section 12, the pressing need for the section
was to "overrule" Field i'. People ex rel. McClernand. (3 111. 79 (1839).)
In that case, Chief Justice Wilson held that, under the 1818 Constitu-
tion, tlie Governor, with the advice and consent of the Senate, appointed
a Secretary of State but had no power to remove Iiim. Moreover, under
the ratlier novel constitutional theory enunciated by the Chief Justice
(see Explanation of Sec. 1, supra, pp. 254-5), it would be necessary to pro-
vide for the power of removal in the Constitution, at least for any consti-
tutional officers appointed by the Governor. The irony of the matter is
that Section 12 goes much furtlier than the Field theory required, for
under the section the Governor has the power to remove any officer
whom he appoints, including, naturally, statutory officers. (This means
that the removal power may be gieater than the President's power under
the United States Constitution. See Comment below.) Moreover, the
Supreme Court, in what may have been an act of expiation for the Field
case, construed Section 12 in just about as broad a manner as is possible.
In Wilcox V. People ex rel. Lipe (90 111. 186 (1878)), the Court held
that (1) Section 12 covered any officer appointed by the Governor and
not just those who were subject to senatorial confirmation; (2) that no
notice or hearing was required; and (3) that the Governor's discretion
was not reviewable in the courts. Although the power of removal under
Section 12 is limited to appointed officers, the legislature has some in-
herent power to provide by statute for the removal of elected officers.
Thus, the Supreme Court upheld a statute giving the Governor the power
to remove a sheriff who permitted a mob to take a prisoner from him.
(People ex re/.Davis v. Nellis, 249 111. 12 (1911).) Whether this inherent
power covers any state constitutional officers has apparently never been
raised.
Comparative Analysis
About a dozen states have provisions giving the governor power to
remove state officials, but, of course, there are many variations in both
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the stated reasons for removal and the offices covered under the power.
A somewhat larger number of states provide that removal from office
shall be as prescribed by law, but in almost half of those states such
legislative power is limited to officers not subject to impeachment.
(Without extended analysis of individual constitutions, it is not possible
to state whether such an impeachment exception is the means of dis-
tinguishing between elective and appointive offices, the means of covering
causes beyond those specified for impeachment, or something else.)
The United States Constitution has no provision, other than the im-
peachment section, for removal. In Myers v. United States (272 U.S.
52 (1926)), the United States Supreme Court held unconstitutional an
Act of Congress that required the consent of the Senate for the removal
of postmasters. The argument was that the doctrine of separation of
powers required leaving the President with a free hand in administering
the government. But in Humphrey's Executor v. United States (295
U.S. 602 (1935)), the Court held otherwise in the case of a member of
the Federal Trade Commission. The argument this time was that the
Commission was a quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial body and that
the members of such an
"independent" agency could be protected by
statute from arbitrary removal without cause. (See also Wiener v. United
States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958).)
The Model State Constitution gives the governor an unrestricted
power to remove heads of departments and empowers the legislature to
prescribe by law for the removal of other executive department officials.
(The applicable section is quoted in the Comparative Analysis of Sec.
10, supra, p. 282.)
Comment
As noted above, Section 12 is unusually broad. It would appear dif-
ficult, for example, for the Illinois courts to follow the Humphrey's
Executor case in the face of such broad language. Nevertheless, it may
be better to leave the section alone than to attempt to narrow it. Any
such attempt is likely to produce too much detail. Nor is it advisable
to use any "as prescribed by law" language to avoid detail, for that would
revive the Field doctrine and permit the "ridiculous spectacle" deplored
by the Committee Chairman in 1870.
It is clear that the 1922 drafters were justified in dropping the second
half of the sentence as unnecessary.
Pardons
Sec. 13. The Governor shall have power to grant reprieves, commutations and
pardons, after conviction, for all offenses, subject to such regulations as may be
provided in law relative to the manner of applying therefor.
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History
The 1818 Constitution contained a simple statement of power to
"grant reprieves and pardons after conviction, except in cases of im-
peachment." The 1848 Constitution went to the opposite extreme with
a complex provision that included special rules for conviction for treason,
a prohibition on pardons for convictions on impeachment, power to
condition pardons, an authorization to the legislature to regulate the
manner of applying for pardons, and a requirement for a detailed bien-
nial report to the legislature on every reprieve, pardon or commutation
granted.
In the 1870 Convention, the section as proposed was substantially as it
now appears, but without the concluding words "relative to the manner
of applying therefor." An extensive debate ensued between those who
felt that, notwithstanding the restrictions added in 1848, the power of
pardon had continued to be abused, and those who feared that the pro-
posed language would permit the legislature to destroy the Governor's
traditional power. A compromise was reached by the addition of the
words quoted above w^hich thus limited the legislature's power of regu-
lation to only one of the alleged areas of abuse — failure to notify in-
terested parties, such as judge and prosecutor, that an application for
a pardon was under consideration.
The proposed 1922 Constitution made one substantive change in the
section. It was provided that the Governor's grant could be "on such
terms as he thinks proper." This was designed to permit the grant of
conditional pardons.
Explanation
It is perhaps appropriate to begin by defining terms that are used in
this section.. A
"reprieve" is a suspension of the sentence that has been
imposed. The popular understanding of the word is in connection with
a death sentence where the Governor or a court grants a reprieve pending
further consideration of some claim of error. But a reprieve can be any
suspension of execution of any sentence. A "commutation" is a shortening
or lessening of a sentence. A "pardon" is, in effect, a complete exoneration
of the convicted person. A "conditional pardon," proposed in effect in
1922, is the equivalent of a release on parole.
The courts have consistently supported the gubernatorial power which
the 1870 delegates preserved from legislative regulation. For example,
the legislature is specifically given the power to regulate the manner
of applying for a pardon, but the courts have refused to set aside a
pardon where the Governor acted without having before him the written
statements of the judge and prosecutor called for by statute. (People
ex rel. Smith v. Jenkins, 325 111. 372 (1927).) Moreover, the courts have
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denied to themselves any general power ot reprieve (People e\ rel. Smith
V. Allen, 155 111. 61 (1895)), and have denied to the legislature any power
to authorize the courts to commute sentences. (People ex rel. Brundage
V. La Buy, 285 111. 141 (1918).)
There are, however, definite limits on the Governor's power. For one
thing, he cannot pardon someone sentenced for civil contempt ot court.
(People ex rel. Brundage v. Peters, 305 111. 223 (1922). For present pur-
poses, it is sufficient to note that a civil contempt order is in furtherance
of effective judicial power; criminal contempt is punishment for dis-
respect of the court, or interference with the judicial process. A pardon
would be appropriate in a case of criminal contempt.) For another, the
Governor has to go all the way; he cannot "commute" a conviction for
murder to a conviction for manslaughter so that a "lifer" would become
eligible for parole. (People ex rel. Fullenwider v. Jenkins, 322 111 33
(1926).) The change in the proposed 1922 Constitution would not have
permitted such a "commutation" but would have authorized a conditional
pardon which is what the Governor presumably was trying to do in the
Fullenwider case.
It is important to note that, absent a proviso authorizing conditional
pardons, there is a clear distinction between commutation and pardon
on the one hand and parole on the other. The former is, under Section
13, wholly and exclusively in the hands of the Governor, and the latter
is wholly and exclusively subject to legislative control. A parole board
may be empowered pursuant to legislative direction to act in the case
of parole but empowered only to advise and recommend in the case of
commutations and pardons. {See generally People ex rel. Abner v. Kin-
ney, 30 111. 2d 201 (1964).)
Comparative Analysis
Almost all states give the governor power to grant pardons. A majority
of the states deny the power to grant pardons in cases of treason and
impeachment. Approximately a third of the states leave the governor's
power relatively unrestricted, another third permit legislative regulation
in general, and about a third require the governor to share his power
with a parole board. In the case of commutations, approximately a third
of the states have a grant of power comparable to Section 13, about a
quarter of the states do not grant any power of commutation to the
governor, and in the rest of the states the power is either shared or
subject to statutory regulation. As for reprieves, about half the states
leave the governor relatively unrestricted, in most of the rest the power
is shared or subject to statutory regulation, and in a few no power is
granted to the governor. In all but a handful of states, whatever the
grant of power, it is a grant "after conviction."
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The United States Constitution gives the President power to grant
reprieves and pardons except in the c^se ol impeachment. The Model
State Constitution states that the
"governor shall have power to grant
reprieves, commutations and pardons, alter conviction, for all offenses
and may delegate such powers, subject to such procedures as may be
prescribed by law." (art. 5, § 5.05. See Comment below concerning an
ambiguity in the foregoing.)
Comment
It would appear appropriate to consider whether to go back to the
original language proposed in 1870 and thus permit the legislature to
regulate the entire pardoning process. There are cogent arguments on
both sides of the issue and the choice is a relatively balanced one. But
if the decision is in favor of retention of the Governor's power, it would
seem desirable to give him the power to grant conditional pardons as
was proposed in 1922.
One of the easiest drafting ambiguities to create is that of a modifying
clause that is so placed that it is unclear whether it is designed to modify
only the last of a series of statements. The pardon provision of the
Model State Constitution quoted above has just such an ambiguous
modifying clause. The question there is: Does the legislature have power
to prescribe procedures only in the case of delegation or can the legisla-
ture also prescribe procedures for the exercise of the power to grant
reprieves, commutations and pardons? The natural reading of the
sentence leads one to believe that the clause refers only to delegation
and, indeed, the Commentary to the Model makes this clear. (Model
State Constitution 70.) But the point is that either of two minor changes
in the wording would erase the ambiguity completely. One change is to
make a separate sentence on the power to delegate. The other is to move
the clause from the end of the sentence and place it between "and" and
"may." The alternatives would read thus:
"The governor shall have power to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons,
after conviction, for all offenses. He may delegate such powers, subject to such
procedures as may be prescribed by law."
"The governor shall have power to grant reprieves, commutations and par-
dons, after conviction, for all offenses and, subject to such procedures as may
be prescribed by law, he may delegate such powers."
Governor— Commander-in-Chief of Militia
Sec. 14. The Governor shall be commander-in-chief of the military and naval
forces of the State (except when they shall be called into the service of the United
States); and may call out the same to execute the laws, suppress insurrection,
and repel invasion.
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History
The first half ot Section 14 appeared in substance in both the 1818
and 1848 Constitutions. The second half was added in 1870. The Chair-
man of the Committee on the Executive Department reported to the
1870 Convention that Section 14 "is the same as in the (1848] Constitu-
tion . . . ." (Debates 748.) At no time during the deliberations was any
explanation offered for the added words. The proposed 1922 Constitu-
tion changed "military and naval forces" to "armed forces" and revised
the last half to read: "and may call them out to execute the law, protect
life or property, suppress insurrection or repel invasion."
Explanation
This traditional statement is in support of the fundamental subordina-
tion of military power to civilian power. (See Art. II, Sec. 15, supra,
p. 76.) The only reported case construing this section observed that
military activities are under the control of the state and cannot be dele-
gated to city or other local authorities. (City of Chicago v. Chicago
League Ball Club, 196 111. 54 (1902).)
In 1906, the Attorney General ruled that the Governor's power to
call out the militia "to execute the laws" did not include the power to
do so just because local officials were failing to enforce the Sunday Clos-
ing and Dram Shop Laws. The Attorney General suggested that citizens
who were concerned about saloons that were open on Sunday could
file complaints themselves. (1906 111. Att'y Gen. Rep. 54.) In 1915,
the Attorney General ruled that the Governor could not use the militia
to aid a judge who was unable to get his orders carried out by the sheriff
in another county. (1915 111. Att'y Gen. Rep. 78.) Both of these instances,
it can be seen by reading between the lines, were simply efforts to drama-
tize a situation by calling on the Governor to call out the militia. In
both instances, the Attorney General politely refused to distort the mean-
ing of "execute the laws."
The official explanation of the proposed 1922 Constitution stated that
Section 14 was revised because "the power of the governor to call out the
militia to protect life or property at times of great public disaster, dan-
ger or catastrophe was questioned." (P.N.C. 37.)
Comparative Analysis
Every state except Connecticut makes the governor the commander-in-
chief of the state's military forces. In Connecticut the governor is the
Captain-general of the militia. The title used for the military forces
varies from state to state. The two new states of Alaska and Hawaii use
the contemporary term "armed forces." The 1964 Michigan Constitution
adopted the same term. Thirty states join Illinois in acknowledging
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that the governor's supreme command is not apjjlicable wlien the armed
forces are under United States control. I liree states are careful to warn
the governor not to take personal command of his forces without legis-
lative consent.
Approximately 20 states use substantially the same language as Illinois
in setting forth the exigencies for calling out the armed forces — execute
laws, suppress insurrection, repel invasion. A couple of states add "sup-
press riots," a couple add "preserve public peace," and Oklahoma adds
"protect public health." The United States Constitution states that the
President shall be "Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the
United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into
the actual Service of the United States . . . ." The Constitution also
grants power to Congress to "provide for calling forth the Militia to
execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Inva-
sions . . . ." The Model State Constitution makes the governor "comman-
der-in-chief of the armed forces of the states," and authorizes him to call
them out "to execute the laws, to preserve order, to suppress insurrection
or to repel invasion."
Comment
It would seem appropriate to change the term to "armed forces" if
this section is to be revised. It would also be appropriate as a matter of
accurate grammar and felicitous phrasing to change the authority to
read "and may call them out to execute the laws, to suppress insurrection,
or to repel invasion." It would seem that the caution expressed in 1922
was undue and that the power to call out the armed forces to execute
the laws is adequate to cover preservation of peace, suppression of riots,
protection of public health and to "protect life or property."
Impeachment of Officers
Sec. 15. The Governor, and all civil officers of this State, shall be liable to
impeachment for any misdemeanor in office.
History
See History of Section 24 of Article IV. (Supra, p. 228.)
Explanation
The purpose of this section is to designate what class of people is sub-
ject to impeachment. In the case of Donahue i'. County of Will (100
111. 94, (1881)), the Supreme Court held that the constitutional county
officers provided for by Section 8 of Article X are not "civil officers of
this State" and are, therefore, not subject to impeachment. This did not,
however, result in an inability to provide for removal of county officers.
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In People ex rel. Davis v. Nellis (249 111. 12 (1911)), the Supreme Court
upheld a statute authorizing the Governor to remove a sheriff who was
derelict in prescribed duties. It is fair, therefore, to assume that the
legislature has the power to provide for the removal of any elected offi-
cials whom it cannot remove via the impeachment process.
Comparative Analysis
Almost every state has a different formulation of coverage for impeach-
ment purposes. Only Mississippi has an exact duplicate of Illinois' cov-
erage. Delaware covers the governor and civil officers under the state.
Only a few states appear to include constitutional local officials, but in a
small number of states the coverage is subject to increase by law. The
United States Constitution covers the "President, Vice-President and all
civil Officers of the United States." The Model State Constitution covers
the
"governor, the heads of principal departments, judicial officers and
such other officers of the state as may be made subject to impeachment by
law." (The Model State Constitution provides for no constitutional elec-
tive offices other than the governor and members of the legislature.)
Comment
This section requires no change.
Approval or Veto of Bills
Sec. 16. Every bill passed by the General Assembly shall, before it becomes
a law, be presented to the Governor. If he approve, he shall sign it, and there-
upon it shall become a law; but if he do not approve, he shall return it with his
objections, to the House in which it shall have originated, which house shall
enter the objections at large upon its journal and proceed to reconsider the bill.
If then two-thirds of the members elected agree to pass the same, it shall be
sent, together with the objections, to the other house, by which it shall likewise
be reconsidered; and if approved by two-thirds of the members elected to that
house, it shall become a law notwithstanding the objections of the Governor;
but in all such cases the vote of each house shall be determined by yeas and
nays to be entered upon the journal.
Bills making appropriations of money out of the Treasury shall specify the
objects and purposes for which the same are made, and appropriate to them
respectively their several amounts in distinct items and sections, and if the
Governor shall not approve any one or more of the items or sections contained
in any bill, but shall approve the residue thereof, it shall become a law as to
the residue in like manner as if he had signed it. The Governor shall then
return the bill, with his objections to the items or sections of the same not ap-
proved by him, to the house in which the bill shall have originated, which house
shall enter the objections at large upon its journal, and proceed to reconsider
so much of said bill as is not approved by the Governor. The same proceedings
shall be had in both houses in reconsidering the same as is hereinbefore provided
in case of an entire bill returned by the Governor with his objections; and if
any item or section of said bill not approved by the Governor shall be passed
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by two-thirds of the members elected to each of the two houses of the General
Assembly, it shall become part of said law notwithstanding the objections of
the Governor. Any bill which shall not be returned by the Governor within ten
days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him shall become
a law in like manner as if he had signed it, unless the General Assembly shall,
by their adjournment prevent its return, in which case it shall be filed with his
objections, in the office of the Secretary of State, within ten days after such
adjournment, or become a law.
History
The 1818 Constitution created a Council of Revision, consisting of
the Governor and the justices of the Supreme Court of which there were
four during the Hfe of that Constitution. A majority of the Council
could reject a bill. A majority of all the elected members of each house
could override the "veto." There was the customary ten-day provision,
but with an unusual twist. In the case of adjournment within ten days,
the "bill shall be returned on the first day of the meeting of the General
Assembly, after the expiration of the said 10 days, or be a law." The
1848 Constitution dropped the Council of Revision and vested the veto
power in the Governor alone. No other changes were made except to
provide that Sunday was not to be counted as one of the ten days, and
to require a recorded yea and nay vote in each house.
In the 1870 Convention, the veto section proposed by the Committee
on the Executive Department purported to differ in substance from the
1848 section only in changing the required vote to override to two-thirds.
Both in Committee of the Whole and in the Convention proper, an
effort was made to go back to the majority vote requirement, but in each
case the effort was defeated by a wide margin. The item veto portion of
the section was added by amendment in 1884. The proposed 1922 Con-
stitution made one substantive change. The period within which the
Governor had to act after adjournment intervened was extended to 30
days. The section was moved to the Legislative Article and the portion
dealing with the form of appropriation bills was made into a separate
section. (See Comment below concerning this change.)
Explanation
General Veto: A routine procedural provision in the nature of rules
of the game ought to be clear enough that no judicial gloss is required.
This is certainly the case with so important a matter as the Governor's
power to veto. Unfortunately, the drafters in 1870 created ambiguities,
one of which showed up almost immediately and the second of w^hich
showed up many decades later as the result of an informal practice de-
signed to cope with the mass of bills passed on the last days of a session.
The 27th General Assembly, the first to meet under the 1870 Consti-
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tution, adjourned on April 17, 1871, under an adjournment resolution
calling for reconvening on November 15, 1871. Prior to that date, the
Governor called a special session which convened on May 24, 1871. The
Governor's call included a number of items, the last of which was:
"Thirteenth — The reconsideration of bills passed by both branches of the
General Assembly and laid before the Governor, and by him filed in the office
of the Secretary of State, with his reasons for withholding his signature there-
from." (1871 111. H.R. Jour. 3 (1st Spec. Sess.).)
In his message to the Special Session, Governor Palmer listed the five
bills which he had vetoed after adjournment and then said:
"And these several bills were, within ten days after the adjournment of the
session, filed by me in the office of the Secretary of State, with my objections.
"From the peculiar language of the last clause of the 1 6th section of the 5th
Article of the Constitution, it is somewhat difficult to determine what is the actual
status of the above mentioned bills. If they had been returned by the Governor,
with his objections, to the Houses respectively in which they originated, the
General Assembly being in session, then the course of procedure would have
been plain; for, in that case, it is provided by the Constitution that the House
in which the bill originated, shall proceed to reconsider the bill, and if two-thirds
of the members elected agree to pass the same, it shall be sent, together with the
objections, to the other House, by which it shall be likewise reconsidered; and if
approved by two-thirds of the members elected to that House, it shall become
a law, notwithstanding the objections of the Governor.
"The foregoing provision is substantially like that upon the same subject in
the Constitution of 1847, but instead of being followed, as in the Constitution
of 1847, by the further language that, 'If any bill shall not be returned by the
Governor within ten days (Sundays excepted) after it shall be presented to him,
the same shall be a law in like manner as if he had signed it, unless the General
Assembly shall, by their adjournment, prevent its return; in which case the said
bill shall be returned on the first day of the meeting of the General Assembly
after the expiration of the said ten days, or be a law,' the last clause in the section
of the present Constitution is: Any bill which shall not be returned by the
Governor within ten days (Sundays excepted) after it has been presented to him,
shall become a law in like manner as if he had signed it, unless the General
Assembly shall, by their adjournment, prevent its return, in which case it shall
be filed, with his objections, in the office of the Secretary of State, within ten days
after such adjournment, or become a law.'
"The last quoted clause is unlike anything I have been able to find in the
Constitution of any of the States, so that I know of no precedents that can be
consulted to aid in its proper construction.
"The last clause of the 14th section of the 5th article of the Constitution of
the State of Indiana, from which this provision of our Constitution was probably
borrowed, is more complete; for, after providing for the filing of bills disapproved
by the Governor, with his objections, in the office of the Secretary of State,
within five days after the adjournment, it contains the additional requirement
that the Secretary of State shall 'lay the bill and the objections of the Governor
before the General Assembly at its next session, in like manner as if it had been
returned by the Governor.'
"Whether the last clause of the 16th section of the 5th article of the Consti-
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tition is to be construed as if the words last quoted from the Constitution of
Indiana were actually employed, or whether the Executive disapproval is to have
the effect to defeat bills that have passed both Houses, as is the consequence in
like cases under the Constitutions of most of the New England States, and New
York, New Jersey and other States, is so uncertain, that I have thought it proper
to call the special attention of the General Assembly to the matter, as one de-
serving most serious consideration." {Id. at 20-21.)
The matter was referred to committee in both houses, but nothing
appears to have been reported back. Tliere was a second special session
convened on October 13, 1871, but it was devoted to consideration of
problems caused by the Chicago fire of October 8th and 9th. At the
Adjourned Regular Session in November, 1871, the Secretary of State
wrote to the Speaker of the House in response to a request for two of
the five vetoed bills and accompanying messages. The Secretary inter-
preted the statutes imder which he operated to require him to retain
the originals, but lie attached certified copies to his letter. Again, noth-
ing appears to have happened. No vote was taken on overriding any
of the vetoes.
As noted in connection with Section 9 of Article IV (supra, p. 145),
there were two other adjourned regular sessions after 1871 and before
the 75th General Assembly's series of adjourned sessions in 1967, 1968,
and a final session on January 8, 1969. The 27th General Assembly, the
second under the 1870 Constitution, and the 45th General Assembly in
1907-1908, both had adjourned regular sessions, but in neither case were
any post-adjournment vetoes considered.
Two important procedtiral decisions, one by the General Assembly,
and one by the Governor, were made in connection with the 75th's
adjourned regular sessions. At all times during the life of the 75th
General Assembly, the offices of the Clerks of the House and the Senate
remained open for business, a practice that obviously is not appropriate
after adjournment sine die. Presumably because of this, the Governor
addressed his veto message to the members of the appropriate house of
origin and dispatched the messages to the proper Clerk. Thus, for exam-
ple, the House |ournal entry following the veto message of August 20,
1968, concerning House Bill 2633, reads:
"The foregoing message from the Governor, transmitting veto to House Bill
No. 2633, having been received in the office of the Clerk of the House on
Tuesday, August 20, 1968, at 10:46 a.m., was read by the Clerk and ordered
placed on file." (Journal No. 106 for January 8, 1969 at 11.)
There were a number of veto messages so handled, but only the veto
of House Bill No. 2633 was overridden. So far no lawsuit has been in-
stituted contesting the validity of the legislative action in overriding
the veto.
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It is clear from the procedural decisions to keep open the Clerk's
offices and to transmit messages to the Clerk's office, that everyone con-
cerned has acted on the assumption that the key words in Section 16 are
"prevent its return," and that "prevent" is to be read in the sense of
physically preventing return because, so to speak, the door is locked.
It is worth noting that the overriding of the veto of House Bill No. 2633
was only the fourth such since 1870, and the first since 1936. The sys-
tem of minority representation in the House (see Sec. 7 of Art. IV, supra,
p. 136) increases somewhat the difficulty of mustering a two-thirds' vote
of the whole membership of the House of Representatives, but the more
significant reason for the absence of overriding has been that so many
bills are acted upon after the legislature adjourns sine die.
The message of Governor Palmer, quoted above, demonstrates that
from the beginning there was a problem of bills passed at the last
minute, but it was not until much later that the well-known "log jam"
developed at the end of the session. By virtue of the July 1 effective
date provision of Section 13 of Article IV (supra, pp. 160-1), there is a
drive to finish business by June 30, and a great many bills are passed in the
last few days of the session. In 1939, for example, 232 of the 474 bills
passed during the regular session were passed on the last day. At the
regular session in 1965, 429 bills were passed on the last day, and in the
last three days of the session, 1,259 of the 2,211 total were passed. In
1967, the first year in which a schedule was adopted in an effort to con-
trol the log jam, there were 421 bills passed on the last day and 832 in
the last three days out of a total of 2,603. In order to give the Governor
adequate time to consider these last-minute bills, an informal practice
has developed whereby bills are "'presented" to him in an orderly fashion
over a period of several weeks following adjournment.
Unfortunately, the drafters in 1870 created an ambiguity in Section
16 which, when combined with this informal practice, finally required
judicial resolution. (People ex rel. Petersen v. Hughes, 372 111. 602
(1939).) The ambiguity first arises because there are two ten-day periods
referred to — from presentation of a bill and from day of adjournment.
In passing, it may be noted that Sundays are specifically excepted in
computing the ten days after presentation, but not the ten days from
adjournment. The Supreme Court has excepted the day of rest from
the adjournment ten-day computation also. (People ex rel. Akin v. Rose,
167 111. 147 (1897).) The Attorney General has told the Governor that he
cannot approve or veto a bill on Sunday. (1917 111. Att'y Gen. Rep. 571.)
The initial problem of ambiguity arises when the legislature adjourns
less than ten days after presentation of a bill. In the Petersen case, the
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Supreme Court pointed out that lor many years Governors had cautiously
followed the practice of acting within ten days of presentation rather
than to assume that a new ten days began to run upon adjournment.
This is the course, familiar to every lawyer, of choosing the alternative
that cannot be wrong.
What gave rise to litigation, however, was the practice of presenting
bills to the Governor some time after adjournment. The two bills in
question in the Petersen case were passed on the 30th of June, the day
on which the legislature adjourned sine die. One bill was presented to
the Governor on July 17 and the other on July 11. Both bills, with
veto messages, were filed with the Secretary of State within ten days of
presentation, but not within ten days after adjournment. The Court
concluded that the Governor has ten days, Sundays excepted, from date
of presentation regardless of how long after adjournment this may be.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied upon and approved the
practice mentioned above whereby the Governor always acts within ten
days of presentation and does not permit adjournment to extend the
period. The long and short of it is that a consistent and eminently satis-
factory solution to a practical problem was found by the Court, but its
reading of the veto provision in both instances of ambiguity is ques-
tionable, both as to the "plain meaning" of the words and the "intent"
of the 1870 drafters. (One judge dissented without opinion.)
There are two minor rulings concerning the Governor's general veto
power that should be noted. If, after adjournment sine die, the Gover-
nor formally approves or vetoes a bill and deposits it in the Secretary's
office, he has lost all power over the bill even though his ten-day period
for consideration has not expired. (People ex rel. Partello v. McCullough,
210 111. 488 (1904).) But if he deposits a bill without having approved
or disapproved it, his power is not lost and he can recall it within his ten-
day grace period. (See People ex rel. Akin v. Rose, 167 111. 147 (1897).)
Item Veto: There have been several straightforward Supreme Court de-
cisions delineating the Governor's power to veto a line item in an
appropriation. The principal ruling was that he could not reduce an
item by, for example, striking "per annum," or saying "I approve in the
sum of $3,500 and veto all in excess of said sum of $3,500." (Fergus v.
Russel, 270 111. 304 (1915).) The Supreme Court has also held that a
line item for a large sum followed by subsidiary lines stating how much
of the sum is to be spent for each of several purposes permits the Gover-
nor to strike a subsidiary item even though, in a sense, this is reducing
rather than striking the principal item. (People ex rel. State Bd. of Agr.
V. Brady, 277 111. 124 (1917).) Finally, the Supreme Court has recognized
that the Governor has the power to strike line items of appropriations
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for constitutional officers. (People ex rel. Millner v. Russel, 311 111. 96
(1924).) Tlie thrust of this case is to underscore the point that the dis-
persion of executive power by the "long ballot" (see Section 1, supra,
p. 253) can be undercut by the Governor if he wants to veto items for
the operations of the offices of the elected constitutional offices.
Another line of decisions deals with the item veto portion of Section
16, but not all of them appear to be limited to the purpose of the pro-
vision. In Peabody v. Russel (302 111. Ill (1922)), the legislature at-
tempted to create a general contingency fund of $500,000 which the
Governor could allocate as he saw fit. The Supreme Court held that
this was unconstitutional because the item did not
"specify the objects
and purposes" of the appropriation and did not appropriate "amounts
in distinct items and sections." In dissent, Mr. Justice Cartwright pointed
out that the purpose of the wording was to prevent the legislature from
destroying the item veto power by appropriations in insufficient detail.
Justice Cartwright was unable to construe the item veto amendment as
an amendment of Section 17 of Article IV (supra, p. 181), which is the
governing section on the "legality" of expenditure of public moneys. The
irony of the Peabody case is that a provision designed to protect the
Governor was used to deny to him a well-recognized budgeting tool.
(The State Finance Act, 111. Rev. Stat., ch. 127, §§ 149 (1967), does pro-
vide for contingency appropriations, but the "contingencies" are nar-
rower than the appropriation involved in the Peabody case.)
A comparable, but not so devastating, construction of the item veto
language was the ruling that an indefinite appropriation — i.e., "such
sums as may be necessary to refund taxes on real estate" — is unconstitu-
tional. (Fergus v. Russel, 270 111. 304 (1915).) The case is comparable
because the Governor's power is not protected by such a construction,
but it is not devastating since the legislature, with executive help, can
make an "educated guess" and put in a sum certain.
Although the Supreme Court was certain of its ground in the two
cases just discussed, it has conceded that determining the required degree
of specification of items is most difficult. (See People ex rel. State Bd. of
Agr. V. Brady, 277 111. 124 (1917).) In many ways, the question of how
far a breakdown must go is almost like the age-old question, "How long
is a piece of string?" For example, an appropriation of $60,000,000 for
the construction of roads was accepted. (Mitchell v. Lowden, 288 111. 327
(1919).) On another occasion, $400,000 for construction and mainte-
nance of roads was accepted. (Martens v. Brady, 264 111. 178 (1914).)
The Attorney General has said, however, that $500,000 for purchase of
lands, machinery, supplies, salaries, wages, and materials will not do.
(1912 111. Att'y Gen. Rep. 960.) It may be noted that the last appropria-
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don includes many different kinds of expenditures, whereas the other two
are comprised of large sums for many units of one kind of expenditure.
Comparative Analysis
General Veto: One state, North Carolina, has no gubernatorial veto of
any kind. All other states require the Governor to return a bill within
a specified number of days, usually excepting Sunday and sometimes
excepting holidays. (Three days, nine states; five days, 21 states; six
days, four states; ten days, 12 states; and 15 days, two states. Under
the new Michigan Constitution, the Governor has "14 days measured
in hours and minutes from time of presentation.") Overriding a veto
requires a vote of two-thirds of elected members in 23 states and of those
present in 15 states. A vote of three-fifths of elected members is required
in four states and of those present in one state. A simple majority of
elected members suffices in six states. In Alaska, the required two-thirds
of elected members rises to three-fourths for revenue and appropriation
bills, including item vetoes. The same step-up in vote is required in
Arizona for emergency measures.
In 18 states, the intervention of adjournment permits a Governor to
"veto" a bill by doing nothing. This, of course, is the pocket veto. In
31 states the Governor must specifically veto a bill. In New York, a
pocket veto state, Governors have long followed a practice of acting on
every post-adjournment bill even though it is not constitutionally re-
quired. This may very well be the practice elsewhere. In the light of the
earlier discussion concerning the end-of-session log jam, it is to be expected
that many states lengthen the time for gubernatorial action upon ad-
journment of the legislature. A total of 32 states give the Governor a
longer time for consideration of bills following adjournment than during
the session. In some cases, the increase may be only from three days to
five, or from five to ten. In other cases, the period is quite long, fre-
quently 30 days, and in a few cases 45 days.
The question of whether or not adjournment refers to sine die is not
answered by the wording of most constitutional provisions. It seems
likely that the more common assumption is that bills vetoed after any
regular adjournment are permanently dead, if only because of some
special provisions in a few of the states. For example, there are five
states which convene in special session to consider post-adjournment ve-
toes. In three states, it is clearly stated that bills may be returned at the
commencement of the next regular session. In a couple of states, the
legislature as a matter of practice holds off adjourning until the Gover-
nor has acted on all bills.
Item Veto: There appear to be 42 states which give the Governor
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power to veto appropriation items, but in three of the states there is a
limitation. In one case, Missouri, no reduction is permitted from appro-
priations for public schools or for debt interest payments. In Nebraska,
appropriations in excess of the budget request require a three-fifths'
majority, and any such items may not be vetoed. In West Virginia, the
budget bill does not require the Governor's approval and his item veto
covers only supplemental appropriations. (The legislature may not in-
crease the executive portion of the budget.)
In five of the states, the Governor may reduce an item rather than
strike it. The state of Washington has a unique provision which permits
the Governor to object to "one or more sections or items while approving
other portions of the bill." Thus, his "item" veto power is not limited
to appropriations.
United States Constitution: The President has ten days, Sundays ex-
cepted, in which to act. A two-thirds' vote of members present in each
house is required to override his veto. If Congress adjourns during the
ten-day period, a bill dies unless signed by the President. The President
has no item veto. On some occasions, the President has announced that
he would not use certain funds which he did not want, a situation an-
noying to Congress but difficult for Congress to prevent. This sort of
situation can exist, of course, only if no third-party rights are created.
The President could refuse to build a battleship, for example, but he
could not refuse to pay re-enlistment bonuses.
Model State Constitution: In view of the earlier discussion of the mean-
ing of "adjournment" in the Illinois Constitution, it is appropriate to
quote the Model's provision in full with certain words italicized:
"Action by the Governor.
"
(a) When a bill has passed the legislature, it shall be presented to the gov-
ernor and, if the legislature is in session, it shall become law if the governor
either signs or fails to veto it within fifteen days of presentation. If the legisla-
ture is in recess or, if the session of the legislature has expired during such
fifteen-day period, it shall become law if he signs it within thirty days after such
[sic] adjournment or expiration. If the governor does not approve a bill, he shall
veto it and return it to the legislature either within fifteen days of presentation
if the legislature is in session or upon the reconvening of the legislature from its
recess. Any bill so returned by the governor shall be reconsidered by the legisla-
ture and, if upon reconsideration two-thirds of all the members shall agree to
pass the bill, it shall become law.
"
(b) The governor may strike out or reduce items in appropriation bills
passed by the legislature and the procedure in such cases shall be the same as in
case of the disapproval of an entire bill by the governor." (art. IV, §4.16 (em-
phasis added).)
Comment
General Veto: The extended Explanation above is indication enough
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that there is a need for a thoroughgoing reconsideration and redrafting
of Section 16. It is necessary, of course, to mesh any such reconsideration
with decisions concerning annual or biennial sessions, and concerning
power of the General Assembly to (all itself into session. (See Comments
to Sec. 9 of Art. IV, supra, p. 151, and Sec. 8 of this Art., supra, p. 275.)
But whatever is decided about these matters, it seems advisable to recog-
nize the realities by giving the Governor a .HO- or 45-day period in which
to act after adjournment. (It should not be forgotten that the present
system of staggered presentation is an informal one and that the legis-
lature could change the system and dump several hundred bills on the
Governor's desk all at once.) It would also be appropriate to give serious
consideration to the relatively new policy of an automatic "veto session."
The new Connecticut Constitution provides:
"If any bill passed by any regular or special session or any appropriation item
described in Section 16 of Article Fourth has been disapproved by the governor
prior to its adjournment, and has not been reconsidered by the assembly, or is
so disapproved after such adjournment, the secretary of the state shall recon-
vene the general assembly on the second Monday after the last day on which the
governor is authorized to transmit or has transmitted every bill to the secretary
with his objections pursuant to Section 15 of Article Fourth of this constitution,
whichever occurs first; provided if such Monday falls on a legal holiday the
general assembly shall be reconvened on the next following day. The reconvened
session shall be for the sole purpose of reconsidering and, if the assembly so de-
sires, repassing such bills. The general assembly shall adjourn sine die not later
than three days following its reconvening." (art. 3, § 2.)
Once all of the decisions on the veto process have been made, extreme
care should be exercised in redrafting the veto section. In this connec-
tion, it should be noted that the veto section is in the Executive Article,
but that the veto is part of the legislative process. (The veto provision
in the United States Constitution and in some state constitutions is in
the Legislative Article.) ff, as is normal, the Convention has Committees
on the Legislature and on the Executive, an effort should be made from
the beginning to assure coordination of consideration of the veto prob-
lem. An alternative solution is to agree at the beginning that the Com-
mittee on the Legislature should have jurisdiction over Section 16 of
Article V. As noted above, the 1920-1922 Convention moved the veto
provision to the Legislative Article.
Item Veto: It would seem appropriate for the Convention to undertake
a redrafting of the item veto language in a manner that wipes out the
Peabody case discussed above. In these days of multibillion dollar
budgets, covering an ever-increasing range of activities in a volatile
economy, it seems tmfortunate that the chief executive is not permitted
to have a general contingency fund. Moreover, this is the day of program
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budgeting, or the even newer planning-programming-budgeting system
(PPBS), and rigid line item constitutional language, though not an in-
surmountable hurdle, does inhibit experimentation.
If the Convention were to go the route of the strong executive budget
with accompanying limitations on legislative power to alter it (compare
the reference to the West Virginia item veto above), the restrictive item
veto language would be of minimal significance. If the decision is to
preserve legislative budgeting power, the way in which to protect the
"
Governor's item veto is to use language of "strike out or reduce" as in
the Model State Constitution section quoted above. With power to
reduce, the Governor can defeat any legislative attempt to lump items
together in order to protect an expenditure against an item veto. If this
simple solution is unattractive, then some sort of "fuzzy" language should
be substituted for the specific "objects and purposes" and "amounts in
distinct items" language in order to insulate the item veto from a tax-
payer's suit of the Peabody nature. Above all, it would seem most ill-
advised to go the route of the 1920-1922 Convention of putting "objects
and purposes" in a separate section, thereby killing any opportunity
for the courts to change their minds and adopt Mr. Justice Cartwright's
approach in his Peabody dissent.
Lieutenant Governor as Acting Governor
Sec. 17. In case of the death, conviction on impeachment, failure to qualify,
resignation, absence from the State, or other disability of the Governor, the
powers, duties and emoluments of the office for the residue of the term, or until
the disability shall be removed, shall devolve upon the Lieutenant Governor.
History
There have been several twists and turns in the evolution of this sec-
tion. The 1818 Constitution provided for the taking over by the Lieu-
tenant Governor in the case of the Governor's impeachment, removal
from office, death, "refusal" to qualify, resignation or absence. This
would appear to cover impeachment, whether convicted or not. Such a
disability as illness was not covered. The 1818 section also said that the
Lieutenant Governor should serve "until the time pointed out by this
Constitution for the election of governor shall arrive, unless the General
Assembly shall provide by law for the election of a Governor to fill
such vacancy." This literally would have meant that if the Governor were
impeached but acquitted or left the state on a trip, he lost his office per-
manently. Such a meaning was undoubtedly not intended. In another
section it was provided that while acting as Governor the Lieutenant
Governor should receive a Governor's salary.
In the 1848 Constitution the provisions for succession were even more
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mixed up. The dralters divided the succession provision into two sec-
tions, one covering temporary succession and one covering permanent
succession. In order to demonstrate the extent of the drafting confusion,
the actual 1848 sections are set out, as follows:
Sec. 19. In case of the impeachment of the Governor, his absence from the
State, or inability to discharge the duties of his office, the powers, duties and
emoluments of the office shall devolve upon tlie Lieutenant-Governor; and in
case of his death, resignation, or removal, then upon the Speaker of tlie Senate
for the time being, until the Governor, absent or impeached, shall return or be
acquitted; or luitil the disqualification or inal)ility shall cease, or until a new
Governor shall be elected and qualified.
Sec. 20. In case of a vacancy in the office of Governor, for any other cause
than those herein enumerated, or in case of the death of the Governor elect be-
fore he is qualified, the powers, duties, and emoluments of the office shall devolve
upon the Lieutenant-Governor, or Speaker of the Senate, as above provided,
until a new Governor be elected and qualified.
The drafting error in the temporary succession section (19) was in
inserting in the middle of the section the provision concerning the
Speaker of the Senate. Without those words it would be clear that the
Lieutenant-Governor ceased to serve as Governor if (1) the absent Gov-
ernor returned, (2) the impeached Governor was acquitted, or (3) the
disabled Governor recovered. (Even so, "disqualified" is left dangling.)
But with the Speaker of the Senate tossed in, the section literally per-
mitted the Governor to resume office only if dining his absence, impeach-
ment or disability the Lieutenant Governor happened to die, resign, or
be removed. This is obviously not what was intended but it is what the
section said. Moreover, in the section on election of Speaker of the Senate,
provision was made for his succession to the duties of Lieutenant Gov-
ernor and, if necessary, to the Governor. Thus, the interpolated lan-
guage was utterly superfluous.
The permanent succession section (20) can be read in a straightfor-
ward manner if one assumes that "as above provided" refers to the
relationship between the Lieutenant Governor and the Speaker of the
Senate that the drafters meant to but did not clearly provide for. It is not
clear in either section whether "until a new Governor (shall be) (be)
elected and qualified" refers to the next regular election or implies that a
special election may be provided lor by law as was explicitly stated in
the 1818 Constitution.
In a masterpiece of understatement, the Chairman of the Committee
on the Executive Department reported to the 1870 Convention that
Sections 17, 18 and 19 "are in substance the same as in the present Con-
stitution, but they have been entirely recast and remodeled." (Debates
748. He was also inaccurate. See History of Sec. 19, iyijra, p. 310.)
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The recasting of Section 17 certainly removed confusions from the
earlier Constitutions. But a new ambiguity was created. The wording
of Section 17 as it now stands either permits the Governor to serve fol-
lowing impeachment and until conviction or includes impeachment
under "other disability." The proposed 1922 Constitution combined
Sections 17 and 19. Succession rules were further clarified and the im-
peachment ambiguity was finessed by omitting the word and simply
referring to "vacancy" which would be the case following conviction on
impeachment, and to using "under disability" which may or may not
have been intended to include the period' from impeachment to the end
of trial.
Explanation
Except for the possible ambiguity of whether or not the Governor is
displaced during the period between impeachment and conclusion of
his trial, this section is clear. There are problems that can arise, such
as how long an absence from the state is necessary to justify temporary
succession or how to determine whether in case of illness the Governor
is disabled, but these are not problems of poor draftsmanship. They
are practical problems that may or may not justify additional consti-
tutional coverage. (See Comment below.) Notwithstanding all of the
confusion in rules of succession discussed above, there appears to have
been no litigation, Attorney General opinion or other consideration of
the problem of succession. The Attorney General has ruled that the
Lieutenant Governor when occupying the Governor's chair, either tem-
porarily or permanently, is the "Acting Governor." (1912 111. Att'y Gen.
Rep. 162.)
Comparative Analysis
In all states (38) that have a constitutional lieutenant governor, he
is, of course, the person who first assumes the office of governor in the
line of succession. Among the remaining states, in seven the president
of the senate first succeeds the governor; in four, the secretary of state;
and in one state the legislature elects a successor, but if the legislature
is in recess the president of the senate succeeds, pending a choice by
the legislature. In general, the several states provide for succession
under much the same circumstances set forth in Section 17. In a few
states a special election is provided for in certain circumstances, but
the more common practice is to permit the lieutenant governor or other
first successor to serve out the unexpired term. There is also consider-
able variation in the provision concerning impeachment. The general
rule is that upon impeachment the governor ceases to act until he is
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acquitted — i.e., the disability removed; upon conviction, he would pre-
sumably be removed from office. Only a few states follow the Illinois
ambiguity of succession upon conviction of impeachment.
With the adoption of the Twenty-fifth Amendment, the United States
Constitution now has one of the more comprehensive provisions cover-
ing succession. It should be noted, however, that the President is not
succeeded upon his absence from the Ignited States and apparently not
upon impeachment pending trial. Under the Twenty-fifth Amendment,
the Vice President becomes President in case of removal, death, or resig-
nation of the President. In case of inability of the President to act,
two alternatives are provided for. The President may notify the Presi-
dent pro tern of the Senate and the Speaker of the House in waiting that
he is incapacitated, in which case the Vice President becomes Acting
President until the President makes a contrary declaration in writing to
the President pro ton and the Speaker. In the absence of a declaration
from the President, the Vice President and a majority of either the
cabinet or some other body created by law may make a written declara-
tion of incapacity to the President pro te?n and the Speaker, and the
Vice President becomes Acting President. Thereafter, the President may
make a contrary written declaration, but if there is disagreement. Con-
gress by a two-thirds vote within a specified time may keep the Vice
President in his capacity as Acting President; otherwise the President
resumes his powers and duties.
The Model State Constitution also provides a comprehensive section
on gubernatorial succession. The section first covers the problem at
the beginning of the governor's term by providing that the presiding
officer of the legislature
— there being no lieutenant governor and the
legislature being unicameral — serves until the governor-elect assumes
office, but if this period exceeds six months, a special election is to be
held and the presiding officer serves as acting governor until the newly
elected governor assumes office. The section next covers temporary
situations — impeachment, mental or physical disability, and continuous
absence — in which case the presiding officer serves as acting governor
in the interim, and if the disability exceeds six months the office be-
comes vacant. In the case of a vacancy, the presiding officer becomes
governor for the remainder of the term or until a special election is
held and a new governor assumes office. A special election is held unless
the remainder of the term is less than a year. The legislature is given
the duty to provide by law for special elections and the supreme court
is given "original, exclusive and final jurisdiction" to settle any questions
of absence, disability, existence of a vacancy or any other matter of
succession.
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Comment
In any major revision of a state constitution these days it is obvious
that consideration should be given to the problem of succession, for
only the more recent constitutions adequately provide for the rare but
quite possible serious mental or physical incapacity of the chief execu-
tive. In a large industrial state, executive duties are much too important
to be left in doubt for any extended period. It may be noted that it is
not absolutely necessary to spell out the contingencies in such detail as
in the Twenty-fifth Amendment and the Model State Constitution. The
succession section could have a sentence saying in effect that the legis-
lature shall provide by law for the manner of determining whether the
governor is incapacitated.
In addition to the problem of incapacity, consideration should be
given to whether the Governor continues to serve after impeachment.
Rare as impeachment may be these days, it seems appropriate as a matter
of principle to require the Governor to stop governing until the cloud
is removed. An even more important consideration is whether to
abandon the traditional "absence from the state" provision for tem-
porary succession. With modern high-speed transportation and high-
speed communication there is no reason for the Governor not to con-
tinue to govern from outside the state. After all, the President of the
United States continues to govern when out of the country. The Model
State Constitution solves this problem by providing for temporary suc-
cession after "continuous absence." It should be possible under such
language to permit the Lieutenant Governor to take over at the request
of the Governor when he expects to be absent for a considerable period
of time or when, as in the case of a vacation, he wishes to be relieved
of his duties.
Finally, it would be appropriate to clarify the distinction between
Acting Governor on a temporary basis and succession as Governor on a
permanent basis. The Model State Constitution, for example, puts it
this way:
"When the presiding officer of the legislature succeeds to the office of governor,
he shall have the title, powers, duties and emoluments of that office and, when
he serves as acting governor, he shall have the powers and duties thereof and
shall receive such compensation as the legislature shall provide by law." (art. V,
§5.08 (c).)
By way of postscript to this Comment, it is perhaps appropriate to
justify the extended discussion under History of the confusing language
of the several succession provisions. In any constitution, there are pro-
visions that should be broad and general to allow for accommodation
to changes in the society. There are other provisions that should be as
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precise and clear as the ingenuity of draftsmen can make them. The
former arc exemplified by a bill of rights and other restrictions on
government action, the latter by procedural provisions for the operation
of the government. In the field of private law, by analogy, there are
many instances when a judge should concentrate on finding the "right"
or
"good" decision, but other instances when it is more important to
enunciate an unambiguous and precise rule than it is to worry about
whether it is a
"good" rule. The distinction lies principally in whether
accommodation to the rule is easy or difficult. A rule of substance can
cause great difficulty, but a rule of procedure, once known, can almost
always be followed with ease. In constitution-drafting, the rules for
the process of government should be clear and definite. There is little
danger of injustice arising at some future time because changed condi-
tions are inconsistent with the assumptions underlying the original
formulation, but there is danger of confusion if there is procedural
ambiguity. The moral is, of course, to let delegates to a convention make
the policy decisions but to rely on professional draftsmen, particularly
in the case of procedural matters, to translate the policies into consti-
tutional language.
President of the Senate
Sec. 18. The Lieutenant Governor shall be President of the Senate, and shall
vote only when the Senate is equally divided. The Senate shall choose a Presi-
dent, pro tempore, to preside in case of the absence or impeachment of the
Lieutenant Governor, or when he shall hold the office of Governor.
History
In the 1818 Constitution, the substance of this section was spread
among three sections. In one of them, the Lieutenant Governor was
made Speaker of the Senate and given the right to debate and vote when
the Senate sat as a Committee of the Whole, but otherwise could vote
only to break a tie. In a second section, provision was made for election
of a Speaker, from among the membership of the Senate, who was to
preside in the absence of the Lieutenant Governor and was to succeed
to the Governor's office if necessary. The third section called for the
Secretary of State to convene the Senate to choose a Speaker if a necessity
for succession to the Governor's office arose while the legislature was in
recess. These three sections were carried over in substance to the 1848
Constitution. The 1870 changes consisted of boiling down the language,
transferring the provision for succession to Section 19, dropping the
Lieutenant Governor's participation in the Committee of the Whole, and
adopting "President, pro tempore" in place of "Speaker." (In Section
19 of this Article the term used is "President of the Senate," in Section
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9 of Article IV the term is
"temporary President," and in Section 13
of Article IV the term
"Speaker" is still used to designate the presiding
officer of the Senate.) The proposed 1922 Constitution combined the
substance of this section with the substance of Section 9 of Article IV
concerning organization of the General Assembly.
Explanation
There appear to have been no problems concerning this section. Under
Section 17, it was noted {supra, p. 303) that the Governor is apparently
not succeeded even temporarily upon impeachment, but only upon con-
viction, whereas the President pro tern presides over the Senate from the
moment of impeachment of the Lieutenant Governor. This is obviously
necessary, for the trial on impeachment takes place in the Senate.
Although the language is unclear, the fair import of the section is that
the Lieutenant Governor would retake his seat as presiding officer if he
were acquitted. (It may be noted that, in dealing with this technical
matter of impeachment, the drafters of the proposed 1922 Constitution
slipped up. They had the President pro tern preside "pending the im-
peachment of the Lieutenant Governor." Literally, this is the period of
time from the filing of a motion of impeachment in the House of Repre-
sentatives until it votes on the motion.)
Comparative Analysis
Lieutenant Governor: In 38 states the lieutenant governor is a con-
stitutional officer and in 36 of those states he presides over the senate.
In Massachusetts he presides over the governor's council and in Hawaii
he has been given by law the duties normally held by a secretary of
state. In Tennessee the title of lieutenant governor has been given by
statute to the speaker of the senate who is a constitutional officer and
succeeds to the governor's chair. In three states, the lieutenant governor
has no vote and in the other 33 states, including Illinois, of course, he has
only a casting vote in case of a tie. In a few states the lieutenant gover-
nor retains the right to debate and vote in committee of the whole as
used to be the case in Illinois. The United States Constitution provides
that the Vice President shall serve as President of the Senate and shall
have a tie-breaking vote. No lieutenant governor is provided for in the
Model State Constitution.
President pro tern: Twenty-eight states besides Illinois provide that
the senate shall elect a president pro tern to preside in the absence of
the lieutenant governor. In those states that have a lieutenant governor
but do not provide specifically for a president pro tern there will still
be such an officer elected pursuant to the usual provision that each
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house oi the legislature shall choose its own officers. The United States
Constitution provides that the Senate shall choose a President pro tern
to serve under the usual circumstances. The Model State Constitution
provides that the unicameral legislature choose a presiding officer Irom
among its members.
Comment
There has been considerable discussion in recent years about the need
for an elected lieutenant governor. On the one hand it seems appropri-
ate that the person who may succeed to the governor's chair be elected
by all the voters ot the state. On the other hand, it is difficult to find
enough for the lieutenant governor to do in that capacity, particularly
if the person chosen for the position is expected to be ol sufficient
stature to become governor. Alaska chose to drop the lieutenant gov-
ernor and to provide that the secretary of state be elected on a joint
ballot with the governor and to succeed the governor if necessary.
Hawaii did the reverse by leaving the lieutenant governor's duties to
be prescribed by law and then by statute making him, in effect, the
secretary of state. The 1964 Constitution of Michigan compromised by
continuing the lieutenant governor's traditional legislative function
of presiding over the senate but adding the following sentence: "He
may perform duties requested of him by the governor, but no power
vested in the governor shall be delegated." (Mich. Const, art. V, § 25.)
The Model State Constitution tries to avoid the difficulty by providing
that the presiding officer of the legislature, an official elected by one
segment of the state, can, in effect, serve as governor for only a relatively
short time, never more than a year, and by requiring a special election
for governor when a longer period is involved.
Acting Governor— Successions
Sec. 19. If there be no Lieutenant Governor, or if the Lieutenant Governor
shall, for any of the causes specified in section seventeen, of this article, become
incapable of performing the duties of the office, the President of the Senate shall
act as Governor until the vacancy is filled or the disability removed; and if the
President of the Senate, for any of the above named causes, shall become in-
capable of performing the duties of Governor, tire same shall devolve upon
the Speaker of the House of Representatives.
History
In the discussion of the Histories of Sections 17 and 18 (supra, pp.
303 and 308), the matter of succession of the presiding officer of the
Senate as it appeared in the 1818 and 1848 Constitutions was covered.
The only significant substantive change made in 1870 was to provide for
succession by the Speaker of the House of Representatives if necessary.
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The proposed 1922 Constitution combined this section with Section 17
and, in the course thereof, clarified the rules of succession.
Explanation
Although this section leaves much to be desired as a matter of draft-
ing, its purpose is clear enough. Section 17 provides for the Lieutenant
Governor to act as Governor under certain circumstances, and Section 18
provides for the President pro tern to act as presiding officer of the
Senate in certain circumstances. Section 19 is designed to move the
President pro tern into the Governor's chair when neither the Governor
nor the Lieutenant Governor is available, and the Speaker of tlie House
into the Governor's chair in the absence of the Governor, Lieutenant
Governor and President pro tern. The drafting difficulty with Section
19 is that it literally fails to spell out an absence of the Governor in
addition to that of the Lieutenant Governor as a condition for suc-
cession of the President pro tern, fn the proposed 1922 Constitution,
the drafters solved this drafting tangle by providing in effect that in the
absence of the Governor, his duties and powers moved to the Lieutenant
Governor; that in the absence of the Lieutenant Governor, his duties and
powers moved to the President pro tern; and so on.
It is provided by statute that if the offices of Governor and Lieutenant
Governor are both vacant, the person acting as Governor, or if there is
none then tlie Secretary of State, shall issue a writ for a special election
to fill the vacancies for the balance of the term. (111. Rev. Stat. ch. 46,
§ 25-4 (1967).) It is not at all clear what constitutional authority exists
for such a law. Presumably, reliance would be placed on the words
"until the vacancy is filled" on the theory that such words are superfluous
if the
"vacancy" is filled by the winner at the next regular election for
a new term. But compare the language used in Section 20 to provide
that a person appointed serves "until his successor shall be elected and
qualified in such manner as may be provided by law." (See Explanation,
infra, p. 314.) In any event, no occasion for a special election appears
to have arisen and thus there has been no opportunity for a determi-
nation of the validity of the statute.
Comparative Analysis
There are a great many variations in the order of succession among
the several states. Approximately 13 states join Illinois in moving from
the lieutenant governor to the president pro tern to the speaker. A
few of these states go on to list further successors or to authorize
further succession as provided by law. In many of the states without
a lieutenant governor the succession is from the president pro tern to
the speaker. Among other variations, the commonest is to provide for
312 Art. V, § 19
the succession oi the secretary of state, either alter the lieutenant gov-
ernor if there is one or directly if there is none. Several states leave
succession after the lieutenant governor or other first successor to be
determined by law.
Prior to the adoption of the Twenty-fifth Amendment, the United
States Constitution left it to Congress to provide by law for succession
beyond the Vice President. Under the Twenty-fifth Amendment, the
President is to fill any vacancy in the office of Vice President by nomi-
nation with confirmation by "majority vote of both Houses of Congress."
In a case where the Vice President became President by virtue of the
President's removal from office, resignation or death, the new President
would nominate a successor Vice President. The amendment does not
cover the case of something happening to the Vice President while he
is Acting President. Presumably, the original language of the Consti-
tution remains applicable, namely: "and the Congress may by Law pro-
vide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the
President and Vice President, declaring what Officer shall then act as
President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the Disability be
removed, or a President shall be elected." The statutory rules of suc-
cession enacted pinsuant to the foregoing are still on the books and
their language is not inconsistent with the Twenty-fifth Amendment.
The line of succession runs from the Speaker of the House to the Presi-
dent pro tern of the Senate to the cabinet officers beginning with the
Secretary of State. (3 U.S.C, § 19 1964).)
The Commentary on the Model State Constitution notes that a virtually
unlimited line of succession is assured, for there will always be a pre-
siding officer of the unicameral legislature and he is the named successor
to the governor. The implication is that either the legislature will have
provided by rule for a successor when its presiding officer has succeeded
to the governor's chair or that a special session will be called to elect
a new presiding officer.
Comment
It seems desirable to clear up the problem of succession by special
election. This could be done by language such as that quoted above
from Section 20 or by a separate sentence empowering the legislature
to provide by law for filling vacancies in the offices of both the Governor
and the Lieutenant Governor. Another solution is to empower the legisla-
ture to provide for further succession in much the manner quoted
above from the United States Constitution. Indeed, it may be that the
present statute calling for a special election was adopted because there
appeared to be no way to assure indefinite succession. But it may also
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have been because of a belief that a person not elected by all the
people should not serve for too long. This is the theory of the Model
State Constitution's rules of succession. (See Comparatixie Analysis of
Sec. 17, supra, p. 305.)
Financial Report of State Officers — Vacancies
Sec. 20. If the office of Auditor of Public Accounts, Treasurer, Secretary of
State, Attorney General, or Superintendent of Public Instruction shall be vacated
by death, resignation or otherwise, it shall be the duty of the Governor to fill
the same by appointment, and the appointee shall hold his office until his suc-
cessor shall be elected and qualified in such manner as may be provided by law.
An account shall be kept by the officers of the Executive Department, and of all
the public institutions of the State, of all moneys received or disbursed by
them, severally, from all sources, and for every service performed, and a semi-
annual report thereof be made to the Governor, under oath; and any officer
who makes a false report shall be guilty of perjury, and punished accordingly.
History
Under the 1818 Constitution, none of the executive offices, other than
Governor and Lieutenant Governor, was elective. The Governor's power
to fill vacancies in appointive positions and his power, under the 1848
Constitution, in the case of both elective and appointive positions are
described in the History of Section 11. (Sirpra, p. 283.) Neither Con-
stitution had a requirement for financial reporting. In the 1870 Conven-
tion the Chairman of the Committee on the Executive Department
described the first half of the section as "the ordinary section relating
to vacancies . . . and . . . how they shall be filled." (Debates 749.) The
second half was noted to be new. (Id.) There was no extended debate
on this section. One delegate pointed out that the Governor is required
to report to himself semiannually. The Chairman of the Committee
on Revision and Adjustment retorted that it "mentions all the officers
except the Governor." (Debates 1782.) The Chairman's reply was irrele-
vant, because the officers are mentioned in the first sentence, and incor-
rect, because the Lieutenant Governor who is an officer of the Executive
Department is not mentioned. But the Chairman's explanation was
accepted. The proposed 1922 Constitution made the substance of the
first sentence of Section 20 into a separate section and combined most
of the substance of the second sentence with Section 21. The official
explanation stated that the first sentence was unchanged in substance
(P.N.C. 37), but this is arguable, for the concluding clause, "in such
manner as may be provided by law," was omitted. Presumably, this clause
permits legislation providing for a special election for an unexpired
term whereas its omission inight not. The second sentence was changed
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in substance only in omission of the perjury provision. The literal
requirement that the Governor report to himself was retained.
Explanation
Vacancies: The first sentence of Section 20 is straightforward and
unambiguous. As noted above, the final clause permits special elections
to be provided for by law. The implementing statute (111. Rev. Stat,
ch. 46, § 25-5 (1967)) provides, however, that the person appointed to
fill a vacancy serves out the remainder of the term.
Accounts: As noted abo\e, this sentence of the section literally calls
for a semiannual financial report by the Governor in addition to the
other officers listed in Section 1 of this Article. In 1904, the Attorney
General dutifully ruled that the Governor, as an officer of the Executive
Department, was required to make a semiannual report A\hich, for
obvious reasons, was to be filed with the Secretary of State. (1904 111.
Att'y Gen. Rep. 385.) In that same opinion, the Attorney General ruled
that this provision covers even officers who merely disburse appropriated
funds through warrants drawn by the Auditor of Public Accounts. {Id.)
He has also ruled that the State Board of Agriculture and the State
Horticultural Society are public institutions under this section. (1910
111. Att'y Gen. Rep. 163, 666.) The Supreme Court has held that accept-
ance of a financial report by the Governor does not relieve the reporting
officer of liability for errors. (People v. W^hittemore, 253 111. 378
(1912).)
Comparative Analysis
Vacancies: The provisions for filling vacancies in the several named
offices vary greatly among those states that make such offices constitu-
tional. In general, it appears that if the office is an elective one, the
go\ernor normally fills the vacancy, sometimes on his own as in Illinois,
sometimes with the advice and consent of the senate. In some states,
it appears to be within the power of the legislature to provide for special
elections rather than to permit the person filling the vacancy to serve
out the unexpired term. Occasionally, a constitution specifically calls
for filling a vacancy only until the next general election. Neither the
United States Constitution nor the Model State Constitution has any
elected executives other than the chief executive and, of course, has no
provision lor filling vacancies.
Accounts: Approximately a dozen states have a provision much like
that of Illinois. Eight of them require the account to be under oath,
but only three other states include perjury language. The absence of
an accounting provision in most states does not necessarily signify that
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there is no constitutional requirement for accounting for public funds.
(See Comment below.) The Model State Constitution has no comparable
provision but the general reporting section (see Comparative Analysis
of Sec. 21 injra, p. 317) could include financial reporting. There is no
comparable provision in the United States Constitution.
Comment
Vacancies: If Illinois is to preserve the long ballot, a provision such
as this is necessary. It is eminently satisfactory as it stands, for the legis-
lature is given the flexibility to provide by law for special elections if
at some future time there were a general feeling that the Governor
ought not to have power to fill vacancies for a long period of time. It
is a matter of choice whether to include the Senate in the appointing
process as is done under Sections 10 and 11 of this Article for other
offices and vacancies. Indeed, one can ponder why the delegates to the
1870 Convention made the choice the way they did. The debates throw
no light on the matter. (See also discussions of Sees. 10 and 11, supra,
pp. 280 and 283.)
Accounts: This is a curious requirement in the light of Section 17 of
Article IV controlling expenditures through the Auditor. Moreover,
in view of the magnitude of governmental expenditures in large indus-
trial states, any assumption that requiring semiannual reports under
oath from elective and appointive officials is the way to assure honest
accounting is simplistic indeed. A comprehensive auditing process is
the appropriate approach to the problem of control over public receipts
and disbursements. (This may be the reason that so few states have a
comparable financial reporting provision.). It would be appropriate
for the Convention to look at the realities of modern-day accounting and
auditing and provide constitutional responsibility therefor, but leave
details to be spelled out by law.
Report of State Officers — Departments — Judges
Sec. 21. The officers of the Executive Department, and of all the public in-
stitutions of the State, shall, at least ten days preceding each regular session of
the General Assembly, severally report to the Governor, who shall transmit such
reports to the General Assembly, together with the reports of the Judges of the
Supreme Court of defects in the Constitution and laws; and the Governor may
at any time require information, in writing, under oath, from the officers of the
Executive Department, and all officers and managers of State institutions, upon
any subject relating to the condition, management and expenses of their re-
spective offices.
History
The 1818 Constitution provided, in language much like that of the
United States Constitution, that the Governor could require information
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in writing irom the several executive officers upon any subject pertain-
ing to their duties. Only changes in punctuation were made in 1848.
In the 1870 Convention the Chairman of the Committee on the Execu-
tive Department explained the proposed expanded section in these
words:
"This is a new feature, and is designed to give the executive such control over
all the State officers and officers of the State institutions, that he can at least know
what they are about, and have some check upon their administration. Heretofore
the Governor of this State has been clothed with hardly any powers. He has been
treated like a child under tutelage. He might complain, but he possessed no
power to remedy any evil in the administration of public affairs." (Debates
747-48.)
This "new feature" did not include the reference to the reports of
the judges on defects in the Constittition. That was added at a later
session on motion of a member of tlie Committee on the Judiciary. The
"reports of the judges" Avere reports called for by a section of the Judi-
ciary Article. (Section 31 of Article VI prior to 1964.) That section
required all judges of courts of record annually to report in writing to
the Supreme Court on defects and omissions in the laws. In turn, the
judges of the Supreme Court were to report annually to the Governor
on the defects and omissions in both the Constitution and the laws and
were to include appropriate bills to cure the defects and omissions in
the laws. That section also originally includeci in parentheses an
instruction to the Governor to send everything along to the legislature.
In view of the addition of the instruction in Section 21, the Committee
on Revision and Adjustment dropped the instruction from the section
in the Judicial Article.
This judicial reporting requirement appears to have been an out-
growth of a device designed to increase the compensation of the judges,
whose salaries had been frozen at a low level in the 1848 Constitution.
In January, 1869, an act was passed requiring circuit court judges to
report to the Supreme Court on "redundancies, omissions, inconsisten-
cies and imperfections in the statutes, together with bills remedying
these defects." For tliis service the judges were each to receive |i,000.
A bare majority of the judges complied, but all were paid. The Supreme
Court forwarded most of the reports to a Statutory Revision Commission
which adopted some of them. (See Annotations 180.)
That this prececient of the year before was clearly in the minds of the
delegates is evidenced by efforts on two occasions to have inserted in
the section a prohibition on extra compensation for the reports. On
both occasions, delegates were assured that extra compensation was
prohibited by another section. (Debates 1185, 1495. The other section
was 16 in the old Article VI.) One delegate objected that the reporting
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"special legislation, and rather interior legislation at that,"
and moved to strike. In defense of the section, a member of the Com-
mittee on the Judiciary noted that all constitutions required the execu-
tive to make recommendations to the legislature but that judges, "who
could be much more useful in this respect," were not required to make
recommendations. He continued:
"This provision will be very useful if the judges do their duty. We would
thus be enabled to make our laws plain, for judges like to have the laws plain
after they get on the bench, however intricate they may desire them when they
are off the bench. We will be enabled to abbreviate and simplify the law, and in
fifteen years we will have the most perfect laws and rules of judicial procedure
in America." (Debates 1495.)
The proposed 1922 Constitution removed that section from the Judi-
ciary Article and the comparable language from the equivalent of Section
21. The proposed revision was a combination of the accounting sen-
tence of Section 20 and the reporting recjuirements of Section 21. The
end product was greatly simplified and the only changes of substance
were the removal of the perjury words of Section 20 and the "under
oath" words of Section 21. Section 19 of the present Article VI provides
that the Judicial Conference report to the legislature on suggested im-
provements in the administration of justice. (See discussion of Sec. 19,
Art. VI, infra, p. 376.)
Explanafion
The first quotation set out above explains why such a detailed report-
ing requirement was inserted in the Constitution. Presumably, the exec-
utive departments have dutifully reported to the Governor. No one
will ever know, however, whether they would have done the same under
the customary short form of constitutional language.
The optimistic hopes expressed in the second quotation were never
fulfilled. The judges apparently ignored the reporting requirement and
in 1909 the Supreme Court formally declined to report. (See Explanation
of Art. Ill, supra, p. 99.)
Comparative Analysis
Aproximately three-fourths of the states have the customary require-
ment that executive officers report to the governor at his request. Only
a handful of states require such reports to be under oath. Almost as
few states specify that periodic reports are to be made at the appropriate
time for transmittal to the legislature at the beginning of its session.
Only about seven states appear to join Illinois in expecting the judges
to offer advice on what is defective in the constitution and laws.
Eight states authorize the governor or the legislature to request advisory
opinions, normally concerning the constitutionality of proposed legis-
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lation, ironi the highest court of the state. (Two ot the states author-
izing advisory opinions are among those with judicial reporting require-
ments.) The United States Constitution simply states that the President
may "require the Opinion, in writing," ol each executive officer. The
Model State Constitution says that the governor "may at any time
require intormation, in \\riting or otherwise," Ironi any executive officer.
Comment
The interesting thing about the quotation from the 1870 Debates set
out above is that the Chairman may not have realized that he was con-
centrating on form and not substance in worrying about the Governor's
power as chief executive. Proponents of the short ballot (sec Comment
on Sec. 1, supra, p. 258) are cjuick to point out that one ot the advantages
thereof is that it enhances a governor's power. Appointed offtcials
are able to build a personal power base, of course, but it is much shakier
and weaker than that of the elected official. While the 1870 Convention
was readily accepting the Chairman's effort to increase the Governor's
power by means of this section, the Convention was also accepting an
increase in elected executive officers from three to five. Indeed, there
was an unsuccessful floor fight to add a sixth, a Superintendent of Public
Charities. (Debates 749-54.)
Even if the substance of executive power were to continue to be
denied by virtue of the preservation of the long ballot, the Convention
could still appropriately simplify this section. It should be sufficient
to state that the Governor may require information in writing or other-
wise at any time from any executive officer. If the custom of requiring
formal reports for the use of the legislature is considered worth preserv-
ing, it would be preferable to provide that the legislature may by law-
require such formal reports from such executive departments as it
deems necessary. Actually, we live in a society that thrives on reports
and our more serious problem is that there are too many of them. An
"information to the Governor" provision is more in the nature of an
attempt to spell out who is boss than it is a reporting device. Formal
reporting ought simply to be assumed as a normal element of the process
of government.
State Seal
Sec. 22. There shall be a seal of the State, which shall be called the "Great
Seal of the State of Illinois," which shall be kept by the Secretary of State, and
used by him, officially, as directed by law.
History
In the 1818 Constitution, the Schedule stated that the Governor should
use his private seal until a state seal was provided. The 1848 Consti-
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tution provided that all grants and commissions be sealed with the great
seal of state, signed by the Governor and countersigned by the Secretary
of State. The section proposed to the 1870 Convention differed only in
the last phrase which was originally worded "under the direction of the
Governor." Upon objection, the phrase was changed to the present
language. The proposed 1922 Constitution simplified the wording but
made no change of substance.
Explanation
There is obviously no explanation required for this section, but it is
worth noting that the nature of the duties of the Secretary of State is
implied by this section.
Comparative Analysis
All but 1 1 of the states have some constitutional reference to a
great seal. Over half of the references give custody of the seal to the
secretary of state and another dozen give custody to the governor. Mis-
cellaneous references are found in half a dozen states. Neither the
United States Constitution nor the Model State Constitution has a refer-
ence to a great seal.
Comment
This section is obviously not essential, but neither is it obtrusive or
capable of creating problems. If the Convention were to move to a short
ballot (see Comment on Sec. 1, supra, p. 258), custody of the seal should
be given to the Governor.
Fees and Salaries
Sec. 23. The officers named in this article shall receive for their services a salary,
to be established by law, which shall not be increased or diminished during their
official terms, and they shall not, after the expiration of the terms of those in
office at the adoption of this constitution, receive to their own use any fees, costs,
perquisites of office, or other compensation. And all fees that may hereafter be
payable by law for any services performed by any officer provided for in this
article of the constitution, shall be paid in advance into the State treasury.
History
Under the 1818 Constitution, the only references to executive com-
pensation were a provision providing that the Governor receive a
salary not subject to increase or decrease during his term and a provision
that the Lieutenant Governor receive the same compensation as the
Speaker of the House except that when serving as Governor he was to
receive the Governor's salary. In the 1848 Constitution, fixed salaries
were set out as follows:
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Governor $1,500.00
Secretary of State 800.00*
Auditor 1,000.00
Treasurer 800.00
*plus fees
In the 1870 Convention, a donnybrook broke out over the matter when
the Committee on the Executive Department presented a proposal which
in principle was the same as the section as finally adopted. Reading
between the lines of the extended debate, one can see that the inade-
quate salaries provided for in the 1848 Constitution had caused various
extralegal and perhaps even unconstitutional devices to be utilized to
augment salaries. For example, one delegate observed that "for the last
ten years, the Governor has had control of about $10,000 a year. His
gardener has had $2,500 a year, and he has never had a gardener in
fact that I know of." (Debates 801.)
It is also obvious from the strong language of prohibition of fees,
that one popular device for getting around the constitutional limitations
on salaries was to authorize the retention of fees. The view that pre-
vailed among the delegates was that a fee system of compensation was
susceptible of overcompensation and not the view that if one did not
have to collect fees in order to get paid he would neglect his duties.
In the proposed 1922 Constitution, the substance of Section 23 was
split up among several sections, some of which were applicable to other
offices. In essence, the equivalent section in the proposed Executive
Article simply said that officers of the executive department should be
paid salaries and no other compensation. In a new article, "Public
Servants," one section said that no legislative, executive, judicial, or
county officer should receive any fees or other nonsalary compensation,
another section said that no
"public officer" should have his compen.a-
tion increased or decreased during his term, and a third section said
that every public officer should pay at least monthly to someone desig-
nated by law all public moneys received. In the Revenue and Finance
Article a rhsw section said that
"[n]o payment of money belonging to
or for the use of the state shall be held to be made to any officer of the
executive department until evidenced by the receipt of the state treas-
urer." The official explanation simply said: "This section is new."
(P.N.C. 52.) Except for the immediately preceding section, the work
of the 1920-22 Convention was simply a matter of rearranging compen-
sation provisions in terms of the principles involved rather than in terms
of offices.
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Explanation
This section does four things. It provides that officers of the execu-
tive department shall be paid salaries to be established by law. It
reinforces the separation of powers principle by prohibiting increases
or decreases in compensation of incumbents during their terms of office.
It ends any fee system of compensation, and it reinforces that prohibi-
tion by making it clear that fee receipts go into the state treasury.
The only significant judicial gloss on this section is a ruling that
appointed officers under Section 10 are also "officers named in this
article," a construction that is not obvious. (Peabody v. Russel, 301
111. 439 (1922).) Several cases have held that the requirement to pay
fees into the treasury means what it says and that no deductions are to
be made before such payment. (People v. Sargent, 254 111. 514 (1912);
Whittemore v. People, 227 111. 453 (1907).) One case relied upon the
public policy behind this section to declare illegal an incredible scheme
whereby the Treasurer had entered into an agreement with the sureties
on his bond to deposit public moneys in the sureties' banks, the interest
thereon to be divided personally among the sureties and the Treasurer.
(Estate of Ramsay v. Whitbeck, 182 111. 550 (1900).)
Comparative Analysis
A large majority of the states either provide that salaries shall be set
by law or stipulate a sum that is subject to change by law. It is custom-
ary to state that salaries cannot be changed during the incumbent's term
of office. Some states specify salaries, most of which are unrealistically
low. Only a small number of states appear to have specific prohibitions
against fees and other emoluments. The United States Constitution
states only that the President's compensation may not be changed dur-
ing his term of office. The Model State Constitution has no provision
on compensation.
Comment
Presumably, the battle over salaries which was won in 1870 will not
have to be fought again. Presumably also, the involved language over
fees could be dropped. That language was designed to end the abuses
that had arisen under the ridiculously low 'salaries set out in the 1848
Constitution. It would seem obvious that omission of such language
today would not lead to a revival of an old practice no longer necessary.
It should also be noted that the fee language of this section is applicable
only to this Article and any decision to drop the language would have
no policy implications concerning fees for county and township officials.
(See Art. X, Sec. 9, infra, p. 507.)
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Definition of "OfFice"
Sec. 24. An office is a public position created by the constitution or law, con-
tinuing during the pleasure of the appointing power, or for a fixed time, with a
successor elected or appointed. An employment is an agency, for a temporary
purpose, which ceases when that purpose is accomplished.
History
This is a new section added in 1870. It appears to have grown out of
the debate over Section 10 of this Article concerning appointments by
the Governor with its accompanying prohibition against appointments
by the legislature. Several amendments were proposed in an effort to
clarify which appointments were to be covered by the section and which
were not. The delegates were particularly exercised over the case of
Biinn V. People ex rel. Laflin (45 111. 397 (1867)), where the Supreme
Court held that commissioners who were to supervise construction of
the state house were not "officers" and could, therefore, be chosen by
the legislature. In the course of the debate, several members of the
Committee on the Executive Department suggested that the proper way
to solve the problem was not by amending Section 10, but by a separate
definition of "officer" to be inserted at some appropriate place. Accord-
ingly, the amendments were withdrawn and on the next day a resolu-
tion calling for a definition of "officer" was introduced. There was no
further discussion of the matter and Section 24 appeared as part of the
Executive Article upon final consideration by the Convention. Ironically,
the section as adopted is essentially the definition worked out by the
Supreme Court in the Biinn case and it would appear that the result
of that case would be the same. Except for punctuation, the section
was carried over unchanged into the proposed 1922 Constitution.
Explanation
There has been considerable litigation referring to this section, but
in almost all cases the substantive issue involved another section of the
Constitution or a statute. (See, for example, the discussion of the
Fergus case under Sec. 16 of Art. IV, supra, p. 179.) This must be so since
Section 24 is only a definition. The only significant effort to use this
section as a substantive provision was in the attack on civil service
wherein it was argued unsuccessfully that civil service tenure, being
neither at the pleasure of the appointing power nor for a fixed term, was
prohibited by Section 24. (People ex rel. Akin v. Loeffler, 175 111. 585
(1898).)
Comparative Analysis
No other state appears to have a definition of a public office. Both
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the United States Constitution and the Model State Constitution are
silent on the subject.
Comment
The fact that no other state constitution defines a public office indi-
cates at the very least that such a provision is not essential and at the
most that such a provision is inappropriate. One should be chary about
putting definitions in a constitution. A definition is designed to produce
precision and in many areas of a constitution one needs imprecision in
order to permit flexibility in coping with changing times. In a narrow
procedural provision, a definition may be helpful, such as "ten days
(Sundays excepted)" in the veto provision of Section 16 of this Article.
{supra, p. 293.) But in something so pervasive as distinguishing "office"
from
"employment," a case-by-case method of developing the meaning
of the word "office" in each context in which it appears is preferable.
For example, "office" in the context of dual office holding need not
necessarily have the same meaning as "office" for an oath or "office"
for the purpose of determining whether salaries may be increased dur-
ing incumbency. A single definition for all uses is likely either to thwart
the purpose of some particular provision in some contexts or to result
in judicial legerdemain in eroding the stated definition. (See discus-
sion of the Capuzi case under Sec. 3 of Art. IV, supra, p. 122.)
In any event, it is doubtful that this definition should be preserved
as is. As noted earlier, the definition is derived from the Bunn case and
a careful reading of the majority and dissenting opinions of that case
should convince one that the commissioners to supervise the construc-
tion of the state house were officers and not
"agents." They were
required to take an oath and to provide bond, and were to supervise
the expenditure of $3,000,000, a princely sum in 1867. A definition
tailored to exclude them from a constitutional provision referring to
"office" inevitably focussed on the wrong attributes.
Oath of Office
Sec. 25. All civil officers, except members of the General Assembly and such
inferior officers as may be by law exempted, shall, before they enter on the duties
of their respective offices, take and subscribe the following oath or affirmation:
"I do solemnly swear (or affirm, as the case may be) that I will support the
Constitution of the United States, and the Constitution of the State of Illinois,
and that I will faithfully discharge the duties of the office of
according to the best of my ability."
And no other oath, declaration or test shall be required as a qualification.
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History
The 1818 Constitution simply required that all public officers take
an oath to support the United States and Illinois Constitutions and an
oath of office. The Schedule of that Constitution provided that justices
of the peace could administer oaths until the legislature otherwise di-
rected. Roth provisions were repeated in the 1848 Constitution and a
new oath was added: against dueling. The proposed 1922 Constitution
left this section unchanged, but nio\ed it to a new article called "Public
Servants."
Explanation
No explanation of the oath itself is necessary. From time to time
there has been litigation to determine whether a particular position
was an office and to determine whether a particular "inferior" office
had been exempted by law from the oath requirement. There has also
been litigation over the word "test." It is clear that "test" is used in
the traditional sense of
"religious test" or "political test" and, for ex-
ample, in no way precludes civil service examinations. (People ex rel.
Akin V. Loeffler, 175 111. 585 (1898).) Similarly, the Attorney General
ruled that a statute requiring an oath of ten years' residence before
taking office was not a prohibited oath. (1913 111. Att'y Gen. Rep. 220.)
Although the question has apparently never arisen, the "no other test"
presumably applies equally to members of the General Assembly not-
withstanding the opening exception. (Their oath is contained in Sec.
5, Art. IV, supra, p. 129.)
Comparative Analysis
The vast majority of the state constitutions require an oath to support
the United States Constitution, the applicable state constitution, and
to perform duties faithfully. A half dozen or so states permit some sort
of exemption by law from the oath. Approximately ten states prohibit
any other oath. The only constitutional oath in the United States
Constitution is that required of the President. The United States Con-
stitution states that "Members of the several State Legislatures, and all
executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the
several States, shall be bound by Oath of Affirmation, to support this
Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualifi-
cation to any Office or public Trust under the United States." (Art. VI.)
The Model State Constitution provides for an oath through the back
door. The Bill of Rights Article prohibits any oath except one as set
forth therein. (It is much like Section 25.) But there is no literal re-
quirement that any one take the oath.
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Comment
In the Comment on Section 5 of Article IV {supra, p. 130), a question
was raised as to the efficacy of that part of the oath requiring a detailed
disclaimer of wrong-doing. If a decision is made to preserve the de-
tailed disclaimer, the question arises, as it did in 1870, of why only legis-
lators should so swear. In short, it would seem appropriate to treat
all constitutional oath-takers — legislative, executive and judicial — alike.
In other words, one constitutional oath section might well suffice.

Article VI
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
General Introductory History
Unlike other Articles of the 1870 Constitution, Article VI is a total
revision of the Article as initially adopted. Except in minor respects,
virtually nothing remains of the original 1870 Article. The amendment
effecting this change was adopted by the voters in 1962 and became
effective January 1, 1964.
The 1962 Amendment has a history more extensive, perhaps, than any
other Article of, or amendment to, the 1870 Constitution. For this reason,
as well as the comprehensive nature of its substantive changes, it may be
helpful to the Convention members to have a brief organic development
of that history, and the major revisions contained in the Article, in this
introductory comment. This approach will not affect the established
format of this publication under which each section will have its own
History, Explayiation, Comparative Analysis and Comment, all serving as
a detailed supplement to this introduction. In respect to the detailed ex-
planation for each section, it must be noted, however, that there is very
little decisional law, since the Article has been in effect for only six years.
Pre-Gateiuay Amendment: Prior to the so-called 1950 Gateway Amend-
ment which liberalized the constitutional amendment process (see
History and Explanation, Art. XIV, Sec. 2), there had been few efforts to
amend Article VI. The rigid electorate approval requirement virtually
foreclosed any significant probability of successful amendment and
eventually discouraged efforts to secure reform, notwithstanding a
general professional consensus that Article VI of the 1870 Constitution
(which itself made little changes in the 1848 Constitutional provisions
relating to the State's Judicial Department) substantially hampered, in
many respects, the objective of an efficient system for the administration
of justice.
Post-Gateway Period: The passage of Gateway immediately inspired
the movement for amendment. A Joint Committee of the Illinois State
and Chicago Bar Associations, after extensive study, prepared a draft of
a proposed new Article in 1952. In 1951 the Illinois General Assembly,
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conscious of the momentum for change motivated by the Gateway Amend-
ment, created a legislative commission to study the needs for constitu-
tional reform and to evaluate proposals and make recommendations with
respect to these changes. The Joint Bar Committee and the Legislative
Commission cooperated extensively in seeking to arrive at an agreed
proposal for submission to the 1953 session of the General Assembly. Con-
sensus was achieved for most of the suggested changes. An impasse de-
veloped, however, on the critical issue of the method of selecting judges.
The Bar Committee insisted upon the American Bar Association pro-
posal of 1938 (also popularly known as the Missouri Plan) which pro-
vided for the selection of a slate of nominees for judicial office by non-
partisan commissions and appointment by the Governor from the nomi-
nees so designated, followed, after a brief tenure, by submission to the
electorate of the question of retaining the appointee in office for the full
term. The purpose of this proposal was to eliminate or minimize the
influence of political parties in the selection of judges. The Legislative
Commission insisted upon the retention of the partisan adversary method
of electing judges, urging that political involvement in the selection of
judges had more to commend it in principle than the proposed non-
partisan nominating commission method. An important aspect of the
Bar plan involved tenure of judges after initial selection. The Bar Com-
mittee insisted upon nonadversary, nonpartisan submission to the elec-
torate of the question of retaining the incumbent in office for another
term. This principle was also rejected by the Legislative Commission.
The conflict on this issue was largely, though not solely, responsible for
the failure of the Bar proposals to secure legislative adoption in 1953
and 1955. In 1957 the General Assembly adopted a substantially revised
version of the Bar Committee draft which contained neither element of
the selection and tenure plan endorsed by the Bar Associations. The
proposal failed by a close margin to receive electorate approval in 1958.
In 1962, the legislature accepted a variant of the 1957 compromise, re-
taining the political method of election of judges but adopting the non-
adversary election on retention. (For a more detailed description of this
compromise, see Explanation, Sec. 10, infra, pp. 356-7). Although selec-
tion and tenure of judges was a central issue in all of the proposals
for constitutional amendment, it was by no means the only major con-
cern of the legal profession and the public. The 1870 Constitution was
deficient in a number of respects. Among the more important were the
following:
(1) The absence of authority and responsibility in the Supreme Court
for the administration of the judicial system.
(2) A proliferation of trial courts of general and limited jurisdiction,
Art. VI, § 1 329
including nonrecord justice of the peace and police magistrate courts.
(3) A hybrid intermediate appellate court structure, legislatively estab-
lished, and manned by circuit judges temporarily assigned to the appel-
late courts.
(4) An allocation of mandated appellate jurisdiction to the Supreme
Court which stifled it in a mass of comparatively unimportant litiga-
tion, effectively preventing it from considering many novel and important
areas of procedural and substantive law.
The 1962 Amendment dealt with these and other matters in a significant
manner. The method of treatment is contained in the Explanation under
each of the sections. Suffice it to say in concluding this introductory
comment that Article VI, on balance, is viewed in objective professional
circles as one of the most far-reaching and constructive reforms in the
history of state constitutional efforts to establish a modern and efficient
system for the administration of justice. This is not to suggest that there
is now a perfect and unanimous consensus as to its merits or that there
is not responsible criticism of some of its features. These will be dealt
with in the appropriate places in the materials which follow.
Courts
Sec. 1. The judicial power is vested in a Supreme Court, an Appellate Court
and Circuit Courts.
History
The 1818 Constitution established only a Supreme Court but author-
ized the General Assembly to create inferior courts as it saw fit. The
Constitution of 1848 gave constitutional status to a Supreme Court, cir-
cuit courts, county courts and justices of the peace. The General Assem-
bly was authorized to establish additional inferior courts of uniform
jurisdiction in cities. The 1870 Constitution added police magistrates,
the Superior Court of Cook County, and the Criminal Court of Cook
County to the 1848 category of constitutionally established courts.
Authorization was given the legislature to establish an appellate court,
probate courts in counties of a specified population, and courts in and
for cities and incorporated towns. It should be noted that the Municipal
Court of Chicago was established, not under the authority of Article VI
of the 1870 Constitution, but under Article IV, Section 34. The conse-
quence of the establishment of the Municipal Court of Chicago was the
abolition of the offices of justices of the peace and police magistrates
in the City of Chicago. (See Explanation, Art. IV, Sec. 34, supra, pp.
250-1.)
The 1922 Convention proposal provided for a Supreme Court, an
independent appellate court, circuit and county courts and justices of
the peace. No provision was made for the creation of additional inferior
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courts by the General Assembly, but the Municipal Court of Chicago
was not affected.
Explanation
The present Section 1 has its greatest significance in (1) the simplicity
of the constitutional judicial structure and (2) the withdrawal of power
from the General Assembly to add courts to that structure. Of special
importance also is the constitutional sanction and status given to the
appellate court. Thus there is a streamlined three-tier structure of
courts — a Supreme Court, the appellate courts, and circuit courts —
which is not susceptible to legislative change.
The advantages which accrue from this simplified structure in the
critical areas of allocation of jurisdiction to the Supreme and appellate
courts and in the overall administration of the judicial system, should
be very great. Moreover, the desirability of an independent constitu-
tionally established appellate court for the first time in the state's
history is generally, if not universally, recognized. But the truly signifi-
cant reform effected by this section is in the establishment of a single
unified and integiated trial court. There is and can be only one trial
court, the circuit court. Of necessity, its jurisdiction is original and
unlimited.
To fully appreciate the import of the integrated trial court concept,
a look at the trial court structure which prevailed prior to the new
Judicial Article will be helpful. The several circuit courts and the
Superior Court of Cook County were the only trial courts of original
and unlimited jurisdiction. The justice of the peace and police magistrate
courts exercised a limited civil and quasi-criminal jurisdiction but their
principal deficiency, aside from the generally low level of competence
of their judges, most of whom were not lawyers, was the fact that they
were not courts of record. Their decisions were re-triable de novo either
in the county or circuit court at the instance of the losing party who fre-
quently failed, quite deliberately, to defend in the justice or magistrate
courts. The only other constitutionally created courts were Superior and
Criminal Courts in Cook County and the county courts. These courts, as
well as the legislatively established probate courts, municipal courts, and
city, village and incorporated town courts, but excluding the Superior
Court of Cook County, exercised only a limited jurisdiction. The appel-
late voidance of a judgment entered by one of these courts, sometimes
after years of litigation, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, was not an
uncommon occurrence.
This hodgepodge of trial courts was wasteful and inefficient. City,
village and town courts were legislatively authorized on occasion to satisfy
a political rather than a public need. Many of these courts were virtually
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staff. The system of re-trials de novo from judgments of justice and
magistrate courts was expensive, frustrating, and wasteful of judicial
time and manpower.
The integrated circuit court eliminates multiple trials and vexatious
questions of jurisdiction. A suit cannot be filed in the wrong trial court,
since there is only one trial court. Problems of venue may remain but
issues of trial court jurisdiction are eliminated. The problems of assign-
ment of cases and control of the dockets are minimized in the integrated
court with the aid of the administrative provisions established in the
Article. In the last analysis, the concept of the single trial court is
premised on the belief that every litigant is entitled to a single trial of
his cause in a court of record and a guaranteed appellate review. This is
what this section and related sections dealing wtih appellate jurisdiction
seek to accomplish.
Comparative Analysis
While 46 other state constitutions provide for a highest court, only
12 provide for an intermediate appellate court — four of these having
been authorized since 1960. Forty-two other states have constitutional
provisions establishing general trial courts. Of these, ten also provide for
separate county courts and 13 for separate probate courts. Twenty-one
states still provide for justices of the peace, a reduction of five since 1961.
At present, nearly all states authorize legislative creation of additional
trial courts of limited jurisdiction. No state expressly authorizes legisla-
tive creation of a single general trial court of unlimited jurisdiction. No
other state constitution provides for the single trial court structure estab-
lished in Illinois.
The United States Constitution establishes only a Supreme Court and
"such inferior Courts as the Congress [may provide]." The Model State
Constitution vests the judicial power in a Supreme Court, an appellate
court, a general court and inferior courts of limited jurisdiction as may
be established by law.
Comment
There appears to be no reason to quarrel with the provisions estab-
lishing Supreme and appellate courts. The single integrated trial court
has raised some sporadic criticism, largely because of the elimination of
the small claims jurisdiction of former justice of the peace and magis-
trate courts. Despite the many failings of these courts, they provide an
inexpensive and expeditious, if not necessarily a judicious, disposition
of many small claims and litigation arising out of localized disputes. And
notwithstanding the right to seek a re-trial de novo, many litigants, for
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reasons of economy, accepted the decisions of these courts as final. Under
the new system, a small claims division of circuit courts is authorized by
Supreme Court rule. If an appeal is desired, a record must be made.
This expense factor irritates many small claim litigants who would prefer
to avoid this expense. To overcome this objection, at least to some ex-
tent, provision is made in the rules of the Supreme Court for inexpensive
small claims procedures and for records which need not be printed. Inex-
pensive typewritten or other methods of producing legible records are
authorized, and other provisions permit further reduction in costs of
appeal. The advantages of the integrated trial court system seem clearly
to far outweigh the relatively minor criticisms which have been directed
against it. Given the importance of the concept, its uniqueness, and its
relationship to efficient judicial administration, it would appear that the
single, integrated trial court concept should be retained.
Administration
Sec. 2. General administrative authority over all courts in this State including
the temporary assignment of any judge to a court other than that for which
he was selected with the consent of the Chief Judge of the Circuit to which
such assignment is made, is vested in the Supreme Court and shall be exercised
by the Chief Justice in accordance with its rules. The Supreme Court shall
appoint an administrative director and staff, who shall serve at its pleasure, to
assist the Chief Justice in his administrative duties.
History
This section has no parallel in any of the prior Illinois Constitutions.
Nor did the 1922 Convention proposal deal with this subject except for
a provision authorizing temporary assignments of judges. Such adminis-
trative power as existed in the Supreme Court was of legislative origin.
Primarily, the statutes granted limited powers of assignment of judges to
serve in courts other than their own. In addition, the legislature in 1959
established the Ofhce of Court Administrator under the administration
of the Supreme Court. The powers of that ofhce were largely routine and
ministerial. The law granted no significant administrative control over
the judicial system to the Supreme Court, but it did provide the rationale
for the expression constitutionally of the principle of centralized admin-
istration of the entire judicial system by the Supreme Court.
Explanation
Under prior Constitutions, courts existed virtually as autonomous
units. A degree of administrative control was exercised in several of the
larger circuit courts, but for all practical purposes there was no admini-
strative plan or purpose to guide a massive system of courts and its judi-
cial and nonjudicial personnel. The absence of a centralized administra-
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live authority over the judicial system was conceived by proponents of
constitutional revision to be one of the major deficiencies of that system.
Judicial manpower in many areas was largely wasted. In other parts of the
state, courts were overburdened to the point of helplessness. Legislative
palliatives authorizing transfer of judges were only partially satisfactory.
To rectify this gaping flaw in the judicial system, this section estab-
lishes general administrative authority over all courts in the Supreme
Court to be exercised by its Chief Justice with the assistance of an ad-
ministrative director and staff. These provisions, together with the pro-
visions of Section 8 providing for administrative responsibility in the
chief judge of each circuit court, subject to the authority of the Supreme
Court, should provide the mechanism for a coordinated and efficient
administration of the judicial system.
This section was not intended to deal with rule-making power respect-
ing practice and procedure in the courts. Legislative history derived from
prior drafts submitted to and considered by the legislature, as well as
other contemporaneous history, make it clear that this section is not a
general grant of authority to the Court to adopt rules of practice and
procedure. Rule-making authority is granted to the Supreme Court in
particular instances (see Sec. 5
—
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court, infra, pp. 338-9; Sec. 7
— rules for inexpensive and expeditious
appeals and for appeal of nonfinal judgments of the circuit courts, infra,
p. 345), but no general grant of rule-making power is made. Of interest
in this connection was the recent assertion by the Supreme Court of an
inherent rule-making power in the Court in a specific instance of a legis-
lative rule confficting with a Supreme Court rule. (People ex rel. Stamos
v. Jones, 40 111. 2d 62 (1968).) The case does not, however, deny the
existence of a concurrent or independent legislative rule-making power.
(See Explanation, Art. Ill, supra, p. 102, for an additional discussion of
the Stamos case.)
Comparative Analysis
Nearly one-third of the state constitutions provide for administrative
control in some form by the state's highest court. Of these, however, only
five have a constitutional office similar to the administrative director pro-
vided by Illinois, and four of these were established since 1959.
The Constitution of the United States has no comparable provision.
The Model State Constitution contains basically the same administra-
tive provision.
Comment
^
It would appear that a grant of administrative power to the Supreme
Court deserves constitutional rather than legislative status. Given the
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unhappy history of the past and the critical importance of centralized
administrative control, the case for retention of this section is strong.
Judicial Districts
Sec. 3. The State is divided into five Judicial Districts for the selection of
judges of die Supreme and Appellate Courts. The First Judicial District consists
of the county of Cook. The remainder of the State shall be divided by law into
four Judicial Districts of substantially equal population, each of which shall
be compact and composed of contiguous countries.
History
Geographic representation in state courts became a constitutional
principle in the 1848 Constitution. Supreme Court representation was
tied to three grand divisions, and circuit judges were elected from nine
judicial districts. Under the 1818 Constitution, Supreme Court justices
and the judges of inferior courts were appointed by joint ballot of the
two houses of the General Assembly and commissioned by the Governor.
Nothing in that Constitution suggested area representation as relevant
to the selection of judges. The 1870 Constitution continued the 1848
precedent but mandated seven districts, from each of which one Supreme
Court justice would be elected. The districts were defined in the Consti-
tution but legislative alteration was authorized. Judicial circuits were
also to be established by law for the election of circuit judges. The 1922
Convention proposal contained the 1870 provisions virtually unchanged.
The 1870 Constitution authorized legislative establishment of appellate
courts, with districts to be defined by law. The 1922 Convention pro-
posal did not provide for appellate court election districts. It provided
instead that appellate court judges would he appointed by the Supreme
Court.
Explanation
The present Article adheres to the principle of geographic represen-
tation for the election of judges. Two major changes from the 1870
requirements were made. The first was the reduction from seven to five
in the number of judicial districts for the selection of Supreme Court
judges, and the second was the designation of Cook County as one of
these districts. The four districts other than the Cook County district
were to be legislatively adjusted to maintain substantial equality of
population. With the creation of the new appellate court, the new
section provided that the five districts would also be the area basis for
the selection of appellate court judges.
The problem of area representation for judicial selection of judges
serving in a state-wide capacity (as distinguished from judges elected for
and serving defined political subdivisions such as circuits, counties and
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cities) is a troublesome one. It is dithcult to see any rational relationship
between Supreme and appellate court judicial service and the principle
of limited geographic representation. The Constitution of the United
States and the constitutions of those states which provide for the appoint-
ment of Supreme Court judges do not mandate area representation. It is
difficult to equate the administration of justice with a particular con-
stituency represented by a defined but impermanent set of county boun-
daries or other standard of area measurement. The Joint Committee
of the Illinois State and Chicago Bar Associations, in its earlier deliber-
ations and drafts, indeed proposed the selection of all or part of the
Supreme and appellate court judges on a state-wide basis. Legislative
resistance, based largely on tradition and considerations of political and
public expediency, ultimately resulted in the decision to retain the prin-
ciple of area representation for the selection of these judges, except for
the changes in the 1870 provision already noted.
In connection with this issue it is important to note that the one
man-one vote principle applicable to legislative representation has not
been determined by the United States Supreme Court to be applicable
to judicial elections. Such limited judicial precedent as exists suggests the
contrary. Thus, in Romiti v. Kerner (256 F. Supp. 35 (N.D. 111. 1966)),
the federal district court rejected a taxpayer's challenge that the district-
ing provisions of this section and the allocation of judges under Section
4 denied him the equal protection of the law, strongly hinting — though
not deciding — that the one man-one vote principle was not applicable.
Comparative Analysis
Two-thirds of the states have a constitutional provision for the elec-
tion of judges of the highest court. Of these, however, only nine, exclud-
ing Illinois, elect high court judges from districts. All other states
provide for "at-large" elections.
In contrast, all seven states which provide for the election of appellate
court judges create judicial election districts. Apparently only one state,
Louisiana, provides for judicial election districts for both Supreme and
appellate court judges.
Since the Model State Constitution provides for the appointment of
judges to the Supreme, appellate, and general trial courts, there is no
provision for election districts. Presumably, the legislature may establish
districts. The Constitution of the United States, for like reason, has no
provisions for election districts.
Comment
Whatever the merits of area representation as applied to statewide
judicial service, the principle is so deeply ingrained in constitutional
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history and tradition that any attempt to repeal or aker it would, in all
probability, cause substantial political and public reverberations. It is
doubtful that there is any merit in provoking this kind of controversy.
As to the establishment of Cook County as a separate and single county
judicial district (as contrasted witli the 1870 provision which grouped
Cook, Lake, Will, Kankakee and DuPage Counties into a single district),
it would seem that if area and jjojjulation representation is the acce]:)t-
able principle, the provision should be retained. It should be noted, how-
ever, that the 1870 districts were subject to legislative alteration, but that
the designation in the present section establishes Cook County perma-
nently as a single judicial district. The judgment here was that in all
probability Cook County would continue to have approximately 50
per cent of the state's population for a considerable period into the
future.
Supreme Court — Organization
Sec. 4. The Supreme Court shall consist of seven judges, three of whom
shall be selected from the First Judicial District and one each from the Second,
Third, Fourth and Fifth Judicial Districts. Four judges shall constitute a
quorum and the concurrence of four shall be necessary to a decision. The judges
of the Supreme Court shall select one of their number to serve as Chief Justice
for a term of three years.
History
The 1818 Constitution established a four-man Supreme Court with
legislative authorization to increase the number. The 1848 Constitution
reduced the membership to three and eliminated the legislative author-
ization to increase the number. The 1870 Constitution established the
number of Supreme Court justices as seven.
Quorum. The 1818 and 1848 Constitutions established a two-member-
ship quorum requirement. The 1870 Constitution increased this to four.
Districts. The 1818 Constitution had no district specifications. Supreme
Court justices were appointed by the General Assembly and commis-
sioned by the Governor. As noted in the History of Section 3 (supra, p.
334), the 1848 Constitution introduced the district concept with provision
for the election of a judge from each of three districts. However, the legis-
lature w^as authorized to provide for state-wide elections. The 1870
Constitution established seven election districts and eliminated the 1848
authorization for state-wide elections.
Chief Justice. The 1818 Constitution provided for a Chief Justice but
was silent as to the method of designation. The 1848 Constitution placed
this mantle upon the judge having the oldest commission. The 1870 Con-
stitution provided for election of the Chief Justice by other members of
the Court with no period of service designated. The Court by rule pro-
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vided for annual rotation of the position among the judges.
The 1922 Convention proposal dealt with these matters as follows:
Number of Judges: Nine, with three being elected from the district
containing Cook County.
Qiwrum Requirement: Majority for a quorum; five for a decision.
Districts: Seven.
Chief Justice, Selection and Tenure: Selection by judges of Supreme
Court; no provision for a term.
Explanation
The present Article changed the 1870 provisions in the following
important respects:
(1) Reduction in the number of Supreme Court judicial districts from
seven to five.
(2) Establishment of Cook County as one of the five districts.
(3) Reallocation of the seven judges so that three justices would be
selected from Cook County and one justice from each of the other four
districts.
(4) Establishment of a three-year term of service for the Chief Justice.
Unchanged were the number of judges, the quorum requirement of
four, and the requirement that the members of the Court elect the Chief
Justice.
The Explanation of Section 3 above touched directly or indirectly
upon points (1), (2) and (3) which deal with the districting principle.
The increase to three in the number of Supreme Court judges to be
selected from the Cook County district was a consequence of adherence
to the district standard for the election of judges. With Cook County
generating more than 50 per cent of the state's judicial business, and
possessing approximately one-half the state's population, the political
and professional pressures to equalize the representation of that district
on the Court were substantial. Three-sevenths of the total was accepted
as a reasonable adjustment.
With the provisions of the new Article vesting administrative authority
in the Supreme Court to be exercised pursuant to its rules by the Chief
Justice and Adiministrative Director and staff (Sections 1 and 2), it was
thought desirable to mandate a minimum three-year term as Chief Jus-
tice. The absence of a specified term could have led to the continuation
of the Supreme Court's annual rotation rule. A longer term of adminis-
trative responsibility was deemed necessary for administrative efficiency.
The three-year term seeks to accomplish this objective. Nothing in this
section precludes the reappointment of the Chief Justice for additional
terms.
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Comparative Analysis
As was noted in the Comparative Analysis of Section 3 above, two-thirds
of the states elect high court judges, nine states with judicial districts
and 24 at large. Eleven states appoint high court judges, normally by the
governor or legislature or a combination of both. The iModel State Con-
stitution provides for the apjjointment of the justices by the governor
with the advice and consent of the unicameral legislature.
About four-fifths of all state constitutions deal in some fashion with
the size of the state's highest court. Twenty-four states, excluding Illinois,
set a specific size. Of these, 15 set the size at seven judges. Delaware
with three, provides the smallest membership, and Mississippi, with
nine, the largest. The average is six to seven. Sixteen states, however,
set either a maximum and minimum or a recommended size with pro-
visions for increases and decreases, typically as directed by the legis-
lature or the Court itself.
Only four states — Kansas, Nebraska, Maryland and Michigan — have
provisions similar to those of Illinois with respect to both size and
selection.
Thirty-two other states provide a quorum requirement. Of these, 24
require a majority, four more than a majority, and four less than a
majority.
Only 28 other states set a voting or decision requirement, however.
Twenty-one states require a majority for a decision, four require less
than a majority of all judges, and three require more than a majority
at times.
Only nine other states provide for the Court itself to select the Chief
Justice. Four states provide for appointment by the governor or legis-
lature. Nine states provide that the justice with the shortest term remain-
ing becomes Chief Justice. Five make the justice with the oldest com-
mission the Chief Justice.
Four other states set a term for the position of Chief Justice, ranging
from two to six years.
The Constitution of the United States, of course, specifies the term of
office to be
"during good Behavior." Selection is by presidential appoint-
ment with the advice and consent of the Senate. No mention is made of
the size of the Court or the selection and terms of the Chief Justice. The
Model State Constitution is silent on the subjects of quorum, voting,
and selection and term of the Chief Justice.
Comment
There is no evidence of professional or public dissatisfaction with the
provisions of this section. The only potentially controversial provision
is that which allocates three Supreme Court judges to Cook County. Yet
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it is difficult to argue against this allocation if area representation is
retained as a constitutional principle. Moreover, a reduction in the num-
ber of judges for Cook County would surely engender a bitter political
controversy. It is doubtful whether the issue is of such importance as
to risk a sharp partisan fight.
Supreme Court — Jurisdiction
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court may exercise original jurisdiction in cases relating
to the revenue, mandamus, prohibition and habeas corpus, such original juris-
diction as may be necessary to the complete determination of any cause on
review, and only appellate jurisdiction in all other cases.
Appeals from the final judgments of circuit courts shall lie directly to the
Supreme Court as a matter of right only (a) in cases involving revenue, (b) in
cases involving a question arising under the Constitution of the United States
or of this State, (c) in cases of habeas corpus, and (d) by the defendant from
sentence in capital cases. Subject to law hereafter enacted, the Supreme Court
has authority to provide by rule for appeal in other cases from the circuit courts
directly to the Supreme Court.
Appeals from the Appellate Court shall lie to the Supreme Court as a matter
of right only (a) in cases in which a question under the Constitution of the
United States or of this State arises for the first tima in and as a result of the
action of the Appellate Court, and (b) upon the certification by a division
of the Appellate Court that a case decided by it involves a question of such
importance that it should be decided by the Supreme Court. Subject to rules,
appeals from the Appellate Court to the Supreme Court in all other cases shall
be by leave of the Supreme Court.
History
The 1818 Constitution gave original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court
in cases relating to the revenue, in cases of mandamus, and in such cases
of impeachment "as may be required to be tried before it," and appellate
jiuisdiction apparently without qualification. The impeachment pro-
vision is somewhat curious, as the Legislative Article granted the "sole
power of impeaching" to the House of Representatives with the trial to
be conducted by the Senate. The 1848 Constitution added habeas corptts
to the category of original jurisdiction, and otherwise re-enacted the 1818
provision, including the impeachment reference. The 1870 Constitution
re-enacted the 1848 provisions respecting original and appellate juris-
diction, eliminating, however, the impeachment reference. With the
authorization in the 1870 Constitution for the establishment of appel-
late courts, the Supreme Court's mandatory appellate jurisdiction was
extended to include judgments "in all criminal cases and cases in which a
franchise or freehold or the validity of a statute is involved, and in such
other cases as may be provided by law."
The proposed 1922 Constitution gave the Supreme Court original
jurisdiction in cases relating to the revenue, in quo warranto, mandamus,
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habeas corpus, prohibition and other cases involving cjuestions of great
piihh'c importance, and appelhite jurischction in all other cases. In a
separate section entitled "Apjjeals and Writs oi IJror," it was also pro-
\ided that a])peals }nny be prosecuted "to oi Ironi the supreme court in
all criminal cases wiiere the punishment allowed by law may be death
or imprisonment in the penitentiary and in cases where a franchise or a
freehold or the validity of a statute is involved . . . and to or from the
supreme court in all other cases."
Explanation
The present Article adds to the original jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court the authority to entertain writs of prohibition, while retaining
revenue, mandamus and habeas corpus. The grant of original jurisdiction
is couched in language of discretion and not mandate. The 1870 grant
had been construed to reach the same result, the Court holding that in
the cases enumerated the circuit courts enjoyed concurrent jurisdiction.
(People ex rel. Taylor v. Board of Educ, 197 111. 43 (1902).) Experience
teaches that the Supreme Court will accept original jurisdiction in only
the most pressing of circumstances,- normally when time is of the essence
in construing important legislative enactments.
The great significance of the present section is in its severe proscrip-
tion of the mandatory appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Be-
cause of this mandated jurisdiction deriving from prior Constitutional
provisions, the Court, as a practical matter, had little fiexibility in the
exercise of its discretion to control or limit appeals to it. In addition to
appeals from different courts in common la^v actions, the legislating
established review responsibility in the Supreme Court in almost all in-
stances of administrative action. And, as noted, with the establishment
by law of appellate courts pursuant to Section 11 of the 1870 Constitu-
tion, mandatory apj^ellate jurisdiction from the judgments of those courts
was constitutionally imposed "in all criminal cases and cases in ^vhich a
franchise or freehold or the validity of a statute is involved, and in such
other cases as may be provided by law."
The effect of this open-ended mandatory appellate responsibility was
to enmesh the Court in a mass of relatively unimportant litigation, leav-
ing it little room for exercising its discretionary appellate jurisdiction in
important and novel issues. A major objective of the new Article was to
make the Supreme Comt, in fact as well as in name, the pinnacle of the
state judicial system by assuring that it would be primarily concerned
with issues of paramount importance. This was aciiieved by severely
circumscribing ajjjjeals as of right from the circuit and apj^ellate courts
to the Supreme Court. Thus under the existing provisions, litigants may
appeal a final judgment of the circuit court directly to the Supreme
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Court only in the four types of cases enumerated in the second paragraph
ot this section. Appeals as of right from the appellate court to the
Supreme Court are limited to the two situations designated in the last
paragraph of this section. However, the Supreme Court is granted the
authority to permit direct appeals from the circuit court and other
appeals from the appellate court in cases other than those which it is
required to take. By this combination of limited mandatory appellate
jurisdiction and discretionary authority to accept other cases for review,
the Supreme Court can now fulfill the function of resolving the litiga-
tion and issues of greatest importance to the state. Many of the cases
formerly heard by it are now shifted to the jurisdiction of the appellate
court, thus assuring the objective of a single trial and a single judicial
review by a competent judicial tribunal in every case.
Several important decisions under this section deserve reference. In
First National Bank & Trust Co. r;. City of Evanston (30 111. 2d 479 1964)),
the Court construed the provision that appeal as a matter of right from
the circuit court lies "in cases involving a question arising under the
Constitution of the United States or this State" and refused to give it an
exact and literal interpretation. Instead, it adopted the "substantial
question" test as employed by the United States Supreme Court in the
exercise of its discretionary jurisdiction. Conceding the difficulty of
applying that test, the Court nevertheless observed that the purpose of the
Judicial Article "seems clearly to have been to relieve [the Supreme Court]
of the bulk of its mandatory appellate jurisdiction and to establish
instead a basic pattern of discretionary review of determinations of the
Appellate Court," and that in the light of that purpose the Court could
deny jurisdiction in a case raising a constitutional issue if in its judg-
ment the issue did not meet the test of substantiality. The principle has
been applied in a number of criminal cases wherein constitutional
issues were raised and preserved and in each of which the cause was
transferred to the appellate court because the issues were not "fairly
debatable" or "substantial." (People v. Wolfson, 34 111. 2d 585 (1966);
People V. Hale, 31 111. 2d 200 (1964); People v. Arbuckle, 31 111. 2d 163
(1964).) Nevertheless in People v. Perry (34 111. 2d 229 (1966)), the Court
assumed jurisdiction of a cause in which a constitutional issue was raised
though it did not find it necessary to rule on the issue, a not unlikely
occurrence where the Rule of Substantiality is itself grounded in judicial
discretion.
In People v. Turner (31 111. 2d 197 (1964)), the Court interpreted the
provision for appeal as a matter of right "from sentences in capital cases"
as excluding a case in which a life sentence and not a sentence of capital
punishment had been imposed. In People v. Nasfi (36 111. 2d 275 (1966)),
the Court held it had jurisdiction to review directly a sentence of im-
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prisonment for a term of 99 years to 150 years in a case in which the
defendant was tried for murder. Though obscurely developed, the appeal
appears to raise issues of procedural due process.
The effect of these interpretations is to protect the Court from appel-
late jurisdiction in numerous cases in which a constitutional issue is
raised spuriously for the purpose of securing a Supreme Court review or
where indeed the issue is not
"fairly debatable" or "substantial." Fairly
administered, this approach by the Supreme Court would seem in accord
with the spirit if not the literal language of the section.
Comparative Analysis
Although the Comparatwe Analysis of the Michigatt Constitutiuu
(C.A.M.C., vii-8) cautions that "[i]t is quite difficult to compare state
constitutions with respect to their provisions for the jurisdiction of the
highest court," the Index Digest of State Constitutions (Index) indicates
that some general observations can be made.
While nearly half of all states provide the high court with some original
jurisdiction, only eight others give it original jurisdiction over cases re-
lating to habeas corpus, seven to mandamus, five to prohibition, one to
revenue, and three "as necessary." On the other hand, nearly three-fourths
of the states provide some form of mandatory appellate jurisdiction in
terms of a case description. All others providing mandatory appellate
jurisdiction do so in terms of a combination of case description and court,
or by court alone. While only about one-sixth of the states provide dis-
cretionary appellate jurisdiction, nearly half authorize the court to issue
writs in aid of its jurisdiction.
The Constitution of the United States grants the Supreme Court
original jurisdiction in "all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls" and those in which a state is a party. In all other
justiciable matters enumerated in Article III, Section 2, the Supreme
Court is given appellate jurisdiction, "both as to Law and Fact, with
such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make."
The Model State Constitution provides the high court with original
jurisdiction in two particular areas, review of legislative redistricting and
all matters concerning the governor, and "in all other cases as provided by
law." Appellate jurisdiction is granted in all cases arising under the
state and federal constitutions, and "in all other cases as provided by law."
Comment
The provisions of this section limiting the mandatory appellate juris-
diction of the Supreme Court are among the most important in the
Judicial Article. It is a fair estimate that the limitation has thus far
operated in a manner consistent with its purpose. The work load of the
individual members of the Court has not been reduced; rather, their
Art. VI, § 6 343
efforts are now expended in the important areas defined and in the addi-
tionally important areas which are brought within the Court's discretion-
ary appellate jurisdiction. There appears to be no professional or other
opinion which is critical of the substance or application of this section.
Appellate Court — Organization
Sec. 6. The Appellate Court shall be organized in the five Judicial Districts.
Until otherwise provided by law, the court shall consist of twenty-four judges,
twelve of whom shall be selected from the First Judicial District and three each
from the Second, Third, Fourth and Fifth Judicial Districts. The Supreme
Court shall have authority to assign additional judges to service in the Appellate
Court from time to time as the business of the Court requires. There shall be
such number of divisions, of not less than three judges each, as the Supreme
Court shall prescribe. Assignments to divisions shall be made by the Supreme
Court and a judge may be assigned to a division in a district other than the
district in which such judge resides with the consent of a majority of the judges
of the district to which such assignment is made. The majority of a division
shall constitute a quorum and the concurrence of a majority of the division shall
be necessary to a decision of the Appellate Court. There shall be at least one
division in each Appellate District and each division shall sit at times and places
prescribed by rules of the Supreme Court.
History
A constitutionally authorized appellate court, intermediate between
the trial and Supreme courts, first appears in the 1870 Constitution (Art.
VI, Sec. 1, supra, p. 329). Its origin and status were both constitutional
and legislative but its establishment, and thus presumably its continu-
ation, was left to the discretionary power of the legislature. The con-
stitutional authorization did not include provision for a separate and
distinct judiciary. Instead it was provided that the court would be
manned by "such number of judges of the circuit courts" and sit in
"such time and places and in such manner, as may be provided by law."
By law, appointments were made by the Supreme Court.
Judges of the Superior Court of Cook County, being determined to
have the same constitutional status as circuit judges, were qualified to sit
on the appellate court established for Cook County. At the time of the
adoption of the Judicial Article in 1962 there were four legislatively
established district appellate courts. Cook County was designated as the
First District and the remaining three districts sat respectively at Ottawa,
Springfield and Mount Vernon. The Cook County District was organ-
ized into three divisions of three judges each. The Second District had
two divisions and the Third and Fourth Districts had one division each.
Each division had three judges assigned to it by the Supreme Court. The
1870 Constitution had no provision respecting quorum or the number of
judges necessary for a decision. It prohibited additional compensation
for circuit judges assigned to appellate court service.
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The proposed 1922 Constitution established a constitutional appellate
court consisting of four districts. The districts, or divisions if applicable,
were to sit where provided "by law." i\o mention was made of a quorum
or decisional requirement. In a remarkable departure from the 1870
provisions, the Supreme Court was given the power to appoint all appel-
late court judges, and no requirement was made that such judges be
selected from judges sitting on a circuit or lower coint.
Explanation
The appellate court (or courts) established pursuant to the 1870 Con-
stitution was hybrid in character. Having neither a permanent constitu-
tional status nor its own judiciary, it lacked the independence and pres-
tige essential to a properly conceived judicial system. Though it served
well, and often with distinction, there was little question among most
proponents of judicial reform that a new and independent intermediate
appellate court structure was a constitutional imperative.
This section establishes the essential structure of the appellate court.
Its most important features are (not necessarily in order of priority or
importance):
(1) A permanent constitutional status.
(2) The establishment of the court into the five judicial districts pro-
vided by Section 3, thus coordinating the districts for the selection of
Supreme and appellate court judges.
(3) Providing for the selection of the courts' own judiciary.
(4) Designation of the number of judges, initially 24, divided equally
between the Cook County district and the four remaining districts, which
number is subject to legislative change.
(5) Administrative authority in the Supreme Court to
(a) assign additional judges (presumably circuit and associate circuit
judges, although assignment of a Supreme Court judge is not
prohibited) to appellate coiut service as the business of the court
demands:
(b) assign, subject to majority consent oi the appellate judges of the
district, an appellate court justice to a district other than the
district in which he resides;
(c) establish such number of divisions in each judicial district, of
not less than three judges each, as the Supreme Court deter-
mines to be necessary; and
(d) prescribe the times and places where each division shall sit.
(6) Designation of a majority of a division as necessary to a quorum
and a decision.
The detail embraced in this section may seem at first blush to estab-
lish too rigid a structure and too many substantive principles which
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might better be left to legislative determination. In fact the structure
is most flexible, permitting a wide latitude of administrative authority in
the Supreme Court, and an important measure of legislative discretion
in determining the number of judges.
Judicial implementation of these provisions has been effective. The
First District has been divided into four divisions; the other districts
remain with one division each. A presiding judge of each division is
also authorized by rule. The assignment power has been employed to
good advantage by the Supreme Court to meet the substantially increased
jurisdictional responsibilities of the appellate court.
Comparative Analysis
As stated in the Comparatixie Analysis of Article VI, Section 1 (supra,
p 331), only 13 states, including Illinois, or slightly more than one-fourth
of all states, have constitutional provisions for an intermediate appellate
court. The organization of each system varies considerably from jurisdic-
tion to jurisdiction.
The Constitution of the United States itself establishes no intermediate
appellate court. The federal courts are established by Congress pursuant
to the constitutional provision vesting the judicial power in a Supreme
Court, "and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time
ordain and establish." —
The Model State Constitution establishes an intermediate appellate
court, but does not define its organization in detail.
Comment
There appears to be much support for and little observable complaint
about the concept of an independent intermediate appellate court. Nor
is there any evidence that the section as structured is in need of revision
in any significant respect. Such problems as have arisen have been quite
manageable, thanks to the flexibility and scope of the administrative
power of the Supreme Court.
Appellate Court— Jurisdiction
Sec. 7. In all cases, other than those appealable directly to the Supreme
Court, appeals from final judgments of a Circuit Court lie as a matter of right
to the Appellate Court in the district in which the Circuit Comt is located,
except that after a trial on the merits in a criminal case, no appeal shall lie
from a judgment of acqiu'ttal. The Supreme Comt shall provide by rule for
expeditious and inexpensive appeals. The Appellate Court may exercise such
original jurisdiction as may be necessary to the complete determination of any
cause on review. The Supreme Court may provide bv rule for appeals to the
Appellate Court from other than final judgments of the Circuit Court. The
Appellate Court shall have such powers of direct review of administrative action
as may be provided by law.
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History
The 1870 Constitution left the jurisdiction of the appellate court to
the discretion of the General Assembly. The provision was quite simple
and general and was utilized by the legislature to relieve the Supreme
Court of some of its awesome burdens of constitutionally and legislatively
mandated direct appellate responsibility.
The proposed 1922 Constitution j^rovided simply that appeals from
circuit and county courts to the appellate court could be had in all cases,
other than those involving direct appeal to the Supreme Court, as pre-
scribed by Supreme Court rules. No mention was made of the cost of
appeals, original jurisdiction, nonfinal judgments, or direct review of
administrative decisions.
Explanation
The appellate jurisdictional philosophy of the Judicial Article, partially
explored in Section 5 dealing with the Supreme Court, is completed and
fully disclosed in this section. An ajjpeal lies as a matter of right to the
appellate court from all final judgments of the circuit court except in
those cases in which appeal as a matter of right lies directly to the
Supreme Court. Thus an aggrieved litigant has a constitutional right of
appeal either to the appellate or Supreme Court in respect to final judg-
ments of the trial court. In addition, the Supreme Court may by rule
authorize appeals to the appellate court from other than final judg-
ments of the circuit court. This discretionary power, not normally to be
expansively exercised, recognizes that substantial rights may be threat-
ened or impaired by interlocutory or other nonfinal trial court orders,
for which immediate appellate review should be available.
The effect of the jurisdictional allocation designated here and in
Section 5 is to enhance the importance of the appellate court by mak-
ing it the final arbiter in the vast majority of cases which it decides.
The discretionary power of the Supreme Court to accept appeals from
the appellate court in cases other than those which it is constitutionally
required to take assures an additional final appellate review in cases
determined by the Supreme Court to be of sufficient importance to justi-
fy such action.
The provision which precludes an appeal from a judgment of acquit-
tal after a trial on the merits of a criminal case was inserted out of a
sense of extreme caution, it having been urged that an otherwise uncon-
ditioned right of appeal would repeal the double jeopardy provision of
Article II, Section 10.
The elimination of the non-record justice and magistrate courts and
the consequent probability of increased appellate review of decisions
formerly terminated by a re-trial de novo of decisions of such courts
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led to the inclusion of the provision that the Supreme Court shall pro-
vide by rule for expeditious and inexpensive appeals. The cost problem
was equally troublesome in other appeals. The direction is at best a
pious and unenforceable pronouncement. Indeed it may be largely
meaningless, since "inexpensive" and "expeditious" are largely abstract
and relative concepts. Yet the Supreme Court has responded to this
direction and by rule has eliminated the need of abstracts and the re-
cjuirement of printed briefs in cases assignable to magistrates, as well
as permitting the preparation of abstracts and briefs by methods less ex-
pensive than printing in other cases.
Of special importance may be the provision authorizing the General
Assembly to provide for direct review of administrative action by the
appellate court. Presently, as well as in the past, most review proceed-
ings were initiated in a trial court with appeal either to the appellate
or Supreme Court. The Illinois Administrative Review Act (111. Rev.
Stat. ch. 110, §§264-279 (1967)) provides for this pattern in all review
actions which are covered by that law. The new provision allows for
a technique of review, similar to that which prevails in several areas of
federal practice, whereby the public interest is deemed to be best served
by permitting direct appellate court review of administrative decisions.
Though not as yet utilized by the legislature, the provision permits a
desirable flexibility in methods of reviewing administrative action.
There have been fairly substantial amounts of litigation and appellate
decisions interpreting provisions of this section. The most important
cases deal with the power of the appellate court to determine consti-
tutional issues when the Supreme Court has transferred a cause to the
appellate court because the constitutional issues raised were not "fairly
debatable" or "substantial" for purposes of direct appeal to the Supreme
Court. (See Explanation of Sec. 5, supra, pp. 339-41.) In People v. Valen-
tine (60 111. App. 2d 339 (1965)), the First District Appellate Court
considered the effect of such a transfer. It rejected both the defendant-
appellant's contention that its power to hear and determine constitu-
tional questions was unlimited and the state's contention that it totally
lacked power to decide constitutional issues. It then proceeded to review
the entire case, including the constitutional issues.
In Belden Manufacturing Co. v. Chicago Threaded Fasteners, Inc.
(84 111. App. 2d 336 (1967)), the appellate court assumed that a transfer
of the cause to it after the Supreme Court had first denied a motion for
transfer, heard oral argument, and then entered an order to the effect
that it had no jurisdiction, constituted a rejection on the merits of the
constitutional issues raised by the appellant. There appears to be no
Supreme Court decision or rule definitely resolving this issue at this time.
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Other litigation concerns the "final order" requirement lor appellate
review. Illustrative is Peof^le v. Miller (85 111. 2d 62 (19()())), wherein
the order ol the circuit court denying delendant's motions to dismiss
rape counts in the indictment was held to he an interlocutory and not
a final order, and that {onsccjuc luly the appellate court had no juris-
diction ol an appeal liom that order. Other decisions establish and
aflnin the constitutional re(|uiiement ol liual order loi pur])Oscs ol aj)-
pellate court review. {Sec Smith \. Lewis, 85 111. App. 2d 24() (19()7)
order relative to master's lees held interlocutory); La Salle Nat'l Bank
V. Little Bill ".S.H" Flavors Stores, Inc., 80 111. Ap]). 2d 298 (HKi/); Schoen
V. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 77 111. Apj). 2d 815 (196()): Robinson v. City
ol Geneseo, 77 111. App. 2d .'^08 (19(i(i).)
Several decisions interpreting the provision prohibiting appellate
review ol a judgment of accpiittal in a criminal case after a trial on the
merits are worth noting. In People v. Blauehetl {Ti 111. 2tl 527 (1965)),
it \vas held that an uncjualified reversal of a criminal verdict of guilty
ijy the a]:)pellate court did not constitute a judgment of ac([uittal from
which an appeal would not lie. In I'ilUige of Park Forest v. lir'(i!;g (.88
111. 2d 225 (1967)), a municipality was held entitled to appeal a judg-
ment ac(|uitting the defendant of an ordinance viotation on the ground
that the jjroceeding, though cpiasi-criminal in character, was civil in
form and thus not within the intent of the constitutional ban on appeals.
Comparative Analysis
Of the states providing for an intermediate court of appeals, nine pro-
vide for appeaf in some areas as a matter of right. The other three estab-
lish ajjpellate jurisdiction "as prescribed by law." Only two states provide
for direct appeals of administrative decisions, and only one mentions
appeal from nonfinal orders. Only one prohibits the state from appealing
an accjuittal in criminal cases, and only one mentions costs of appeal. "Lhe
Constitution of the United States has no comparable provisions.
The Model State Constitution provides only that the appellate court
will have such jurisdiction as is provided by law.
Comment
The constitutional j^lan of allocation of appellate responsibility be-
tween the Supreme and appellate couits aiul the experience thereiuuler
to date seem to jjrovide vindication for the underlying philosophy of
the Article. Of course any alteration of the jurisdictional provisions of
this section would of necessity involve reconsideration antl amendment
of Section 5 as well. The necessity for revision is not only not apparent;
it would appear to be unwarranted.
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Circuit Courts— Judicial Circuits
Sec. 8. The State shall be divided into judicial circuits each consisting of
one or more counties. The county of Cook shall constitute a judicial circuit
and the judicial circuits within the Second, Third, Fourth and Fifth Appellate
Districts, respectively, shall be as established from time to time by law. Any
judicial circuit composed of more than one county shall be compact and of
contia;uous counties.
There shall be one circuit court for each judicial circuit which shall have
such number of circuit and associate judges and magistrates as may be pre-
scribed by law; provided, that there shall be at least twelve associate judges
elected from the area in Cook County outside the City of Chicago and at least
thirty-six associate judges from the City of Chicago. In Cook County, the City
of Chicago and the area outside the City of Chicago shall be separate units
for the election or selection of associate judges. All associate judges from said
area outside the City of Chicago shall run at large from said area, such area
apportionment of associate judges shall continue until changed by law. There
shall be at least one associate judge from each county. There shall be no masters
in chancery or other fee officers in the judicial system.
The circuit judges and associate judges in each circuit shall select one of the
circuit judges to serve at their pleasure as Chief Judge of such circuit. Subject
to the authority of the Supreme Court, the Chief Judge shall have general
administrative authority in the court, including authority to provide for divi-
sions, general or specialized, and for appropriate times and places of holding
court. The General Assembly shall limit or define the matters to be assigned
to magistrates.
History
Circuit courts, in name, found their first constitutional identity in
the 1848 Constitution. The 1818 Constitution established only a Supreme
Court, delegating authority to create "inferior courts" to the General
Assembly. The 1870 Constitution continued and built upon the circuit
court concept, providing for their establishment in Cook County and
generally on a multicounty basis for the remainder of the state. The
1848 and 1870 Constitutions also established or alternatively authorized
the establishment by law of courts of lesser geographic and jurisdictional
scope than the circuit court. The General Introductory History and the
Explanation of Section 1 {supra, pp. 328-9) have treated such lesser con-
stitutional and statutory courts.
The establishment of the district or circuit structure for circuit courts
was also first established in the 1848 Constitution, wherein provision
was made for the division of the state into nine judicial districts. The
1870 Constitution continued the concept, authorizing circuits (other than
Cook County) formed of "contiguous counties in as nearly compact form
and as nearly equal as circumstances will permit, having due regard to
business territory and population," but with a maximum circuit popula-
tion of 100,000. One circuit judge was authorized for each such circuit.
Authority was granted, however, to establish larger circuits by law, with
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a maximum of lour judges to be elected in each circuit.
None of the prior Constitutions dealt with the remaining provisions
in the present Section 8.
The 1922 Convention proposal was substantially the same as the 1870
constitutional provisions.
Explanation
In this section (and in the jurisdictional grant in Section 9, infra, p.
353) we see the full flowering of the integrated trial court concept—one of
several great objectives of the new Judicial Article. All trial courts, consti-
tutional and statutory, established prior to the new Article, were abol-
ished, and all their powers, functions, and jurisdiction vested in a single
circuit court for each judicial circuit. The nonrecord justice and magis-
trate courts, and the courts of record of limited jurisdiction, e.g., county,
probate, city and village, municipal, and the specially established courts
in Cook County, were merged into a single circuit court for each judicial
circuit as established by law, with Cook County being constitutionally
designated, as in the 1870 Constitution, a single and separate judicial
circuit. To maintain a desired continuity in the trial and appellate rela-
tionship, all circuits were to be established within the newly created five
judicial districts.
The central and important substantive aspects of this section, beyond
those already mentioned, deal with the following matters:
(1) The classification of the circuit court judiciary into three levels,
e.g., circuit judges, associate judges, and magistrates.
(2) The requirement that there be at least one associate judge from
each county in a circuit.
(3) The requirement of the selection of a chief judge for each circuit
in whom general administrative authority is vested, subject to the para-
mount administrative authority of the Supreme Court.
(4) The administrative authority of the chief judge to establish gen-
eral and specialized divisions within the circuit court.
(5) The abolition of masters in chancery and other fee officers in the
judicial system.
(6) The allocation of judges in Cook County.
Extended explanation of each of these principles is not practical, but
an attempt will be made to distill the essence of each.
(1) Classification of Circuit Court Judiciary
With the abolition of all pre-existing trial courts of a lesser jurisdic-
tion than the circuit court and the absorption of the judges of those
courts into the newly created integrated circuit court structure, it was
thought desirable to maintain to some extent the difference in judicial
status which had theretofore prevailed. Thus county judges, probate
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judges, city, village, and town court judges, and municipal court judges,
and the judges of the Municipal Court of Chicago (other than its chief
judge), all having exercised limited jurisdictional powers, were absorbed
into the circuit court as associate circuit judges. Circuit judges, the
judges of the Superior Court of Cook County (a court on a constitu-
tional parity with the circuit court), the Cook County probate and
county court judges, and the chief judge of the Municipal Court of
Chicago, were all absorbed as circuit judges in their respective new
circuits.
Presumed differences in judicial experience, as well as the desire to
establish a structure which would result in progressive advancement to
the highest level of trial court service, were among the factors which
motivated this classification.
Several points must be noted with regard to this classification. First
and foremost is that all levels of the circuit court judiciary, including
magistrates, exercise the full jurisdiction of the circuit court. However,
the section authorizes the General Assembly to limit or define the matters
to be assigned to magistrates. This provision derives from the notion that
magistrates, selected by the circuit judges to serve at their pleasure
(Sec. 12, infra, p. 361), would be selected initially from personnel having
little or no judicial experience and that their judicial responsibilities
should be equated to those previously vested in the prior justice and
magistrate courts. It must be emphasized, however, that the newly created
magistracy is not and was not intended to be a mere reflection of the prior
justices and magistrates. They are judicial officers in the circuit court
structure as fully as circuit and associate judges and theoretically it would
appear that they can exercise the full jurisdiction of the court, though
by law, and for the reasons noted, particular kinds of cases are assigned
to them.
(2) One Associate Judge for Each County
To assure that each county within a multi-county circuit has a full
time judicial officer, the section requires that there be at least one asso-
ciate judge for each county. All counties had had county judges as of
constitutional right and many had had probate judges. The provision
seeks to maintain this standard and to assure the constant availability
in each county of a judge prepared and competent to handle the full
jurisdictional range of the circuit court.
(3) Chief Judge and Administrative Authority
The problems incident to the administration of judicial business in
each circuit are many. Indeed, in Cook County and in larger circuits they
are enormous and complex. Prior Constitutions made no provision for
administrative responsibility. The consequence, in most cases, was that
each court and each judge exercised virtually independent and auto-
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nomous power. The results were frequently ujiloriunatc. The provision
seeks to give each circuit a responsible role in the administration oi its
business, subject to the overall, centralized adminisirative authority of
the Supreme Coint. Ihe importance of tliis concept cannot be over-
emphasized.
(4) General and Specialized Dixnsions
With the absorption of all pre-existing trial courts into a single
circuit court, the level of its business corresjjondingly increased. A com-
pensating factor was the absorjjtion of the judicial manpower from the
abolished courts. Levels of judicial maturity and experience quite
naturally may vary among the judicial personnel. Also, particular subject
matter may call for specialized treatment, handling and experience,
establishing the need for specialized divisions. The specialized division
within a court of general jurisdiction is not a novel concept. In Cook
County, by assignment, designated judges handled only divorce and sepa-
rate maintenance cases. Others handled only a chancery docket; still
others dealt exclusively with personal injury litigation. These examples
are not exhaustive of this practice.
The provision has special relevance to the objectives of an eHicient
administration of the judicial business of the court and the maximum
effective utilization of the judicial manpower available to the court.
Again it is emphasized that the divisional structure within a unified court
does not affect the jurisdictional status of the court. Thus in Coleman v.
Scott (38 111. 2d 387 (1967)), it was held that an error in assigning a
particular claim to a magistrate did not affect the validity of the ultimate
judgment rendered by that magistrate, since the error did not affect the
jurisdictional power of the court. Although the decision rests on statutory
grounds, the validity of the statute, under the constitutional concept of
a unified trial court, is implicit in the decision.
(5) Abolition of Masters in Chanceiy and Other Fee Officers
One of the most troublesome and vexatious practices under the pre-
existing Article was the employment, generally in chancery cases, of
masters in chancery or other special hearing officers to take testimony
and make advisory recommendations to the court. The costs to litigants
in many of these cases were enormous. With the larger pool of available
judicial manpower in the integrated trial court structure, it was felt that
there was neither need nor justification for the continuation of this prac-
tice. The elimination of the fee officer is a major achievement in minimiz-
ing costs of litigation.
(6) Allocation of Judges in Cook County
The provisions in this section which provide for a numerical allocation
of associate circuit judges in Cook County between the City of Chicago
and the remaining area in Cook County were designed to assure equi-
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table area representation. The provision reflects a natural concern in
both the city and suburban areas of a county containing approximately
one-half the state's population that the elective process could conceivably
result in too large a concentration of judges from either area of the
county.
Comparative Analysis
Better than three-fourths (38) of all state constitutions provide for
judicial districts. All but four of these states have flexible provisions
allowing the legislature to draw the boundaries of the districts. Only five
states, however, require at least one judge from each county, while 27
states require at least one judge from each district. Four states provide
that changes in judicial districts will not affect the term of office of any
judge.
Only eight other states have a constitutional provision abolishing the
fee system or prohibiting the use of fees. The states have done away
with masters in chancery.
The Constitution of the United States, having no express provisions
establishing trial courts, understandably has nothing comparable to this
section. The Model State Constitution provides that judicial districts
may be "provided by law" but fails to mention district representation,
general or special divisions, masters in chancery or other fee officers,
or other items provided for in this section of the Illinois Constitution.
Comment
This section, in the breadth and novelty of its concept, is one of the
main nerve centers of the new Judicial Article. In detail it has been
subject to some criticism. Thus associate circuit judges have expressed
concern over a system of classification which they believe unfairly saddles
them with the stigma of inferiority. Exercising the full jurisdiction of
the court, just as circuit judges, they nevertheless receive smaller salary
and a somewhat less prestigious title. It is difficult to assess the problem
of classification of judges. Salary differentials may be eliminated by legis-
lation, thus removing a primary irritant. In other respects the problem
may be simply one of failure in human relations. A fair conclusion, per-
haps, is that the criticism may be valid but that it may not, in these still-
formative years of the new Article, justify an amendment. This, of
course, may be a controversial judgment. Otherwise the section appears
to be fulfilling, albeit slowly, the great objectives claimed for it.
Circuit Courts— Jurisdiction
Sec. 9. The Circuit Court shall have unlimited original jurisdiction of all
justiciable matters, and such powers of review of administrative action as may
be proj/ided by law.
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History
There is no parallel in prior Constitutions for the grant of unlimited
original jurisdiction to a single trial court. No specific trial courts
were created by the 1818 Constitution. Special authorization for the
establishment of inferior courts by law was coupled with legislative
power to determine the jurisdiction of such courts. The 1848 Constitu-
tion was the first charter to designate circuit courts and to define a virtu-
ally unlimited jurisdiction "in all cases at law and equity." However, that
Constitution initiated county courts and also authorized justice of the
peace courts, in recognition of the need for a continuously available
judicial service in all counties — a service which could not be provided
by a limited number of circuit judges required to sit in all the counties
within the circuit. County courts were granted constitutional jurisdiction
in probate matters and minor criminal offenses, and such other jurisdic-
tion in civil cases as the legislature determined to confer. Justice of the
peace jurisdiction was also left to legislative determination. With the
expanded number of trial courts authorized by the 1870 Constitution
(primarily city, village and incorporated town courts, and probate courts
authorized to be established by law), the allocation of fragmented seg-
ments of trial court jurisdiction was enhanced. Circuit courts, however, in
addition to the constitutionally conferred general original jurisdiction
in all cases in law and equity, were to exercise such appellate jurisdiction
as the legislature might prescribe. This appellate jurisdiction was imple-
mented primarily in respect to cases originating in the county and pro-
bate courts. Re-trials de novo from judgments of the nonrecord justice
and magistrate courts were not the exercise of appellate jurisdiction but
rather the exercise of an original trial court jurisdiction.
The proposed 1922 Constitution drew liberally on the 1870 provisions,
making only relatively unimportant changes.
Explanation
The grant of general unlimited and original jurisdiction in all justi-
ciable matters is a natural and unavoidable consequence of the single
unified trial court structure. With the abolition of all trial courts of
limited jurisdiction, the investiture of original and unlimited jurisdic-
tion in the integrated trial court follows as inevitably as night follows
day. The General Introductory History and the Explanation of Section 1
(supra, pp 338-9) have given the rationale behind the integrated trial
court structure, with particular emphasis upon the elimination of vexa-
tious problems of jurisdiction. There is no need here to develop that
theme.
Special mention should be made of the use of the term "justiciable
matters" in lieu of the formal terminology of "cases in law and equity."
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Old-line concepts which distinguished courts on the basis of the nature
of the litigation as "law" or "equity" are largely passe in terms of juris-
dictional principles. Where the distinction is retained, it is primarily for
procedural purposes and not for jurisdictional reasons. If a matter is
justiciable, it is within the court's jurisdiction without regard to whether
it is a case in law or equity. Justiciability, however, is not a simple or
readily definable concept. It involves determination of the existence of
legally recognized and protected rights, standing to secure judicial relief,
ripeness, timing, exhaustion of remedies, and other principles which
concern the rights of persons and the role of the judicial branch of gov-
ernment. In the last analysis, justiciability will be defined by the courts,
as has been the case in the past, and by the legislature under its power to
create new rights and duties and to define them in justiciable terms.
Lastly, the grant of power to exercise such powers of review of ad-
ministrative action as may be provided by law is the first constitutional
recognition in Illinois that administrative agencies exercise power which
is commonly the subject of judicial review. The j^rovision reflects the
long-standing practice and tradition in Illinois and other states. Its ex-
pression as a constitutional principle was deemed important to complete
the concept of the totality of the circuit courts' jurisdictional powers.
Comparative Analysis
No other state has provided for a single trial court with unlimited
original jurisdiction. All other states have varying numbers of trial courts
of limited jurisdiction. There is nothing comparable in the Constitution
of the United States. The Model State Constitution provides that the
general trial court shall have original and appellate jurisdiction as
provided by law but also authorizes the establishment by law of courts
of limited jurisdiction.
Comment
The section cannot be considered apart from the provisions of Sections
1 and 8 establishing a single integrated trial court. If that concept is
affirmed, then this section must also be retained. The operation of the
integrated trial court to date has merited the enthusiastic approval of
most responsible professional, public and political analysts. It repre-
sents what many believe to be the most important single advance in
judicial administration effected by the 1962 Amendment.
Selection and Tenure — Election or Selection
Sec. 10. All of the judges provided for herein shall be nominated by party
convention or primary and elected at general elections by the electors in the
respective judicial districts, judicial circuits, counties, or units. Provided, how-
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ever, the General Assembly may provide by law lor the selection and tenure
of all judges provided herein as distinguished from nomination and election by
the electors, l)Ut no law establishing a method of selecting judges and providing
their tenure shall be adopted or amended except l)y a vote of iwo-ihirds of the
members elected to eacii House, nor sliall any metiiod of selecting judges and
providing tlieir tenure become law uinil the question of tiie method of selection
be first submitted to the electors at the next general election. If a majority of
those voting upon the question shall favor tiie method of selection or tenure
as submitted it shall then become law.
The office of any judge shall bv deemed vacant izpon his death, resignation,
rejection, removal or retirement. Whenever a vacancy occurs in the office of
judge, the vacancy shall be filled for the unexpired portion of the term by the
voters at an election as above provided in this Section, or in sucli other manner
as the General Assembly may provide by law as set out in this Section and
approved by the electors. Whenever an additional judge is autliorized by law,
the office shall be filled in the same manner as in the case of a vacancy.
History
With the exception of the 1818 Constitution, which provided for the
appointment of judges by a joint ballot of the General Assembly and the
issuance of a commission by the Governor, the constitutional tradition in
succeeding state charters, both 1848 and 1870, provided for the jiopular
election of all judges. This developed into the uniform practice of adver-
sary political elections with prior nominations either by party convention
in the case of Supreme and circuit court judges and primary elections in
the case of county, probate and other judges in the judicial system.
The 1818 Constitution was silent as to vacancies. The 1848 Constitu-
tion simply authorized the General Assembly to provide a method of fill-
ing vacancies. The 1870 Constitution elaborated upon this by requiring
vacancies of more than one year to be filled by special election and
vacancies of less than one year to be filled by appointment by the
Governor.
The proposed 1922 Constitution differed in several respects from the
Constitution of 1870. While all judges (except appellate court judges
appointed by the Supreme Court) were to be elected, the proposal con-
tained an important innovation, subject to referendum approval by the
voters in Cook County, providing for gubernatorial appointments to fill
all vacancies on the Cook County circuit court from a list of nominees
submitted by the Supreme Cotnt. All judges so appointed were to hold
office
"during good behavior" but could be removed by vote of the
electorate at an election to be held in the sixth or seventh year after
appointment. In addition, the Governor was vested with the power to
"fill vacancies in elective judicial offices," with no special election
limitation on this power. The referendum option for Cook County is
remarkably similar to the so-called Missouri Plan which came almost
20 years later.
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Explanation
In the long fight for constitutional retorm there was no issue more
controversial or more hotly debated than the method ol selection of
judges. Proponents of judicial reform insisted that the abolition of the
political method of electing judges was absolutely central to any mean-
ingful improvement in the structure and administration of the judicial
system. They proposed the so-called Missouri Plan which provided for
selection of a panel of nominees by a nonpartisan nominating commis-
sion, followed by appointment by the Governor from among such
nominees. The appointee would serve a short probationary term and then
submit his unopposed candidacy for a full term to the voters of the
appropriate district or other geographic unit which he represented. If
the voters approved his candidacy on a ballot which simply asked, "Shall
Judge Jones be elected to (or retained in) the office of Supreme (or cir-
cuit, etc.) Court for a full term?" he would be so elected. If the vote was
unfavorable, the nomination and selection process would be repeated
until the office was filled.
Opponents of this proposal were equally vehement in their insistence
that judges, no less than other constitutional officers, should submit to
adversary elections in which the voters would have a choice of candidates.
The existing method was extolled as a necessary concomitant of a truly
free and democratic society.
It is a fair assessment that constitutional judicial reform in Illinois
would at this time still l)e an unrealized objective if the contending
forces had not agreed on the compromise contained in this Section 10.
Under this compromise, partisan adversary elections are mandated for all
judges (excluding magistrates) in every case of a vacancy, but the non-
adversary retention mechanism (running unopposed against the record) is
provided for incumbents who seek another term. (The retention princi-
ple is contained in Section 1 1 and not in this Section 10.)
The compromise further permits a change in the selection and tenure
provisions by a law adopted by two-thirds of the members elected to each
house of the General Assembly and aj^proved by a majority of the elec-
torate at a state-wide election who vote upon the question. Under this
provision, a mechanism less rigorous than constitutional amendment per-
mits the replacement of the present system of adversary partisan election of
judges by the Missouri Plan, or some variation thereof, by a nonpartisan
adversary elective process, by appointment by the Governor, or by some
other plan conceived by the legislature. In like manner, the retention
provision is subject to the same legislative-referendum method of change.
Unlike the 1848 and 1870 Constitutions, there is no authority for in-
terim special elections or gubernatorial appointments to fill vacancies. All
vacancies must be filled by the adversary partisan method of general elec-
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tions (defined in Sec. l.S to mean the biennial election at which mem-
bers of the General Assembly are elected, infra, p. 363), or it a method has
been substituted by the combined legislative-referendum technicjue
authorized in this section, by that method. Notwithstanding these explicit
provisions for the filling of vacancies, the General Asssembly in 1967 en-
acted a law which authorized the Governor, when notified by the
Supreme Court of the existence of a vacancy, to fill the vacancy until the
next general election. An exercise of this power by the Governor in 1969,
shortly before the expiration of his term, was invalidated in People ex rel.
Scott xK Powell (42 111. 2d 132 (1969)), as violative of this section.
Comparative Analysis
Only Illinois has a single constitutional provision establishing a uni-
form method of electing all judges. At least five other states, through
several different sections, however, establish a uniform method of select-
ing all judges. A comparison of the practices, not constitutions, of all
states other than Illinois reveals that only 17 states use a uniform method
of selecting all judges, 14 by election and three by appointment. {See
Council of State Governments, The Book of the States, 1968-69 at 1 10-1 1 1
(1968).) Seven states appoint all judges, though the method varies from
court to court within a state. (Id.) Similarly, 16 states elect all judges with
different methods within the state. Twenty-six states use a combination
of appointments and elections. (Id-)
Of the 42 states which use elections, wholly or in part, to select judges,
20 use partisan ballots, 1 7 nonpartisan, and five a combination of both.
(Id.)
While 15 states, in variable measure as to particular courts, use features
of the Missouri Plan of a nonpartisan nominating commission followed
by appointment (Id.), only eight have constitutional provisions incorpo-
rating the plan. California, in addition, uses a variant of the plan.
(Model State Constitution n. 1 at 79.)
The methods of filling vacancies also vary a great deal from state
to state, and often within a state according to the court involved. Nine
states have constitutional provisions authorizing an appointment to fill
judicial vacancies until a successor is qualified. Four states provide for
appointments to fill the vacancy for the remainder of the term. Three
states provide for filling vacancies as provided by law. All federal judges
are appointed by the President wutfi the advice and consent of the Senate.
The Model State Constitution provides that all judges shall be ap-
pointed by the governor with the advice and consent of the legislature.
As an alternative, the Model provides for appointment by the governor
from a list of nominees presented to him by a judicial nominating com-
mission made up of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, three elected
members from the local bar, and three citizens appointed by the governor.
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Comment
The controversial nature of the selection and tenure provisions of this
section and Section 1 1 has not diminished. Proponents of the Missouri
Plan, or a variation thereof, which eliminates the adversary political
elective feature, may insist that this concept be mandated by the Consti-
tution rather than being made a contingent alternative by legislative
action and electorate referendum. On the other hand, opposition has
manifested itself in some quarters to the retention features (Sec. II)
whereby the uncontested election or retention virtually assures, as it was
intended to do, a more permanent, if not indeed an indefinite, tenure
for incumbent judges.
The issue is volatile, politically explosive and emotionally charged.
The advocacy in respect to both election and tenure will probably be
intense and unyielding from both sides of the issue. It is impossible to
suggest an appropriate Convention resolution without being charged
with bias and other lack of objectivity. In the last analysis, therefore, the
resolution of this issue will depend on the Convention's sense of logic and
principle as it is fashioned by the contending forces. It is important to
note, however, that most recent constitutional proposals have incorpo-
rated the so-called Missouri Plan of selection and tenure for all or part
of their judiciary. As noted in the Comparative Analysis, there is a
growing measure of acceptance of this principle.
In respect to the vacancy issue, it would appear desirable to authorize
a method of interim appointments (assuming the elective method of selec-
tion is retained). The Bar Association proposals suggested emergency
temporary appointments but, for reasons not clear, the final legislative
draft in 1961 omitted any authorization for temporary vacancy appoint-
ments. It seems that the issue here should not b£ controversial and that
logic and principle support the inclusion of such authorization.
Selection and Tenure — Retention in Office
Sec. 11. Not less than six months prior to the general election next pre-
ceding the expiration of his term in office, any judge previously elected may
file in the office of Secretary of State a declaration of candidacy to succeed
himself, and the Secretary of State, not less than 61 days prior to the election,
shall certify such candidacy to the proper election officials. At the election the
name of each judge who has filed such a declaration shall be submitted to the
voters, on a special judicial ballot without party designation, on the sole ques-
tion whether he shall be retained in office for another term. The elections shall
be conducted in the appropriate judicial districts, circuits, counties and units.
The affirmative votes of a majority of the voters voting on the question shall
elect him to the office for another term commencing the first Monday in
December following the election. Any judge who does not file a declaration
within the time herein specified, or, having filed, fails of re-election, shall vacate
his office at the expiration of his term, whether or not his successor, who shall
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be stli'( led ioi a lull urm puisuaiit to Sec lion 10 ol this Anide, shall yet
have (jiialificd.
Any law rccliuing the iiunibcr ol judges ol tiie A])]nllale (louri in any District
or the number of C.irtuit or associate judges in any circuit shall be without
prejudice to the right of judges in office at the time of its enactment to seek
retention in odicc as hereinabove provided.
History
There is, of course, nothing in the C^onstittitions of 1818, 1848 or 1870
whicli parallels the retention features in the present Section 11. The 1922
Con\ention projjosal contained a j)rovisic:)n in some as])ects comparable
to the retention feattire for circuit judges in Cook County. (See History.
Sec. 10, supra, p. 356.) The history of selection, including election, and
tenure, under those instruments is set forth under Section 10. The 1(S70
Constittition and the proposed 1922 Constittition hotli preserved the
tentne of circtiit jtidges where a change in circuit botnidaries occurred.
Explanation
The Explanation imder Section 10 is ecjtially relevant here, since reten-
tion is the second phase of the so-called Missouri Plan of selection and
tenure. However, some brief additional observation may be helpful. Pro-
ponents of the "rtmning against the record" method of retention can-
didly concede that this virttially assures indefinite tenure. Experience in
Illinois and in other states establishes that an incumbent is rarely voted
out of office in an tmcontested submission of his candidacy. As an alter-
native to the sometimes imhappy experience of tying a judge's expectancy
for retention to the political process, and as a means of freeing jtidges from
political influences and establishing their independence from political
controls, the advocates of the retention plan are willing to accept the
risk that an incompetent judge may not be subject to removal by the
electorate. On the other hand, opponents of this plan cite this assured
tenure as being productive of judicial "arrogance" in judges who no
longer need curry the favor of political parties or the electorate. There
is probably a modicum of truth in this latter charge, but to generalize
and apply it to the judiciary as a whole or in significant part is assuredly
inaccurate and unfair. Many judges seeking retention are indeed con-
cerned with and apprehensive about voter approval and public and
professional assessment of their competence in other unofficial appraisals.
Thus the issue narrows to the priority to be given to the concept of
judicial independence and freedom from political controls or restraints.
Proponents of the retention provision give this the highest priority;
they believe that the administration of justice absolutely demands a
judiciary freed from traditional political controls. Opponents are
equally certain that the political adversary process is an indispensable
aspect of the democratic process.
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Several important decisions have interpreted this section. People ex rel.
Barrett v. Barrett (31 111. 2d 360 (1964)) held that the constitutional
requirement of a "special judicial ballot" (without party designation)
precluded the use of voting machines in retention elections as authorized
by law. In People ex rel. Nachman v. Carpentwr (30 111. 2d 475 (1964)),
a statute which required a sitting judge to vacate his office if he sought
election to another judicial office was invalidated as an unauthorized
legislative addition to the constitutionally prescribed and limited quali-
fications and conditions for judicial office.
It is important to note that, though the new judicial Article reserves
to the legislature the authority to determine the number of appellate,
circuit, and associate circuit judges, this section precludes a reduction
vvhich affects the status of incumbent judges or their right to seek retention
in office. This provision was deemed necessary to assure incumbents that
their tenure was not subject to unreasonable or whimsical legislative
determinations to lessen the number of judges. It is a factor related to
recruitment of competent candidates for judicial office, and to the neces-
sity of providing assured tenure.
The Model State Constitution, which provides for the appointment
of all judges, contains no similar provision.
Comparative Analysis
Four other states provide for general trial court judges to run for
retention unopposed. Only two states, however, provide for such run-on-
record elections of appellate court judges. Siy^ states, other than Illinois,
have similar constitutional provisions for re-election of incumbent high
court judges. In practice, nine different states employ, at least in part, a
run-on-record election at some level for judicial selection. The Consti-
tution of the United States provides for tenure during "good Behavior
after initial appointment."
Comment
The Comment under Section 10, as well as the Explanation under this
section, leaves little room for additional treatment. Perhaps one yet un-
remarked point should be noted. Proponents of nonpolitical selection
and tenure of judges believe that tenure (running against the record)
is best related to an initial nonpolitical, nonelective method of selecting
judges. They are not particularly happy with a system which virtually
assures lifetime tenuie for judges initially elected by the routine adver-
sary political process. This factor must be considered in the overall
evaluation of the selection and tenure provisions of Sections 10 and 11.
Selection and Tenure — Appointment of Magistrates
Sec. 12. Subject to law, the circuit judges in each circuit shall appoint
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magistrates to servt- at tlicir pleasure; provided, that in C^ook County, until and
unless changed by law, at least one-lourtii of the magistrates shall be appointed
from and reside in the area outside the corporate limits of tiie Ciity of C;hicago.
History
There is no prior constitutional history which is truly relevant to
the present section. The magistrates aiithori/ed by .Section 12 have
no constitutional relationship to the justices of the peace and police
magistrates of prior Constitutions. Those officers were elected for specified
terms, exercised a very limited civil and quasi-criminal jurisdiction as
established by law, were not judges of courts of record, and in the case of
justices of the peace, administered justice by the much-condemned fee
system which was finally legislatively abolished in 1961. Although there
is a measure of similarity in respect to the kinds of cases tried, there is
no other relationship.
The proposed 1922 Constitution dealt with justices of the peace and
magistrates in the same manner as prior Constitutions.
Explanation
Section 8 contains the first reference in the Judicial Article to magis-
trates. As indicated in the Explanation of that section [supra, p. 350), the
magistrates are a part of the three-tiered classification of trial judges
which consists of circuit judges, associate circuit judges, and magistrates.
The cases to be assigned to them are determined by the legislature. The
legislature did act in 1963 and in subsequent sessions, and maintained, in
general, the principle of assignability to magistrates of the kinds of cases
theretofore handled by justice and magistrate courts. Significantly, how-
ever, there has been an expansion in several areas, as well as increases in
the monetary maximiun which had severely circumscribed the "jurisdic-
tion" of old justice and magistrate courts.
Because magistrates are now an integal part of the circuit court judi-
ciary, it is no longer proper to speak of their "jinisdiction." This Article,
Section 8, carefully states that the matters "assigned to magistrates" shall
be determined by law. Constitutionally, however, magistrates can exer-
cise the full jurisdiction of the circuit court. (Coleman v. Scott, 38 111.
2d 387 (1967).) The judgn]ents of magistrates, unlike those of prior
justices of the peace and police magistrates, are judgments of record,
carrying the full authority and official imprimatur of the circuit court.
These judgments are thus reviewable directly by either the appellate
or Supreme Court in accordance with the appellate jurisdictional prin-
ciples already discussed.
Magistrates differ from their judicial brethren, however, in several
major respects. They are appointed and serve at the pleasure of their
circuit judges (this term does not include associate judges of the circuit
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court) instead of being elected to office for constitutionally specified
terms, and they are not within the tenure provisions of Section 11, e.g.,
running against their records. The "at pleasure" principle was intro-
duced largely on the premise that magistrates would initially be drawn
from lawyers of a lesser degree of experience and maturity than the other
judges, and that their service should be subject to a continuing and
closer critique and administrative supervision than other trial judges,
with broader and more flexible powers of removal for incompetence or
other good cause.
To assure an equitable distribution of magistrates between Chicago and
the Cook County area outside of Chicago, this section, as in the case of
associate circuit judges in Chicago and Cook County (Sec. 8, supra, pp.
348-9) allocates one-fourth of the magistrates to the county areas out-
side of Chicago. Unlike the associate judge allocation, however, the per-
centage division of magistrates between the two areas of Cook County
is subject to legislative change.
Comparative Analysis
No other state constitution contains a similar provision. As noted
earlier, no other state has established a single general trial court of un-
limited jurisdiction as has Illinois. The Model State Constitution is silent
on the subject.
Comment
The "at pleasure" provision of this section has caused considerable
unhappiness, not without justification, among magistrates. With a tenure
wholly subject to the judgment and discretion of the circuit judges,
the magistrates understandably live in a climate of constant apprehension.
In Cook County the circuit judges have somewhat alleviated the problem
by an administrative designation of one-year appointments. In down-
state circuits the "at pleasure" status remains. The problem is more than
one of effective control over the least-experienced segment of the trial
judiciary. It involves recruitment and retention of qualified personnel.
In most cases, qualified lawyers who are interested in a judicial career
will not give up their practice for an office whose tenure is so precarious.
Although there is no evidence of arbitrary exercise of the "at pleasure"
principle through unwarranted dismissals from service, the problem
nevertheless remains. The serious nature of this issue has led to the forma-
tion of a special committee of the Illinois Judicial Conference which
is now studying possible legislative or judicial approaches to strength-
ening the tenure of magistrates. This issue deserves the serious consider-
ation of the Convention.
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Selection and Tenure — General Election
Sec. 13. As used in this Article, the term "general election" means the
biennial election at which nienibcrs of the General Assembly are elettecl.
History
There are no antecedents to this section in any prior lUinois Constitu-
tion or in the proposed 1922 Constitution. Prior provisions mandated
elections ol all classes ot judges (beginning in 1848) but the time or
nature ot the election was not tied to any constitutional mandate. Legis-
lative implementation was not consistent. Many judicial elections were
held at the time ot the general elections in November ot even-numbered
years. Others were lield at ditferent times.
Explanation
The recpiirement that judges be elected at general elections, defined
as the biennial election for members of tlie General Assembly, has a
purposeful relationship to the election and tenure provisions of Sections
10 and 11. Initial adversary political elections, wlien held previously at
times other than the general November elections, produced little voter
interest or participation. The apathy was oppressive and the percentage
of voter participation alarmingly low. The result was a contest which
was a poor retfection ot the desirable concept of substantial electorate
paticipation.
More importantly, however, with the adoption of the tenure provisions
ot Section 11, e.g., a judge running uncontested against his record, the
necessity for assuring a large measure of voter participation was thought
to be of utmost importance for two reasons. The first was that the novel
elective method, designed to assure a greater degree of tenure than was
normally possible in contested elections, recjuired larger voter partici-
pation to justify the judginent of retention in office or rejection of an
incumbent. Secondly, since it was more than a remote possibility that
an incumbent might be voted out of office by a small segment ot the
electorate determined, for reasons good or bad, to be rid of trim, an
election held at times other than the general election, with a minimum
voter turnout, could unfairly accomplish the intended result. By requiring
retention elections to be held with general elections as defined, this
possibility is blunted without destroying the legitimacy ot appropriate
campaigns to remove an incumbent for a cause thought to be adequate
by any segment ot voters.
Comparative Analysis
No other state constitution contains a similar provision. The same
is true also of the Model State Constitution.
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Comment
The rationale behind this provision, whether or not elections continue
initially to be adversary or the retention provision is maintained, seems
sound. There is little in history or experience which commends a return
to elections for judges at times other than general elections.
Selection and Tenure— Terms of Office
Sec. 14. The term of office of judges of the Supreme Court and of the
Appellate Court shall be ten years and of the circuit judges and associate judges
of the Circuit Courts six years.
History
All judges held office during "good behavior" under the 1818 Con-
stitution. Fixed terms were constitutionally introduced in 1848 and con-
tinued in 1870. Under both latter Constitutions, Supreme Court judges
held nine-year terms; circuit judges (and Superior Court judges in Cook
County), six years; county and probate judges, and justices of the peace
and magistrates, four years; and jtidges of the Municipal Court of Chicago
and of other municipal, city, village and town courts authorized by
law, six years.
The 1922 Convention proposal provided a ten-year term for Supreme
Court judges; six years for appellate, circuit and county court judges;
and two years for justices of the peace.
Explanation
It is generally conceded that judges, in order to assure the recruitment
of competent men into service, and their independence from political ties
and inffuences customarily present and acceptable for nonjudicial officers,
should have a substantial measure of constitutionally prescribed tenure.
This is reflected in the Federal Constitution and in the constitutions of
several states which provide for tenure based on "good behavior." This,
for all practical purposes, is the equivalent of life tenure. In several other
states, the fixed tenure exceeds substantially the terms specified in this
section. (See Comparative Analysis below.)
The contrary view holds that all elective officers exercising govern-
mental power, including judges, should be subjected to periodic and
relatively frequent voter evaluation, lest they be tempted to abuse the
power exercised by them.
However one views the merits of these positions, the provisions of this
section establishing ten-year terms for Supreme and appellate cotirt
judges, and six-year terms for circuit and associate judges of the circtiit
court, are hardly a significant departure from the long-established consti-
tutional and statutory tradition in this state, as the History of this section
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attests. The terms designated, however, must be viewed in the light of tlie
tenure provisions of Section 1 1 which provide for the nonadversary run-
ning against the record. This factor, for all practical purposes, gives added
dimension and scope to the fixed terms specified in this Section 14.
Also, it is again important to recall that neither the specified terms of
this section nor the retention provisions of Section 1 1 apply to magis-
trates of the circuit court, all of whom serve at the pleasure of the
circuit judges. The only significant decision to date respecting tenure
is People ex rel. Nachman v. Carpentier (30 111. 2d 475 (1964)) which,
as already noted, held invalid a legislative attempt to recpiire an in-
cumbent judge to relinquish his office if he sought election to another
judicial office.
Comparative Analysis
While over three-fourths of the states have constitutional provisions
respecting the terms of office of high court and general trial court judges,
only one-fifth have provisions for appellate court terms. Only nine other
states have provisions for terms of office for all three courts.
No other state sets a ten-year term for high court judges. Terms pro-
vided by the other state constitutions vary from two years in Vermont to
21 years in Pennsylvania. The most frequently established terms are six
years (13 states) and eight years (eight states). Only one state provides
a term of
"during good behavior." Several states provide terms as estab-
lished by law.
Only ten other states provide a term of office for appellate court judges.
These terms vary, extending to a maximum of 12 years in several other
states. One state provides that the term shall be set by law.
Thirty six states, other than Illinois, set a term of office for general
trial court judges, ranging from two years in Vermont to 14 years in New
York. Most popular are terms of four years, in 13 states, and six years, in
13 states. Three states provide terms as prescribed by law.
The Model State Constitution provides that all judges shall hold
office for seven years and upon reappointment during good behavior. Only
one state. New Jersey, follows the Model Constitution principle.
The Constitution''of the United States provides for appointment and
tenure during good behavior.
Comment
The terms specified in this section fall within generally accepted
constitutional and statutory designations and agree substantially with
the pre-existing standards in this state. Apart from the relevance of this
section to the tenure provisions of Section 11, and the "at pleasure"
tenure of magistrates (Section 12), in respect to which analysis and
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comment have already been made, ihere appears to be no quarrel with
the tenure provisions of this section.
Selection and Tenure — Eligibilty for Office
Sec. 15. No person shall be eligible for the office of judge unless he shall be
a citizen and licensed attorney-at-law of this State, and a resident of the judicial
district, circuit, county or unit from which selected. However, any change made
in the area of a district or circuit or the reapportionment of districts or circuits
shall not affect the tenure in office of any judge incumbent at the time such
change or reapportionment is made.
History
The Constitution of 1818 contained no provisions pertaining to eligi-
bility for judges. The 1848 Constitution, in contrast, dealt with eligibility
in detail, prescribing for all judges a United States citizenship status,
a five-year state residency requirement, and a two-year residency require-
ment in the division, circuit or county in which elected for service in
courts of limited geographic area. In addition, age requirements, 35 and
30 respectively, were established for Supreme and circuit court judges.
The 1870 Constitution continued the 1848 requirements of citizenship
and state residency, required geographic residency^ but without a mini-
mum specified term, and reduced to 30 and 25 years, respectively, the
age requirements for Supreme and circuit judges. In addition, all the
foregoing recpiirements applicable to circuit judges were made applicable
to the
"judge of any inferior court." None of the prior Constitutions
required a licensed-attorney status. The proposed 1922 Constitution
contained no citizenship requirement, and judges were merely required
to reside in the district, circuit or county for which they were selected.
Judges of the Supreme, appellate and circuit courts were required to
be at least 35 years of age and for ten years' a licensed and practicing
attorney or judicial officer. County court judges were required to be
at least age 30 and to be licensed and practicing for five years.
It also contained a provision whereby alterations in circuits would have
no effect upon the term of any judge.
Explanation
The first important observation is that the provisions of Section 15
have no application to magistrates of the circuit court. The careful
restriction of the language to the "office of judge," here and in other
provisions of the Article, clearly confirms this conclusion. The legislature,
however, has enacted its own eligibility requirements for magistrates.
(111. Rev. Stat. ch. 37, §§ 160.1-160.5 (1967).) A licensed-attorney status
is required, subject to limited exceptions for justices of the peace and
police magistrates in office on January 1, 1964, the effective date of the
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Judicial Article Amendment, and for circuits which have no available
resident attorneys. (111. Rev. Stat. ch. 37, § 1(30.3 (1967).)
The present constitutional section retains the citizenship and general
current geographic residency rec|uiremcnts ol prior Constitutions, elimi-
nating the minimimi age and five-year state residency requirements, but
adding the licensed-attorney-at-law requirement. The attorney require-
ment assures, at the least, a minimum age geared to the degree and bar
examination requirement, normally age 21. Pre-existing age and state
residency requirements were thought to be unduly restrictive and prac-
tically dubious as constitutional standards. The normal process of selec-
tion or election of judges should reasonably assure a judiciary sufficiently
mature in age and, hopefully, experience. Reference is again made to
People ex rel. Nnchman v. Carpenlier (30 111. 2d 475 (1964)), which held
that legislative attempts to add to eligibility requirements for judges
under this section will not be tolerated.
The second sentence of this section is not new. The 1870 Constitution
contained a similar provision. It is designed to protect incumbents in
their tenure against legislative changes or reapportionment in district
or circuit areas.
Comparative Analysis
No state has an identical provision. The constitutional requirements
for judicial officers not only vary from state to state, but also vary from
court to court in nearly all states.
Nearly half the states require that a general trial judge be an attorney.
Aside from Illinois, only six states require him to be a citizen of the
state. Eleven states provide that trial judges must be citizens of the
United States. Eleven, including Illinois, require that he reside in the
district from which he was selected.
Only one-fifth of the states, however, require that an appellate judge
be an attorney. Five other states provide that he nuist be a citizen of the
state and three require him to be a citizen of the United States. Only two
other states require that an appellate judge reside in the district or
circuit from which he is selected.
Seventeen states provide that all high court justices be attorneys. Nine
require justices to be citizens of the state, while 13 require them to be
United States citizens. Only five other states provide that a high court
judge reside in the geographical unit from which he is selected.
While Illinois sets no age requirements, many states do. Nearly two-
fifths of the states set a minimum age for both high court and general
trial judges. These qualifications range from 25 to 35 for high court
judges and from 25 to 38 for general trial court judges. The most common
requirement for the high court is 30 (13 states) and the most common
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for general trial court judges are 25 (seven states) and 30 (six states). All
five states setting a minimum age for appellate court judges require him
to be at least 30. The Constitution of the United States established no
age, citizenship or residency requirements. The Model State Constitu-
tion provides that all judges must have "been admitted to practice law
before the supreme court for at least .... years."
Comment
It is difficult to quarrel with the eligibility provisions of this section
other, perhaps, than in its inapplicability to magistrates. As to the latter,
the gap, to some extent, has been filled by legislation, but the importance
of the subject may deserve constitutional treatment. Professional or
other criticism of this section is virtually nonexistent in its applicability
to judges.
General — Prohibited Activities
Sec. 16. Judges shall devote full time to their judicial duties, shall not engage
in the practice of law or hold any other office or position of profit under the
United States or this State or any municipal corporation or political subdivision
of this State, and shall not hold office in any political party. Compensation for
service in the State Militia or the armed forces of the United States for such
periods of time as may be determined by rule of the Supreme Court shall not
be deemed
"profit."
History
The 1848 Constitution first expressed a limitation upon judges in its
provision which barred Siq^reme and circuit court judges from eligi-
bility for any other state or federal office of public trust or profit during
their elective terms and for one year thereafter. The 1870 Constitution, in
its Legislative Article (Art. IV, Sec. 3), disqualified judges generally from
having a seat in the General Assembly and, even more expansively, pro-
hibited any person holding any office of honor or profit under any
foreign government or the government of the United States (except post-
masters earning less than $300 annually) from holding any office of honor
or profit under the authority of the state. (See, however, interpretation
of this provision in regard to eligibility of officers as members of the
Constitutional Convention (Livingston v. Oglivie, — 111. 2d — (1969));
also. Explanation, Art. IV, Sec. 3, supra, p. 123.) In its Judicial Article
(Art. VI, Sec. 16), the 1870 Constitution provided that judges of the
Supreme and circuit courts could neither receive "any other compensa-
tion, perquisite or benefit, in any form whatsoever, nor perform any other
than judicial duties to which may belong any emoluments." Neither of
the prior Constitutions contained a ban on the holding of office in any
political party, but presumably such office could fall within the other
general proscriptions. No judicial interpretations exist on this or other
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provisions or issues raised by the 1818 and 1870 provisions.
The proposed 1922 Constitution, in its specific application to judges,
provided that "[n]o justice of the supreme court or judge of any court
of record . . . shall receive any compensation, perquisite or benefit other
than his salary or engage in the practice of law."
Explanation
The provisions of this section are not markedly dilicrent from the
prior constitutional restraints noted in the History, with the single excep-
tion of the ban on holding office in a political party. This addition reflects
and emphasizes the concern explicit or iiiij)li(it throughout the Article
and its history relative to the removal of judges as far as possible from
political relationships and influences.
The provision excluding compensation for service in the State Militia
or the armed forces of the United States from the definition of profit finds
a partial parallel in Article IV, Section 3, of the 1870 Constitution already
alluded to in the Histoiy.
This section has no application to magistrates. However, the General
Assembly, in its 1963 law pertaining to magistrates (111. Rev. Stat. ch. 37,
§ 160.5 (1967)), enacts langtiage identical to this section of the Constitu-
tion, thus applying the full thrust of the prohibitions to them.
Comparative Analysis
No other state prohibits all judges from engaging in all three activities:
the practice of law, dual ofhce holding, and holding an ofhce in a political
party. Nineteen other states, however, prohibit all judges from practicing
law. One state places this restriction only on some judges. While 38 other
states have a provision respecting dual office holding, only 30 prohibit
all judges (with minor exceptions such as special judges and jtistices of
the peace in some cases) from holding another office. Only three other
states provide that all judges may not hold an office in a political party,
though three others jjlace such a restriction on some judges. Those states
placing similar restrictions on some, but not all, judges typically place
them on higher court judges only. The Constitution of the United States
has no comparable provisions.
The Model State Constitution provides that Supreme, appellate and
general trial court judges "shall [not] hold any other paid office, position
of profit or emjjloyment under the state, its civil divisions or the United
States."
Comment
The provisions of this section are relatively standard and no serious
challenge to them has been made. Again it may be desirable, as in the
case of the eligibility provisions of Section 15, to extend the constitu-
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tional sanctions to magistrates, rather than to rely upon legislative im-
plementation. The Bar Association draft proposals in fact applied both
Section 15 and Section 16 to magistrates but for reasons unknown, the
legislature modified the sections to exclude magistrates.
General — Judicial Salaries and Expenses
Sec. 17. Judges and magistrates shall receive for their services salaries pro-
vided by law. The salaries of judges shall not be diminished during their
respective terms of office. Judicial officers may be paid such actual and necessary
expenses as may be provided by law. All salaries and expenses shall be paid by
the State, except that judges of the Appellate Court for the First District and
circuit and associate judges and magistrates of the Circuit Court of Cook County
shall receive such additional compensation from the county as may be provided
by law.
History
The constitutional history of judicial salaries has followed a curious
pattern. The 1818 Constitution established a temporary fixed salary for
Supreme Court judges, but established a permanent principle of salaries
fixed by law for all judges, which could not be diminished (increase thus
permitted) during their terms of office. The 1848 Constitution estab-
lished fixed and unchangeable salaries of $1,200 and $1,000 per annum
for Supreme and circuit court judges, respectively, while the salaries of
county judges were to be set by law. The 1870 Constitution established
annual salaries of $4,000 and $3,000 for such judges, respectively, but
authorized legislative change, subject to the limitation that such salaries
could not be increased or diminished during a term of office. That Con-
stitution also authorized supplemental compensation to be provided by
Cook County for its circuit and Superior Court judges. The county
board was empowered to fix the salaries of all county offices. County
judges, and, inferentially probate court judges, were within this cate-
gory of county officers. All other comts being established by law, the
General Assembly thus fixed the salaries of the judges of such courts. The
1870 Constitution was silent as to who assumed the obligation of judicial
salaries. By law the state paid Supreme, appellate (temporarily assigned
circuit and Cook County Superior Court judges), and circuit and Superior
Court judges (with Cook County supplement as noted). Also the state paid
the salaries of city, village and incorporated town judges; shared with
counties the salaries of county and probate judges, and the judges of
the Municipal Court of Chicago, but saddled the burden of other muni-
cipal court judges upon the cities and villages which established such
courts. Until 1961, justice of the peace courts were fee offices, but there-
after and until January 1, 1964, the justices' salaries were fixed by law
and paid by the counties.
The proposed 1922 Constitution provided for salaries to be paid by
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the state tor Supreme, appellate, circuit aiul county court judges, and
authorized Cook County supplementation for its appellate and circuit
court judges. It omitted the provision ol the 1870 Constitution barring
increases or decreases in salary dining terms ol office.
Explanation
The significant provisions of the existing Article are (1) the assumption,
as a state obligation, of the salaries and expenses of all judges and magis-
trates (retaining, however, the authorization for Cook County supple-
mentation and extending its application to appellate judges elected from
the Cook County judicial district, all circuit and associate circuit judges,
and magistrates of that district), and (2) prohibiting decreases, but not
increases, of salaries during terms of office. All salaries are left to legis-
lative determination. (See also ConnncuL Art. IX, Sec. 11, infra, p. 476.)
The imposition upon tlie state of the obligation for all judicial
salaries and expenses gives explicit constitutional sanction to the princi-
ple that judicial service, whatever may be the geographic areas from which
judges are elected, is a state service. The achninistration of justice thus
assumes coordinate status with constitutional state officers in Executive
and Legislative Departments of government. This principle had in fact
been long established under the State Judges Retirement Act, wherein
the state alone was considered the governmental employer responsible
for the employer contributions for the judges of all courts of record
who had opted to become members of the system.
Comparative Analysis
Four-fifths of the state constitutions provide that judicial salaries may
be fixed by law. Only one state sets a rigid salary, and only three set maxi-
mums or minimums. Seven other states expressly provide for payment of
expenses. More than half the states place a constitutional restriction on in-
creases or decreases during a judge's term. The pattern varies substantially
as to the obligation for payment of salaries, with local governments assum-
ing all or part of the salary obligation in the case of trial courts.
Comment
The principle of state responsibility for all judicial salaries is a con-
stitutional extension of what had been for the most part a combined
constitutional and legislative policy under the 1870 Constitution. It
may be argued with justification that county or municipal responsibility
in the first instance, for judicial salaries, whether or not shared by the
state, demeans the nature of judicial service and even the judicial office.
The provision regarding Cook County supplementation stands perhaps
on a different plane because the primary responsibility is the state's. The
tradition of Cook County supplementation goes back to the 1870 Consti-
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tution and is based on the premise that the cost of living in Cook County
is, as a generality, higher than in the remainder of the state. There is
some unhappiness with this authorization among some downstate judges
who believe the provision is unjustifiably discriminatory. It is not known
whether this concern has created a conviction that a change is necessary.
Perhaps of greater importance is the existing legislative classifica-
tions which establish differentials in salary between associate and circuit
judges. Again, it is hard to gauge this problem from a constitutional
point of view. Unlike the county supplementation authorization which
is limited to Cook County, the other problems of salary differentials are
wholly legislative. Since the legislature can rectify any differential it
believes to be discriminatory, the necessity for constitutional consider-
ation would appear to be less evident.
General — Retirement, Suspension and Removal
Sec. 18. Notwithstanding the provisions oi this Article relating to terms of
office, the General Assembly may provide by law for the retirement of judges
automatically at a prescribed age; and, subject to rules of procedure to be
established by the Supreme Court and after notice and hearing, any judge may
be retired for disability or suspended without pay or removed for cause by a
commission composed of one judge of the Supreme Court selected by that court,
two judges of the Appellate Court selected by that court, and two circuit
judges selected by the Supreme Court. Such commission shall be convened by
the Chief Justice upon order of the Supreme Court or at the request of the
Senate.
Any retired judge may, with his consent, be assigned by the Supreme Court
to judicial service, and while so serving shall receive the compensation applicable
to such service in lieu of retirement benefits, if any.
History
These provisions have no coiuiterpart in prior Illinois constitutional
history.
The 1818 Constitution provided in its Legislative Article (art. II,
§ 23) that the Governor "and all other civil officers under this state"
could be impeached for any misdemeanor in office. That this applied to
judges seems clear from that Constitution's provision in its Judicial
Article (art. IV, § 5) that for any reasonable cause "which shall not be
sufficient ground for impeachment" judges of the Supreme and inferior
courts could be removed from office by a two-thirds vote of each house
of the legislature. Substantially identical provisions appeared in the 1848
Constitution. The 1870 Constitution continued the general impeach-
ment provision for the Governor and "all civil officers of this State," and
in the Judicial Article (Art. VI, Sec. 30) authorized the General Assem-
bly "for cause entered on the journals" and after "due notice and oppor-
tunity of defense" to remove any judge from office upon a three-fourths
vote of the members of each house.
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The j)roj)Osed 1922 Constitution was the same with respect to jucUcial
removal as the 1870 Constitution cx(e]H the ])roposal also provided that
appellate court judges (appointed l)y the Supienie Court) could be re-
moved by the Supreme Comt "lor gootl cause shown oi record."
Explanation
The relationship of the general impeachment provision in the 1870
Constitution to the special provision for legislative removal of judges is
not clear. One decision, Dounhue v. County of Will (100 111. 91, (1881)),
treats the phrase "all civil officers of the state" in Article V, Section 15,
and determines that it is inapplicable to all officers who by Article 10
of the Constitution are designated as comity officers. This designation
included county judges who were thus inununi/ed from impeachment.
The question is important since Article V, Section 15, is still very much
a part of the existing Constitution. Its relation to Section 18 of Article
VI, now under discussion, which authorizes a judicial commission for
the suspension or removal of any judge for cause is not spelled om in
Article VI. The commission is to be convened by the Chief Justice u])on
order of the Supreme Court or at the request of the Senate. The ques-
tion is as to the effect of this provision on the impeachment provision re-
garding civil offices of the state in Article V, Section 15. On the one hand,
it may be argued that the removal provisions of the new section are exclu-
sive and constitute an implied repeal of the impeachment provisions in
Article V as applied to judges. Authority for such an interpretation can be
found in City of Chicago v. Reeves (220 111. 274 (1906)), wherein the
Court held that the adoption of Article IV, Section 34, of the Consti-
tution pursuant to which the office of justice of the peace in Chicago was
abolished upon the establishment of the Municipal Court of Chicago,
though in fact an amendment of Article VI, was not thereby invalid,
the amendment toeing incidental to the primary objective of Article IV,
Section 34. On the other hand, an interpretation that the suspension and
removal provision in this new Section 18 left intact the wholly inde-
pendent power of impeachment for misdemeanor in office would not be
unreasonable, especially since "cause" for removal or suspension is not
defined in Section 18. The issue probably cannot be resolved short of liti-
gation or constitutional clarification. It is noted here because in recent
months the role of the Courts Commission established under Section 18,
and the powers to be exercised thereunder, ha\e been relevant in several
instances of alleged dereliction in office by judges. In addition, the recom-
mendation of a specially convened Joint Committee of the Illinois and
Chicago Bar Associations for a revision of Supreme Court Rule 51 which
established the Illinois Courts Commission to deal with cases of removal
or suspension has been adopted by the Supreme Court. The issue may
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prove troublesome if at any time the General Assembly determines to
invoke the impeachment provision in Section 15 of Article V. It is noted,
however, that the explanatory statement of the Joint Committee on the
Judicial Article of the Illinois State and Chicago Bar Associations, which
provided an interpretation of the 1953 proposal, indicated that this section
was not intended to disturb the legislative impeachment power.
Two additionally important constitutional principles introduced by
this Section 18 are (1) authorization to the General Assembly to provide
for the retirement of judges automatically at a prescribed age (imple-
mented by law in 111. Rev. Stat. ch. 37, §§ 23.71, 23.72 (1967)), providing
an automatic retirement age of 70 subject to deferred retirements for pres-
ent incumbents for certain periods), and (2) authorization to use the serv-
ices of a retired judge with his consent. In addition, provision is made for
retirement for disability by rule of the Supreme Court, in addition to
suspension without pay or removal. Supreme Court Rule 51 covers this
aspect through the Courts Commission authorized by that rule to im-
plement Section 18. The composition of the Courts Commission author-
ized by this Section 18 includes Supreme, appellate and circuit court
judges, and, by its terminology, inferentially excludes associate circuit
court judges from appointment to the commission.
Comparative Analysis
About half the states have constitutional provisions concerning the
retirement of judges. A little more than half of these, about one-third
of all states, set a specific retirement age. The remainder provide for a
retirement age as established by law. Fourteen states other than Illinois
provide for the assignment of retired judges to judicial service.
All states provide a constitutional method of removal. Forty-six states,
have an impeachment provision. Twenty other states provide for a judicial
commission or similar court on the judiciary. Twenty-eight states provide
for address, a formal request by the state legislature asking the governor
to remove a judicial officer. Seven utilize the recall, typically a petition
for a new election filed by the electorate. Only four states provide for a
special board dealing with involuntary retirement of disabled judges.
The Constitution of the United States provides for legislative im-
peachment but is silent on suspension and removal for cause, or retire-
ment for age and disability, by any judicial tribunal.
The Model State Constitution provides for a retirement age of 70 and
the appointment of retired judges to special judicial assignments. The
Model also provides that appellate and general court judges may be
removed for cause by the Supreme Court. Under the Model State Consti-
tution all judges are subject to impeachment.
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Comment
Impeachment and the akernative removal authority by General As-
sembly action (see History, above) are apparently ineffective devices tor
the removal or suspension of judges for cause. The mechanism authorized
by Section 18 was thought to provide a more effective device for such re-
moval or retirement for disability. In fact, the existence of this device has,
on several occasions, caused allegedly offending judges to resign rather
than face the proceedings before the Courts Commission.
It is not possible to assess the effectiveness of this method. The revision
of Rule 51 seeks to strengthen the concept. The principle of a judicial
removal technique appears sound and is a device more and more utilized
by other states. (See Comparalive Analysis.) In the final analysis, the
effectiveness of this mechanism will depend upon the vigilance of the
pulDlic and the bar and the desire and dedication of the officers in tfie
judicial system, in whom administrative power is vested, to make it
work. The compidsory retirement provisions and the provision for volun-
tary service for retired judges make good sense and are not subject to
serious criticism. It may be desirable to clarify the impeachment problem
discussed above. If legislative impeachment of judges is to be assured,
the Constitution should be amended to remove the existing uncertainty.
General— Judicial Conference
Sec. 19. Tlie Supreme Court shall provide by rule for and sliall convene an
annual judicial conference to consider the business of the several courts and to
suggest improvements in the administration of justice, and shall report thereon
in writing to the General Assembly not later tiian January thirty-first in each
legislative year.
History
The provision that the Supreme Court convene an annual judicial
conference is novel in Illinois constitutional history. The requirement
that the conference suggest improvements in the administration of
justice and report thereon to the General Assembly appears to be a lineal
descendant of Article VI, Section 31, of the 1870 Constitution, but in fact
it is quite different in scope and purpose. The f870 provision required
(1) judges of inferior courts of record to report to the Supreme Court
annually "such defects and omissions in the laws as their experience may
suggest"; (2) judges of the Supreme Court to report annually to the
Governor such "defects and omissions in the Constitution and laws as
they may find to exist, together with appropriate forms of bills to cure
such defects and omissions"; and (3) judges of the circuit courts to report
to the General Assembly the nimdjer of days they held court in the respec-
tive counties of their circuit in the preceding two years.
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These 1870 reporting requirements, including the Supreme Court's
duty to study the Constitution and laws and prepare legislative bills for
curing defects, were ignored after 1909, when, after an exchange of corre-
spondence between the Governor and the Supreme Court, reported in 243
111. 9, the Court flatly rejected the notion that the Governor could
compel reports from judges of the Supreme Court, asserting that advisory
opinions and suggestions for constitutional and legislative changes, un-
related to specific litigation, was not an appropriate judicial function
and could not, despite Section 31, be demanded of the courts by the
Governor. The reporting requirements became a dead letter from nonuse.
(See also Explanation , Art. III.)
The 1922 Convention proposal contained no similar provision.
Explanation
The annual judicial conference requirement and the requirement that
"improvements in the administration of justice" be reported to the Gen-
eral Assembly are much more modest in scope and purpose than the re-
pealed 1870 reporting requirements of Section 31. Annual judicial con-
ferences, both federal and state, are relatively recent phenomena and
reflect a laudable judicial involvement and concern in the business of the
courts. Though it seems hardly necessary to mandate an annual judicial
conierence in the Constitution, the decision to do so was motivated by the
belief that the importance of this mechanism was so great that it deserved
constitutional status.
Comparative Analysis
Only two other states provide for a periodic judicial conference or coun-
cil meeting similar to this. The Constitution of the United States and the
Model State Constitution are silent on this subject.
Comment
The section establishes an important principle related to the general
administrative authority vested in the Siq^reme Court. Annual judicial
conferences have been held and are regarded as constructive and emi-
nently worthwhile. Though we may argue with the constitutional status
given this requirement, its overall importance would seem to justify its
retention.
General— Clerks of Courts
Sec. 20. The General Assembly shall provide by law for the selection by the
judges or election, terms of office, removal for cause and salaries of clerks and
other non-judicial officers of the various courts; provided that a clerk shall be
selected or elected for each Appellate Court District.
History
Constitutional designations of clerks of courts first appeared in 1848.
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Popular elections were provided lor clerks ol each ol the then-existing
three grand divisions ot the Supreme Court, circuit court clerks in each
county of the circuit, and clerks ol county courts. Supreme Court clerks
were given six-year terms and the other clerks, lour-year terms.
The 1870 Constitution provided lor elc'( lions as in the 1848 Consti-
tution, but added expressly the elective offices of tlie Criminal, Superior
and circuit courts of Cook County. The legislature implemented the
constitutional authorizations for the establishment of appellate courts,
probate courts and municipal, c ity, village and incorporated town courts
by providing for the election of clerks for each of such courts. In like
manner, provision was made for the election of a clerk of the .Municipal
Court of Chicago.
The proposed 1922 Constitution provided that the Supreme Court and
each appellate court shoidd apjjoint a clerk for a term of six years subject
to removal by the respective court. Clerks of the circuit and county
courts were to be elected as provided in the 1870 Constitution.
Explanation
The present section departs significantly from the pattern of prior Con-
stitutions by authorization to the General Assembly to provide either
for the selection of clerks by judges or for the popular election of clerks
as theretofore authorized. The Generaf Assembly has not acted to accept
the new afternative of selection of clerks by the judges, but the option
remains wlien and if the legislature deems it advisable.
Also raised to tlie levef of constitutional status, a consequence of the
establishment of constitutional appellate courts, is the provision for the
election or selection of one clerk for each appellate court district. The
legislative authorization to establish grounds for removal of clerks for
cause is new, as is the authorization to establish tlie terms of office, fn
other respects, the provisions of this section pertaining to clerks and
other nonjudicial officers represent no significant changes in prior provi-
sions or practice.
Comparative Analysis
Over three-fourtlis of the states have constitutionaf provisions deafing
with clerks and other nonjudicial officers. Only two other states, however,
leave the method of selection to the discretion of the fegislature. The
remaining states are split into three classes, approximately equal:
those appointing clerks, those electing clerks, and those combining both
methods. All but one of the 21 states mentioning compensation leave the
amount to be set by the legislature. One allows the court to set the figure.
Over half the states mention terms of office, but only two (excluding
Illinois) leave the term to be set by the legislature. Nineteen states set a
specific term, ranging from two to eight years. The rest leave the term to
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the court's discretion. Just over a fifth of the states specifically mention
removal of clerks, but only two delegate this authority to the state legis-
lature. The rest allow the court to remove, either for cause or at its
pleasure.
Neither the Constitution of the United States nor the Model State
Constitution deals with this subject.
Comment
The most important constitutional change effected by this section is the
authorization to the legislature to provide for the selection of clerks by
judges (instead of popular election) and other nonjudicial officers.
This provision reflects a judgment that the offices in question, being
largely ministerial, should be manned by administrators whose compe-
tence may more likely be assured by the selective rather than the elective
method. The section also quite properly, it seems, delegates to the legis-
lature the determination of terms of office, removal for cause and salaries
for clerks and nonjudicial officers. The section seems soundly conceived
as a matter of constitutional principle.
State's Attorneys— Selection— Salary
Sec. 21. There shall be a state's attorney elected in each county in the year
1964 and every fourth year thereafter for a term of four years. No person shall
be eligible for such office unless a citizen and licensed attorney-at-law of this
State. His salary shall be prescribed by law.
History
The office of state's attorney was first constitutionally established in
1848. The framers of that Constitution evidenced an uncertainty as to
the nature and scope of the office by providing for an election in each
judicial circuit with authorization in the legislature to substitute for that
office the office of county attorney in each county, an authority which
was never exercised. The 1870 Constitution established the present pat-
tern of the election of a state's attorney in each county with a four-year
term. Neither prior constitutional provision established a licensed-attor-
ney status as a qualification for office.
The proposed 1922 Constitution diflfered from the 1870 Constitution
only in that the state's attorney was required to be licensed to practice
law in this state.
Explanation
The only new aspects of the present section are the express require-
ments that the state's attorney be a citizen and licensed attorney-at-law
of this state and that his salary be prescribed by law. In fact, the attorney
requirement simply codified prior judicial interpretations that although
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the 1870 Consiitution established no such requiienient, want ol a license
was a bar to eligibility due to the nature of the office. (People ex rel.
Elliot V. Beneficl, 405 111. 500 (1950); People v. Munson, 319 111. 596
(192()).) In respect to salary, the Court has held that the state's attorney
was not a county officer within Article X, Section 10, of the 1870 Con-
stitution, and thus his compensation could be fixed Ijy the legislature.
(Hoyne v. Danisch, 261 111. 167 (191 1).) For a period after the adoption
of the 1870 Constitution, state's attorneys were held entitled to certain
fees in addition to their salary paid by the state, but fee payments were
abolished by law in 1912, with the result that salaries are paid by the
state, with county supplementation.
Comparative Analysis
Over three-fourths of the states provide for state's attorneys. Of these,
25 set a specific term of office ranging from two to eight years; 19 states, in-
cluding Illinois, provide a four-year term. Others apparently leave the
term of office to the legislature. Nearly half the states mention salary, but
all but three leave the amount to the legislature. Only two other states
require the state's attorney to be a state citizen, while seven other states
require him to be a practicing attorney. Of the 32 state constitutions
specifying a means of selection, 31 require the state's attorney to be
elected. Only one state specifies that he be appointed.
The Model State Constitution is silent on this subject.
Comment
There appears to be little or no basis for suggesting any substantive
changes in the present section, which, as noted, substantially reflects a
long-standing constitutional tradition.
Article VII
SUFFRAGE
Qualifications for Voting
Sec. 1. Every person having resided in this State one year, in the county
ninety days, and in the election district thirty days next preceding any election
therein, who was an elector in this State on the first day of April, in the year of
our Lord one thousand eight hundred and forty-eight, or obtained a certificate
of naturalization, before any court of record in this State prior to the first day
of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and seventy, or
who shall be a male citizen of the United States, above the age of twenty-one
years, shall be entitled to vote at such election.
History
The 1818 Constitution gave the franchise to "white male inhabitants
above the age of 21 years, having resided in the state six months next
preceding the election." The Constitution also said that one could vote
only in the "county or district" in which he resided on election day. In
the 1848 Constitution, the foregoing qualifications were preserved as
of the date of the Constitution, but for the future, citizenship was added
to the qualifications. This, of course, covered people moving into the
state thereafter and people reaching the age of 21 thereafter.
In the 1870 Convention, the principal controversy concerned the de-
letion of the word "white." The Committee on Right of Suffrage proposed
to continue the 1848 arrangement. Four of the nine members of the
committee filed a minority report supporting "impartial suffrage." They
observed that the majority feared that the proposed Constitution would
be rejected if the word "white" were omitted. The minority proposed to
offer the voters alternative sections, one with the word "white," one
without. The minority further proposed to permit the voters to decide
whether or not to omit the word "male."
When these reports were first presented to the Convention, considera-
tion was delayed several weeks, apparently to see whether or not the
Fifteenth Amendment was ratified. (Illinois had been one of the first
to ratify the amendment almost a year earlier.) A few days after the
adoption of the amendment was certain, a delegate moved to recommit
the committee report "because great changes have occurred in our coun-
try in reference to this matter, in the brief time that has elapsed since
this report was made. ..." (Debates 758.) The motion was agreed to. When
381
382 Art. VII, § 1
the committee reported again, the word "wliite" had been deleted. A
minority report was filed by the same four delegates who had been in
the minority before, but this time they were proposing only that a
separate vote be authorized on the question of woman suffrage. Three
other members filed a second minority report in favor of retaining the
word "white."
W'hen Section 1 was taken up in Committee of the Whole, there was
no debate and the section was accepted by a vote of 32 to 18. In the
Convention proper, however, an extended debate developed around the
cjuestion of whether to allow aliens to vote. In part, the debate involved
doubt concerning the acccj^tability under federal law of certifications
of naturalization issued by county courts. It was to meet this objection
that the words "or obtained a certificate of naturalization before any
court of record in this state" ^vere added. The more significant argument
for allowing aliens to vote A\as made by those who objected to allowing
Negroes to vote. The pro-citizenship bloc prevailed and Section 1 was
accepted.
On two occasions, votes were taken on woman suffrage. On a motion
to strike the Avord "male," there were 12 in favor and 46 against. The
vote was closer on a motion to submit the question to the voters as a
separate question. Twenty-eight delegates favored the submission and
32 opposed it. There was also a motion to reduce the voting age to 18,
but no vote appears to have been taken on the motion. The delegate
who so moved had announced earlier that he would do so because under
the militia article 18 year olds were subject to a draft. (Debates 861.)
The 1848 section had said that a person could vote only "in the district
or countv in which" he resided "at the time of" an election. Section 1,
it should be noted, shifts the wording around to say that a resident
for the requisite period "shall be entitled to vote at [an] election."
When Section 4 (infra, p. 392) was under consideration, it was proposed
to add to that section an authorization to the legislatme to provide for
absentee voting by military personnel. It was pointed out by one dele-
gate that the "only in the district" language in the 1848 Constitution
had prevented absentee voting and that a careful reading of the pro-
posed Section 1 would show that the legislature could provide for ab-
sentee voting. Another delegate pressed the point as follows:
"The first section does not say one word as to the place of voting, but simply
as to the necessity of residence in the election district.
"The [fourth] section says that the elector shall not be deemed to have lost his
residence by reason of his absence, and the General .Assembly are left free to fix
where the party shall cast his vote. The only thin,^ required is, that he shall have
a particular residence. Having that residence he can cast his vote at the place
prescribed by law." (Debates 1295.)
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The proposed addition to Section 4 was rejected. It is not possible to
say with certainty that the vote was a ratification of the foregoing inter-
pretation of Section 1, but it seems the more Hkely understanding, for
if the delegates were voting against the absentee ballot, they would have
questioned the wording of Section 1. In fact, a delegate moved to
reconsider Section 1 because he thought it was "left on dangerous
ground." The Convention voted against him, 40 to 13. (Id.)
The proposed 1922 Constitution combined Sections 1 and 7 to read:
"Excepting only idiots and persons adjudged insane or convicted of infamous
crime and not restored to civil rights, every citizen of the United States above
the age of twenty-one years who has resided in the state one year and (unless
naturalized because of military or naval service) in the United States five years
shall be a qualified elector. He may vote only in the election district and county
in which he has resided thirty and ninety days respectively next before such
election." (art. VI, § 132.)
It is to be noted that the foregoing deleted the obsolete material con-
cerning electors in 1848 and 1870, but other changes were made, the most
significant of which was the reversion to the "only in the district"
language of 1848. The Committee on Phraseology and Style reported that
the revised section was intended to make absentee voting constitutional.
(Journal 294-6.) In the light of the foregoing history, it would appear
that the committee had in fact endangered absentee voting.
Explanation
Prior to the adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment, there was con-
siderable litigation concerning whether or not there were any "elections"
at which women could be permitted to vote. In general, the cases per-
mitted extension of the franchise to women in any election for any office
not named in the Constitution and in any referendum not required or
specifically authorized by the Constitution. {See Scown v. Czarnecki, 264
111. 305 (1914).) The question can be raised whether that line of cases
should be relied upon in all other contexts. The courts were sympathetic
to woman suffrage and undoubtedly stretched a point in authorizing
legislative inroads on the mascidine ballot. Courts might not have the
same attitude in the case of legislative extension of the franchise to
aliens, or to people with only a few days' residence. Nevertheless, as
recently as 1952, the Supreme Court said that the legislature could pro-
vide qualifications for voting in school elections differing from those
required by Section 1, but the Court construed the School Code in a
manner consistent with Section 1. (Scofield v. Board of Educ. 411 111.
11 (1952).)
The question could be presented squarely by Section 3-1 of the
Election Code. (111. Rev. Stat. ch. 46 (1967).) As amended in 1963, that
section permits an adult citizen to vote in a presidential election if he
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has resided in the election district for 60 days and would have been
eligible to vote some place else had he not moved. It seems likely at this
late date that the Scown case, which was a full-chess consideration of
the issue with three dissenting opinions, would be followed at least in
the case of presidential elections. (See Comment below for a further
discussion of the judicial interpretation of Sec. I.)
In the light of the earlier discussion of absentee voting, it is interesting
to note that absentee voting has been authorized by law since 1917
without, apparently, any reported constitutional challenge. (111. Rev. Stat,
ch. 46, §§19-1 to 19-44 (1967).) In 1912, the Attorney General expressed
some doubt that an absentee voting law would be constitutional. He
noted that the courts of other states were in conflict and that until the
Supreme Court spoke, no one could be sure of the result in Illinois.
(1912 111. Att'y Gen. Rep. 1266.) In 1917, the legislature passed a general
absentee voting law and a special one w^hich permitted military per-
sonnel to vote as a unit. On the assumption that National Guard units
called into the federal service would remain intact, the necessary quantity
of ballots would be sent to a unit commander, polling would take place,
and the ballots would be bundled up and returned to the Secretary of
State for distribution. On June 16, 1917, the Attorney General rendered
an opinion that Section 4 {infra, p. 392) justified permitting military
personnel to vote as a unit. (1917 111. Att'y Gen. Rep. 300.) On July 11,
1918, he rendered an opinion to the Governor, concluding rather
cautiously that Section 1 would authorize absentee voting for military
personnel not voting as a unit. The Attorney General noted that there
were no Supreme Court opinions on the validity of either the military
unit voting act or the general absentee voting law previously enacted.
He relied on the difference in wording between the 1848 and 1870
sections, but he did not refer to the 1870 debates concerning that dif-
ference. (1918 111. Att'y Gen. Rep. 345.)
The first reported Supreme Court case construing the absentee voting
law was decided in 1920. (McCreery v. Burnsmier, 293 111. 43 (1920).)
The second case appears to have been in 1932 (Talbott v. Thompson,
350 111. 86 (1932)), w^ith a good many more since then. No case appears
to have involved an attack on the statute. In the recent case of Craig
V. Peterson (39 111. 2d 1991 (1968)), however, there was an attack on the
absentee voting law by absentee voters whose votes had not been coiuited
because the election judges failed to initial the ballots. In that case, all
voting for candidates, except for judges seeking retention, was by voting
machine and only absentee ballots were capable of being initialed. The
Supreme Court distinguished earlier cases, which had held initialing to
be mandatory, by noting that in the case in litigation there was no
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allegation of fraud and initialing would have served no essential purpose.
The Court concluded that to protect the right to vote, guaranteed by
this Section 1 and Section 18 of Article II (supra, p. 83), uninitialed absen-
tee ballots should be counted under the circumstances set forth. This case
can reasonably be accepted as an affirmation of the validity of absentee
voting, for a court can hardly be expected to invalidate part of a statute
on the ground that that part is inconsistent with a constitutional pro-
vision if the constitutional provision in fact prohibits the entire statute.
There have been numerous decisions interpreting the residency re-
quirements of Section 1. The courts have held that "residence" refers
to a permanent abode (Coffey v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 375 111. 385
(1940)), but have noted that there is a large element of subjective intent
in the permanence of a person's abode. (Sec Welsh v. Shumway, 232 111. 54
(1907).) In this respect, residence for voting purposes is somewhat like
the elusive term "domicile." Because of the element of intent, someone
once observed that the only truly accurate definition of domicile is that
it is something a person has only one of. This is the case with voting
residence, and it seems unlikely that any purpose is served in a con-
stitution by trying to go beyond using the word "resident."
A problem arises under a time-of-residence provision when one be-
comes eligible to vote too late to comply with the administrative scheme
of registration. One of the defects in one of the several invalidated
primary election laws was a provision that in effect prevented voting by
anyone reaching 21 or becoming a citizen within four months of the
election. (People ex rel. Phillips v. Strassheim, 240 111. 279 (1909).) The
Supreme Court did, however, uphold a provision that required registra-
tion within three weeks of election, thus disfranchising those who be-
came 21 or were naturalized in the intervening period. (People ex rel.
Grinnell v. Hoffman, 116 III. 587 (1886).) The present statutory pro-
vision permits registration in advance if a person will be qualified by
the next election day. (111. Rev. Stat. ch. 46, §4-2 (1967).)
The requirement of residence in the "election district" for 30 days
preceding the election has also created some difficulty. The Supreme
Court once noted that "election district" had no settled meaning and
decided that a 30-day resident in a town, who was otherwise qualified,
was a legal voter regardless of his length of residence in a particular
election district within the town. The rationale was that any voter
should be able to vote at a town meeting and that it was not consis-
tent to deny him the right to vote for town officers. But the Supreme
Court went on to say that in any other election, the 30-day residence
requirement referred to the denominated election district. (People ex rel.
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Delaney v. Markiewicz, 225 111. 563 (1907).) In a city, "election district"
may be a precinct, but ii the precinct is divided into districts, then it is
the district. (Donovan v. Comertord, 332 111. 230 (1928).)
Section 1 limits qualifications to matters ol age, residence, and cit-
izenship. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has said that idiots and insane
persons cannot vote. (Welsh v. Shumway, 232 111. 54 (1907); Behrens-
meyer v. Kreitz, 135 111. 591 (1891).) Literacy is not recjuired, and the
Supreme Court has said that a statute which prohibited voter assistance
would he invalid, for it would deny the right to vote to an illiterate.
(People ex rel. Drennan v. Williams, 298 111. 8() (1921).) Likewise, dis-
abled people would be entitled to assistance. (Id.)
Comparative Analysis
Citizenship: There appear to be two states. New Hampshire and Texas,
that have no constitutional citizenship requirement. Delaware and West
Virginia require state citizenship, but the wording of the Delaware pro-
vision makes it clear that a voter must be a United States citizen. Massa-
chusetts simply says that a voter must be a "citizen." (The Index Digest
of State Constitutions is the primary source for checking comparable
provisions in other state constitutions. There are errors in the Index
Digest and for this reason references to other states are usually couched
in terms, of approximation. In the case of citizenship qualifications for
voting, 44 states are listed, but Illinois is labeled "Ind VII I" instead of
"111 VII I." Four states with citizenship requirements are not entered at
all. Moreover, the Council of State Governments, The Book of the States,
1968-69 (at 30 (1968)) notes that all states require United States citizen-
ship. This notation would be based, of course, on constitutional and
statutory provisions.)
Age: Forty-six states set the minimum voting age at 21, assuming, as is
undoubtedly the case, that in West Virginia "minors" means "persons
under 21." The minimum age is 20 in Hawaii, 19 in Alaska, and 18 in
Georgia and Kentucky.
Residency:
State: According to the Book of the States, 1968-69, state residency re-
quirements are as follows:
Two years 1 state
One year 32 states
Six months 15 states
Three months 1 state
90 days 1 state
(Id. at 30.)
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County: Only 36 states have a county residency requirement, dis-
tributed as follows:
Six months 10 states
Four months I state
Three months 4 states
90 days 7 states
Two months 1 state
60 days 5 states
40 days 3 states
30 days 5 states
(Id.)
Election District: Forty-one states have a residency requirement in an
election district, as follows:
One year 1 state
Six months 5 states
Three months 7 states
60 days 3 states
54 days I state
40 days 1 state
One month 1 state
30 days 14 states
20 days 2 states
10 days 5 states
By fifth Friday preceding election 1 state
(Id.)
In the case of residency requirements for county and election districts,
the information set out above incltides both constitutional and statutory
time periods and does not include various exceptions. It should also be
noted that, over the past decade, residency requirements have been
changed in several states. Invariably, the time has been shortened. In
South Carolina, for example, the residence requirement which used to be
two years (ministers, teachers and their spouses, six months) was short-
ened in 1963 to one year (same six-month exemption), and under a
current proposed constitutional revision wotdd be cut to six months.
Literacy: Not quite half of the states include a literacy requirement
among the qualifications for voting. (But apparently only 14 states re-
quire a literacy test. Council of State Governments, The Book of the
States, 1968-69 at 30 (1968).) Usually, the requirement is one of being
able to read the English language; but in New Mexico, it is English or
Spanish; in Hawaii, English or Hawaiian; and in Louisiana, English or
mother tongue. In many cases, the requirement has been superseded
in part by the Federal Voting Rights Act of 1965. (42 U.S.C. §§1971, 1973.)
Mental Condition: Almost half the states exclude idiots from voting,
and almost three-fourths exclude the insane. About ten states exclude
incompetents.
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Other QjtnUfications: Many states have cjualidcations that are no
longer effective. For example, six states besides Illinois have not removed
"male" from their suffrage article, antl a lew states still retain a poll
tax requirement. Nine states disqualily paupers, three states require good
moral character, and one state requires "quiet and peaceable behavior."
The United States Constitution has no affirmative suffrage provisions
but by the Filteenth Amendment prohibits denial of suffrage "on account
of race, color, or previous condition of servitude"; by the Nineteenth
Amendment prohibits tlenial of suffrage "on account of sex"; and by the
Twenty-Fourth Amendment prohibits denial of suffrage in federal elec-
tions
"by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax." Since adop-
tion of the amendment, the United States Supreme Court has outlawed
the poll tax in all elections. (Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383
U.S. 663 (1966).)
The Model State Constitution's article on Suffrage and Elections
reads as follows:
"Qualifualions for Voting. Every citizen of the age of . . . .years and a resident
of the state for three months shall have the right to vote in the election of all
officers that may be elected by the people and upon all questions that may be
submitted to the voters; but the legislature may by law establish: (1) minimum
periods of local residence not exceeding three months, (2) reasonable require-
ments to determine literacy in English or in another language predominantly
used in the classrooms of any public or private school accredited by any state
or territory of the United States, the District oi Columbia, or the Common-
wealth of Puerto Rico, and (3) disqualifications lor voting for mental incompe-
tency or conviction of felony." (art. Ill, §3.01.)
"Legislature to Prescribe for Exercise of Su0rage. The legislature shall by law
define residence for \oting purposes, insure secrecy in xoting and provide for the
registration of voters, absentee voting, the administration of elections and the
nomination of candidates." (art. Ill, § 3.02.)
Comment
The suffrage article of a constitution should do two things: it should
provide for the qualifications for being allowed to \ote and it should
guarantee that those who have such qualifications can vote. With one
exception, the Model State Constitution suffrage article succinctly covers
all of the essentials. The exception is the problem of voting in presiden-
tial elections. The Model State Constitution has a short residence re-
quirement, but even so, the Illinois statute for presidential voting, re-
ferred to supra, pp. 383-4, probably would not be valid. It may well be
that, before long. Congress will set national standards lor voting in presi-
dential elections, but until then, a state suffrage provision ought to permit
the waiver of state residence recjuirements for voting in presidential
elections. This is especially significant if the minimum residence require-
ment is six months or a year. It should be noted that, under the Model
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State Constitution, the legislature would be able to waive local residence
requirements tor voting for state officers.
Although the Model State Constitution's suffrage article contains all of
the essentials, there is room for different policies on details. The Conven-
tion should consider whether to shorten the present state residence mini-
mum, but it is certainly not unreasonable to consider three months too
short. It is also questionable whether a literacy test should be inserted at
this late date. In the light of the history of the misuse of literacy require-
ments in other parts of the country, a proposal to include even permis-
sion for one in Illinois would undoubtedly be misunderstood. The point
is that the Model suffrage article has all the necessary constitutional
guarantees and qualifications for voting and all the necessary flexibility
for appropriate legislative regulation of the electoral process.
The old saying that "Hard cases make bad law" certainly applies to
the cases in which the Supreme Court granted women the right to vote
in "nonconstitutional" elections. It is clear from the debates of the 1870
Convention that the delegates intended Section 1 to cover all voting.
Thus, if one follows the intent of the drafters, the decisions were wrong.
If Section 1 is read strictly and literally, it says that the persons described
shall be entitled to vote at "such" election, and "such" election is "any
election" in the voting district. Thus, if one follows the rule of strict
construction, the decisions were wrong. There is a theory that the legis-
lature has all the sovereign powers of government except those with-
drawn by the people through the Constitution. Under this theory, one
could argue that Section 1 denies to the legislature the power to exclude
from voting the persons described but does not deny the power to en-
large the franchise. Under this theory, the courts could have upheld an
extension of voting rights to women, but could not have distinguished
between constitutional elections and other elections. The moral, other
than that one should never underestimate the power of women, is that
no amount of careful draftsmanship can foreclose an erroneous inter-
pretation, whether for a good cause or a bad cause.
A word is in order about a bit of inadvisable constitution-making in
the proposed 1922 section quoted above. (Supra, p. W6.) That section pro-
vided that a naturalized citizen had to have been a resident in the United
States for five years before he could vote. The debates of the Convention
make it clear that the purpose of this language was to prevent wives of
United States citizens from voting just because, under the law as it was
then, they automatically acquired the citizenship of their husband. (State
of Illinois, Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention 967 (1920)
[hereinafter cited as Proceedings].) The five-year residence requirement
would put wives on a par with any other alien who had to live in the
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United States lor fi\e years belore he could get Iiis final paj^ers. It pie-
sumably did not occur to any one in ilie Convention that the United
States might make any number ol changes in the Naturalization Act,
and that it was not necessarily appropriate to enshrine in a semiper-
manent state constitution a special exception to cover a specific lederal
statutory ride. This is not to say that the provision was necessarily bad,
though the actual wording raises the question oi whether a citi/en, natu-
ralized or not, who had been out ol the country had to be back ior five
years before he could vote. The point is that the reason for the provision
was both ephemeral and beyond the control of Illinois. One of the most
important attributes of good constitution decision-making is to take the
long view, to rememlDcr that what is to be proposed should be good for
at least a generation and preferably for longer.
Ballots Required
Sec. 2. All votes shall be by ballot.
History
The 1818 Constitution provided that voting should be viva voce until
changed by the legislature. In 1848 it was provided that "[a] 11 votes
shall be given by ballot." The change in verb form was made by the
Committee on Revision and Adjustment of the 1870 Convention. The
proposed 1922 Constitution dropped the ^vord ".\11."
Explanation
As the history above indicates, the purpose of this section is simply to
avoid x/iva voce voting. At the time of adoption in 1870, the section did
not insure secret voting. Nevertheless, in the debate on the floor, it was
clear that the delegates assumed that the existing statutory system per-
mitting a voter to demand a secret ballot would be preserved. In those
days, the Australian ballot had not been generally accepted and a fre-
quent practice was to have different colored paper for the different
political parties. It was in this context that a delegate observed that it
was
"clearly the right of a voter, if he is offered a blue or red ticket, to
procure a ticket on white paper of the kind usually employed." (Debates
1294.) In 1905, the Supreme Court upheld the use of voting machines,
and in doing so announced that the real purpose of this section was to
preserve secrecy in voting. (Lynch v. Malley, 215 111. 574 (1905).) Thus,
to the three provided by Illinois, there are preservations of voting rights
Court, so to speak, switched the meaning so that, in effect. Section 2 now
reads: Secrecy in voting shall be insured.
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Comparative Analysis
Approximately two-thirds of the states specify that voting shall be by
ballot. About a third of the states specify that secrecy shall be preserved.
A dozen or so states specifically authorize the use of voting machines.
The United States Constitution provides that the "times, Places and
Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be
prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress
may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations. ..." (art. 1,
i^4.) The Model State Constitution instructs the legislature by law to
"insure secrecy in voting" and to provide for "the administration of
elections."
Comment
Since the Supreme Court in 1905 produced the brilliant result both of
making this section guarantee secrecy in voting and of permitting the use
of voting machines, it would appear advisable to leave the section alone.
It would be appropriate, of course, for the Convention to make a legis-
lative record to the effect that the section was retained in the light of the
judicial gloss. It might also be appropriate for the delegates to "assume"
formally that "voting machine" includes whatever the electronic magic
of computers may make possible so long as secrecy is preserved.
Freedom from Arrest— Military Duty
Sec. 3. Electors shall, in all cases except treason, felony, or breach of the
peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at elections, and in
going to and returning from the same. And no elector shall be obliged to do
military duty on the days of election, except in time of war or public danger.
History
This first appeared in substance in the 1848 Constitution as two sepa-
rate sections. In the 1870 Convention, the two sections were agreed to
without discussion. The Committee on Revision and Adjustment pro-
duced the combined section. The proposed 1922 Constitution retained
the substance of the provision.
Explanation
There does not appear to have been any interpretation of this section.
The only question likely to arise is the meaning of the exception of
"treason, felony, or breach of the peace." (See discussion of Sec. 14, Art.
IV, supra, p. 174.)
Comparative Analysis
Freedom from Arrest: Approximately half the states have the same
provision as the first sentence of this section. Another eight states or so
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have variations in the privilege, including five thai limit it to civil
process. Most of the newer constitutions omit the privilege. Michigan,
for example, deleted it in its new constitution. Neither the United States
Constitution nor the Model State Constitution has such a constitutional
privilege.
Military Duty: Not quite a third of the state constitutions contain this
privilege. The statements above concerning newer constitutions, Michi-
gan, the Ihiited States Constitution and the Model State Constitution are
applicable to this privilege, also.
Comment
These privileges are appropriate ones but not so fundamental as to
require constitutional protection. Legislative extension of the privileges
could be afforded without any specific constitutional authorization.
Losing Voting Residence
Sec. 4. No elector shall be deemed to have lost his residence in this State by
reason of his absence on the business of the United States, or of this State, or in
the military or naval service of the United States.
History
The civilian part of this section was first adopted in the 1848 Consti-
tution. The military part was added in 1870. At that time there was a
debate over whether specifically to provide for absentee voting by the
military. The argument was made that legislation on absentee voting was
permitted by the revised language of Section 1 (see History of Sec. 1,
supra, pp. 382-3), and apparently on the basis of this representation a pro-
posed addition to Section 4 concerning absentee voting was defeated.
The proposed 1922 Constitution retained the substance of this section in
combination with the substance of Section 5.
Explanation
Several cases have construed this section, but all of them have simply
confirmed that the section means what it says. The Attorney General has
expressed the opinion that this section may authorize absentee voting
for military personnel. (1917 111. Att'y Gen. Rep. 300. See also, Explan-
ation of Sec. 1, supra, p. 384.)
Comparative Analysis
A majority of the states spell out various circumstances when the privi-
lege of voting is not lost by absence from one's residence. In addition
to the three provided by Illinois, there are preservations of voting rights
notwithstanding attendance at college; confinement in jail, an asylum,
or an almshouse; and while navigating in state waters and the high seas.
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Presumably, most states with no such provision permit appropriate de-
terminations by law. Michigan, ior example, deleted its comparable
provision and a provision comparable to Section 5. The new Michigan
Constitution has a general section on voting cjualifications that ends
with the sentence: "The legislature shall define residence for voting
purposes." (art. II, § 1.) The United States and Model State Constitu-
tions have no comparable provision.
Comment
In the Comment on Section 1 (supra, pp. 388-9), it was suggested that a
suffrage article along the lines of the Model State Constitution would
be appropriate. Such an article would eliminate the need, if there ever
was any, for this section.
Military Service— Residence
Sec. 5. No soldier, seaman or marine in the army or navy of the United States,
shall be deemed a resident of this State in consequence of being stationed therein.
History
This section, in a slightly expanded form, was first adopted in the
1848 Constitution. The 1870 Convention retained the section without
debate, and the Committee on Revision and Adjustment shortened the
section by substituting "therein" for "at any military or naval place
within the State." (One wonders why not "herein.") The proposed 1922
Constitution retained the substance of this section in combination with
the substance of Section 4.
Explanation
In 1848, this perfectly straightforward principle may have been deemed
to be of constitutional status for some reason no longer apparent. In
any event, there does not appear even to have been any occasion to
interpret it.
Comparative Analysis
Just under half the states have a comparable provision. Some states
simply work out a "gain and loss" reciprocal arrangement and thus such
other circumstances as attendance at college, confinement in prison,
and the like, do not create residence for voting. (See Comparaiwe
Analysis of Sec. 4, supra, pp. 392-3.) Again, it may be noted, Michigan de-
leted a comparable provision. {Id.) The United States and the Model
State Constitutions have no comparable provisions.
Comment
It seems doubtful that this section was ever necessary. If, as suggested
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earlier (supra, pp. 388-9), a sufirage article along the lines of the Model
State Constitution were used, this section would be unnecessary, for that
article instructs the legislature to define residence for voting purposes.
Qualifications for Civil or Military Office
Sec. 6. No person shall be elected or appointed to any office in this State, civil
or military, who is not a citizen of the United States, and who shall not have
resided in this State one year next preceding the election or appointment.
History
This section was first adopted in the 1848 Constitution with the word
"before" instead of
"preceding." In the 1870 Convention, the Committee
on Riglit of Suffrage proposed a section reading: "No person shall be
elected or appointed to any civil office, public position or place of trust,
profit or emolument, in this State, who is not an elector of this State."
Tliis was accepted without debate, but when the section came back to
the ffoor in final form from the Committee on Revision and Adjustment,
the wording had reverted to tlie 1848 language with the one word change
noted above. In the proposed 1922 Constitution, this parochial provision
was moved to the article on Public Servants and made somewhat less
restrictive in one respect but gratuitously more restrictive in another
respect. It read: "To hold any office created by this constitution a person
shall be a citizen of the United States, resident in this state one year and
able to read and write the English language." The less restrictive lan-
guage was presumably designed to conform to the McCormick case dis-
cussed below.
Explanation
In the leading case of People ex rel. Hayne v. McCormick (261 111.
413 (1913)), the Supreme Court limited the coverage of this restrictive
section to offices, state and local, provided for by the Constitution. It
further held that legislation could not make the restrictions on such
offices more onerous as, for example, requiring five years' residence; but
that in the case of offices created by statute, it was wholly within the
power of the legislature to determine the qualifications of the office.
The Attorney General has ruled, however, that statutory officers must
meet the citizenship and residency requirements, (1900 111. Att'y Gen.
Rep. 237 (Notary Public a citizen); 1915 111. Att'y Gen. Rep. 593 (over-
seer of the poor a resident); 1917 111. Att'y Gen. Rep. 108 (civil service
applicant a citizen); 1926 fU, Att'y Gen. Rep. 71 (probation officer a
resident).)
In the 1917 opinion, the Attorney General was faced with construing
the provision of the Civil Service Act that opened applications for
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"offices or places" to all citizens of the state. Since "offices" can be filled
only by United States citizens, and since he doubted that the legislature
intended to distinguish between "offices" and "places," he concluded that
only United States citizens were eligible for civil service positions. That
act was repealed in 1955 and replaced by the Personnel Code under
which there appear to be no citizenship requirements and under which
residence requirements may be waived under certain circumstances. (111.
Rev. Stat. ch. 127, i^G.^blOSb.l (1967).) In the light of the McCormick
case, supra, and the Wilson case, infro, it seems likely that the courts will
not follow the several opinions of the Attorney General.
In 1960, the Supreme Court utilized the distinction between "office"
and
"employment" (see Sec. 24 of Art. V, supra, p. 322) to permit Chicago
to hire nonresidents as Administrator of the Police Board and Superin-
tendent of Police. (People ex rcl. Adamowski v. Wilson, 20 111. 2d 568
(I960).)
Comparative Analysis
A restrictive provision like Section 6 is relatively rare among the states.
Only five or so require United States citizenship and two or three more
require state citizenship. Approximately eight states require residency,
but a few of them do not appear to require residency for as long as a
year. Hawaii requires three years' residence for certain positions. (This
may be simply an attempt to discourage "vacationland" immigration. Cali-
fornia, Arizona and Florida, for example, make it difficult for retired pro-
fessional men to get a local license to practice.) Some states have weird
exclusions from public office. Several states prohibit duellers from hold-
ing public office. Idaho has perhaps, the weirdest provision. Excluded
are polygamists, bigamists, persons who are idiotic or insane, Chinese
and persons of Mongolian descent not born in the United States, and
Indians not taxed who have not severed their tribal relations and adopted
habits of civilization. The United States and Model State Constitutions
exclude nobody from public office.
Comment
As indicated above, this is a parochial provision conceivably suited to
the Jacksonian concept that anyone is competent to hold any govern-
ment job, but not suited to today's requirements for high competence
in specialized fields. It is, of course, possible to rely on the courts to
exclude professional positions from the term "ofhce," but it would seem
more realistic simply to confine requirements of citizenship and residency
to elective positions.
The McCormick case, discussed above, raises an interesting question in
constitution-drafting. It seems doubtful that the drafters of this section.
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either in 1818 or 1870, meant to limit the section to offices created by
the Constitution. As a matter ol hindsight, it is easy to word the section
to cover statutory offices. As a matter ol loresight, it is not easy to antici-
j)ate a judicial refusal to read clear language to mean what it says. But
in constitution-drafting, there is great danger in being loo specific. For
one thing, a constitution can quickly become too nuuh like a statute. For
another, the times may change and it may be a lot simpler to permit
the courts to rewrite the language than it is to amend a constitution.
The best way to avoid worrying over whether the courts will read sec-
tions jjroperly is to concentrate on limiting constitutional provisions to
princijiles that will liold good for at least two or three generations. Biu
then even this exemplary outlook nuist I)e tempered by the jjolitical
realities of getting a constitution adopted. The voter who reads as he
runs rarely thinks in terms of two or three generations ahead. Fortunately,
he is also likely to accept clear and simple language and not worry aboiu
whether it can be misread.
This section provides an opportunity to make a couple of "nuts and
bolts" observations about constitution-drafting. The section states most
explicitly that no person can be elected to any office in the state who is
not a United States citizen. Section ,S of Article IV (supra, p. 120) states
that a member of the legislature must be a United States citizen. Section
5 of Article V (supra, p. 267) states that the Governor and Lieutenant
Governor must be United States citizens. Section 3 of the original Article
VI required judges of the Supreme Court to be United States citizens
and Section 17 of the same original article required circuit and inferior
court judges and county commissioners to be United States citizens. (The
present Judicial Article is another matter. It was put together as a self-
contained package and any cautious draftsman would hesitate to rely
on some other part of the Constitution to cover the judiciary. For the
record, the present Sections 15 and 21 of Article VI (supra, pp. 366 and
379) require judges and state's attorneys, respectively, to be citizens "of
this State." See Comment on Sec. 1 of Art. XII, iiifra, p. 538, concerning
state citizenship.)
There are two obvious morals here. He who drafts a blanket provi-
sion ought to touch base with anyone who is affected by the provision.
Presumably, no one on the 1870 suffrage committee checked with other
committees concerning the diqDlication. The second moral is that the
Committee on Style and Arrangement ought to add "and Consistency"
to its title. In addition to the mammoth tasks of trying to impress a single
writing style on the various draft sections and of trying to get everything
arranged logically, the committee has to watch for inconsistencies and
duplications. In the long run, the elimination of inconsistencies may be
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more important than style and arrangement. (Anyone interested in an
even better story of drafting confusion can search out the variations in
referendum wording in the Constitution. There are at least 15 references
to a referendum by voters.)
Infamous Crime— Loss of Franchise
Sec. 7. The General Assembly shall pass laws excluding from the right of
suffrage persons convicted of infamous crimes.
History
In the Legislative Article of the 1818 Constitution, the legislature was
given "full power to exclude from the privilege of electing or being
elected any person convicted of bribery, perjury or any other infamous
crime." In 1848, this section was retained but a shortened version was
added in the new article on Elections and Rights of Suffrage, giving the
legislature "full power to pass laws excluding from the right of suffrage
persons convicted of infamous crimes." This latter language was in the
original proposal of the Committee on Right of Suffrage of the 1870
Convention. The original proposal was referred back to the committee
for resolution of disputed matters concerning Section I (see History of
Sec. 1, supra, pp. 381-2), and during this period of reconsideration the
Convention, in debating what is now Section 4 of Article IV, decided to
spell out tlie prohibition against office-holding rather than grant power to
the legislature to prohibit certain classes of people from holding ofhce. (See
History of Sec. 4, Art. IV, supra, pp. 127-8.) When the committee resub-
mitted Article VII to the Convention, this principle showed up in a re-
vised version of Section 7. This version was accepted without debate.
(One may note, however, that the Convention did not go all the way,
for instead of mandating legislation, it could have provided that no
person convicted of an infamous crime could vote.) In the proposed 1922
Constitution this section was combined with Section 1 in a self-executing
form. Excepted from the privilege of voting were persons "convicted of
infamous crime and not restored to civil rights."
Explanation
It is clear from the historical development of this section and from
the wording of Section 4 of Article IV {supra, p. 127) that bribery and
perjury are infamous crimes. This was reinforced in 1903 when the
Supreme Court upheld a long-standing statute that disfranchised for a
period anyone convicted of bribery in an election. (Christie v. People,
206 111. 337 (1903).)
Under the current Election Code, no person legally convicted in
Illinois, in any other state or in federal court, of any crime punishable by
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confinement in the penitentiary may vote unless rights ol citizenship
are restored by the Governor or by a court. (111. Rev. Stat. ch. 46, iijS-S
(1967).)
Comparative Analysis
Almost every state has some constitutional restriction on voting by per-
sons who have engaged in criminal activity. In some cases the restriction
is spelled out on a selt-executing basis, in others in the lorm oi a com-
mand to the legislature as in Illinois, and in still others in the iorm ot
a permission to the legislature to act. Some 20 states use the adjective
"iniamous." The United States Constitution has no comparable provi-
sion. The Model State Constitution provides that the legislature may
by law establish "disqualifications lor voting tor mental incompetency
or conviction ot telony."
Comment
There is no need to spell out in a constitution what criminal activity
is cause for disfranchisement, but it is necessary to give the legislature
power to provide for disqualification for certain criminal activity if that
is desired. Once there is a suffrage provision that says "any person who,
etc., can vote," there is no legislative power of exclusion unless author-
ized. (See also Comment on Sec. 1, stipni, p. >^fi8.)
Article VIM
EDUCATION
Free Schools
Sec. 1. The General Assembly shall provide a thorough and efficient system
of free schools, whereby all children of this state may receive a good common
school education.
History
This section of the Constitution was new in 1870; neither the 1818
nor the 1848 Constitution contained a mandate requiring the legislature
to establish a state-wide school system, although as a matter of fact
considerable effort had been made toward that goal before 1848. The
first effective school code for a general school system in Illinois was
passed in 1845.
In the 1870 Convention there was a much-debated amendment to strike
out all the words following "schools," and insert the words "for all per-
sons in the state." This amendment was opposed on two grounds. There
was a considerable immigration of southern Negroes in the southern
part of the state, and it was feared that the education of these adults
at public expense would be unduly burdensome. It was also felt that
retaining the requirement of "common school education" would indi-
cate that "academic" and
"collegiate" educations were not to be sup-
ported by taxation. The amendment failed. In the proposed 1922
Constitution the provision was retained unchanged. The Committee on
Education proposed an additional provision that the state educate and
care for defective, delincjuent, and dependent children, but this was
rejected on the grounds that it was not directly relevant to the subject
of public education and was adequately covered by legislation.
Explanation
This section grants no new powers to the General Assembly, for in
the event of constitutional silence on the subject, it woidd certainly
be within the authority of the legislature to create a public school system,
as in fact was done prior to 1870. Rather, this section requires the
legislature to provide a system of "common school education" and
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establishes tliree standards by which that system is to be maintained —
that it be (1) thorough and efhcient, (2) avaihible to all children of
the state, and (3) free.
The question of what constitutes a "common school education" has
not caused any difficulty in the courts, which have in general been
content to acquiesce in whatever curricuhun requirements have been
established by the legislature. In an early case where a group of taxpayers
challenged the teaching of German in the elementary schools because it
was not on the list of subjects required for licensing teachers, the court
held that any academic subject matter could be taught in the schools
so long as it was not specifically prohibited by the General Assembly.
The court suggested that the only constitutional limitation would be
that the medium of instruction in the schools must be English. (Powell
v. Board of Educ, 97 111. .S75 (1881).) It is doubtful that such a limita-
tion would be implied today. Legislative provisions for the establishment
of high schools were earlier approved as a legitimate part of the common
school system (Richards v. Raymond, 92 111. 612 (1879)), and indeed
in later cases the courts said that it was the duty of the legislature to
provide high schools. In carrying out this duty, it was proper for the
legislature to organize those parts of the state which do not maintain
high schools into "non-high school districts" and to authorize taxes on
those districts for the payment of tuition of their qualified resident
students to attend high school in neighboring districts. (People ex rel.
Goodell V. Chicago & Nw. Ry., 286 111. 384 (1918); Cook v. Board of
Directors, 266 111. 164 (1915)). In a recent decision, the Court held that
the state schools for the mentally incompetent were charitable and hospi-
tal institutions, and were not part of the common school system; hence
there was no obligation to provide free school training to the mentally
incompetent. (Department of Pub. Welfare v. Haas, 15 111. 2d 204 (1958).)
The question of whether the school system is "thorough and efficient"
has been raised in numerous cases. The trend in Illinois school svstem
organization has been to simplify, consolidate and enlarge school districts
as transportation and communication services improve. There has been
a continuing legislative program which has resulted in substantial
changes in school district boundaries, administrative structure and opera-
tion, and financing through property taxes. These changes are ordinarily
effected by local referendum and have frequently been challenged in the
courts. Often one of the grounds of challenge is that the new organi-
zation will render the schools less thorough and efficient for a variety
of particular reasons. As a general matter, the Court has refused to
intervene in school reorganizations on these grounds, if the reorganiza-
tion conformed to statutory requirements. It has said that the "thorough
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and efficient" requirement was solely a matter tor legislative discretion
and the courts will not look into it. The most complete statement of
this position can be found in People n. Deatherage (401 111. 26 (1948)).
This principle has been applied in one case to approve annexation
proceedings in which the territory annexed to a new district included
the only schoolhouse in the old district and it w-as alleged that there
was insufficient property valuation in the remaining old district to build
a new building. (Board of Educ. v. Board of Educ, 1 1 111. App. 2d 408
(1956).) However, one recent case has invalidated annexation proceed-
ings which left the remaining district in three separate islands of terri-
tory on the grounds that this violated the constitutional requirement of
efficiency. (People ex rel. Community Scliool Dist. v. Decatur School
Dist., 31 111. 2d 612 (1964).)
The language "all children of the state" has been interpreted to mean
that the school system must operate uniformly throughout the state and
that within a particular school district, the school system must not
discriminate among students. There has been little controversy over the
application of this principle. It was early established in Illinois that
school boards could not separate white and nonwhite students, regard-
less of whether the facilities were
ecpial. (People ex rel. Bibb v. Mayor
of Alton, 193 111. 309 (1901); Chase v. Stephenson, 71 111. 383 (1874).)
Children who live in orphanages or foster homes were held entitled by
this provision to attend schools in the districts where the homes were
located, even though their legal domiciles were elsewhere. (Dean v.
Board of Educ, 386 111. 156 (1944).)
1 he provision that the schools must be free has caused little difficulty.
It does not require that the schools provide free textbooks. (Segar v.
Board of Educ, 317 111. 418 (1925).) A statute was held unconstitutional
under this provision which granted all eighth-grade graduates of a school
district not maintaining a high school the right to attend high school
in another district, but required parents who were financially able to
pay the transfer tuition. (People v. Moore, 240 111. 408 (1909).)
It is clear that under this section the pow-ers of the General Assembly
to operate the school system may be delegated to local school boards.
(Smith V. Board of Educ, 405 111. 143 (1950).) There have been a
number of cases in which the conduct of school affairs by the General
Assembly, or its authorized agency, the local school board, has been
challenged as violating other provisions of the Constitution. In general,
the Court has held that the broad mandate of this Article supersedes
particular proscriptions of other sections. For example, a tax required
by the General Assembly to be levied by local school districts for con-
tribution to the state teachers' pension fund was relevant to the general
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mandate ot Article VIII, and therefore it wus not a tax levied l)y the
General Assembly lor a purely "corporate pinpose" which is jMohibited
by Article IX, Section 10. (People ^.v rrl Nelson v. Jackson-Highland
Bldg. Corp., 400 111. br^ (1948).) And Artide IV, Section 20, prohibiting
state aid to private corporations, was held not to prevent the General
Assembly from making aj^projjriations to Illinois State Normal School,
a private corporation, since imder Article VIII, Section 1, the state may
maintain normal schools to sujjply teachers for the common school
system. (Boehm v. Hertz, 182 111. 154, (1899). See also the discussion of
special legislation under Art. IV, Sec. 22, supra, pp. 218-9.)
Comparative Analysis
Approximately '^0 states ha\e provisions substantially identical to this
one. Many state constitutions go into considerably more detail than
does Illinois on the structure of the public school system. It would seem
that in the interests of flexibility the more general provisions are prefer-
able. The Model State Constitution (art. IX) contains a similar pro-
vision in somewhat different language as its only provision on the subject
of education. It provides:
"The legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support of a system
of free public schools open to all children in the state and shall establish,
organize and support such other public institutions, including public institu-
tuions of higher learning, as may be desirable."
Comment
It is a common biu not uniform practice for state constitutions to
endorse public support for education. The language of the Illinois
provision could be modernized, and perhaps there should be recognition
of tlie state's function in providing college and university education,
though it is hardly likely that a state would today refuse to assume this
obligation if there were no constitutional directive.
School Property and Funds
Sec. 2. All lands, moneys, or other property, donated, granted or received
for school, college, seminary, or university purposes, and the proceeds thereof,
shall be faithfully applied to the objects for which such gifts or grants were made.
History
This new section was adopted without debate by the 1870 Convention.
A similar but differently worded section was approved without signifi-
cant debate by the 1920 Convention.
Explanation
As interpreted by the Supreme Court, the major effect of this section
is to prohibit taxation or special assessment of public school property
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acquired by gift. Since the legislature is prevented by this section from
directly appropriating public school lands and applying them to other
purposes, it cannot accomplish the same purpose indirectly by taxing
them. (People ex rcl. Little v. Trustees of Schools, 118 111. 52 (1886).)
The Court has held that this section applies only to property acquired
prior to 1870, not subsequently; and that it refers primarily to Section
16 of every township (or property acquired with the proceeds of Section
16) which was reserved for school purposes in the original federal grant
of land for statehood. It is the burden of the school trustees to trace
property, and in the absence of a showing that it was purchased with
funds from protected property, any property acquired subsequent to
1870 is subject to taxation or special assessment under a proper statute.
(Grosse v. People ex rel. Ruch, 218 111. 342 (1905).) "Proceeds" in this
section includes rents and profits from protected property, even if the
property is not directly used for school purposes. (People ex rel. Han-
berg V. City of Chicago, 216 111. 537 (1905).)
This section does not exempt the property of private educational
institutions from taxation. (University of Chicago v. People ex rel.
Seipp, 118 111. 565 (1886).) Where a public school board has leased
protected school-owned property to a private person or corporation, the
lessee's interest is subject to taxation and special assessment, regardless of
who has title to the improvement. (People ex rel. Paschen v. Hendrick-
son-Pontiac, Inc., 9 111. 2d 250 (1956).)
Comparative Analysis
Approximately 20 states have similar provisions. No analogous section
is found in the Model State Constitution.
Comment
This provision may have been desirable to provide a fund for edu-
cational purposes at a time when broad public support of schools by
taxation was not as common as it is today. However, currently, the
section is not applicable to the vast bulk of school property, and its
main effect would appear to be the creation of bookkeeping difficulties.
Article IX, Section 3 {infro, p. 435), authorizes the General Assembly
to exempt school property from taxation and the exercise of this
authority should accomplish whatever ends are thought to be desirable
through such exemption. As noted in that discussion. Article IX,
Section 3, applies to both public and private schools. Of course, leav-
ing the matter of tax exemption to be covered only by that section
would make it entirely a matter of legislative discretion. Because of the
limited application of this Section 2, the delegation of discretion to the
legislature under Article IX, Section 3, should cause little concern.
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Public Funds for Sectarian Purposes Forbidden
Sec. 3. Neither the General
.Assembly nor any county, city, town, township,
school district, or other public corporation, shall ever make any appropriation
or pay from any public fund whatever, anything in aid of any church or sectarian
purpose, or to help support or sustain any school, academy, seminary, college,
university, or other literary or scientific institution, controlled by any church
or sectarian denomination whatever; nor shall any grant or donation of land,
money, or other personal property ever be made by the state or any such public
corporation, to any church, or for any sectarian purpose.
History
This was a new section of the Constitution proposed by the Conven-
tion of 1870. As originally submitted, the section ended with the word
"whatever." When the point was raised that only ajjjjropriations to sec-
tarian institutions were prohibited, the last clause was added to prevent
any form of aid. This proposal was apparently prompted in part by what
was believed to be the New York experience, where it was alleged that
one-half million dollars had been appropriated to convents and semi-
naries. One ground of opposition to the provision was that it injected
such a note of controversy that the whole Constitution might be rejected
by the public. In general, the debate centered on the pro's and con's
of giving aid to parochial schools or of permitting the public schools
to establish or maintain a sectarian influence if the majority of voters
in a district so desired. One amendment was offered permitting the
appropriation of public funds to sectarian schools to the extent of taxes
paid by those members supporting the public schools. This was defeated
primarily on the grounds that this would fragment and destroy the
public school system, since it would not have a broad base of support
and every denomination would demand equal rights.
This section generated great controversy in the 1920 Convention be-
cause of the Dimn decision, discussed in the Explanation below, which
permitted the state to pay to sectarian institutions at least part of the
cost of caring for dependent children committed to them by the state.
The majority report of the Committee on Education reported out
Section 3 as it now stands. Immediately, a minority report, the exact
text of which is not available, was offered in substitution for the majority
report. The gist of the minority report was to prohibit absolutely any
payments to sectarian institutions, in effect reversing the Dunn decision,
on the grounds that the rationale of that case went considerably beyond
the limited problem of caring for dependent children and coidd permit
a
"partnership" of church and state in dealing with any social problem,
including public education. Several supporters of the majority report
pointed out that the rejected sentence, noted in the History of Section 1
above, amending Section 1 had been intended to remedy the problem of
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caring for dependent children, and lor that reason no change was sug-
gested for Section 3. In view of the Convention's rejection of the amend-
ment to Section 1 (see Hislory of Section 1, supra, p. 399), they now sup-
ported the minority report. Initial debate focussed on the issue that the
state could not afford to build its own institutions for dependent children,
and there would be no care fortliem if the minority report were approved.
Much concern was voiced that the charities would no longer accept the
children if state aid were not forthcoming and that large numbers would
be turned out into the streets. In answer to this, one delegate pointed
out that of the total cost of supporting the children, including both
private donations and state aid, only 12 per cent consisted of state aid
to sectarian institutions. The chief problem was in Cook County, where
there were large numbers of dependent children; but downstate counties
feared that their dependent children were so few in number that a public
institution could not be economically supported. Eventually the debate
shifted to the broader implications of the Dunn decision, namely, that it
could be used to justify payments to general sectarian schools so long
as the payments did not exceed the costs of educating the students.
Ultimately there was a compromise and as the section was finally included
in the proposed Constitution, it provided that public money could not
be paid to sectarian institutions when public institutions were available,
and that when it was paid it was not to exceed the cost of maintenance
and care of persons "temporarily committed" to such institutions. Since
this was obviously not limited to schools, but included, for example,
hospitals, it was placed in the Revenue Article and Section 3 was elimi-
nated from the Education Article altogether.
Explanation
This section of the Constitution, which relates to the authority of
the state and other public corporations, is often construed in conjunction
with Article II, Section 3, of the 1870 Constitution and the First Amend-
ment to the Federal Constitution, which relate to individual religious
freedom. Although only a few cases have arisen under this section, they
have been exceptionally controversial. Basically, this section poses two
issues: one, the problem of religion in the public schools, and the other,
the problem of aid to parochial schools. Involved in both of these
problems may be two questions: (1) to what extent is the challenged
state activity an "establishment" of religion; (2) to what extent is the
challenged state activity a violation of the personal freedom to worship.
Although the terms of this section would seem to be primarily directed at
the first question, often the two issues are inextricably intermingled.
The problem of religion in the public schools is most acutely demon-
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strated in the so-called "released-time" cases. Various forms of "released-
tinie" programs had became popular across the United States. The
essence of the plan involved the release of students from school attend-
ance for one hour a week in order to attend religious education classes.
In the first program to be litigated in Illinois, students who had their
parent's permission were excused from classes for one hour per week to
attend classes in religious instruction conducted in their own churches.
The Illinois Supreme Court held that this violated neither Article II,
Section 3, nor Article VllI, Section 3, because there was no discrimina-
tion among sects, attendance at the classes was not compulsory, and
no significant public support in terms of monetary aid was shown.
(People ex rel. Latimer v. Board of Educ, 394 111. 228 (1946).) A year
later the Court upheld another released-time program whose features
differed somewhat from the Latimer case. In this case, the religious
education teachers from the various denominations were
"approved"
by the Superintendent of Schools and came into the school building at
the end of the school day once a week to conduct the religious educa-
tion classes in the school classrooms. Attendance was taken and reported
during these classes. Those students desiring not to participate were
assigned to a study hall. The Illinois Supreme Court held that this
was not a violation of Article VIII, Section 3, because no significant
public expenditures were shown. The United States Supreme Court
reversed this decision on the ground that the program constituted an
"establishment" of religion in violation of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments of the Constitution of the United States. The establish-
ment was found, not in any monetary support given to religion, but in
the use of public facilities coupled with the coercive use of state power
(in this case, the compulsory school attendance laws) to encourage
cooperation with the religious enterprise. (People ex rel. McCollum
V. Board of Education, 396 III. 14 (1947), rev'd, 333 U.S. 203 (1948).)
A few years later, the United States Supreme Court sustained a released-
time program whose features were essentially the same as those of the
Latimer case, the religious instruction taking place away from the school
premises. (Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).) Critics of the Mc-
Collum decision viewed Zoracfi as a victory for their cause and a reversal
of the Court's position. Probably this is imjustified optimism, although
from a certain viewpoint the cases are difficult to reconcile. While attend-
ance was taken in the Zorach program, the Coint specifically noted that
truancy laws did not appear to be enforced, and it clearly indicated that
it believed the "coercive" features of McCollum were not present. Per-
haps the McCollum case is more analogous to the school prayer cases
(School Dist. V. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S.
Art. VIII, § 3 407
421 (1962).) In those two cases, the religious exercises were conducted
on school property, they had the specific sponsorship ot school authori-
ties, and students not specifically requesting to be excused were re-
quired to participate. It should be noted here that the Illinois courts
were considerably ahead of the federal Supreme Court on the issue of
public school prayers and bible reading, having decided in 1910 that
these practices were unconstitutional on essentially the same grounds
as the later federal decisions. (People ex re]. Ring v. Board of Educ,
245 111. 334 (1910).)
The problem of public aid to parochial schools has prompted little
litigation in Illinois, except for one significant series of decisions around
1917. The subject has, however, been receiving renewed national at-
tention and the United States Supreme Court recently rendered its first
decision on the subject in more than 20 years (Board of Educ. v. Allen,
392 U.S. 236 (1968)); so it seems reasonable to assume that Illinois
may again face the issue soon. Despite what would appear at first reading
to be a clear constitutional prohibition against public aid to sectarian
schools in Section 3 of Article VIII, a decision of the Illinois Supreme
Court has cast considerable doubt on this issue. That case has already
been referred to in the History of this Section, but its importance justifies
a more detailed analysis. The case is Dunn v. Chicago Industrial School
for Girls (280 III. 613 (1917).) Pursuant to statute, the juvenile court of
Cook County was authorized to commit dependent girls to various private
institutions for their care. Many of these institutions -wert owned and run
by religious organizations. The state paid $15 per month to these in-
stitutions for the support of each girl. In a taxpayer's suit to prevent
the payment of this support, it was shown that the amount was consider-
ably less than the actual cost of maintenance for the girls and that the
cost for similar care in a state institution amounted to about $30. The
Court upheld the validity of this arrangement on the ground that there
was no "aid" to an institution where the value of services rendered
exceeded the payment which was received for them. The decision was
followed in a series of similar cases. This principle could well be applied
to justify payments to parochial schools in proportion to the value of
the educational services they perform in the community, and indeed at
least one commentator has suggested that such a standard is completely
consistent with the Federal Constitution. (Choper, "The Establishment
Clause and Aid to Parochial Schools," 56 Cal. L. Rev. 260, 286-87
(1968).) The federal cases on this issue have not as yet drawn any defini-
tive lines as to what, if any, may be the permissible extent of public sup-
port of parochial schools under the First Amendment. Two kinds of
"indirect" aid have been sustained. In the first case on this issue the
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United States Supreme Court held that free public bus transportation
for children attending parochial schools was not unconstitutional because
the statute had a general public j)urpose (satety of school children) and
the "aid," if any, was tor the benefit of the child, not the school (Everson
V. Board of Educ, 'iHO ILS. 1 (1947)); Illinois provides such transporta-
tion. In a recent case, the Court upheld the furnishing of free textbooks
at public expense to parochial school children as well as jniblic school
children. Again the Court pointed out that the aid was for a public
purpose, namely the general education of the children, and the aid went
to the child, not the school. (Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236
(1968).) In this case, the Court specifically pointed out that the parochial
schools perform a real secular service under state supervision in providing
a general education to their students. It is certainly conceivable that
this decision may clear the way, at least as far as federal constitutional
impediments are concerned, for more aid to parochial schools than has
been customary in the past, although the states are not bound by such
holdings in interpreting their own constitutional provisions.
The latest experiment in Illinois in the field of cooperation between
the public and parochial schools has been the "shared-time" arrange-
ments which are becoming more common throughout the state. Under
these arrangements, students take about half of their courses in the public
school (usuaiily so-called "nonvalue" courses such as mathematics, science,
physical education) and the remainder (literature, humanities and social
sciences) in the parochial schools. This system has been challenged only
once in the upper courts of Illinois where it was upheld without any
significant discussion of the constitutional issues. (Morton v. Board of
Educ, 69 111. 2d .S8 (1966).)
Comparative Analysis
Approximately 18 states have provisions similar to those of Illinois.
The Model State Constitution has no similar provision, although the
prohibition in its bill of rights against an "establishment" of religion
woidd be applicable to some of the problems in the same way as the First
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States has been applied
through the Fourteenth Amendment.
Comment
This section of the Constitution will have to be given careful attention
in conjunction with Article II, Section 3, and the First Amendment of
the United States Constitution. At least three approaches can be taken.
It could be eliminated altogether, leaving the restrictions of the First
and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States
applicable to needed restraints upon the legislature. If it is decided
that the state as a matter of constitutional policy should impose, or have
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sectarian institutions than are imposed by the Federal Constitution, then
some redrafting of this provision would be necessary, in the light of the
Dunn decision. Or the provision may be retained in its present form. It
seems that as a practical matter this last option would have no different
legal effect from the first luiless the Illinois Supreme Court were to
modify the position taken in Diddi. As noted in other portions of this
study, it is not thought to be desirable state constitutional policy to
"abdicate" a field simply because of a holding that a comparable pro-
vision in the federal Bill of Rights has been held applicable to the states
through incorporation into the Fourteenth Amendment of the Con-
stitution of the United States. (See Introductory and Preliminary Com-
ment, Art. II, supra, pp. 5-8.)
School Officers not to be Interested In School Contracts
Sec. 4. No teacher, State, county, township, or district school officer shall be
interested in tlie sale, proceeds or profits of any book, apparatus or furniture,
used or to be used, in any scliool in tliis State, with whicli such officer or teacher
may be connected, under such penakies as may be provided by tlie General
Assembly.
History
This section dates from 1870. When the section was first considered
in Committee of the Whole, the debate, with the exception of the
remarks of one delegate, was of the sort one would expect to find in a
legislative session
—
namely, an extended exposition of the evil to be
legislated against, argument as to the breadth of the proposed wording,
and consideration of amendatory language to provide appropriate ex-
ceptions. One delegate addressed himself to the question of whether the
section belonged in the Constitution, argued that the legislature could
properly cope with the evil complained of, and moved to strike tlie
section. His motion carried. But when the Convention voted on whether
to confirm the Committee's action, a tie resulted and the proposed dele-
tion was lost. On a subsequent vote to adopt the section following an
amendment that added the words "with which such officer or teacher
may be connected," the result was 33 to 19, with 31 not voting.
The proposed 1922 Constitution pulled together the conflict-of-interest
provisions of Sections 15 and 25 of Article IV (supra, pp. 176 and 230)
and, in part, this Section 4. The proposed section in the article on Public
Servants stated that no officer should be beneficially interested in any con-
tract with the government entity of which he was an officer. Notwithstand-
ing this blanket prohibition, the proposed Constitution retained a section
in the Education Article reading: "No school officer shall be financially
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interested in any contract concerning any school with which he is con-
nected or in any book, apparatus or turniture used in such school."
Explanation
No tjnestions concerning this section apjjcar to have arisen. The im-
plementing statute is Section 22-5 of the School Code. (111. Rev. Stat,
ch. 122, §22-5 (19()7).) That section substantially repeats the constitu-
tional language and provides penalties ol lines from 3-5 to $500 and
jail terms from one to 12 months.
Comparative Analysis
Two states, Mississippi and South Dakota, have a comparable pro-
vision. West Virginia also has a comparable provision but adds a jjroviso
that allows an author to receive his royalties. (The words "with which
such officer or teacher may be connected" were added in the 1870 Con-
vention to cover this problem in j^art. Under these words, a teacher could
receive royalties from books used in any school except the one in which
he taught.) The Model State Constitution has no comparable provision.
Comment
Prohibitions against conflicts of interest are legislative matters. As noted
elsewhere (see Comment on Sec. 15 of Art. IV, supra, pp. 177-8.), conflict-
of-interest coverage may be apj^ropriate in the case of legislators, but if
that is done, it seems likely that the legislature will enact legislation
covering conflicts of interest of other government officials.
County Superintendent of Schools
Sec. 5. There may be a County Superintendent of Schools in each county
whcjse qualifications, powers, duties, compensation, and time and manner of
election, and term of office, shall be prescribed by law.
History
This section dates from 1870. The section as originally proposed by
the Committee on Education said that there "shall be a county super-
intendent" and contained no words concerning election of superin-
tendents. When the Convention first undertook consideration of the
section in the Committee of the Whole, the words concerning election
had been included. During the debate there was a proposal to change
"shall" to
"may" in the interest of flexibility, but instead the Committee
voted to strike the section. In the Convention proper, the decision was to
retain the section but to substitute the word
"may" for "shall." This
compromise solution was designed to preserve flexibility. On the one
hand, it would be constitutionally possible to dispense with county super-
intendents and on the other hand, there would be no danger that some-
one would argue that such an office could not be created by law. This
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danger arose because the article on Counties created a number of offices
(see Sec. 8 ot Art. X, infra, p. 504.), and under the ancient maxim exprcssio
unius est exchisio alterius—the expression of one is the exclusion of an-
other— it coidd be argued that the legislature could not create a county
office in addition to those listed in that article.
In the proposed 1922 Constitution, this section was moved to the
county part of the proposed article on Local Governments. One important
substantive change was made by adding the words "or appointment" after
the word "election."
Explanation
There have been several cases interpreting this section, but all have
been relatively obvious confirmations of the meaning of the words used.
There has apparently been some c]uestion as to whether "manner of elec-
tion" would permit the legishitine to provide that the superintendent of
schools be elected by tl^e comity board. There has been no definite answer
to the cjuestion.
Comparative Analysis
There appear to be approximately 15 states besides Illinois that have
constitutional references to county school superintendents. Half a dozen
states or so mandate an elected superintendent. Some states authorize
abolition of the office either by the legislature or by local vote. Several
states provide flexibility in determining whether superintendents shall
be elected or appointed. In general, the states with county super-
itendents provide that compensation, powers and duties, and qualifica-
tions shall be set by law. In most of these states, the term is fixed at either
two or four years. The Model State Constitution has no comparable
provision.
Comment
The tentative decision by the 1870 Convention not to make the county
superintendent of schools a constitutional office at all was probably the
better one. The compromise of permitting the legislature to create or
not to create the office was the next-best solution. The additional flex-
ibility of permitting appointment in place of election as proposed in
1922 was also an improvement. In reviewing the matter now, the position
of county school superintendent should be considered as a part of the
problems of county government and not of education.

Article IX
REVENUE
Taxation of Property— Occupations— Privileges
Sec. 1. The General Assembly shall provide such revenue as may be needful,
by levying a tax, by valuation, so that every person and corporation shall pay
a tax in proportion to the value of his, her, or its property—such value to be
ascertained by some person or persons, to be elected or appointed in such manner
as the General Assembly shall direct, and not otherwise; but the General Assembly
shall have power to tax peddlers, auctioneers, brokers, hawkers, merchants, com-
mission merchants, showmen, jugglers, inn-keepers, grocery-keepers, liquor-
dealers, toll bridges, ferries, insurance, telegraph and express interests or busi-
ness, vendors of patents, and persons or corporations owning or using franchises
and privileges, in such manner as it shall, from time to time, direct by general
law, uniform as to the class upon which it operates.
Enlarging Tax Base
Sec 2. The specification of the objects and subjects of taxation shall not
deprive the General Assembly of the power to require other subjects to be taxed,
in such manner as may be consistent with the principles of taxation fixed in
this Constitution.
History
In the 1818 Constitution there was no Revenue Article, but Article
VIII (the bill of rights), Section 20, provided: "[T]he mode of levying
a tax shall be by vakiation, so that every person shall pay a tax in pro-
portion to the value of the property he or she has in his or her pos-
session." It was very early decided that this provision did not impose
any substantial restriction on the legislative power to tax. In Saivyer if.
City of Alton (4 111. 126 (1841)), the city sued to collect a penalty of $3.00
for failure to perform required road labor. Sawyer argued that this
was a tax and violated the 1818 Constitution because it was levied per
capita and not by valuation. The Supreme Court agreed that it was a
tax, but held that this constitutional provision merely prescribed the
method of levying property taxes and did not prohibit the legislature
from imposing other kinds of taxes. The next significant case under
this provision was Rliinehart v. Schuyler (7 111. 473 (1845)). In this
case the Court held that lands could be classified for purposes of tax
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levies — i.e., taxed at different rates — and that the General Assembly
could assess land by statute without actual visitation of the property in
question. The Rhinehart case is of particular importance because the
revenue provisions of the 1848 Constitution were specifically intended
to reverse both grounds of this decision.
Sections 2 and 6 of the 1848 Constitution are the direct antecedents
of Sections 1 and 2 of the 1870 Constitution. (liecause of the close rela-
tionship between Sections 1 and 2, they are considered together.) Since the
state was in very bad financial circiunstances in 1848, the matter of revenue
consumed a great deal of the Convention's attention. It seems clear that
the primary intent of Section 2 (which corresponds almost exactly to the
present Section 1) was to prohibit the classification of property for the pur-
poses of the property tax and to require individual assessment of specific
parcels. Whether any further restrictions of the taxing power were
intended is not clear. The author of the most thorough historical review
of these provisions suggests that no other restrictions were contemplated.
{See Lucas, "Nonproperty Taxes Under the Illinois Constitution," 25
U. of Chi. L. Rev. 63, 72-74 (1957).) Judicial decisions on the meaning
of these sections, when examined with reference to their particular facts,
are not particularly instructive. Some of the looser language used in
these cases suggested that the property tax was intended as the primary
system of taxation with only limited exceptions pemiitted. However,
since there were no serious legislative experiments with other modes of
taxation, such observations were gratuitous and the nature of any such
restrictions, speculative.
When the Constitutional Convention of 1870 was called, the state's
financial condition was relatively satisfactory and there was practically
no pressure upon the Convention for reform of the 1848 general revenue
sections. These sections were reported out of committee w'ith the ob-
servation that they could not be improved upon. There was remarkably
little debate over them. What debate there was indicated a difference
of opinion among the delegates as to whether the last clause of Section 1
was intended to operate as an exclusive limitation. The substance of
the debate did nothing to clarify the issue or to define any particular
understanding of the Convention. The one substantial change in the
section — the addition of the last phrase "by general law, uniform as to
the class upon which it operates" — was not even commented upon.
Presumably, the addition was simply another manifestation of the strong
feelings of the delegates against special legislation. (See Histoiy of Art.
IV, Sec. 22, supra, pp. 204-5.)
Since 1900, six unsuccessful attempts have been made to amend Sec-
tions 1 and 2. The most comprehensive revision was the entirely new
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Article in the proposed 1922 Constitution. Among the more significant
changes proposed, insofar as they related to Sections 1 and 2 ot the 1870
Constitution, were the following: (1) all property, real and personal,
was to remain unclassified, with the exception that forest lands could be
classified; (2) in lieu of a property tax on intangibles, a uniform tax on
income from intangibles could be levied; (3) in place of the long list of
business activities, and other subjects designated in Section 1, it was
simply provided that taxes could be imposed on "privileges, franchises,
and occupations, uniform as to class"; (4) a graduated income tax was
authorized, with the highest rate not to exceed three times the lowest;
(5) an exemption from the property tax of up to $500 value for household
goods was authorized.
Explanation
Gerjeral Constitutional Principles of Taxation in Illinois. A broad
outline of the constitutional structure of the tax system in Illinois may
be helpful in understanding the more specific problems that have arisen.
It is generally understood that Article IX, Section 1, limits the state
to three kinds of taxes: (1) a general property tax; (2) occupation taxes;
(3) franchise and privilege taxes. The broader language of Section 2 does
not ameliorate this limitation, but merely permits the imposition of
occupation, franchise and privilege taxes on subjects in addition to those
listed in Section 1. It should be noted that the restrictions imposed on
the state apply equally to the taxing powers of county and municipal
corporations, since they are but subdivisions of the state. (See Addendum,
infra, p. 435, for recent Supreme Court of Illinois decision overruling dicta
establishing above three classifications as a limit on state's taxing power.)
The general property tax is governed by two important principles —
the uniformity and ad valorem, requirements. The Constitution requires
that
"every person or corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to the
value of his, her or its property." This means that all property must be
taxed, if any is taxed, and no property may be exempted (with certain
very limited exceptions discussed in Section 3 but not relevant here).
"Property" as used in this section means real and personal, tangible and
intangible. The ad naloreyn principle is really just a specific application
of the uniformity principle. The tax must be levied "by valuation."
This means that all property must be taxed at the same rates. Property
may not be classified for the purpose of taxing it at different rates nor,
what amounts to the same thing, may it be assessed at different ratios
when applying a tax rate. Thus, if urban residential real estate is taxed on
the basis of 50 per cent of its full cash value, then rural agricultural real
estate, as well as industrial real estate, must be similarly taxed; and
correspondingly, all personal property, tangible and intangible, such as
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household goods, stocks and bonds, inusi be taxed at 50 per cent of full
cash value. In the light of connnon knowledge of assessment practices in
Illinois, the mere statement of these principles reveals the extent to
which the general property tax, as a revenue measure in Illinois, epito-
mizes the avoidance of, rather than the compliance with, the Constitu-
tion's mandates.
In contrast to the rigid uniformity rules governing the property tax,
occupation, franchise and privilege taxes must only be "uniform as
to the class upon which they operate." Since classification of these taxes
is expressly permitted by the Constitution, it is obvious that the require-
ment of uniformity means something quite different from its meaning
in conjunction with the property tax. Essentially, it means that where
the legislature defines and levies one of these taxes upon a class, the
definition must be reasonable in relation to the purpose of the tax
and in terms of the membership comprising the class; the class as defined
must include only those properly within it and not exclude those reason-
ably a part of it. The legislature has broad discretionary powers in this
respect, including the power to prescribe subclassifications, exclusions,
exemptions, graduated rates, and the like, so long as they are reasonable.
Occupation and franchise taxes are traditional methods of imposing
taxes on business and commerce. A franchise tax is normally imposed
as a condition to legally carrying on certain kinds of business, and may
be imposed for purposes of regulation or revenue, or both. On the other
hand, an occupation tax is imposed merely as an incident of doing busi-
ness and is primarily a revenue measure. The use of privilege taxes as
significant sources of revenue is a currently expanding fiscal develop-
ment. What constitutes a taxable privilege is a complex and elastic
concept, the limits of whicli have not yet been defined.
The General Property Tax. More than half of all revenue produced
by taxation in Illinois comes from the property tax, nearly all of which
goes to local governments. Approximately 90 per cent of local revenue is
derived from the property tax. No general state property tax has been
levied since 1932. Although it has been estimated that from one-half to
two-thirds of all property in the state is in the form of personal property
of various kinds, only 20 per cent of property tax revenue is produced by
personal property taxes, of which only 3 per cent is from intangibles, and
80 per cent by real estate taxes. These percentages are, of course, variable
annual approximations, but it is apparent, as an accurate generality, that
the property tax in Illinois is tlie single most important revenue-producing
tax in the state, that it is practically the sole support of local govern-
ments, and tJiat it is primarily a real estate tax.
The administration of the property tax depends on two factors — valid
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tax levies and proper assessment procedures. The requirements for tax
levies are dealt with in later sections oi this Article. The procedures for
assessment of property are dependent to a large extent upon this section.
Initially, it is to be noted that assessed valuation is "to be ascertained
by some person or persons, to be elected or appointed in such manner as
the General Assembly shall direct, and not otherwise." The adminis-
trative machinery of the assessment procedure has not of itself been a
subject of much constitutional controversy. The constitutional standards
are very general and the authority of the legislature quite broad. (A
notable exception to this generalization is the case of Giebelhausen i>.
Daley (407 111. 25 (1950)), which held that a newly prescribed method of
selecting local assessors was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
power to the executive and an encroachment on the authority of local
governments.) However, since the great bulk of constitutional decisions
on the property tax arise out of a controversy over a particular assess-
ment, it is necessary to understand the mechanics of assessment and the
requirements for a successful challenge. Nearly all property assessments
are made by local assessors, usually at the township level, selected in
various ways. These local assessments are subject to supervision and
review by administrative agencies at the county level. There are a few
exceptions to this practice, tlie principal one relating to the property
(both real and personal) of railroads and certain other corporations which
is assessed at the state level by the Department of Revenue, with the appro-
priate proportion of property value being certified to county assessing
offices for purposes of local taxes.
Since 1947, administrative machinery has existed at the state level
designed to facilitate and assure uniformity of assessment practices among
the counties throughout the state. The Department of Revenue is re-
quired to investigate the assessed valuations of each county, and if it
finds that property is being assessed at less than its fair cash value, it
must assign a "multiplier" to the county which when applied will raise
the valuations to 100 per cent. For example, if a county assesses property
at 50 per cent of its cash value, a multiplier of 2.0 will raise the assessment
to 100 percent. There are several reasons for such a system. Most impor-
tant, the Constitution requires statewide uniformity, but, as the cases dis-
cussed below reveal, the courts are unable to fashion suitable remedies,
and administrative machinery is necessary to obtain the objective. This
is particularly critical in the case of taxing authorities (close to 1,000
in number) whose boundaries cross county lines. Secondly, many state
grant-in-aid programs, for schools, welfare and the like, are tied to
the aggregate assessed valuation of the taxable property in the recipient
governmental units. Third, the legal tax rate and indebtedness limits
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of local governments are expressed in terms ot assessed property valu-
ation. Finally, since some property is assessed by state procedures at 100
per cent of value, in order for this property to bear no more than its fair
share of the tax burden, property must be assessed locally at 100 per cent.
It should be emphasized that this state-wide administrative procedure
equalizes assessments only among counties and docs not affect uni-
formity within a county. This latter problem must be dealt with by
appropriate procedures at the local level.
Since the great majority of cases establishing the constitutional prin-
ciples of property taxation arise from challenges to individual assess-
ments, it may be helpful to summarize the basic requirements for judicial
review of property assessment. First of all, Illinois courts will review
an assessment only when it is made fraudulently. If the assessment is
erroneous because of an error of judgment or difference of opinion as
to value, the only remedy is administrative. Secondly, even if a fraudu-
lent assessment is made, a taxpayer must first exhaust his administrative
remedies before a court will hear his challenge. Finally, even a fraudu-
lent assessment, through undervaluation or omission of one kind of
property, will not invalidate assessments on other kinds of property.
The rationale for this last principle is that dereliction of duty of an
individual tax assessor should not render the whole tax void and make
it impossible to collect any taxes. (Bistor v. McDonough, 348 III. 624
(1932).)
It was the emergence of this last rule that finally led to the almost
complete collapse of the collection of personal property taxes in Illinois,
although the difficulties of collecting a flat ad valorem tax on personalty,
especially intangibles, were apparent earlier. In one of the first cases
on this issue, it was proved that the stock and securities of the protest-
ing bank were valued at 75 per cent of their fair cash value, while real
estate in that district was assessed at only 43 per cent. The Supreme Court
held that this variation violated the constitutional requirement of mii-
formity and, further, that the magnitude of the discrepancy was itself
proof of fraud. However, the Court held that the proper remedy was not
to reduce the bank's assessment, but to compel the assessor to assess other
property at the proper value; it said that the former remedy would be un-
fair to other taxpayers who had paid taxes on a high valuation without
protest. (First Nat'l Bank v. Holmes, 246 111. 362 (1910).) While this case
concerned overvaluation of intangible property in relation to real estate,
the converse situation soon became a primary difficulty in collection of
the property tax. Intangible property, although it accounts for well
over half of the wealth of the state, contributes little to tax revenues.
The inequity of this situation became especially severe during the eco-
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noniic depression of the late 1920's and early 1930's, and real estate
owners sought relief in the courts by alleging that the omission of per-
sonal property from the tax rolls was unconstitutional. Although this
challenge was indisputable, the courts were unable to fashion an effective
remedy. Reluctant to jeopardize the whole tax structure, the Court
reinforced its First Natio?ial Bank rule by holding- that owners of real
property could not challenge the validity of the assessment and taxation
of real property on the grounds that personal property was omitted or
undervalued on the assessment rolls. (Koester v. McDonough, 351 111.
492 (1933).) In another attempt to secure relief, taxpayers of Cook
County sought to mandamus the assessor to add omitted property to the
tax rolls and to value it properly. The petition contained very detailed
allegations of property which was not being taxed, such as seats on the
Board of Trade, bank deposits, estates in the probate court, boats in the
harbor, and the like. Nevertheless, the Court held that in order for
mandamus to issue, the petitioner must show the name and residence
of the owner of the property, its situs, character, and all facts necessary
to prove that it was taxable. (People ex rel. Koester v. Board of Review,
351 111. 301 (1932).) Since as a practical matter these facts cannot be
obtained by a private party, mandamus is an illnsory remedy. Thus,
although classification of projjerty is unconstitutional, de facto classi-
fication established deliberately, even arbitrarily, by an assessor is immune
from judicial attack.
There has been more success in achieving the uniformity standard in
the assessment of real estate than with all property generally. Grossly
excessive valuation of real property in relationship to assessments on like
property has been sufficient in some cases to prove constructive fraud,
and the courts will provide relief. More impoitantly, it was early estab-
lished that the constitutional requirement of uniformity takes priority
over legislative requirements of full valuation Thus, if property values
are debased for purposes of assessment in violation of legislative stand-
ards, they must still be uniformly debased; and a taxpayer may challenge
his assessment as being fraudulent when it is considerably in excess of
the ratio of assessed value of other property in the district, even though
it is not actual full value. (People ex rel. McDonough v. Illinois Cent.
R.R., 355 111. 605 (1934); People ex rel. Wangelin v. Wiggins Ferry Co.,
357 111. 173 (1934); People's Gas Light & Coke Co. v. Stuckart, 286 111.
164 (1918).) Despite these rules, which are often effective in providing
relief from unequal real estate assessments, the principle of uniformity
continues to create difficult problems. For one thing, the ride discussed
above, that owners of one class of property cannot challenge the assess-
ment of another class, seems to have worked its way into real estate
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taxation. In a case where plaintiffs urged the invalidity of assessments
of 35 per cent of value on their agricultural property because urban
property was assessed at only 25 per cent of value, the Court invoked this
rule in denying relief. (Tuttle v. Bell, 377 111. 510 (1941).) Although not
entirely clear, the decision appears to be based primarily on the premise
that disparate classes of property are involvei.1 and that a ditlerential
in assessment of one class provides no basis for equitable relief of the
"unassessed" class. The decision in no way suggests a departure from
or modification of the rules theretofore determined.
A more critical problem, which led to the present system of state
equalization of assessments, is that of inequality of assessment practices
among counties. The unfairness of these practices was demonstrated in a
case where three municipal taxing districts overlapped both Lake and
Cook Counties. Property in Cook County was assessed at 75 per cent ol
value, whereas property in Lake County was assessed at 21 per cent. Thus,
property owners in Cook County paid almost three times as large a tax
as property owners in Lake County for identical services and under
identical tax rates. The Court conceded this to be clear violation ol
the Constitution, but held that it was powerless to grant a remedy.
The solution, if any, was legislative. (People ex rel. Schlaeger v. AUyn,
393 111. 154 (1946).) This situation and this decision led to the pas-
sage in 1947 of the so-called "Butler Bills," which required full value
assessment and state ecjualization of assessments among counties. While
these provisions contributed much toward achieving uniformity in real
estate taxation (they have no effect on personalty), they have not been
entirely successful, as the recent so-called "railroad strike" cases showed.
In these cases, the railroads proved that their property was assessed by
the state at 100 per cent of full value; proportionate values were cer-
tified to the counties for extension of taxes. However, local property,
even after application of the equalizing multiplier, was still assessed
at only 50 per cent of full value. The railroads were granted relief.
(People ex rel. Kohorst v. Gulf & O. R.R., 22 111. 2d 104 (1961); People
ex rel. HiUison v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R., 22 111. 2d 88 (1961).) How-
ever, instead of ordering debasement of the assessment on railroad
property, the Supreme Court held that the proper remedy was reim-
bursement of taxes paid in excess of what would have been extended
had local property been assessed at full value. The application of this
remedy is very complex and will require litigation in every county for
the railroads to receive relief.
Bachrach x>. Nelson — The Structure of Noyiproperty Taxes in Illinois. It
is impossible to understand the structure of nonproperty taxes in Illinois
without considering the pervasive influence of Bachrach i'. Nelson, (349
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111. 579 (1932)), for this case has governed either directly or indirectly
all subsequent tax legislation and litigation up to the present. (Note: The
entire remaining analysis under this Explanation has been substantially
affected by a recent decision oi the Illinois Supreme Court sustaining the
new Illinois Income Tax Act. See Addendum, infra, p. 435.) With the ad-
vent of the economic depression, the property tax ceased to be a viable
source of state revenue, although it has continued to provide most local
revenue. In searching for new means of support for the state government,
the legislature passed a graduated income tax. This tax was immediately
challenged under the limitations imposed by Section 1. The state con-
tended that the tax was constitutional under the broader terms of Section
2. With the possible exception of the inheritance tax, this was the first
time that the Court had been confronted with the validity of a tax which
was not clearly of a kind specified in Section 1. Thus there were two
significant new questions to be answered: (1) what were the exact limi-
tations, if any, imposed on the taxing power by Sections 1 and 2? And
(2) was the income tax within these limitations?
The answer to the first question was by far the most crucial for the
future development of tax policy in Illinois. The Court held that Section
1 limited the legislature to three kinds of taxes
—
property, occupation,
and franchise and privilege. The language of Section 2 that "other subjects
or objects" might be taxed was held to mean, not that other kinds of
taxes might be imposed, but only that the list of permissible occupation,
franchise and privilege taxes in Section 1 was not exclusive. While nearly
all other aspects of the Bachrach opinion have been subject to consider-
able erosion, both judicial and academic, this particular formula seems
to have become accepted, if not necessarily welcomed, dogma. In reach-
ing this conclusion, the Court considered a large amount of historical
evidence which it said showed that the drafters of the Constitution
intended the property tax to be mandatory and the main source of
support for the government. The exceptions were limited and of a
merely supplementary nature. Of course, this aspect of the Court's opinion
is of no validity today, as there has been no state property tax since 1932,
and the principal source of state tax revenue, since 1933, has been the
retailers' occupation tax.
In considering whether the income tax met the formula required
by Section 1, the Court did not have the benefit of a complete analysis
by the state. Since the state's position had been that the tax was sui
generis and hence justified under Section 2, it had not argued that the
tax could be sustained under Section 1 as a privilege tax. Thus the Court
did not consider this possibility. But it did conclude that an income tax
was a property tax and that its graduated features violated the uniformity
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The Court is open to criticism on a number of counts, several ot
which may be briefly noted. For one thing, the historical analysis was
not entirely accurate, for there was a failure to perceive that alternatives
to the property tax had not been seriously contemplated as constitutional
issues in 1870; thus no real decision either for or against them had then
been made. And of course, the • onclusion that the property tax was man-
datory as the primary source of revenue is decisively rejected today.
Finally, the conclusion that an income tax is a property tax was un-
sound then and would certainly not be accepted in theory today. It was
directly contrary to an earlier decision of the Court which held, in inter-
preting a lease, that an income tax was not a property tax for which a
lessee could be held liable (Young v. Illinois Athletic Club, 310 111. 75
(1923)), and the principal case on which the Court relied (Pollock v.
Farmer's Loan &: Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895)) has since been in effect
overruled. {See New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U.S. 308 (1937).)
The fact that the Court explicitly failed to consider whether an income tax
was a privilege tax, coupled with the presently expanding concept of what
constitutes a taxable privilege, makes it an open question Avhether the
Illinois Court would today validate an income tax; some constitutional
law scholars believe it wovild. (For a complete discussion of this issue,
see Cohn, "Constitutional Limitations on Income Taxation in Illinois,"
1961 U. 111. L. F. 586.) Perhaps it should also be noted that a corporate
franchise tax measured by net income, as distinguished from a personal
income tax, could probably be enacted under present provisions. (See
Young, "Constitutional Problems," in Report of the Commission on
Revenue 354, 380-82 (1963).)
Francliise, Occupatioji and Privilege Taxes. In considering these
kinds of tax, it is important to keep in mind the distinction between
the subject of a tax and the measure of the tax. The statutory definition
of the subject of a tax, if the uniformity requirement of the last clause
of Section 1 is met, will detemiine its constitutionality. For example, what
is popularly known in Illinois as the "sales tax" is actually defined in
the statute as a tax "on the business of selling tangible personal property
at retail." So defined, it is clearly an occupation tax. At the time the
statute was passed, it was believed that a tax on the sales transaction itself
would not fall within the property-occupation-privilege formula required
by the Constitution. The peculiar consequences of structuring the tax
as an occupation tax will be discussed below. On the other hand, how-
ever, if the subject of the tax is constitutional, the measure of the tax —
i.e., the formula by which it is imposed — will not affect its constitu-
tionality, so long as it is reasonable. With regard to occupation and
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privilege taxes, the test of reasonableness does not come so much from
the uniformity clause of Article IX, Section 1, as from the due process
clauses of the state and federal constitutions. {See Bode v. Barrett, 412
III. 204 (1952). Compare Fiorito v. Jones, 39 111. 2d 531 (1968).) Thus
it was soon decided that an occupation tax on brokers could be imposed
as a flat fee, even though it was objected that by failing to take into
account the size of the business, the tax was not uniform as to property
(Banta v. City of Chicago, 172 111. 204 (1898)); that graduated features
of privilege taxes were valid (Metropolis Theater Co. v. City of Chicago,
246 111. 20 (1910); Kochersperger v. Drake, 167 III. 122 (1897)); and that
even a combination of the two methods was proper (McGrath v. City of
Chicago, 309 111. 515 (1923)).
In imposing an occupation tax, the crucial constitutional issue in terms
of the uniformity requirement is the definition of the occupation to be
taxed—which businesses are to be included and which are to be excluded?
The case most clearly setting out standards for such a decision is Peoples
Gas Light & Coke Company v. City of Chicago (9 111. 2d 348 (1956)). In
this case, the city, under an appropriate state statute, passed ordinances
taxing gas companies and electric companies at the rate of 5 per cent of
gross receipts. The electric company was allowed a credit equal to its
payment of street use taxes of 4 per cent of gross receipts so that the
effective occupation tax was 1 per cent. The gas utility did not pay
street use tax, so its rate was 5 per cent. The gas company challenged
the tax on the ground that the tax violated the uniformity requirement
of Section 1, because the distinction between the utility companies,
which compete for much of the same business, was discriminatory.
In rejecting this contention, the Court discussed three standards to
be used in determining reasonableness. (1) Are the businesses com-
petitive? Here it pointed out that there were many cases in which
the utilities were not—e.g., ilkmiination. (2) Even if they are competitive,
that is not conclusive if there are basic differences in the means of
production, distribution and use of products—an obvious situation here.
(3) Finally, classification of even similar objects may be justified under
special circumstances. Here the different street taxes paid by the utilities
were such a circumstance. The standards have not been referred to in
all cases, but they are helpful in understanding the uniformity require-
ment.
Since 1933, the principal source of revenue for the state government
has been the retailers' occupation tax (111. Rev. Stat. ch. 120, §§ 440-
452 (1967)) and a small group of related taxes. The history of this legis-
lation is revealing of the constitutional gauntlet through which tax
legislation in Illinois must run. As originally passed, the tax was imposed
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on those
"engaged in ilie business of selling tangible personal property
at retail" and exempted Irom its coverage retailers of motor fuel (because
that was already taxed) and agricultural producers who also sold their
produce at retail. This act was held unconstitutional because the ex-
emptions violated the uniformity requirement. (Winter v. Barrett, 352
111. 441 (1933).) The legislation was quickly passed again without the
offending cxemj^tions, and was sustained by the Court. (Reif v. Barrett,
355 111. 104 (1933).) In this case, special note was taken of the fact that
the tax was measured by gross receipts of the business; it was contended
that this was an income tax and hence invalid under the rule of Bach-
rack V. Nelson. But the Court held that the tax was in fact an occupation
tax, that retail selling was a taxable occupation, and that gross receipts
was a reasonable measure.
In 1961, the Retailers' Occupation Tax Act was amended to exempt
retail sales to units of the state government and to charitable organiza-
tions. These exemptions were challenged as violating the uniformity
provision because they made the amount of the tax dependent on the
character of the purchaser rather than the occupation. Such a challenge
would appear to be well founded on the basis of the ]Vinter decision
discussed above. But the Court held that this objection was not sufhcient
to invalidate the exemption. The purpose of the exemption was to
mitigate certain economic effects of the tax— /.<?., that it w^as passed on
to the purchasers—and as such the classification was not arbitrary or
capricious. However, although the statute exempted sales to the state
government, it did not provide a comparable exemption for sales to the
federal government, and this difference was held to be discriminatory
since there were no rational distinctions between them; therefore the
state exemption was not allowed. W^ith regard to the exemptions to
charitable institutions, a substantial difference between governmental
organizations, such as the public schools, and charitable organizations,
such as private schools, was found in the ability of governments to tax
in order to meet their budgets. Therefore the charitable exemptions
were valid. (People ex rel. Holland Coal Co. v. Isaacs, 22 111. 2d 477
(1961).)
Since the "sales tax" was formulated as an occupation tax on the
business of selling at retail, large amounts of personal property transfers
at retail escaped taxation because they w^ere made by businesses which
were primarily of a service nature. For example, businesses which serviced
automobiles and television sets were held not to be in the business of
selling at retail, and therefore the incidental transfer of such items as
tubes, batteries, and carburetors was not taxed as a sale at retail. In an
effort to include these transfers in the tax, the General Assembly amended
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the Retailers' Occupation Tax Act by adding the lollowing provision:
"Persons Avho engage in the business of repairing, remodehng or recondi-
tioning tangible personal property for others by adding or incorporating
therein other tangible personal property for use or consumption shall
be deemed to be engaged in the business of selling tangible personal
property at retail within the meaning of this Act . . . ." The measure of
the tax was the value of the personal property so transferred. The tax
was challenged by a number of businesses primarily engaged in repair
work. While both the plaintiffs and the Court conceded that these
businesses and transactions could be taxed under a proper statute, it was
held that the amendment violated the uniformity requirement because
it attempted to include within a class persons not reasonably a part
thereof. (Central Television Serv., Inc. v. Isaacs, 27 111. 2d 420 (1963).)
In direct response to this case, the General Assembly in 1963 passed
the Service Occupation Tax Act. {See 111. Rev. Stat. ch. 120, i5§ 439,101-
439,121 (1967), for present provisions.) The tax was on "persons engaged
in the business of making sales of service" and taxed transfers of personal
property in those occupations measured by the cost of the property to the
serviceman. Under this statute, the transfer of ink, newsprint, paper,
etc., by "job printers" (e.g., for letterheads, advertising brochures, etc.)
was taxable, but transfers of the same property "for the primary purpose
of conveying news" were exempted. This was held to be valid classifica-
tion, since even though the performance of the service might be the same,
the finished products were for essentially different ptirposes. (Klein v.
Hulman, 34 111. 2d 343 (1966).)
It is difficult to distill any consistent set of principles from these cases.
The Winter case sets out a very strict rule of classification in not per-
mitting exemptions from the defined class to be subjected to an occupa-
tion tax. But the exemptions which were permitted in the Holland
Coal Company case and Klein i>. Hulman were not significantly different
from those invalidated in the Winter case. One might simply conclude
that these later cases had in effect overruled the restrictive interpretation
of Winter were it not for the fact that Winter was one of the cases relied
upon in invalidating the first attempt to tax retail transfers in service
occupations. That attempt, while admittedly a departure from customary
drafting techniques, could hardly be said to have been capricious. Since
the sales in question were indisputably retail transactions, it is not at all
clear why it is arbitrary to classify the sellers as being in the business of
selling at retail, even if they were engaged in another kind of business
as well. The fact that these very transactions were made validly taxable
by means of another statute suggests that there was nothing essentially
imreasonable about the legislative action. It also suggests the difficulties
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inherent in structuring a sensible tax system under existing and uncer-
tain constitutional standards.
It may be seriously questioned whether the uniformity principle in
Article IX performs any usetul function with regard to occupation and
privilege taxes. It might appear that its main effect has been to serve
as another
'mpediment to a rational tax structure. In the cases discussed
above, the legislative actions were based on plausible and reasonable
assumptions. In the Peoples (ias Light c> Coke Company case (9 111. 2d
348 (1956)), the effort was actually to equalize tax burdens. In the various
attempts to formulate a "sales tax" under the artificial strictures of the
property-occupation-privilege tax formula, care was being taken not
to impose undue hardships—e.g., double taxation in the case of motor
fuel—while reaching transactions which should be legitimately taxed. In
the one case in which the legislature could be said to have acted un-
reasonably—in discriminating between the state and federal governments
—the same result could have been reached on other groimds, namely
the due process clauses of the state and federal constitutions. {Sec United
States V. Department of Revenue, 191 F. Supp. 723 (N.D. 111. 1961).)
This last point is well illustrated in Fiorito x>. Jones (39 111. 2d 531
(1968)). In 1967, the General Assembly passed a series of amendments
which significantly altered the nature of the Service Occupation Tax
Act. Although the tax still purported to be taxing retail transfers, in-
stead of applying to all persons who engaged in "sales of service," it was
applied to four restricted service categories; and instead of being meas-
ured by the value of the property transferred, it was measured by the
gross receipts of the business. The Court concluded that there was no
rational basis for this particular scheme. If the intent of the tax was
really to reach the property transfers, which were analogous to the trans-
fers taxed by the retailers' occupation tax, then the gross receipts measure
was totally inappropriate because receipts from property sales were a very
small amount of the gross receipts of these service businesses. On the
other hand, if the purpose of the tax was to tax the value of services
performed by these businesses, which was what the gross receipts measure
suggested, then to discriminate among services to be taxed on the basis
of whether an incidental transfer of personal property was involved was
arguably unreasonable. The important point of emphasis in this decision
is that, while the conclusion seems to be justified, it was founded on the
due process clauses as well as the more particular uniformity requirement
of Section 1. Thus, in the rare case in which the legislature does act
arbitrarily, the Constitution can provide satisfactory protection without
the uncertain and ambiguous hazards of the uniformity clause.
Privilege taxes comprise the third category of taxes which can con-
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stitutionally be imposed in Illinois. What constitutes a taxable privi-
lege is critical to current revenue policy in Illinois, since "privilege"
is the most expansive and ambiguous of the tax classifications desig-
nated in Section 1 of Article IX. Considering ttje date when this pro-
vision was included in the section (1848) and the context in which
it was used, one could safely conclude that the privilege tax was in-
tended in its classic sense as defined in these words —
"[a] tax on
the privilege of carrying on a business for which a license or franchise
is required." (See Black's Law Dictionary 1360 (4th ed. rev. 1968).) How-
ever, the concept of a taxable privilege has been substantially expanded
from its connotation of a comi*nercial undertaking licensed by the state.
The first significant development was the passage of the inheritance
tax. Under this statute, each person who inherited all or part of a
decedent's estate paid a tax according to the value of the inheritance;
the tax was classified into six classes according to the relationship of the
successor to the decedent, and different flat tax rates were imposed on
each class. It was contended that this tax was a property tax — i.e., a
tax on the estate — and the graduated rates violated the uniformity
required of a property tax. The Court held that the tax was not on the
property itself, but on the right of succession to the property, a right
which was created and controlled exclusively by the legislature. Such a
right could be taxed as a privilege and, as the classifications were reason-
able, the uniformity recpiirement was not violated. (Kochersperger v.
Drake, 167 111. 122 (1897).)
The next significant decision came ten years later when the City
of Chicago imposed a wheel tax on vehicles using the city streets.
It was contended that the use of the public streets was a common
right enjoyed by everyone, not a special privilege which could be
bestowed or withheld by the legislature, and hence was not a proper
subject of taxation. The Court disposed of this contention on two
grounds. First, it held that even if this was not a taxable privilege, it
was a subject or object of taxation which could be permitted under
Section 2. In view of the restrictive interpretation of the taxing power
which was thereafter adopted in the Bachrach case, this exceedingly
liberal position must be discounted. The Court also held that since the
construction and control of the public streets rested entirely with the
legislature, a tax could be imposed on those who used this public benefit.
•(Harder's Fireproof Storage & Van Co. v. Chicago, 235 111. 58 (1908).)
In 1931, the State Motor Fuel Tax was sustained against the challenge
that it, combined with the vehicle license tax, constituted double taxa-
tion on the same privilege, on the grounds that the combination of the
two taxes did not exceed a reasonable charge for the privilege of using
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the highways. The license tax was measured by tlie weight and capacity
of the vehicle, while the luel tax was measured by actual use ol the
vehicle. (People v. Deep Rock Oil Corp., M3 111. .H88 (1931).)
The concej)t oi taxable privilege has been most substantially expanded
with the recent development ol "use taxes." Use taxes are designed
to prevent the avoidance ol the retailers' occupation tax which occurs
when personal property is purchased out ol state and hence is not sub-
ject to that tax. The first use tax in Illinois was enacted in 1951, the
statute imposing a tax on "the privilege ol using cigarettes in this state."
(.S^^^ 111. Rev. Stat. ch. 120, §§ 453.31-453.67 (1967).) This tax was equal
to the cigarette "sales" tax which was framed as an occupation tax "on
the business of distributing cigarettes in this State." 1 o the extent that
a dealer paid the occupation tax he was excused from paying the use
tax, so that the effect of the tax was to reach only out-of-state purchasers.
This tax was challenged in Johnson x>. Halpin (413 111. 257 (1952)) on
two grounds: (1) the use of cigarettes was not a right which derived
exclusively from the authority of the state (as was the riglit to inherit
property) nor was it a benefit conferred by the state (as was the use of
the public highways) and therefore it was not a taxable privilege; and
(2) no reasonable distinction could be drawn between persons who used
cigarettes purchased within the state and those who used cigarettes pur-
chased outside the state, and since the use tax fell only on the latter it
violated the uniformity requirement. On the first issue, the Court could
have premised its decision that use of cigarettes was a taxable privilege
on a prior case regulating tobacco content which had said that the
legislature could prohibit the use of cigarettes. However, the Court, after
extensive analysis of the Illinois cases, defined taxable privilege as
follows:
"[T]he concept of 'privilege' with reference to the taxing power has not been
limited in Illinois... to conduct previously authorized by the legislature, or
which the legislature could entirely abolish, or to benefits conferred by the
State.... [A] taxable privilege may involve lawful rights and conduct enjoyed
without previous legal authority, but over which the legislature has some power
of control or classification." (Johnson v. Halpin, 413 111. 257, 270 (1952).)
While the exact limits of "some power of control or classification" are
not yet certain, it is clear that there is considerable room for legisla-
tive action in this area. As to the second contention, non-uniformity of
classification, the Court held that even though the use tax fell primarily
on out-of-state purchasers, the offsetting provisions of the Cigarette Tax
Act had the effect of distributing the tax burden uniformly. It is
important to note here that two separate taxes
— the privilege tax on
cigarette use and the occupation tax on cigarette distributors
— were
combined to meet the uniformity requirement of the Constitution,
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rather than each tax having to meet that test individually.
The success of the cigarette use tax prompted the legislature to adopt
the same device to prevent avoidance of the retailers' occupation tax
in a significant segment of retail sales — automobile purchases out of
state. The Motor Vehicle Use Tax Act was passed in 1953. The tax
was imposed only on out-of-state purchases of automobiles, the amount
of the tax was equal to the retailers' occupation tax, and proof of
payment was required before the vehicle could be licensed. In the
inevitable constitutional challenge which followed (People ex rel.
Schoon v. Carpentier, 2 III. 2d 468 (1954)), the state sought to justify
the tax on the ground that the tax was complementary to the retailers'
occupation tax, just as the cigarette use tax was complementary to the
cigarette distributors' occupation tax, and should be sustained on the
authority of Johnson x>. Halpin. However, the Supreme Court held that
the tax was unconstitutional because it violated the uniformity require-
ment in three ways. First of all, the tax depended on the tacit assumption
that Illinois car dealers would pass on the retailers' occupation tax
to the customer in the purchase price, and would in fact remit the tax
although no proof of this payment was required. The Court said this
assumption was speculative and "wholly without legal sanction." Pre-
sumably it was warranted in the cigarette case because tax stamps were
required to be affixed to the packages. (It must be pointed out that
the very same assumption was the justification for the exemption of
charitable purchases from the retailers' occupation tax which was
permitted in the Holland Coal Company case discussed above.) Sec-
ondly, the tax was not uniformly applied to users, since if the retailers'
occupation tax were repealed, in-state purchasers would not have to
pay a tax while out-of-state purchasers would. This was not true in the
cigarette case because the use tax applied to all purchases but was abated
to the extent that the retailers' occupation tax was paid. Finally, the two
acts were not coordinated to assure that one or the other tax would be
paid. An in-state purchaser would not be prevented from getting a
license if the occupation tax were not paid.
Following the failure of this act, the legislature attempted to prevent
the erosion of the retailers' occupation tax base by enacting a com-
prehensive use tax drafted to avoid the objections in the Schoon case.
(See 111. Rev. Stat. ch. 120, §§ 439.1-439.22 (1967).) This tax was levied
on "the privilege of using in this state tangible personal property pur-
chased at retail," and applied to all retail purchases. The tax was at
the same rate as the retailers' occupation tax and was basically co-
extensive with that act. The tax was collected on in-state purchases by
the retailer, but to the extent of the occupation tax remitted, he retained
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the use tax. On out-of-state purchases, the out-ol-state retailer could be
licensed to collect and remit the tax; il he were not, the purchaser was
required to remit it. The tax A\as uplicld in Turner r'. ]Vriglil (11 111.
2d 161 (1957)), a case which has very significant implications lor the
concept ol privilege taxes in Illinois, the scojje of Section 2, and the
meaning of the uniformity requirement with respect to non-property
taxes.
The first challenge was that using personal property was not a taxable
privilege. Had the Court held stjuarely that stich a subject was a tax-
able privilege, it would have been tantamount to saying that an ordinary
right or legal activity
— such as the right to earn income — was a taxable
privilege. However, the Court declined to base its ruling quite so
broadly and instead held that a tax which was supplementary to an
admittedly valid tax — in this case, the retailers' occupation tax — was
constitutional imder Section 2 of Article IX. To support this conclusion,
the Court cited the cigarette use tax and an old case which had approved
the application of the inheritance tax to inter x>ix>os gifts in contempla-
tion of death. {In re Estate of Benton, 234 111. 366 (1908); it probably
should be noted that this case did not in fact involve a supplementary
tax, such as a gift tax, but turned on what property could constitu-
tionally be included in the estate for jnuposes of the inheritance tax.)
The fundamental significance of this holding is that for the first time
the Court read Section 2 as being broad enough to permit a form of
tax which did not fit the property-occupation-privilege formida of Sec-
tion 1. As the dissent points out, the basic proposition of Schoon v.
Carpentier was that any tax, allegedly supplementary or not, had to
meet the constitutional requirements of a basic tax permitted by Section
1. The Court completely ignored this case. It would not require too
much effort to find other kinds of taxes which might be similarly justi-
fied. For example, it could be argued that a tax on income from in-
tangible property was supplementary to the general property tax.
Plaintiffs tried to avoid this justification for the tax by arguing that
the use tax was not an actual supplementary tax, either in form or in
its effect on the tax base. This argument was supported by three points:
(1) the form of the tax was not complementary in that it was imposed,
not alone on out-of-state purchases not reached by the retailers' occu-
pation tax, but on domestic transactions as well; (2) the set-off provisions
were an unconstitutional commutation of state taxes in violation of
Sections 6 and 7 of Article IX; and (3) the tax bases were not identical
because the use tax was collected on the basis of "selling price," includ-
ing the value of trade-ins or other credits, while the retailers' occiqjation
tax was collected on
"gross receipts," which was defined by a 1955
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amendment to exclude the value of trade-ins. The first two points were
met by the answer that this had to be viewed as an integrated system by
which only one tax was intended to reach the treasury. The Court ob-
served, "it may be ciunbersome, but it is not unconstitutional." (One
cannot resist remarking that it is cumbersome because of the restrictions
imposed by the Schooji case.) The last point was answered by nullifying,
in effect, the 1955 amendment. The example was used of a $3,000 car
purchased in part with a $1,000 trade-in; the retailers' occupation tax,
which excluded the value of trade-ins, would be |50, while the use tax
on selling price would be $75. Since the retailer was excused from
paying the use tax only to the extent of the occupation tax, he would
be required to remit $50 occupation tax plus $25 use tax. Thus, there
was no discrimination between purchasers. But it seems impossible to
avoid the point of the dissent that such a device has the effect of the
"supplementary" use tax actually increasing the base of the primary
occupation tax.
The final challenge to the use tax was that it violated the luiiformity
requirement because the exemptions were arbitrary and discriminated
between purchasers of personal property. For purposes of the retailers'
occupation tax, certain occupations were held to be more of a service
than retail selling and were thus exempt — e.g., a tailor selling tailor-
made suits. These exemptions were carried over to the use tax. The
Court admitted that considered as a use tax per se, such distinctions
made no sense (a tailor-made suit is just as usable as a ready-made
suit), but this flaw would not invalidate the tax because of its supple-
mentary nature. It was held that such a classification attack should be
directed at the main statute, not the supplementary one. This is a highly
debatable holding. The plaintiff was subject to the use tax because he
was an out-of-state purchaser; but he was not subject to the occupation
tax because he was not a retailer. Consequently, he had no standing to
challenge the classification scheme of the retailers' occupation tax.
Therefore, even if his objection were valid, as the Court seems tacitly to
concede, he had no remedy. This position is reminiscent of the Court's
foreclosure of any effective remedy for the omission of personal property
from the tax rolls. It may well be that the Constitution (as well as
judicial decisions) substantially hampers legislative efforts to devise a
rational tax scheme. It is an unfortunate consequence that the Court is
virtually forced into strained and awkward avoidances of what appear to
be valid constitutional challenges.
The uniformity requirement has caused as much confusion in the
area of privilege taxes as it has with occupation taxes. In the case of
the use tax, in the first hearing of Turner v. Wright, the Supreme
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Court held the tax unconstitutioiuil l>ccause ol tlie classification scheme
before reversing itscU and sustaining the tax. As has been noted, that
decision is itsell unsatistactory in several respects and is particularly
difficidt to reconcile with the standards oi Sclioou <'. Carpcuiicr, involv-
ing the motor vehicle use tax. In neither case was the legislature acting
arbitrarily; it was merely trying to equalize the tax bmclen. The tailiue
of the motor vehicle use tax did not residt in any lessening of the tax
burden but merely caused the enactment of an even more comprehensive
tax. Thus the conclusion may he drawn that the imiformity ride, rather
than providing a viable standard by which to formulate equitable tax
legislation, actually serves as a somewhat crude weapon to impede tax
reform.
Comparative Analysis
It is difficult to make exact comjjarisons oi revenue articles among
state constitutions, since these are probably the most variable provisions
of all, and because judicial construction of these articles is critical.
However, some very rough generalizations can be made. The following
information is from the Illinois Legislative Council Research Depart-
ment Publication 134, Constitutional Manddlcs for Unifortuity of Taxa-
tion (1959). Although the information is ten years old. and there have
been a few state constitutional changes in the interim, it is believed
that the basic information is still adequate to give an overall perspec-
tive. (Another helpful source of comparative material is Young, "Con-
stitutional Problems," in Report of the Commission on Revenue 354,
416-36 (1963), which analyzes the provisions of 14 states selected for
geographical distribution and industrial development.)
On the issue of classification of real property, the states appear to be
about evenly divided between those whose constitutions require uniform
taxation of realty and those which permit some form of classification.
Twenty-four states retpiire uniformity, Illinois being included in this
group. Four states permit a very limited classification, usually in the
form of special treatment for forest and mineral lands, and small-home-
stead exemptions. Twenty-two states permit reasonable classification,
altfiough it appears that this power has not been used to any great
extent.
As to personal property, the situation is quite different. Only Arkansas
appears to be as rigid as Illinois in requiring the uniform taxation of
personal property. Nineteen states allow a limited form of classification,
primarily on intangibles, automobiles, and small amounts of household
goods. Twenty-nine states permit general classification.
Constitutional mandates on the subject of non-property taxes vai^
considerably. About one-fourth to one-third of the states have a general
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rule of uniformity within classes specifically applicable to taxation. In
the remaining states, general rules of classification are governed only by
the due process clauses. However, there are ninnerous specific rules
applicable to individual cases. For example, Ohio's Constitution spe-
cifically exempts food from the sales tax.
Since the issue of the income tax is particularly important in Illinois,
it may be relevant to review the other state provisions in this area.
The following summary is taken from Advisory Commission on Inter-
governmental Relations, Federal-State Coorditiation of Personal Income
Taxes 154-161 (1965). It should be pointed out that these provisions
vary considerably from state to state in their details, and only a general
overview is presented here. In 1965, thirty-four states levied personal
income taxes. Of these, 20 state constitutions contained specific author-
ity for such a levy; 14 contained no reference to an income tax. Thirty
of these taxes were graduated, while only four were flat rate. Of the re-
maining 16 states which levied no income tax, 11 of them probably could,
including four which have specific authority. In three states, including
Illinois, authority for an income tax is debatable (see Addendum, infra
p. 435, for change re Illinois status); and in two, Florida and Tennessee,
an income tax is specifically prohibited.
The Model State Constitution has an exceptionally brief article on
finance, containing only the following recjuirements: (1) that no state
debt may be contracted except that authorized by law for specific
objects; (2) that the governor must annually submit to the legislature
a budget and an appropriation bill; (3) that no obligations may be in-
curred nor money withdrawn from the treasury except as authorized by
law; and (4) that all expenditures, including salaries, shall be matters of
public record. (See also Comparative Analysis of .\rt. IV, Sec. 18, supra,
pp. 191-3.) The commentary accompanying the finance article of the
Model State Constitution is reproduced here because of its relevance
to the overall problem of constitutional revenue principles. Serious con-
sideration should be given to the reasons expressed for avoiding constitu-
tional restrictions on the revenue powers.
The Model State Constitution is based upon confidence in the system of
representative democracy. The finance article reflects these beliefs by leaving
to the legislature and the governor, the people's elected leaders, broad respons-
ibility for the conduct of the state's fiscal affairs with ample power to adjust
needs to the rapid changes characteristic of modern times.
Ideally, some authorities believe, a state constitution should be silent on mat-
ters of taxation and finance, thus giving the legislature and the governor com-
plete freedom to develop fiscal policies to meet current and emerging require-
ments. . . . [T]he complex and lengthy fiscal articles found in many state con-
stitutions. .
.obviously are barriers to responsible government.
Despite elaborate constitutional limitations upon the legislature designed to
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insure fiscal prudence, state revenues, expenditures, and outstanding debt have
grown enormously since World War II.. . .Legislatures have been resourceful
in circumventing tax and debt limitations. (Model State Constitution 91.)
Comment
The central problem confronting the Convention with respect to the
necessary reform of the Revenue Article has been well stated by Professor
Cohn:
Revenue reform has been impaled upon the horns of a policy and legal
dilenuna. On the one hand, the rigidity of the uniformity and ad valorem prin-
ciples as applied to tangible and intangible personal property is almost uni-
formly recognized as the major obstacle to an equitable tax system. On the other
hand, a relaxation of these principles to authorize classification of property for
tax purposes risks the danger of permitting the levy of a graduated income tax,
a prospect which is viewed with abhorrence in many quarters. Underlying
these alternatives is the deeper issue of the appropriate scope and content of
the taxing power generallv. . . . (Cohn, "Constitutional Limitations on Income
Taxation in Illinois," 196i U. 111. L. F. 586, 588.)
Of course, it is the fundamental task of the Convention to frame the
constitutional principles by which legislative policies are to be formu-
lated. It is critical to the successful completion of this task that basic,
long-term constitutional decisions do not become enmeshed in and
obscured by more immediate political problems. Illinois has already
experienced serious problems arising from detailed and rigid constitu-
tional standards. The lessons of this experience should be seriously
considered by the Convention as it formidates constitutional revenue
policies.
Some states have placed no direct limits on the taxing power of the
legislature. (Of course, there are many indirect constitutional limits,
the principal one being the due process clause.) The only requirement
in the Alaska and Hawaii constitutions is that any tax imposed must
be for a public purpose. The Vermont constitution has contained only
one limitation on the taxing power since its adoption in 1793; it must
appear that the pulic benefit is greater than it would be if the money were
not collected. Connecticut has no reference to taxation in its constitu-
tion. Other examples could perhaps be foiuid, but they are admittedly few
in number.
If such an approach is rejected and a more restricted taxing power is
desired, then the following problems must be considered. With respect
to property taxes, it appears that there should be some provision for
reasonable classification of tangible personal property. This could be
by grant of general classification powers, or by giving special attention
to household goods, motor vehicles, business and industrial equipment,
inventories, and agricultural property. Intangible personal property
should also be given special treatment, perhaps by tax alternatives
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other than of an ad i>alorcm tax. Classification of real property is a more
difficult problem, but one which will have to be faced in view of the
de facto classification which already exists, particularly in Cook County.
Also, some attention should probably be given to assessment and equali-
zation standards. With respect to non-property taxes, the retention of
the artificial formula of occupation and privilege and franchise taxes
would appear to be questionable, since it would continue to force a
strained and cumbersome tax structure. Also, the uniformity clause
specifically applicable to non-property taxes could well be eliminated,
since it has had little effective meaning and application. The reason-
ableness of such taxes would then be tested, as in fact is now the case,
by due process principles.
Addendum
On August 14, 1969, after this document went to press, the Supreme
Court of Illinois issued an opinion sustaining the newly enacted state
income tax against constitutional objections. The Court overruled its
decision in Bachracli v. Nelson (349 111. 579 (1932)) that an income tax
was a property tax; and it also overruled the highly influential dictum
in that case that the legislature was limited to three kinds of taxes —
property, occupation, and franchise and privilege taxes. It sustained
the income tax on the basis of Section 2 of Article IX. (Thorpe v. Mahin,
-111.
-(1969).)
It is not possible in this analysis to assess fully the implications of this
decision. It is reasonably clear that it may open up new sources of
revenue through the broadened concept of "privilege" and the more
liberal interpretation of the authority in Section 2. The validation of
different income tax rates for individuals and corporations is further
indication of a relaxation of both the privilege and uniformity re-
quirements.
The decision will apparently have no effect on clearly identifiable
property taxes. Classification of property, whether real or personal, tangi-
ble or intangible, will remain beyond the authorizations of the Consti-
tution; the ad valore^n and uniformity requirements will still be appli-
cable.
Tax Exemptions
Sec. 3. The property of the state, counties, and other municipal corpora-
tions, both real and personal, and such other property as may be used exclusively
for agricultural and horticultural societies, for school, religious, cemetery and
charitable purposes, may be exempted from taxation; but such exemption shall
be only by general law. In the assessment of real estate encumbered by public
easement, any depreciation occasioned by such easement may be deducted in
the valuation of such property.
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History
This section derives from Article IX, Section 3, ol the 1848 Consti-
tution which provided that "the property of the state and counties, both
real and personal, and such other projx'rty as the general assembly
may deem necessary for school, religious, and charitable purposes, may
be exempt from taxation." Two important changes were made in this
provision. The first required that any exemptions were to be only by
general law. This was designed to correct the common abuse of includ-
ing exemptions in special charters. Various schools, libraries, and reli-
gious groups would receive special corporate charters which, among
other provisions, exempted their property from taxation. The United
States Supreme Court held that such charters were contracts between
the state and the organization which could not be modified subse-
quently by the state to remove the exemption, because that would con-
stitute an impairment of the obligation of contracts in violation of
Article 1, Section 10, of the Federal Constitution. (See the discussion
in Northwestern Univ. v. Hanberg, 237 111. 185 (1908).) Requiring
exemptions to be granted only by general la^v would permit subsequent
modification if that was deemed desirable. The other significant change
was to substitute "used exclusively" for exempt purposes for "necessary."
Although Supreme Court interpretations under the prior language had
tended to be restrictive, it was felt that the limited nature of the
exemption should be made explicit. Property used for business pur-
poses should be subject to taxation, even though the income it produced
was used for exempt purposes and could be deemed "necessary" for
those purposes.
The new exemption of cemeteries was not commented on. The inclu-
sion of the new exemption for "agricultural and horticultural societies"
was primarily intended to exempt county fair grounds. There was con-
siderable opposition to this exemption by members who felt that these
operations were mainly for profit. The last sentence was included as a
compromise over an attempted exemption of highways. Since in many
instances the public highways are merely easements over private prop-
erty, they are included in the assessments of that property. It became
clear upon debate that any actual exemption would pose impossible
survey and assessment problems, so the compromise was a concession to
farmers who felt that their property containing highways was being over-
assessed. Since the highways are often as much of a benefit as a detriment
to the farms themselves, the problem is mainly one of accurate assess-
ment. This provision has caused no litigation.
There was considerable debate in the 1870 Convention over the
propriety of exempting property used for religious purposes from taxa-
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tion. Many members felt that "churches should bear their fair share"
of the property tax burden for the benefits and protection they received
from the community, while others felt that there should be no "tax on
religion." This is very much a contemporary concern and the issue is
explored in depth in the Explauntion below.
This section received only minor changes in the 1922 Convention
proposal. Parsonages and societies of war veterans were added to the
exempt list, as well as household furniture to the extent of $500. The
great part of the debate over exemptions was concerned with what
should be done with the income of exempt properties from endowments in
the event that an income tax was passed as authorized by the proposed
Constitution. Some members argued that since property used for exempt
purposes was exempt, so should be income used for exempt purposes.
Opponents of such an exemption had several bases of opposition. First,
there were members who opposed any exemptions at all, except for
publicly owned property. There were others who approved the limited
exemption of property directly used for exempt purposes but dis-
approved any extension of the exemption. Some members feared that
exempting income could logically lead to exempting property producing
that income which was not presently exempt — for example, school-
owned property leased to businesses, where rents were applied to school
purposes. Others simply felt that the burdens of taxation should be
shared by these institutions to some extent. In the end, exemption
from the income tax was not allowed.
Explanation
This section operates as a limitation on the power of the General
Assembly to exempt property from taxation. The general principle estab-
lished by Section 1 is that all property is to be taxed and the only
exceptions to that rule are those permitted by this section. It is not
self-executing, as are many similar provisions in other state constitu-
tions, but requires legislation for any of the exemptions to take effect.
A number of statutes providing exemptions from the property tax
have been declared unconstitutional because the exemptions were not
permitted by this section. Some of these attempted exemptions were
for purposes not specifically mentioned in the section. {See Consoli-
dated Coal Co. V. Miller, 236 111. 149 (1908) (coal companies and other
corporations); International College of Surgeons v. Brenza, 8 111. 2d 141
(1956) ("philosophical" societies).) In other cases, the legislature was
merely giving a broader interpretation to the constitutional language
than the Court thought warranted. (People ex rel. Thompson v. First
Congregational Church, 2vS2 111. 158 (1907) (exemption of parsonages
unconstitutional because such a use not for religious purposes); People
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ex rel. McCullough v. Deutsche Gemeinde, etc., 249 111. 132 (1911)
(exemption of all school property not used for profit unconstitutional
because exemption limited to property actually in use as school prem-
ises). Sec also People ex rel. Lloyd v. University of 111., 357 III. 369
(1934) (discussed below). For the current statutory exemptions, see
111. Rev. Stat. ch. 120, §§ 499-500, 22 (1967).)
For purposes of exemption from property taxes, this section estab-
lishes two general divisions of property. First is jjroperty which is
publicly owned. While the legislature has authority to exempt such
property solely on the basis of its ownership, and has in a few cases
exercised this authority, it has usually been more restrictive in granting
exemptions and has reqiured use for a public purpose, as well as public
ownership, in order to qualify for exemption. The other authorized
division of exempt property is that which is used for certain specified
purposes, in which case it may be exempt regardless of its ownership.
Here again, the legislature has not always been as liberal as the Con-
stitution permits. At one time, property used for religious purposes
had to be owned by a religious organization in order to be exempt;
this restriction was removed in 1909. (People ex rel. Bracher v. Salva-
tion Army, 305 111. 545 (1922).)
In deciding whether specific property may be exempted, the Supreme
Court has adopted the general principle that it is the primary use to
which the property is put which determines its exempt status, not an
incidental or
"secondary" use. (People ex rel. Fix v. Trustees of Nw.
College, 322 111. 120 (1926).) While this principle is somewhat more
liberal than the "exclusive use" required by the Constitution, still the
Court in general has been strict in validating exemptions, often denying
them in cases where other states have allowed them under comparable
constitutional language. Where property can be physically separated
into exempt and nonexempt uses, it may be partially taxed and partially
exempt. (City of Mattoon v. Graham, 386 111. 180 (1944).) Whether or
not the property produces income is irrelevant to the determination of
its exempt status. The fact that its revenue is applied exclusively to
exempt purposes will not confer exemption on property not itself used
for such purposes; nor will the fact that exempt property produces
revenue vitiate its exemption.
It should be noted that this section relates only to general property
taxation and does not authorize the legislature to exempt any property
from special assessments. (South Park Commr's v. Wood, 270 111. 263
(1915).)
The Court has developed working definitions of the exempt classes,
the most important of which are discussed below. However, the exemp-
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tion of property in nearly all cases depends upon its actual use, which
is primarily a tactual determination, and the relationship ol that use to
the definition, which is a matter ot judgment not readily controlled by
definitive standards. Therefore, many of the "borderline" cases grant-
ing or denying exemptions are not easily reconcilable, and it is necessary
to keep in mind that these cases cannot always be generalized to other
situations.
The largest class of exempt property is that which is owned by the
state, counties and other municipal corporations. So far as the statutory
exemptions are concerned, this class can be divided into two sub-classes —
that which is exempt solely by virtue of ownership and that which is
exempt because of public ownership and use for public purposes. A
notable example of the first sub-class is park districts, all of whose
property is exempt, even if it is located outside municipal limits and is
used for nonpark purposes. (People ex rel. Curry v. Decatur Park Dist.,
27 111. 2d 434 (1963).) Property owned by the state is also exempt by
the test of ownership, but in this case there has been some difficulty
over what constitutes state ownership. The University of Illinois claimed
that certain property, which because of its restricted use was not exempt
as school property, was exempt as state property by virtue of its owner-
ship by the University as trustee. The Court held that in order for
property to be owned by the state for purposes of tax exemption, there
must be a complete title free from any legal or ecjuitable interest. In
this case, the property was held in trust for the benefit of agriculture
students. (People ex rel. Olmstead v. University of 111., 328 111. 377
(1927).) Following this decision, the legislature amended the statute
to provide that any property of a public educational institution held
for educational purposes was property of the state. This amendment
was held unconstitutional in a case involving the same property on the
grounds that the cjuestion of state ownership was a matter of consti-
tutional interpretation. (People ex rel. Lloyd v. University of 111.,
357 111. 369 (1934).)
In most cases, however, the legislature has required that publicly
owned property be used for a public purpose before it is exempt from
taxation. In People ex rel. Laxvless v. City of Qiiincy (395 111. 190
(1946)), the Court defined "public purpose" as applied to municipal
property. Where the property is located .within municipal limits, it is
used for a public purpose if it is open to residents of the municipality.
If it is located outside the corporate limits, it must be open on equal
terms to the public generally. A municipal airport located outside the
city limits meets this test; and the fact that a fee is charged for its use
does not disqualify it for exemption, since the use does not have to
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be free. However, where jjart ot the airport pi()j)ert\ was rented lor
farming, that part was taxable even though the rents were necessary
for airport operations. (Ciity of Lawrenceville v. Maxwell, (i 111. 2(1 12
(1955).) Property located outside a sanitary district (a drainage channel)
has been held not to be exempt from taxation. In this case the property
was not rented to private parties and the public had a right of ease-
ment over the channel (i.e., boats could run on it). Hut the purpose
of the sanitary district was to provide drainage and sewage treatment lor
the niunicijiality, and the public outside its limits could not use its
property lor this puin[)Ose. Therefore, the Court held that the proj)erty
was not used for a public purpose. (Sanitary Dist. v. Gibbons, 29') 111.
519 (1920).)
Property used exclusively for school purposes is also exempt from
property taxation. For pinposes of this section, there is no distinction
betw^een public and private schools. (People ex re I. Gill \. Trustees of
Schools, 364 111. 131 (1936).) In this respect, the section should be
contrasted with .Section 2 of Article VIII. {Supra, p. 402). That section
applied to school purposes is subject to taxation. (People ex rcl. Gill v.
to 1870, regardless of its use. Under Section 3 of Article IX, the prop-
erty must be actually used for school purposes. Thus, property owned
by a school but leased to business enterprises with the income being
applied to school purposes is subject to taxation. (People ex rel. Gill v.
Trustees of Schools, 364 111. 131 (1936).) Furthermore, this case held
that so long as title is in the public school trustees, it is not property of
the state for that exemption. WHiat constitutes use for school purposes
fias generated considerable litigation. It has been held that residence
halls, dining rooms, club houses and recreational facilities are proper
to the function of a university and hence are exempt. The fact that
these buildings produce income and are owned by a nonprofit corpo-
ration, rather than the educational institution itself, will not remove the
exemption. (People ex rel. Goodman v. University of 111. Foundation,
388 111. 363 (1944).) On the other hand, fraternity houses owned by the
college but not open to the student body generally, the college presi-
dent's home, and unimproved lots which were jjart of the general endow-
ment, were held not exempt. (Knox College v. Board of Review, 308 111.
160 (1923).)
In the most recent decision involving private schools, the Court
denied tax exemption to staff housing facilities, notwithstanding that
the property was owned by the colleges and was contiguous to the
campus. The basis of denial was that the primary use of the facilities
was residential, and the absence of a showing that residence in the
facilities was required of faculty and staff because of their professional
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duties, coupled with the tact that a majority of iaculty and staff mem-
bers resided in private non-college-owned housing of their own selection,
precluded holding that a tax-exempt educational status existed for this
property. (MacMurray College v. Wright, 38 111. 2d 272 (1967).)
Private schools which do not provide a general course of education
as that is commonly understood have usually been held not to qualify
for exempt status under this section, even though they may qualify
for exemption as educational institutions for purposes of the federal
income tax and may be recognized for purposes of veteran's education
benefits. The stated basis lor this rule is that exemption is granted
the institution on the premise that it assumes responsibility for educa-
tion which would otherwise be borne by the taxpayers. (Milward v.
Paschen, 16 111. 2d 302 (1959) (mortuary school); People ex rel. Brenza
V. Turnverein Lincoln, 8 111. 2d 198 (1956) (physical education school);
Coyne Elec. School v. Paschen, 12 111. 2d 387 (1957) (electrical school).)
However, property of the Association of American Medical Colleges was
exempted as being used for public educational purposes, since the asso-
ciation and accredited medical schools conducted numerous activities
designed to improve medical education. The Court held that these
were educational purposes and the fact that the organization itself did
not conduct classes did not affect its exempt status. (Association of Am.
Medical Colleges v. Lorenz, 17 111. 2d 125 (1959).)
Cases involving exemptions for charitable uses are perhaps the most
difficult to reconcile. The exempting statute requires that property be
put to a charitable use and be owned by a charitable organization.
While the Court has defined both tests, the application of the tests to
the cases has not been uniform. A "charitable organization" is one which
has no capital and makes no profits but derives its funds mainly from
public or private charity and holds them in trust for the objects ex-
pressed in the instrument creating the organization. (Methodist Old
Peoples Home v. Korzen, 39 111. 2d 149 (1968).) A charitable use of
property is one which is applied for the benefit of an indefinite number
of people, either by "bringing their hearts under the influence of educa-
tion or religion"; by relieving their bodies from disease, suffering or con-
straint; by assisting them to establish themselves for life; by erecting or
maintaining public buildings or works; or otherwise lessening the bur-
dens of mankind. (Milward v. Paschen, 16 111. 2d 302 (1959).) As will
be seen, there appear to have been peculiar discrepancies in the appli-
cation of these tests.
A school of "domestic arts and sciences" taught cooking and sewing
to girls. All girls who applied were accepted up to the seating capacity
of the school. Those who were able paid tuition for the classes, while
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otliers were taught liee. I liere were two other sources ot income —
donations troni the pubHc and a restainant open to the pubHc which
served lood cooked by the girls. The school did not make a profit. It
was held to be tax exempt as a charitable institution. (School ot Domes-
tic Arts K; Science v. Carr, 322 111. 562 (1926).) On the other hand, a
school which conducted physical education, liie-saving, and first-aid
classes was denied exemption. Funds were derived primarily from
membership dues and gilts irom members, but anyone who was unable
to pay was forgiven the dues and it ajipeared that only about half of
the members actually paid dues. The Court ai)parently viewed the
"school" as primarily a recreation club. (Turnverein "Lincoln" v.
Board of Appeals, 358 111. 135 (1934).)
An interesting comparison can be made of two cases involving asso-
ciations of surgeons, one of which was granted and the other denied
exemption for its national headquarters building. The American Col-
lege of Smgeons and the International College of Surgeons were both
nonprofit corporations whose purpose was to advance the art of
surgery. Both derived their income primarily from membership dues.
Both maintained a library and museimi, although it does not appear
whether International's was open to the public. So far as the Court's
opinions are concerned, the chief difference seems to be that the educa-
tional activities of the American College are set out in considerable
detail, whereas the International College was merely said to have held
"meetings." American was granted an exemption while International was
denied one. (American College of Surgeons v. Korzen, 36 111. 2d 340
(1967); International College of Surgeons v. Brenza, 8 111. 2d 141 (1956).)
Another interesting comparison is suggested by cases where a local
chapter house of the D.A.R. which contained a "public rest room" was
exempted, while the headcjuarters of the Rotary clubs was not. (People
ex rel. Greer v. Thomas Walters Chapter D.A.R., 311 111. 304 (1924);
Rotary Int'l v. Paschen, 14 111. 2d 480 (1958). See also Kiwanis Int'l v.
Lorenz, 23 111. 2d 141 (1961).)
Recently tax exemption as a charity was denied to a church-affiliated
old people's home. (Methodist Old Peoples Home v. Korzen, 39 111. 2d
149 (1968).) The statute designating exempt charitable uses had been
expressly amended in 1967 to include "old people's home," but the
Court held that the statute was not intended to deviate from the consti-
tutional requirement that the property be used exclusively for charitable
purposes. Reasserting its frequently stated rule that it is the province
of the courts, and not the legislature, to determine whether or not prop-
erty is used exclusively for charitable purposes within the meaning of
this section, the Court denied exemption because of the practice of
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charging residents substantial lees determined by the type of accommo-
dation, without guaranteeing that an individual resident, who by other
rules had to meet certain health and financial requirements prior to
admission as a resident, would be permanently cared lor by the home.
On similar grounds, tax exemption was denied another not-for-profit
home for the aged in People ex rel. Norliind v. Association of the Wimie-
bago Home for the Aged (40 111. 2d 91 (1968)).
On occasion the Court has gone considerably beyond its own defini-
tions in granting charitable exemptions. Public housing authorities have
been granted exemption as charities (not as publicly owned property),
although it is obvious that they are not supported by charitable contri-
butions, nor do they lessen the burdens of government. (Springfield
Housing Authority v. Overaker, 390 111. 403 (1945).) And an arboretum
established by a private trust and open to the public was exempted,
the Court saying, "a charitable use may be applied to almost anything
that promotes the well-doing and well-being of society." (People ex rel.
Hellyer v. Morton, 373 111. 72, 78 (1940).) However, such broad inter-
pretations are rare.
Special attention should be given to the exemption from taxation of
property used for religious purposes. While such exemptions are per-
mitted in all states, as well as exemptions for church income from
federal income taxes, serious questions have been raised as to whether
they violate the First Amendment of the Federal Constitution prohibit-
ing an "establishment" of religion. Before this problem is explored in
depth, the extent of the exemption in Illinois and its distinction from
other kinds of exemptions should be examined. By the terms of Section
3, such property must be used exclusively for religious purposes. The
Court has held that this relates primarily to church buildings actually
used for public worship (People ex rel. Bracher v. Salvation Army, 305
111. 545 (1922)), and also includes funds used to pay the salaries of
ministers and other church officials (Yates v. Board of Review 312 111.
367 (1924)). However, it does not apply to parsonages, even when they
are supplied rent-free as part of the minister's compensation, because
these are used for residential purposes and are indistinguishable from
any other residence. (People ex rel. Thompson v. First Congregational
Church, 232 111. 158 (1907).) By analogy, it has been held that a con-
vent tor nuns who have renounced all connection with the world is
used primarily as a residence and hence is not exempt, even though
the property contains a chapel open for public use. (People ex rel. Car-
son V. Muldoon, 306 111. 234 (1922).) Particular rules applicable to
exemption of religious property vary widely from state to state, with
Illinois being among the strictest in granting such exemptions. For
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example, many stales cxemjH parsonages. (For a comprehensive review
of state law in this area, see Van Alstyne, "Tax Exemption of Church
Property," 20 Ohio St. L.j. Kil (1959).) The exemption of property
used exclusively lor religious purposes should be distinguished from
the exemption of property used for educational or charitable purposes,
such as parochial schools or hospitals, which might incidentally be
owned by religious organizations. As noted above, the traditional justi-
fication for the latter exemptions is that they perform functions which
would otherwise have to be born by the taxpayers, and the fact of
ownership has no bearing on the grounds of the exemption. Indeed, to
deny such exemptions solely on the basis of religious ownership when
they are granted to others might itself be an unconstitutional discrimi-
nation. However, this justification clearly cannot be applied to property
used for worsliip and other exclusively religious piuposes, because this
is not an activity in which the state could engage.
In debating the constitutionality of this exemption, opponents and
proponents have managed to agree on only one point, but that is a very
fundamental one. Tax exemption in its economic effect is indistin-
guishable from a direct state subsidy of reiigion, which is clearly uncon-
stitutional. Taxes of all other taxpayers are raised in the exact amount
that churches are exempt, and churches receive indirectly from the state
an amount equal to an ap})ropriation of the taxes they would otherwise
pay. Even the most recent state court decision upholding the constitu-
tionality of the exemption conceded this point. (Murray v. Comptroller
of the Treasury, 241 Md. 383 (1965).) Yet despite this concession, the
exemptions have consistently been upheld in the state courts, and for
some time the United States Supreme Court refused to review these
decisions. (See Murray v. Comptroller of Treasury, 241 Md. 385 (1965),
cert, denied, 385 U.S. 816 (1966); General Fin. Corp. v. Archetto, 93 R.I.
392 (1961), appeal dismissed, 369 U.S. 423 (1962); Lundberg v. County
of Alameda, 46 Cal. 2d 644 (1956), appeal dismissed sub nom Heisey v.
County of Alameda, 352 U.S. 921 (1956).) Recently, however, the Court
has agreed to take a case involving this issue and a definitive ruling hope-
fully may be expected within the year. (VValz v. Tax Comm'n, 24 N.Y.
2d 30 (1969), prob. juris, noted, 395 U.S. 957 (1969).)
Some proponents of religious exemptions have argued that the exemp-
tion is in fact required by the "free exercise" clause of the First
Amendment. They assert that to tax church property is to tax the
exercise of religion by its members. Support tor this position is found
in a Supreme Court decision which held that an occupational tax on
booksellers could not be applied to Jehovah's Witnesses who sold books
and pamphlets as a religious duty. It was held that such a tax violated
Art. IX, § 3 445
the Witnesses' exercise oi their religious beHels. (Murdock v. Pennsyl-
vania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943).) The Murdock case is not entirely persua-
sive in the recent instance tor two reasons. The ownership of property
by an organization is not the exercise ot a duty compelled by a religious
belief. And there was no issue raised in that case that the law, or exemp-
tion from it, constituted a forbidden establishment of religion.
Other proponents of the exemption argue that, while not necessarily
required by the Constitution, it is a permissible form of accommodation
to the religious needs of the community. Since it is admitted that
churches perform many charitable and educational tasks beneficial to
the state, it is argued that these functions cannot be entirely separated
from the organization itself; and the exemption enables the churches to
perform these functions without a partial diversion of their resources
to the public treasury. Furthermore, churches contribute to the general
welfare of the community by improving the moral climate of the public.
The case of Zorach v. Clauson (343 U.S. 306 (1952)) discussed in Article
VIII, Section 3 {supra, p. 406), which approved a form of released-time
program for religious education classes, is frequently cited as illustrative
of a principle that the state may adjust its own programs to accommo-
date religious preferences of the citizenry, so long as there is no dis-
crimination among religions. Finally, and this argument is perhaps the
strongest of all, the universal practice of the states and Congress since
the inception of the Constitution in granting these exemptions is pointed
to as evidence that they are not the kind of "establishment" referred
to in the First Amendment. {See Kauper, "The Constitutionality of
Tax Exemptions for Religious Activities," in The Wall Between Church
and State (D. Oaks ed. 1963).)
In the face of these various argiuiients, opponents of the exemption
make only one argument for its unconstitutionality, but it is a strong
one theoretically. Churches receive all the benefits of organized govern-
ment, without paying for them as does the general public. Tax exemp-
tions are a substantial subsidy of religion by the state, and subsidies of
any or all religions are forbidden by the First Amendment. Illinois ex
rel. McColhim v. Board of Education (333 U.S. 203 (1948)), invalidat-
ing released-time programs conducted on school premises, is cited in
support of this. Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court in that
case based its decision in large part on language from Ei'erson t'. Board
of Education (330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947)) which is particularly relevant
here: "Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church.
Neither can pass laws which aid one religion [or] aid all religions ....
No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any
religious activities or institutions . . . ." Since the exemptions are in-
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distinguishable, economically, Ironi appropriations, it is argued that
they arc unconstitutional. [Sec Note, "The First Amendment and Fi-
nancial Aid to Religion: Limits on the Government's Conduct," 61
NW.U.L. Rev. 777, 787-9.S (19()()); tor similar arguments attacking the
constitutionality ot federal income tax exemptions, see Korbel, "Do the
Federal Income Tax Laws Involve an Establishment ol Religion?," 53
A.B.A.J. 1018 (1967).)
No satisfactory conclusion can be drawn on this issue. As a matter
of pure logic, the arguments against the exemption are extremely per-
suasive. On the other hand, the historical evidence strongly indicates
that these exemptions are not offensive under the First Amendment.
While historical tradition is not decisive on questions of constitutional
interpretation, in this case it is unusually explicit.
Comparative Analysis
Exemption provisions vary widely among the states. Ten state consti-
tutions provide that the legislature may grant any exemptions so long
as they are by general law. Another 1 1 states prohibit any exemptions
other than those specifically permitted by the constitution. Thirty-five
constitutions provide for the exemption ot charities, 35 for property
used for religious purposes, and 40 tor educational institutions. In addi-
tion to these common exemptions, there is a long list of special exemp-
tions in a few states. In some ot these states, the constitutional exemp-
tions are self-executing, while in others, as in Illinois, legislative action
is necessary to make them effective.
The Model State Constitution, in keeping with its policy of allowing
the widest possible freedom tor legislative action in fiscal affairs, is
silent on this subject.
Comment
What action is taken on this section depends in large part upon the
Convention's decision on general taxing powers of the legislature. If it
is decided to grant the legislature wide discretion in matters of taxing
policy, then the need for a special section on exemption is minimal and
it could well be dispensed with. On the other hand, if substantial re-
strictions are placed on the taxing power, and particularly if a uni-
formity requirement is imposed on property taxation, then it will be
necessary to make some provision for exemptions if they are to be al-
lowed. This provision could be in the form of a broad grant of power
to allow such exemptions as are reasonable and promote the general
welfare, or a more restricted limitation such as the present section. In
any event, the last sentence of this section should be dropped, as it does
not deal with a problem of constitutional dimensions.
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Sale of Real Property for Tax Delinquency
Sec. 4. The General Assembly shall provide, in all cases where it may be
necessary to sell real estate for the non-payment of taxes or special assessments,
for State, county, municipal, or other purposes, that a return of such unpaid
taxes or assessments shall be made to some general officer, of the county, having
authority to receive State and county taxes; and there shall be no sale of said
property for any of said taxes or assessments but by said officer, upon the order
or judgment of some court of record.
History
This section ot the Constitution and Section 5, discussed below, re-
placed Section 4 of the 1848 Constitution. That section contained
extremely complex provisions relating to notice and affidavit procedures
required in order to obtain tax deeds to property on which taxes were
in default. While the requirements of the present Section 4 were new
additions to the Constitution, there was no significant debate in the
Convention proceedings revealing why the delegates felt it necessary
to include them.
This section, together with Section 5, engendered considerable debate
in the 1920-22 Convention, which ultimately proposed some significant
changes. These changes are discussed below in the History of Section 5.
Explanation
This section imposes two limitations on the power of the General
Assembly to direct a sale of property for nonpayment of taxes: (1) the
sale must be conducted by the county officer in charge of collecting taxes
and (2) it must be done only after a judicial proceechng. Except for
these limitations, the General Assembly may enact any provisions it
thinks desirable to encourage the collection of delinquent taxes. For
example, it may authorize penalties for delinquency and provide for
the sale of property for nonpayment of such penalties. (Chambers v.
People ex rel. Fuller, 113 111. 509 (1885).)
The requirements of this section, as well as of Section 5, apply only
to proceedings in rem against the property for collection of back taxes.
They do not apply to executions on property enforcing in personam
judgments, even where those judgments are based on delinquent taxes.
In order to enforce an in personam judgment for delinquent taxes,
the procedures applicable to ordinary judgment enforcement must be
followed —
e.g., the sale is conducted by the sheriff, not the county col-
lector, and there is a different period of redemption. (Langlois v. Peo-
ple, 212 111. 75 (1904).) Perhaps it should be noted that while general
property taxes are a personal liability of the owner, special assessments
are not. (Craw v. Village of Tolono, 96 111. 255 (1880).) Also, while
public property is not exempt from special assessment, it cannot be
sold for payment of delinquent assessments. The proper remedy in this
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case is mandamus to compel payment Irom the treasury. (County of
McLean v. City of IMoomington, 106 111. 209 (188.8).)
The provisions of Section 4 are self-executing and repeal all statutes
in conflict. Thus, prior to 1870, sales foi delincjiKiu taxes in Chicago
were made by the city collector, hut following the adoption of the
Constitution, a county officer was required to discharge this duty. (Gar-
rick V. Chamberlain, 97 111. 620 (1880).) This section recjuires only that
tfie sale be made by the county collector; the application for a judicial
order of foreclosure and sale may be made by any interested taxing au-
thority, such as a municipality. (Village of Downer's Grove v. Glos,
307 111. 293 (1923).)
The requirement that a sale of property for nonpayment of taxes
can be held only after a court order reflected a very common practice
prior to the adoption to the 1870 Constitution, but aj^parently it was not
universal. There is one case suggesting that the 1861 charter of a
board of water commissioners authorized sale of property for delinquent
assessments in a summary manner. The Supreme Court held that this
provision was invalidated by the 1870 Constitution. (Board of \Vater
Comm'rs v. Conkling, 113 111. 340 (1885).) The authority of a court to
supervise tax sales includes the power to disapprove a sale because of
the inadequacy of the price; and a board of coimty commissioners can-
not compromise taxes due so as to bind the court and force approval of
the sale. (People v. Schwartz, 397 111. 279 (1917).)
The fact that there is a court order for a sale of property for non-
payment of taxes and a subsequent attempt to sell it does not mean
that the property will actually be sold to the highest cash bidder. There
may be no cash bidders at all, in which case the property is forfeited to
the state; or wliere the cash bids are not sufficient to cover the taxes
due, the county may acquire the jjroperty under certain circumstances
by a noncash bid of the amount of taxes. In either case, there may be
a subsequent sale of the land in order to pay the taxes, and the question
has arisen whether the subsequent sale must also be imder a court order.
The Supreme Court held that it is not necessary, so long as there is
proper notice of the sale to interested parties. (Keilty v. Chicago Real
Estate Co., 25 111. 2d 581 (1962); People v. Wrage, 20 111. 2d 55 (I960).)
Comparative Analysis
This constitutional requirement is unique to Illinois. Most state con-
stitutions are entirely silent on the subject of sales of property for non-
payment of taxes. Three states expressly permit sales without judicial
proceedings, where certain notice requirements are followed.
Comment
While there is nothing fundamentally objectionable about this sec-
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tion, it is primarily legislative in nature. There may well be more effi-
cient ways of collecting taxes on delinquent property than requiring
judicial sales, and it might be desirable to permit the legislating more
flexibility. It is doubtful if the provisions of this section merit consti-
tutional status.
Redemption from Tax Sale
Sec. 5. The right of redemption from all sales of real estate for the non-
payment of taxes or special assessments of any character whatever, shall exist
in favor of owners and persons interested in such real estate, for a period of not
less than two years from such sales thereof. And the General Assembly shall
provide by law for reasonable notice to be given to the owners or parties in-
terested, by publication or otherwise, of the fact of the sale of the property for
such taxes or assessments, and when the time of redemption shall expire:
Provided: that occupants shall in all cases be served with personal notice before
the time of redemption expires.
History
As noted in the History of Section 4 (supra, p. 446), this section replaced
Section 4 of the 1848 Constitution which contained very complicated
notice requirements. Although several unsuccessful attempts were made in
the 1870 Convention to reinstate the former section, there was no substan-
tial debate revealing why one section was preferred over the other. The
major substantive change introduced by this section was the fixing of the
redemption period at not less than two years. Several amendments were
introduced lengthening the period to as much as five years, presumably in
an effort to benefit economically destitute owners who lost their land for
unpaid taxes. These amendments failed because of determined opposition
which pointed out that the longer redemption period woidd not neces-
sarily benefit the small landholder because the increased interest and
penalties over the longer period of time would resiUt in a greater financial
burden to redeem, and that the longer period would encourage specula-
tors to withhold taxes even more than was already the case and would
also discourage buyers at tax sales who would have an even more difficult
time obtaining a valid title. In both cases, loss of tax revenues would
increase.
The Committee on Revenue of the 1920-22 Convention was concerned
with the problem of delinquent taxes and proposed several substantial
changes in these sections. At that time, there was a large amount of de-
linquent property on the tax rolls which remained unsold for a number
of reasons. Decisions of the Illinois Supreme Court had made it almost
impossible to obtain a good tax title, so that a purchase at a tax sale was
a highly speculative investment. In addition, the General Assembly had
substantially reduced the amount of interest and penalties that could
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be collected by the tax buyer, llie lower rate ot return on this invest-
ment, combined with the difhculty in obtaining a valid title, sidjstantially
restricted the number oi buyers who were willing to bid at a tax sale.
And the small number ot tax buyers, combined with the invalidity ot
tax titles, encouraged tax delinquency, so that collection ot taxes became
more difficult.
In an effort to remedy this situation, the proposed 1922 Constitution
made two substantial changes in tlie requirements. For ordinary tax sales,
the provisions were retained that the sale be made by the county treas-
urer after a court order, with a two-year redemption periocf. How-
ever, the only notice required was "notice as provided by law." This
eliminated the compulsory notice to occupants which was cited as one
of the chief obstacles to obtaining good title under the Supreme Court's
strict requirements. It was argued that compulsory notice to occupants
served no essential purpose. Where the occupant was also the owner, his
interests were sufficiently protected by serving notice on the owner,
although there were cases in which the owner-occupier had been served
notice as owner wliich was constitutionally defective because it tailed to
specify him as the occupant also. Where the occupant was merely a
tenant, it was argued that his interests in the tax sale were not substan-
tial enough to mandate a constitutionally required notice. And where
the property contained a large number of tenants, as in the case of an
office building, or where the tenants were ot a transient nature, the consti-
tutional mandate was impossible to fulfill.
The other major change proposed in the 1922 Constitution was a
provision that the tax buyer could waive his title accjuired at the tax sale,
be subrogated to the state's tax lien and foreclose the lien in equity. This
procedure would eliminate the two-year redemption period. It was be-
lieved, perhaps over-optimistically, that this would effectively assure the
acquisition of good title to the property.
A large number of members of the 1920-22 Convention recognized
that these provisions were essentially legislative in nature, and there was
considerable opposition to including anything at all on the subject of
tax sales in the proposed Constitution. At one point in the debate, a
motion to eliminate the section altogether faded by only one vote.
Explanation
In Illinois, there are three primary methods of selling land in order to
collect delinquent taxes. The requirements of Section 5, as well as Section
4, apply to all of them, and a brief explanation ot these methods may be
helpful in understanding the cases. Taxes and special assessments become
a lien on the property as of April 1 in the year for which they are levied.
Proceedings by any of the three methods may be commenced only after
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entry ot a judgmenL ior the delinquent taxes and an order oi sale in
accordance with the requirements of Section 4.
The most common procedure is the annual tax sale. All delinquent
property is offered ior sale annually at a public auction. The property
must be sold for the full amount of taxes due, and the bidding is to de-
termine the amount of penalty which will be charged for redemption.
Thus, the successful purchaser at the tax sale is the bidder who is willing
to accept the lowest penalty. Payment of taxes by the bidder extinguishes
the lien. Redemption may be made within two years for the amount of
taxes plus penalties. If there is no redemption in this period, the purchaser
is entitled to a tax deed upon fulfilling certain notice requirements. If
there are no bidders on the property at the annual tax sale, the property
is forfeited to the state.
The second method is the tax foreclosure. Where taxes are delinquent
on the property for two or more years and there has been a forfeiture to
the state at the tax sale, proceedings may be instituted by the state to
foreclose the tax lien. Under a decree ordering foreclosure of the lien, the
property is sold to the highest bidder regardless of whether the amount
is sufficient to pay all the taxes due. The lien is merged in the foreclosure
decree and is extinguished by the sale. The right* of redemption exists
for two years from the time of the sale, and at the expiration of that
period the purchaser is entitled to a deed, again after fulfilling certain
notice requirements.
The third method of collecting taxes by a sale of property is a proceed-
ing under the so-called "Scavenger Act." Where taxes have been unpaid
for ten or more years, the county treasurer, upon approval by the court,
may offer the delinquent property for sale at the annual tax sale. In this
case, hoAvever, the property is sold to the highest bidder, whether or
not that bid is for the full amount of taxes. As in the above proceedings,
there is a two-year period of redemption, at the expiration of which the
buyer is entitled to a tax deed if he fulfills the notice requirements. (For
a thorough treatment of this subject, see Harbert, "Tax Foreclosures and
Tax Titles," 1952 U. 111. L. F. 209.)
It is extremely difficult to obtain a valid tax title to property in Illinois
under any of the foregoing methods. The reason is that the Illinois
Supreme Court has evidenced a consistently hostile attitude toward the
sale of property for delinquent taxes and as a result has required very
strict compliance with the mechanics of obtaining a tax deed. The chief
obstacle to obtaining a valid deed has been the notice requirements prior
to the expiration of the period of redemption. Under Section 5, only
personal service of notice on occupants is constitutionally mandatory;
otherwise the General Assembly is free to specify any kind of notice it
likes. (Frew v. Taylor, 106 111. 159 (1883).) The service of notice must be
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on occupaius at the time ol the expiration ol the period oi redemption.
In one case, the notice was served on Fred Meyers, owner and occupier ot
the land at the time it was sold. This was tlelective because it did not
specify that Meyers was the occupier at the time ol service ot notice. The
attorney's affidavit that Fred Meyer was the owner and occupier at time
of service did not cure the defect because of the discrepancy between the
two names. (Gonzalia v. Bartelsman, M3 111. 634 (1892).)
It has been held that a statute directing in the words of the Constitu-
tion tliat notice be served on owners, occupiers and "j:)arties interested" in
the property confers no right to notice on anyone other than the owners
and occupiers, since it is impossible to determine who is meant by "parties
interested." Thus a mortgagee has no right to notice of the expiration
of the period of redemption under this statute. (Glos v. Evanston Bldg.
& Loan Ass'n, 186 111. 586 (1900).)
In order to acquire a valid tax title, every statutory requirement must
be strictly complied with, and it is irrelevant that the defects are neither
harmful nor misleading. Numerous examples could be given of the ex-
tremes to which this proposition has been carried, but two will sufhce
for illustration. One tax deed was held invalid because of two defects in
the notice. It stated that the period of redemption expired October 18,
when in fact it expired September 8; obviously there was no harm here,
since the o^vner was given an extra month in which to redeem. Another
defect was that the owner was stated to be in possession on April 19 antl
served on May 20. The notice should have stated who was in possession
on May 20, even though other evidence in the case showed that possession
had not changed. (Wisner v. Chamberlain, 117 111. 568 (1886).) The notice
must specify whether the property was sold for taxes or special assess-
ments. A notice that the property was purchased at a "sale of lots and
lands for taxes and special assessments" does not meet this requirement
because the words refer to the sale and not to the property. This notice
was also deficient in specifying the date for expiration as November 3,
1878, because that day fell on Sunday, and the owner could actually
still redeem on Monday, November 4, even though there was no attempt
to redeem. (Gage v. Davis, 129 111. 236 (1889).)
The economic depression of the 1930's caused a substantial increase
in tax delinquency. And the difficulty of obtaining valid tax titles to
delinquent property discouraged buyers at tax sales. Thus,
in the
decade beginning in 1940, there were large amounts of property in the
state which produced no tax revenue because of chronic delinquency
of the owners, and which the counties were unable to sell to buyers
in order to return them to revenue-producing status. In an effort to
mitigate this situation, the legislature in 1943 passed
the so-called
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"Scavenger Act" (111. Rev. Stat. ch. 120, § 716a (Supp. 1968)), which
provided that property which was delinquent for as long as ten years
or more should be sold at the annual tax sale to the highest bidder.
The act specifically stated that it was to be given a liberal construction
so as to enable conveyance ot a merchantable title. Notice was to be
provided under the statute applicable to other tax sales. There have
been few cases decided under this act; but the first one construing the
notice provisions held that since the same statute governed all tax sales,
the requirements relative to the Scavenger Act would be applied in con-
formity with the rules governing other sales — i.e., strict compliance
would be required. (Gaither v. Lager, 2 111. 2d 293 (1954).) In that
case, the owner of the land had continuously occupied the property
and was delinquent in his taxes for more than 15 years. He was per-
sonally served with the notice ot the correct expiration date of the
period of redemption, but the notice was held defective because it failed
to specify for what years' taxes the property was sold and whether it
was for general taxes or special assessments. Again, it was clear from
the other evidence that the owner had this information.
Section 5 secures the right of redemption to owners and gives a mini-
mum of two years in which to exercise that right. The General Assembly
has always observed this provision, and there have been no cases holding
that the right of redemption has been violated. (See, e.g., Ziccarelli v.
Stuckart, 277 111. 26 (1917).) However, the right of redemption is favored
over the rights of purchasers at tax sales, and the General Assembly
may enlarge the right of redemption beyond the protection afforded by
the Constitution. By this justification, a statute was sustained against
due process objections which provided that if the tax buyer failed to
take possession of property within one year from issuance of the tax
deed, the prior owner could still redeem. (Elmhurst State Bank v. Stone,
346 111. 157 (1931).)
The right of redemption under Section 5 exists in favor of owners
and
"persons interested" in the property. In recent years there has been
some confusion as to who has the right to redeem. The difficulty stems
from a 1961 Illinois Supreme Court decision which held, four to three,
that a stranger to the record title could not redeem from a tax sale.
(Weiner v. Jobst, 22 111. 2d 11 (1961).) In that case, a bank claimed
title to the property under a deed of trust and attempted to redeem
by its agent-attorney. The bank's record title was incomplete because
of a 1937 conveyance which was not recorded. As the dissent points
out, the Court's decision denying redemption was not consistent with
prior decisions (see Franzen v. Donichy, 9 111. 2d 382 (1956)), and re-
sulted in no one being able to redeem from the sale. Later decisions of
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an Illinois appellate court have cast considerable doubt on the via-
bility ot the Weiner decision. In one case, the appellate court ignored
the express language of the majority in Weiner and held that record
title was not a prerequisite to the right to redeem, but that cc|uitable
owners could also redeem, in this case the delect in title consisted ol a
contract to convey which was recorded and marked paid in iull, but
with no deed having issued. {In re County Treasiner, 63 111. Ajip. 2d
135 (1965).) In a later case, the executor of an estate was allowed to
redeem, even though at the time of redemption he had not yet received
his appointment as executor and hence was technically a stranger to
the title. {In re County Collector, 72 111. App. 2d 272 (1966).) Neither
of these cases was reviewed by the Supreme Court. While the question
is still unsettled, one may infer that owners of equities in property and
certainly equities of which there is some record notice, may redeem ironi
tax sales.
Comparative Analysis
Four states besides Illinois guarantee the right of redemption in
their constitutions; in three states the right is protected for two years and
in one for three years. West Virginia's Constitution specifies that the
right is not to extend beyond 20 years. Notice requirements are men-
tioned in only three other constitutions: in one, as in Illinois, notice must
be given to occupants; in another, notice is required for owner; and in
the third, notice is to be provided by law. The Model State Constitution
is silent on the subject.
Comment
Like Section 4, this section deals with problems that are primarily
of legislative concern, and very few states find it necessary to treat
them in their constitutions. It is extremely difficult to suggest any com-
pelling reasons which justify a continued constitutional status for this
section.
Release from Taxation Forbidden
Sec. 6. The General Assembly shall have no power to release or discharge
any county, city, township, town or district, whatever, or the inhabitants thereof,
or the property therein, from their or its proportionate share of taxes to be
levied for State purposes, nor shall commutation for such taxes be authorized
in any form whatsoever.
History
This section of the Constitution was adopted in 1870 for the express
purpose of forbidding legislation of questionable merit which had
taken several forms. For example, acts had frequently been passed
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exempting communities from state taxes in order to permit them to
construct levies and embankments tor protection Irom river flooding.
In 1869, an act had been passed partially exempting communities which
had subscribed to railroad stock in order to facilitate their payment for
the stock. (See discussion of Ramsey v. Hoeger, below.) There was
widespread opposition to such legislation, and this section resulted.
The substance of this section was retained without significant debate
in the 1922 Convention proposal. The language was considerably sim-
plified to read, "Taxes levied for state purposes shall never be released,
discharged, or commuted."
Explanation
There has been little significant litigation over this section, probably
because its provisions are relatively clear and the legislature has appar-
ently made no attempt to circumvent them. An 1875 case held that the
section applied retroactively to repeal all inconsistent legislation. In
that case, an 1869 act of the General Assembly attempted to ease the
tax burden on communities which had incurred indebtedness by sub-
scribing to railroad stock. The act required the State Auditor, before
assessing state taxes, to deduct a certain proportion of the property
valuation in those counties which had subscribed to railroad stock.
This was held to be a partial release of state taxes and a violation of
this section. (Ramsey v. Hoeger, 76 111. 432 (1875).)
In only one case has a law passed after 1870 been held unconsti-
tutional because of this section. Under the school law as it stood in
1915, all eighth-grade graduates were entitled to attend a high school.
In those school districts which did not maintain a high school (a non-
high school district), the district was required to pay the tuition of its
students attending school in other ciistricts. The state school tax was
distributed by the county superintendents of schools to the various
township school districts in proportion to the number of school-age
children residing in them. In 1915, the legislature passed a statute
directing the superintendents first to pay the tuition of non-high school
district students and then to distribute the tax as above. The effect
of this mode of distribution was to increase that portion of the state
school tax returned to the non-high school districts, while decreasing
that returned to the high school districts. This was held to be the
equivalent of the commutation of the state school tax and a violation
of this section. (Board of Educ. v. Haworth, 274 111. 538 (1916).)
The Supreme Court's decision in the Haxvorfh case seems question-
able. It is extremely doubtful that this section should be applied to a
dispersal of state funds, as distinguished from their initial collection.
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Any time that state lunds are dispersed to a coiniminity in an amount
greater than that which is collected Irom them, there is a "commtita-
tion" ol state taxes in the vague sense in which that concept was used
in the Hdivortli case. Adherence to this view could jeopardize any pro-
gram of state aid which is related to the taxable wealth of conmuniities.
Fortunately, Hoiuorth has not pro\cd to be a viable precedent, although
it has not been overrided.
When the legislature drafted the Use Tax Act, in an effort to avoid
constitutional problems under Article IX, Section 1 (sec discussion,
supra, pp. 327-31), it provided that the use tax must be collected on all
sales, but did not have to be remitted to the extent that the retailers'
occupation tax was paid. This was attacked as a release of the use
tax in \iolation of this section, liut the Court held that the two taxes
were to l^e viewed as an integrated system, that only one tax was in-
tended to reach the treasury, and that the purpose of the use tax was to
reach only out-of-state sales. Viewed in this light, the method was cum-
bersome, but not a violation of Section (i. (Tinner v. Wright, 1 1 111. 2d
161 (1957).)
Section 6 applies only to commutation of state taxes and does not
prevent connnutation of local taxes. Thus, a 1944 case held that it
was not a violation of this section to sell land for less than the amount
of delinquent taxes because state taxes were not involved. In addition,
the purpose of the proceeding was remedial
— to return the land to
active tax-paying status. (Schreiber v. County of Cook, 388 111. 297
(1944).) However, Sections 9 and 10 (see discussion, injra, p. 462) have
been construed to prohibit commutation of local taxes. (Raymond v.
Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 196 111. 329 (1902).) It is not clear whether the
remedial objective sustained in Schreiber is precluded under Sections 9
and 10 by virtue of the earlier Hartford Fire Insurance Co. case.
Comparative Analysis
Seven other states have constitutional provisions prohibiting commu-
tation of taxes. The Model State Constitution has no similar provision.
Comment
While the principle of this section is certainly not objectionable, nor
a serious imj^ediment to fiscal operations, consideration might Avell be
given to eliminating it from the Constitution. Forty-three states do with-
out it. The chief evil at which the section was directed was the commu-
tation of the state property tax. This, of course, is now and for the fore-
seeable future, a moot issue since a state property tax is not likely to
be revived. The policy of this section can be assured, if deemed neces-
sary in any given case, by legislative action. Finally, in this area, as in
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others, serious abuses ot power could be controlled by the due process
clause.
If this provision is to be retained, the language used in the proposed
1922 Constitution (see History, supra, p. 454) is much simpler in form.
State Taxes Paid into State Treasury
Sec. 7. All taxes levied for State purposes shall be paid into the State treasury.
History
This section dates from 1870. In explaining this section to the- Con-
vention, the Chairman of the Committee on Revenue said that it was
"simply to carry the intent of the [sixth] section more fully into ef-
fect . . . ." The section was accepted without debate. The proposed 1922
Constitution left the section unchanged.
Explanation
Section 6 (supra, p. 454) forbids release by the legislature of any state
taxes due from any political subdivision. Prior to 1870, the legislature
sometimes would authorize the diversion of state taxes due from a par-
ticular subdivision in order to pay for some local improvement. Section
7 is designed to prevent this sort of diversion. (The background is set
out in the dissenting opinion in Green v. Black, 352 111. 623 (1933).)
It is to be noted that this section requires taxes, but not all moneys,
to be paid into the treasury. This is, of course, the other side of the
coin referred to in the Explanation of Section 17 of Article IV (supra,
pp. 182-3), where it was pointed out that under certain circumstances,
operations may be carried on without the benefit of an appropriation.
There is, however, an exception to the requirement that all taxes be
paid into the treasury. The tax that supports unemployment compen-
sation is not paid into the treasury. The statute relative to the payment
of state moneys into the state treasury provides that it is not applicable
to the Unemployment Compensation Act. (111. Rev. Stat. ch. 127, § 176a
(1967).) This is undoubtedly the case because of the interrelationship
between the state tax and the federal tax. In any event, this aspect of
the unemployment compensation system does not appear to have been
attacked constitutionally.
Comparative Analysis
There appear to be six states besides Illinois with a comparable provi-
sion. The United States Constitution and the Model State Constitution
have no comparable provision.
Comment
This section was probably not necessary when adopted. The type of
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diversion referred to above is clearly prohibited by Section 22 of Article
IV. (Supra, pp. 203-4.) The unemployment compensation practice demon-
strates the need for more fiexibility than is permitted by the literal
wording of the section.
County Tax Limit
Sec. 8. County authorities shall never assess taxes, the aggregate of which
shall exceed seventy five cents per one hundred dollars' valuation, except for
the payment of indebtedness existing at the adoption of this Constitution, unless
authorized by vote of the people of the county.
History
This was a new section in the 1870 Constitution and was adopted with-
out debate. The lack of debate is particularly interesting in view of
the fact that an attempt to impose a similar limitation on the tax rate
of the state met with vigorous opposition and was ultimately defeated.
The principal argument of the opponents of the state limitation was
that it would be ineffective because it would only serve as an impetus
to increase the assessment ratio which was then 25 per cent.
The limitation was retained in the proposed 1922 Constitution, but
was included in the article on Counties and was phrased as % of 1 per
cent of assessed valuation. A new provision of that section permitted
counties which were the unit for road taxation to levy up to an addi-
tional 34 of 1 per cent. At that time, the townships, which are not
limited by this section, were the governmental units priinarily res{X)n-
sible for roads, but it was felt that with the coming of the automobile
and hard roads it would be more efhcient for the counties to control
road-building. If they were to assume that responsibility, however, they
w'ould need considerably more taxes than the 75-cent limit provided.
There was considerable opposition to the inclusion of tliis limitation
in the 1922 Constitution on the ground that there were no constitutional
rate limits on other governmental units, and the counties should be
regulated only by statute just as the others were. There were three votes
taken on the issue, and the vote was against inclusion of the limit the
first two times, but on the third vote it was adopted.
Explanation
Counties derive their taxing powers from the legislature, and the
legislature is free to place any conditions on that power it likes; this
section only specifies the upper rate limit which may be levied without
a vote of the people. But the legislature may fix a county rate limit lower
than the constitutional limit. (People ex rcl. Bothfuhr v. Chicago &: E. 111.
Ry., 305 111. 454 (1922).) This section in no way governs the assessment
of property against which the constitutional limit may be extended;
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and the counties may be required to use the assessment value determined
by the State Board of Equalization, instead of their own county board
of review, even where this results in less revenue. (Chicago, B. & O.R. R.
V. People ex rel. Sonnet, 213 111. 458 (1904).)
When a county tax is improperly levied in excess of the 75-cent limit,
only the excess is invalid. (Mix v. People ex rel. Pierpont, 72 111. 241
(1874).).
The problem of what qualifies as a county tax for pmposes of this
section was settled by early decisions. Taxes levied by the county
board for funds administered by the county are county taxes; and
the legislature may not designate any such tax as not a county tax
so as to exempt it from the 75-cent limit. (People ex rel. Lusk v. Cairo,
V. & C. Ry., 266 111. 557 (1915).) On the other hand, taxes levied and
administered by townships are township taxes, and they do not become
county taxes merely because they are certified by the township trustees
to the county board which directs the county collector to extend them.
(Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry v. McCleave, 108 111. 368 (1884). Compare Wright
V. Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry., 120 111. 541 (1887).) When an election is held
to authorize a tax rate above the constitutional limit, either the statute,
the notice of the election, or the ballot itself must specify that the tax
to be voted on is above the constitutional limit. If such notice is not
given, an affirmative vote on a particular tax leferendum will be inter-
preted as authorizing the particular levy up to, but not over, the con-
stitutional limit. (People ^'x rel. Hileman v. Missouri P.R.R., 319 111.
433 (1925); People ex rel. Flick v. Chicago, B. & O. R.R., 291 111. 502
(1920); People ex rel. Graff v. Wabash Ry., 286 111. 15 (1918).) In order
to authorize a rate above the constitutional limit, a majority of votes
cast at the election (not a majority of electors voting on the proposition)
must be recorded in favor of the proposition; where the vote is merely
to exceed the statutory limit, a majority of votes on the proposition
is sufficient. (People ex rel. Lawrence v. Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. Ry.,
339 111. 169 (1930).)
This section of the Constitution is in no way a limitation on the
power of counties to incur debt, and it is not a valid objection to the
assumption of a county obligation that it will require a tax levy over
the constitutional limit; the only limitation on debt incurrence is Section
12. (County of Coles v. Goehring, 209 111. 142 (1904).)
The exception to this section for debts existing prior to its adoption
is, of course, obsolete now. (For interpretations, see County of Pope v.
Sloan, 92 111. 177 (1879); Chiniquy v. People ex rel. Swigert, 78 111. 570
(1875).)
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Comparative Analysis
There are 27 states, including Illinois, which have some sort ol propert)
tax rate limitations in their constitutions. These provisions vary so
widely that only the most general comparisons can be made. It might
be noted that many states have statutory limitations which have not been
included in this analysis. Five states have overall limits on the rate ot
taxes which can be assessed against property lor both state and local
purposes. Another 18 states have specific limits on the rate of state
property taxes; six ot these states do not limit local taxes. Sixteen states
limit the rates ot local property taxes; but ot these, tour states do not
limit state property taxes, while 13 limit both county and municipal
rates, and three limit only the county rates.
Illinois is in the rattier unique position ot being one ot only tour
states which limit county taxes but not state taxes, and one of only three
states which limit county taxes but not municipal taxes.
The Model State Constitution is expressly opposed to such limitations.
Comment
Property tax rate limits have had a long statutory history in Illinois,
in addition to this constitutional provision. There have been many
attempts to establish overall limits to the property tax, most ot which
were notably unsuccessful for two reasons — the vicissitudes of the assess-
ment procedure and the increasing demands tor services. (For a general
review, see Howards, "Property Tax Rate Limits," in Report ot the
Commission on Revenue 521 (1963).) Most authorities oppose these limits
in any form and particularly oppose their inclusion in a constitution.
Regardless of the general merits of the argument, this particular limit
standing alone in the Illinois Constitution seems highly illogical.
Local Municipal Improvements
Sec. 9. The General Assembly may vest the corporate authorities of cities,
towns and villages with power to make local improvements by special assessment,
or by special taxation of contiguous property, or otherwise. For all other cor-
porate purposes, all municipal corporations may be vested with authority to
assess and collect taxes; but such taxes shall be uniform in respect to persons
and property, within the jurisdiction of the body imposing the same.
History
This section of the Constitution derives from the Constitution of
1848, Article IX, Section 5, which provided in part:
The corporate authorities of counties, townships, school districts, cities, towns
and villages may be vested with power to assess and collect taxes for corporate
purposes; such taxes to be uniform in respect to persons and property within
the jurisdiction of the body imposing the same.
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The most significant decision of the Illinois Supreme Court under the
1848 Constitution, in respect to its effect on Section 9 ot the 1870 Consti-
tution, was City of Chicago v. Lamed (34 111. 203 (1864)). That case
held that municipalities had no powers of special taxation for making
local improvements. These projects came under the power of eminent
domain for which compensation had to be made. While such compensa-
tion could be made by benefits conferred, such benefits had to be speci-
fically assessed against the individual properties benefitted, with the
right of judicial review, and any excess cost of the improvements had to
be paid for by general taxation. Although this position seemed sound
in theory, as a practical matter it made the construction of many local
improvements, particularly sidewalks, exceedingly complex and expen-
sive. This case was the main concern of the 1870 Convention with regard
to Section 9, and it was finally determined to grant cities, towns and
villages the authority to make local improvements by special assess-
ment, special taxation or otherwise. The distinction between these
methods is discussed below.
The 1922 Convention proposal took the first sentence of Section 9 and
made it a separate section of the Revenue Article and included park
districts in the list of municipal authorities which could construct local
improvements by special assessment. There was some discussion as to
whether the provision restricting special taxation to contiguous property
should be removed, but it was finally retained. Another change per-
mitted municipalities to join together to make local improvements. The
remainder of Section 9 was combined with Section 10 into one section
with some change in wording, but the essential features were retained.
Explanation
This section and Sections 10 and 12 form the basis of the taxing
powers of local governments for local purposes. In addition to these
sections, local governments derive taxing powers from the General Assem-
bly through a delegation of its authority under Sections 1 and 2. The
authority of cities to prescribe license taxes, for example, is such a
delegated power and is governed by principles already discussed in Sec-
tions 1 and 2; it is not affected by this section. (Harder's Fireproof Stor-
age Van Co. v. City of Chicago, 235 111. 58 (1908); Banta v. City of
Chicago 172 111. 204 (1898).) Of course, these powers are also governed
by the limitations of the due process clause and the police power.
(Condon v. Village of Forest Park, 278 111. 218 (1917).) Thus, the princi-
ples of this section relate only to property and can be analyzed under
two main classifications, (1) special assessment and taxation for local im-
provements, and (2) general property taxation tor corporate purposes.
Before these general problems are investigated, it would be well to
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delineate the relationship ol these sections to the powers ol the General
Assembly. The authority to grant taxing powers to municipalities under
this section is permissive only and not self-executing. Thus in creating
municipal governments, the legislature has discretion in deciding whether
or not to give them the power ot taxation, and in fact often has not.
(People ex rel. Tuohy v. City of Chicago, 399 111. 551 (1948).) But once
it is decided to grant the power, certain restrictions must be observed.
It has been held that this section, together with Section 10, prevents the
legislature from commuting local taxes. Otherwise, taxes would not be
uniform within the jurisdiction. Therefore, insurance companies could
not be exempted from their local personal property taxes upon payment
of a state tax on their premiums collected. (Raymond v. Hartford Fire
Ins. Co., 196 111. 329 (1902). Note: Section 6 of Article IX prevents
commutation of state taxes, but has no effect on local taxes. Supra, p. 451.)
And when the power is granted, it must be granted to the proper author-
ity. The power to levy special assessments and special taxes for local
improvements is limited to a small list of municipalities, and the power
of general taxation for corporate purposes is limited to "corporate
authorities." The exact definition of authorities who can exercise each
power is discussed below in the analysis of the respective taxing powers.
Finally, it should be noted that the legislature's power to grant taxing
authority under this section is often construed in conjunction with the
restriction in Section 10 preventing the legislature itself from imposing
local taxes on municipalities for corporate purposes. While the two ques-
tions are often involved in the same case, analytically they can be distin-
guished and the latter issue is discussed in the analysis of Section 10.
The power to make local improvements is authorized for cities, towns
and villages, and the Supreme Court has held that this list is exclusive.
Thus a statute which enabled drainage districts to make such improve-
ments by special assessment {i.e., to charge lands which are drained with
the whole cost of draining) was held unconstitutional. (Updike v. Wright,
81 111. 49 (1876).) Article IV, Section 31, was amended specifically to over-
rule this decision for drainage districts. The general principle of Updike
was followed later when it was held that counties could not be given
this power. (People ex rel. Van Slooten v. Board of Comm'rs, 221 111. 493
(1906).) However, by an accident of constitutional history, park districts
had also been given this power and had exercised it unchallenged for
many years. When a case finally reached the Supreme Court, it held that
because many rights had already become settled, the power would be up-
held, but this was recognized as an exception to the general nde.
(VanNada v. Gocdde, 263 III. 105 (1914).) One further apparent devia-
tion from this principle is worth noting. In 1925, the Supreme Court
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held that it was within the police power of the state to authorize sanitary
districts to construct local improvements by means of special assessment.
(Taylorville Sanitary Dist. v. Winslow, 317 111, 25 (1925).) While the
opinion is rather unclear, the basis of this decision appears to be that the
activities of sanitary districts are not local corporate purposes, but part
of the general health and welfare of the state, and therefore not covered
by the restrictions of this section. The broad implications of this decision
have not been tested; it would appear to modify the Updike decision.
One further very important restriction has been judicially grafted onto
this provision of the Constitution. In order to be financed as a "local
improvement," a project must be entirely under the control of one
municipality. Chicago and Cicero attempted to construct one continuous
sewer, with the outlet in Cicero because there was no suitable location in
Chicago. Although the cost of the sewer construction in Chicago was
only one-fifth of that in Cicero, two-thirds of the cost was apportioned to
Chicago. This excess represented primarily the cost of the outlet, plus
an administrative assessment that the property in Chicago would be more
greatly benefitted than that in Cicero. Applying the rule of single muni-
cipal control, the Court held the project unconstitutional. (Loeffler v. City
of Chicago, 246 111. 43 (1910).) Obviously, this restriction greatly hampers
efforts of municipalities with contiguous boundaries to coordinate their
municipal services.
The most recent decision limiting the authority to make local im-
provements to the municipalities designated in this section is Com-
mittee of Local Improvements %'. Objectors to the Assessment (39 111.
2d 255 (1968)), wherein the Court interpreted "towns" to mean "incorpo-
rated towns" and not
"townships," and in consequence held invalid a
statute authorizing townships to levy special assessments for local im-
provements.
The definition of a project which constitutes a local improvement
has not caused any difficulty, although it is important because it deter-
mines the method of financing which a municipality may utilize for
its projects. It has been said that a local improvement implies a permanent
benefit which will significantly enhance the market value of property
affected by the improvement. This encompasses, tor example, the con-
struction of streets, sewers, and lighting; but it does not include the
mere maintenance and repairs of existing streets (Crane v. West Chicago
Park Comm'rs, 153 111. 348 (1894)); nor does it include the removal of
noxious weeds (People ex re I. Van Slooten v. Board of Comm'rs, 221 111.
493 (1906)). The taking of land for a park is a local improvement which
may be financed by special assessment. (Winnetka Park Dist. v. Hopkins,
371 111. 46 (1939).) Local improvements are to be distinguished from
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projects of general utility to the coninumity. Thus, in constructing a city
waterworks system, the reservoir, wells, pumping stations, etc., are
general improvements which nnist be pdid lor by general taxation,
while the laying of main lines along streets is a local improvement which
may be financed by special assessment or taxation. (Hughes v. Clity of
Momence, 163 111. 535 (1896).)
The most important constitutional questions with regard to local
improvements lie in the area of financing. Three methods of financing
are authorized by Section 9: (1) special assessment, (2) special taxation
of contiguous property, and (3) general taxation within the "or other-
wise" provision. General taxation needs no attention here, since the
principles governing it in regard to local improvements are no different
from those in any other taxing problem. Special assessment and special
taxation must be distinguished. In either case, the city passes an ordinance
describing the improvement to be made and specifying the method of
financing. In the case of special assessment, each piece of affected
property is individually assessed to determine the increase in market
value conferred upon it by the improvement, and the cost of the im-
provement is apportioned among the properties in relation to these
benefits. In no case may the charge on the property exceed the actual
value of the benefits, and the determination of this value is subject to
the right of trial by jury and judicial review. Where the method of
financing is by special taxation, the municipality determines in advance
and declares in the ordinance the method of apportioning the cost. The
most common way of doing this is by foot frontage on the improvement.
In this case, the determination of benefits and costs by the city is con-
clusive and there is no right of judicial review, except on due process
grounds. (Kuehner v. City of Freeport, 143 111. 92 (1892).) It has been
held that a statute passed in 1897 giving the right of review in cases of
special taxation did not abolish the distinction between the t^\o methods
(see 111. Rev. Stat. ch. 24, ^59-2-41 (1967)); it merely required
that the
special tax not exceed the benefits actually conferred, which question
is subject to review. l)ut it does not require that the tax be in proportion
to the benefit conferred, and the ordinance itself is prima facie evidence
of the benefit. (City of Nokomis v. Zepp, 246 111. 159 (1910); Pfeiffer v.
People ex rel. McCormick, 170 111. 347 (1897).) Special taxation is
limited
to property contiguous to the improvement, while special
assessment
is made of all property benefitted, whether or not contiguous. (Guild
v. City of Chicago, 82 111. 472 (1876).)
In financing local improvements, municipalities may combine either
special assessment or special taxation with general taxation
for part of
the costs, and indeed this combination is often necessary in the case of
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special assessments because the cost of the improvement may exceed the
specific benefits to individual property. But special taxation and special
assessment may not be combined, since this would be an unequal and
unfair discrimination among taxpayers paying for the same improve-
ment. (Kuehner v. City of Freeport, 143 111. 92 (1892).) However, while
combination methods of financing are permitted, once the decision is
made on how the improvement is to be financed and is prescribed by
ordinance, the municipality cannot later change its mind and adopt
another method, at least after the project has been completed. The
City of Chicago issued local improvement bonds which were to be paid
for out of the proceeds of a special assessment. When it subsequently
appeared that delays in collection of the assessment would prevent pay-
ment of the bonds on time, the city purchased the bonds out of its
general funds, making provisions to reimburse itself out of the final
assessment collections. The city argued that this action was justified
because it had the power to finance the improvement by combining both
special assessment and general taxation. The Court held that the proced-
ure was unconstitutional because it was unfair to the property owners
who had already paid their assessments in full. (City of Chicago v. Brede,
218 111. 528 (1905).) The Court's reasoning in this case seems clearly
erroneous. So far as property owners who pay their assessments in full
are concerned, it is immaterial to their position of equality whether
nonpaying owners default on the obligation to the bondholders or on an
obligation to the general fund of the city; it is a default in either case,
and this decision affords the paying owner no protection whatsoever in
that regard. Furthermore, the collection remedy in the case of either
obligation is the same
—
levy and execution on the assessed property in
default. Thus the question resolves itself to whether the bonds will be
paid on time, with the city ultimately reimbursing itself for costs and
interest and a consequent saving of its financial rating, or whether they
must be dishonored, with a consequent impairment of the city's borrow-
ing power even though they would eventually be paid.
In addition to combining methods of financing a local improvement,
it is within the power of a municipality to make local improvements,
such as the laying of sewer lines, in one part of the city by general taxa-
tion and in another part by special assessment or special taxation.
(Murphy v. People ex rel. Weiennett, 120 111. 234 (1887).) This is com-
monly done, for example, in street lighting where major traffic arteries
are lit by general taxation while residential areas are lit by one of the
special methods.
The other major division of municipal taxing powers is the authority
to levy general property taxes for corporate purposes. Since this section
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j-equires that such power can be vested only in corporate authorities,
the initial problem in this area is the definition ol "corporate authori-
ties." The general rule is that corporate authorities are those officers
whom the people have elected or to whose manner ot ajjpointment they
have assented. Thus where the original charter of a park district organ-
ized by election of the voters of the district specified the appointment of
commissioners to be by the judge ot the circuit court, the legislature
could not later change the method ol appointment without the consent
of the voters. That would be vesting the taxing power in other than
corporate authorities. (Cornell v. People ex rel. Walsh, 107 111. 372
(1883).) Officers can be corporate authorities only of territory imder
their jurisdiction; thus where territory is detached from the school dis-
trict, the school board is no longer a corporate authority of that territory
and cannot levy taxes on it even for indebtedness incurred while the
territory was part of the corporation. (People ex rel. Bergan v. New York
Cent. R.R., 390 111. 30 111. (1945).)
The difficult question is what constitutes an exercise of taxing
power by a particular body. It is clear that the power to create a debt is
the equivalent of the power to tax. A municipal corporation cannot be
empowered to undertake projects for its own corporate purposes and
then charge the cost of those projects to another municipality. For ex-
ample, a drainage district had the authority to build bridges to connect
adjacent land to public highways where they were separated by a drain-
age ditch. The cost of the bridges was to come from the road and bridge
fund of the town. This was held unconstitutional because it vested tax-
ing powers of the town in other than the corporate authorities. (Morgan
v. Schusselle, 228 111. 106 (1907).) This situation should be distinguished
from one in which municipal corporations jointly undertake projects
where the participation of each is not compulsory. Projects of one muni-
cipal corporation may be entirely financed by the taxes of another, so
long as the taxing municipality determines voluntarily the extent of its
financial participation. For example, the Land Clearance Commission, a
corporation which had the power to create its own debts and could be
sued, was authorized to acquire land for slum clearance. It had no taxing
power and its finances were obtained from taxes of the City of Chicago
and state matching grants. This was held not to vest the taxing power
of the city in other than corporate authorities, because the city itself
determined the extent of its appropriations to the commission. (People
ex rel. Tuohy v. City of Chicago, 339 111. 551 (1948). Compare People
ex rel. Gallenbach v. Franklin, 338 111. 560 (1944) xvith McFarlane v.
Hotz, 401 III. 506 (1948).)
Taxes levied by corporate authorities must be for corporate purposes.
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With one significant exception, the Supreme Court has not interpreted
this provision to impose any substantial restriction on municipalities. A
tax for corporate purposes is one which promotes the general prosperity
and welfare of the municipality which levies it; it must be germane to
the objects of the creation of the municipal corporation. A tax levied
by the city for civil defense purposes meets this test. (People v. City of
Chicago, 413 111. 83 (1952).)
The two significant cases, in which the requirement that taxes must
be for corporate purposes was held to invalidate municipal levies,
both involved attempts to maintain credit ratings of Chicago. In order
to understand the more important of these decisions, it is necessary
to explain the use of tax anticipation warrants as a method of financing
local governments prior to actual collection of a levied tax. A full dis-
cussion of this problem can be found in Section 12. {Infra, p. 484.) Here
it is sufficient to note that the warrants are interest-bearing "i.o.u.'s"
issued by the municipality following the levy of a tax and payable only
from the receipts of that particular tax. These warrants have been held
not to be a debt of the municipality and therefore not to be com-
puted in determining debt limits under Section 12. However, it is
obvious that if a city were to default on the warrants, its future ability
to borrow, either by the issuance of warrants or bonds, would be sub-
stantially impaired. Such a situation occurred in 1929 when the City of
Chicago issued warrants in the amount of 60 per cent of anticipated tax
revenues. A reassessment of property in the interval between levy and
collection, coupled with the effects of the economic depression, caused
the actual tax receipts to be wholly inadequate for payment of the
warrants. The resulting default on the 1929 warrants made it practically
impossible to find buyers for warrants in ensuing years; and the city,
especially in its school system, was virtually bankrupt. In an attempt to
remedy the situation, the city issued bonds to- redeem the outstanding
warrants. However, the Supreme Court invalidated the bond issue, hold-
ing the enabling statute unconstitutional on the grounds that since the
warrants were not a debt which could be enforced against the city, the
issuance of bonds to pay them was not for a corporate purpose. (Berman
V. Board of Education, 360 111. 535 (1935).). This position was reinforced
a few years later when it was held that bonds could not be issued to pay
outstanding judgments against the city, where the judgments repre-
sented actions on the warrants. (Leviton v. Board of Educ, 374 111. 594
(1940). See Comment "Judicial Treatment of Tax Anticipation Warrants
in Illinois," 45 111. L. Rev. 653 (1950).) A similar situation occurred where
Chicago attempted to pay local improvement bonds out of its general
funds, when it appeared that the collection of the special assessment to
pay the bonds would be delayed. It was held that since the bonds on
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their lace specified liability only out ol ihe special assessment, payment
out of the general luncl was not tor a corporate purpose even if it would
ultimately be reimbursed. (City of Chicago v. Brede, 218 111. 528 (1905).)
In each oi these cases, the Court seemed to be unconcerned with the
financial facts of life. Maintenance of a numicipality's credit rating
should be a valid corporate j^urpose, and no protection whatsoever is
offered to a taxpayer by preventing such transactions.
Comparative Analysis
Six other states have constitutional provisions similar to this section.
Another 1 1 states have one section which combines the substance of
Sections 9 and 10 of the Illinois Constitution. The Model State Consti-
tution contains no similar provision.
Comment
What action is taken on this section depends, in large part, upon deci-
sions made in two other areas of constitutional revision — home rule for
local governments, and the taxing powers of the General Assembly. If
significant reforms are adopted in the area of local self-government per-
mitting extensive home rule, the taxing powers necessary to implement
such government should be included in those provisions. Of course, to
be consistent with the principles of home rule, such powers should be
substantially independent of legislative control. If home rule is not in-
corporated into tlie new Constitution, then the taxing powers of local
governments would rest on the same relationship to state government
as exists now — i.e., they are derived solely from grants by the state
legislatvne, subject to whatever restrictions are imposed on that body by
the Constitution. If it is decided to leave the legislature substantially
unrestricted in matters of fiscal policy, then the need for a section such
as this would be minimal. But if substantial restrictions are imposed on
the legislature, then consideration must be given to the relationship of
these restrictions to the needs of local governments for taxing authority.
If a special provision relating to local taxation is included, several
alternatives may be pursued. One would be simply to give the legislature
broad authority to vest local governments with such taxing authority as
may be needed. Another would be to adopt a more restrictive provi-
sion such as the present section, making some attempt to ameliorate the
specific problems inherent in the present section. Still another would be
the recommendation of the Chicago Home Rule Commission that
authorization be requested of the legislature either for a permissive tax
statute listing a series of tax powers, with authority in the city govern-
ment to levy any or all of the taxes specified, or, alternatively, power to
levy one or more, but less than all, of the taxes specified. (Chicago Home
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Rule Commission, Modernizing A City Government 327-28 (1954).)
Among the more serious problems of this section, the most numerous
are those pertaining to the making of local improvements. The restricted
list of governments permitted to make local improvements should be
changed to allow any municipality to undertake such projects so long
as they are consistent with its governmental functions. Joint participa-
tion in the construction of local improvements by two or more munici-
palities should be permitted. Consideration could be given to removing
the restriction that special taxation be limited to contiguous property,
thereby allowing special taxation for projects benefitting more than
contiguous property. Finally, attention should be given to the possibility
of allowing methods of financing local improvements other than special
assessment, special taxation, or general taxation
— for example, user
charges.
In the area of general property taxation, two questions are of primary
concern. The uniformity requirement of this section is subject to all the
problems and defects discussed above in relation to Section 1. Also, the
maintenance of confidence in the financial integrity of local governments
should be recognized as a valid "corporate purpose" for which taxes
could be levied, thus avoiding, for example, the rigid treatment of tax
anticipation warrants.
In the last analysis, consideration may well be given to the repeal of
this section in its entirety, leaving the resolution of tax authority for
local purposes to legislative judgment, where in fact it largely rests
anyway.
Municipal Taxation
Sec. 10. The General Assembly shall not impose taxes upon muncipal cor-
porations, or the inhabitants or property thereof, for corporate purposes, but
shall require that all the taxable property within the limits of municipal cor-
porations shall be taxed for the payment of debts contracted under authority
of law, such taxes to be uniform in respect to persons and property, within the
jurisdiction of the body imposing the same. Private property shall not be liable
to be taken or sold for the payment of the corporate debt of a municipal cor-
poration.
History
Section 5 of the 1848 Constitution contained the provision that
property shall be taxed for the payment of debts contracted by muni-
cipalities under authority of law. Apart from this provision, this section
is a product of the 1870 Constitution. Although the section was adopted
without debate or explanation, it has generated considerable litigation.
The 1922 Convention proposal retained the essence of this section,
with a minimum of debate.
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Explanation
The two most important questions which arise under this section are
what constitutes the imposition ol ;i tax by the legislature and tor what
purposes a tax may be imposed without violating this section.
The concept of the imposition ot a tax is not confined to the actual
levy. It extends to the imposition ot a debt which must be paid by
taxation and to the specification of amounts and purposes which must
be included in a municipal budget, such as the fixing of minimum
wages. (See cases discussed below in regard to the purposes of a tax.)
In exceptional cases, and where the levy of a tax is optional with
the local government, the legislature may direct the disposition of
receipts without violating this section. For example, in one case both
cities and townships were authorized to levy library taxes. When both
governments levied such taxes and the township was located within
the city, it was required to pay over to the city a proportion of its tax
collection relative to the amount of its territory in the city; the city
was required to abate its library tax by that amount. The township
contended that this was the imposition of a debt in violation of this
section, but the Court held that the requirement was valid because
it was in the township's discretion whether to levy the tax in the
first instance. (Board of Library Directors v. City of Lake Forest, 17
111. 2d 277 (1959).) Also, the creation of a cause of action against a muni-
cipality, which may or may not materialize in the future, is not the
imposition of a debt. An act of 1887, known as the Mob Law, gave a
property owner the right to collect from the city damages to his property
caused by a riot. In a suit to recover under this statute, the Court held
that there was no imposition of a debt. (City of Chicago v. Manhattan
Cement Co., 178 III. 372 (1899).) Furthermore, the Court said that even
if it were conceded to be the imposition of a debt, it would not be
prohibited by this section because it was an exercise of the general
police power of the state to promote peace and tranquility rather than
a tax for a corporate purpose of the municipality.
This last aspect of the Court's opinion raises the other important
question under this section — what kinds of taxes fall within the pro-
scription? This section prohibits the imposition of taxes for local corpo-
rate purposes; it does not prevent the imposition of taxes relating to
general governmental functions of the state which may be delegated to
and required of a municipality. Municipalities are subdivisions of the
state and may be required to perform functions related to the admini-
stration of general public policy as well as their own local functions.
Thus, for example, general elections are part of the welfare and security
of the state, and municipalities may be required to bear the expense
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of them even if they are not directly benefitted by the elections.
(People ex rel. Sanitary Dist. v. Schlaeger, 391 111. 314 (1945).) Even
the special corporate purpose of a municipality may be so related to
the public welfare that the state may require the municipality to per-
form its duties more thoroughly though this results in an increase in
taxes. A sanitary district's obsolete facilities resulted in raw sewage
being discharged into a river. A district referendum held in 1957 to
authorize the issue of bonds for modernization was defeated. There-
upon, a private party sued the sanitary district, charging that the pollu-
tion was a nuisance and seeking an order of abatement. If such an order
was issued, then a statute permitted the district to issue bonds without
a referendum in order to comply. The district defended the suit on
the grounds that this constituted the imposition of a debt by the state
for a local corporate purpose. The Court held that the treatment of
sewage was directly related to the health and welfare of the public, and
that a municipal corporation could be required to perform that duty
adequately, even when this resulted in additional taxes. (Ruth v.
Aurora Sanitary Dist., 17 111. 2d 11 (1959).)
In nearly all cases which have challenged a statute under this section,
the Court has upheld the law on this ground that it relates to the general
welfare of the state rather than to a local corporate purpose. There are
some cases, however, in which the application of the principle appears
to be inconsistent. Usually these cases involve a construction of this
section in conjunction with the provision of Section 9 prohibiting the
granting of taxing powers to other than corporate authorities. Hefjner
V. Cass ir Morgan Comities (193 111. 439 (1901)) concerned an action
in trespass against a drainage district which had removed a bridge
across a road while constructing a ditch. The complaining counties
sought damages in the amount of the cost of replacing the bridge.
The drainage district relied on a statutory provision which required the
counties to replace the bridge at their own cost. The Court accepted
this defense, holding that the statute was not a violation of this section
because the construction and maintenance of bridges was a general
public purpose of the state, and not a local corporate purpose. How-
ever, in a later case on the same issue, the Court overruled the Heffner
case and held that such a procedure violated Section 9, vesting taxing
power in other than corporate authorities, as well as Section 10 because
it imposed a debt without consent. (People ex rel. Burow v. Block,
276 111. 286 (1916).) But in a still later case, the Court held that the
legislature can compel counties to contribute to the cost of constructing
bridges near the county line, even though the bridge is located wholly
within the one county which undertakes the construction. The Coiat
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again adopted the rationale that this was for a general piibHc purpose
not ])rohibited by Section 10, and rclictl in pait on the presumably
overriUed Heffuer case. (County ol Staik \. County ol Henry, H26 111.
535 (1927).)
Another situation in which Section 9 has caused confusion in con-
junction Avith Section 10 is the fixing of compensation for municipal
employees, it has been clearly established that prescription of minimum
wages, while it does impose a debt, does not violate Section 10 because
it is for a general public purpose. (Sec, e.g., Peojjle ex rel. Cannon v.
City of Chicago, 351 111. .H96 (1933) (minimum salary for probation
officers): People ex rel. Moshier v. City of Springfield, 370 111. 541 (1939)
(minimum salary for firemen).) There ha\e also been a number of
cases upholding, ioi the same reason, statutes requiring municipal con-
tribution to retirement funds. (See, e.g., Board of Trustees v. Com-
missioners of Lincoln Park, 282 111. 348 (1918) (pension fund for park
policemen); Peoj)le ex rel. Nelson v. Jackson-Highland Hldg. Corp.,
400 111. 533 (1948) (teachers' retirement fund).) However, in one case
the Court invalidated a system set up to administer a firemen's retire-
ment fimd on the ground that it violated Section 9. (People ex rel.
Callenbach v. Franklin, 388 111. 560 (1944).) Although the issue seems
to correspond with the Lincoln Park case above, the Court simply dis-
missed that case as not being in point. In any event, the bridge cases,
together with these retirement fund cases, illustrate the confusion which
sometimes arises when Sections 9 and 10 are construed together.
In the area of curative tax legislation, this section has caused serious
difficulties for municipal taxing authorities. In order to pass a valid tax
ordinance, municipal authorities must comply with statutory require-
ments which are exceedingly complex. These requirements range from
the very fundamental, such as what authorities may levy taxes, to the
rather trivial, such as tlie manner of publication of an ordinance; and the
statutory prescriptions are subject to constant change. Mistakes in this
situation are inevitably made, most of them of a minor nature which do
not affect the basic issues of the fairness of the tax or the important pro-
cedures employed in the levy. In most states, as well as in the federal gov-
ernment, such mistakes can be corrected by cmative tax statutes so as to
validate the tax. In Illinois, however, a number of such validation efforts
have been held to violate this section, with the result that municipalities
are often faced with serious losses of revenue, ft is difficult, if not impos-
sible, to reconcile all the cases, many of which have sustained curative
legislation. The general rationale is that the legislature may validate a de-
tective exercise of power but cannot remedy a total absence of power. For
a statement of this position, see People ex rel. ]Vard v. Chicago ir E. III.
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Ry., (365 III. 202 (1936)). In that case, a county board was directed by
statute to make its tax levy tor the year in September. It did not make the
levy until December, and the legislature attempted to validate the levy
after it had been made. The Court held that the county board had no
power to make the levy in December, and the curative act could not vali-
date the levy without violating this section. It is again emphasized that
the procedures under attack are not usually ot a nature that go to the
fundamental fairness of a tax; serious abuse of the taxing power can
and should be prevented by the due process clause. What may be needed,
perhaps, is greater power to pass curative tax statutes in those cases where
the defect in the exercise of the taxing power is insubstantial and not
prejudicial. The cases in the area are voluminous, and it would not be
particularly helpful to detail the complexities of the litigation. Two good
sources which deal with the problem in detail are Comment, "Curative
Tax Legislation," 32 111. L. Rev. 456 (1937) and Blomquist, "Effect of
Curative Statutes on Taxation in Illinois," 27 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 211
(1949).
There are several minor points in this section which may be dealt
with briefly. The last sentence specifying that private property may not
be taken in payment of corporate debts has not been a cause of litiga-
tion; the principle is so well settled that it would seem not to necessitate
an express constitutional statement. The clause in the first sentence
requiring property to be taxed for the payment of debts was last con-
strued in 1873; that case held that the General Assembly could require
the State Auditor to levy taxes on property in towns which had sub-
scribed to railroad stock in order to pay the bonds funding the sub-
scription. (Decker v. Hughes, 68 111. 33 (1873).) The clause does not
seem to be of much contemporary utility. There was a dictum in another
early case that this Section 10 does not apply to counties and town-
ships (Wetherell v. Devine, 116 111. 632 (1886)); and this point was
commented on favorably in a more recent case (People ex rel. Lind-
heimer v. Gaylord Bldg. Corp., 369 111. 371 (1938)). However, that is
contrary to a prior holding of the Supreme Court (Sleight v. People,
74 111. 47 (1874)); and in nearly all subsequent cases in which this issue
could have been raised, the Court apparently preferred to rely on the
general principles discussed above rather than on a distinction in the
type of governmental unit.
Comparative Analysis
As noted above, nine states have constitutional provisions which
combine the essential provisions of Sections 9 and 10. Only one state
appears to have a separate section comparable to Section 10. The Model
State Constitution contains no comparable section.
474 Art. IX, § 11
Comment
The useiulness of this section is doubtful and it could well be elimi-
nated. To the extent that it merely reinforces the recjuirement of Section
9 (that taxing power for local corporate purposes is vested only in
corporate authorities), it is superfluous; and there are many situations
in which its relationship to Section 9 has caused considerable confusion.
Given the nebulous, perhaps even nonexistent, distinction between a
purely local corporate purpose and a purpose of general state concern,
the section seems to deal with what is largely an anachronism. The one
situation in which this section has exerted an independent influence —
in curative tax statutes — has occasionally caused undesirable results and
should be corrected. Two of its requirements, that the legislatine require
property to be taxed for the payment of debts and that private property
not be taken for the payment of corporate debts, have not been the
subject of significant litigation. They, surely, can be safely repealed.
Municipal Officers — Defaults— Compensation
Sec. II. No person who is in default, as collector or custodian of money or
property belonging to a municipal corporation shall be eligible to any office
in or under such corporation. The fees, salary or compensation of no municipal
officer who is elected or appointed for a definite term of office, shall be increased
or diminished during such term.
History
The Schedide to the 1818 Constitution had a section comparable to
but broader than the first sentence of Section 11. The 1818 section said
that no sheriff or collector of public moneys in default was eligible "to
any office in this State." This prohibition was moved to the Legislative
Article of the 1848 Constitution and rephrased to cover a seat in the
legislature and "any office of profit or trust in this State." (See Art.
IV, Sec. 4, supra, p. 127.) Neither of the earlier Constitutions contained
a provision comparable to the second sentence of Section 11.
Section 11 was offered to the 1870 Convention as two separate sections,
each of which was modified slightly in the Committee of the Whole.
Apart from a discussion of technical modifications, there was no debate.
They were combined into one section by the Committee on Revision
and Adjustment and placed in the Revenue Article, presumably because
there was no other place to put it.
In the proposed 1922 Constitution, the section was split in two and
placed in an article on Public Servants. In both cases, the section was
an amalgam of several sections dealing with the same subject matter.
In the one case, the section included matter from Sections 3 and 4 of
Article IV and the first sentence of Section 11; in the other case, one
section on increasing or diminishing compensation covered a principle
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expressed in some eight different sections of the 1870 Constitution.
(Sections 21 and 22 ot Article IV; Section 23 of Article 5; Sections 7,
16, and 25 of the original Article VI; Section 10 of Article X; and this
Section 11.)
Explanation
Default: The first sentence of this section is probably redundant be-
cause it seems unlikely that any situation would arise that is not covered
by the broader language of Section 4 of Article IV. (Supra, p. 127.) In
any event, no question appears to have arisen under this sentence.
Compensation: The courts decided long ago that this section was to
be the catchall for prohibiting salary increases and decreases. As noted
above in the History, therfe were originally seven other sections in the
Constitution that expressed the principle that those "officers" elected
or appointed for a definite term should neither receive an increase in
compensation nor suffer a decrease. (See Comment below for a dis-
cussion of the broad principle.) Whatever the meaning of "municipal
officers" in the minds of the delegates to the 1870 Convention, the courts
decided the words were "intended to include all officers not specifically
mentioned in other provisions of the constitution, occupying offices
created by the laws of the State in and for any of xhe political subdivi-
sions of the State . . . ." (Wolf v. Hope, 210 111. 50, 61 (1904).) Con-
sequently, all sorts of positions not normally thought of as "municipal
officers" are covered by Section 11. (See People ex rel. Judge v. Board
of Comm'rs, 260 111. 345 (1913) (board of election commissioners);
People v. Williams, 232 111. 519 (1908) (state's attorneys); Wolf v. Hope,
210 111. 50 (1904) (city judge); Jimison v. Adams County, 130 111. 558
(1899) (county superintendent of schools); County of Cook v. Sennott,
136 111. 314 (1891) (probate court clerks).) On various occasions, the
Attorney General has followed the catchall approach of the courts. {See
1926 111. Att'y Gen. Rep. 123 (county highway superintendent); 1915
111. Att'y Gen. Rep. 318 (county oil inspector); 1912 111. Att'y Gen.
Rep. 447 (county commissioners); 1912 111. Att'y Gen. Rep. 564 (county
commissioners); 1910 111. Att'y Gen. Rep. 900 (drainage commissioners).)
Apart from the all-inclusive construction given to this section, the
courts have generally drawn routine lines within its bounds. Thus, re-
imbursement of expenses would not be an increase in compensation,
but pinporting to fix a sum in lieu of audited expenses would be.
(Peabody v. Forest Preserve Dist., 320 111. 454 (1926).) An "officer"
who holds his position at the pleasure of a superior can, of course, re-
ceive a salary increase or suffer a decrease. (Village of Forest Park
V. Collis, 329 111. App. 273 (1946) (village attorney); Morgan v. County
of DuPage, 371 111. 53 (1939) (assistant county superintendent of
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schools).) A statutory classification ot salaries tied to federal census
figures does not run aloul ol Section 1 1 11, alter a census, an officer's
salary is cut Ixcausc his county dropped in j)opulation. (Brissenden
V. Howlett, 30 HI. 2d 247 (1964).) The same rule would apply to a salary
increase, init presumably no taxpayer has sued to j)rc\xiu the increased
payment. The pesky problem ol j)cnsions, discussed more lully in con-
nection \\ith Section 19 ol Article I\' (supra, pp. 19.')-r)), has shown
up here. Pensions are valid under this section. (DeWoll v. Rowley, 355
111. 530 (1934); People ex rd. Kroner v. Abbott, 274 111. 380 (1916).)
One problem has arisen under this section that shoidd delight a law
professor and anyone else interested in the finer weaving of judicial
logic. The president of a \illagc board, serving without compensation,
was reelected, following which his board adopted an ordinance fixing
his compensation at .$2,000 per year retroactive a few months to the
beginning of his new term. The Supreme Court said he could not be
paid. (Baumrucker v. Brink, 373 111. 82 (1939).) One judge dissented
on the ground that many years earlier the Supreme Court had held
that to create a salary w4iere none had existed before was not an increase.
In reply, the majority opinion simply said that the earlier case arose
under Section 10 of Article X (infra, p. 509), and this case arose under
Section 11 of Article IX, a distinction which the dissenting judge could
not comprehend.
Comparative Analysis
Default: See Coinparative Analysis of Section 4 of Article IV. (Supra,
p. 129.)
Compensation: Only a few states appear to have a comparable pro-
vision. Alabama prohibits increases or decreases during the term of an
incumbent, Missouri prohibits an increase, Louisiana prohibits a de-
crease, and Kentucky and Washington say that compensation may not
be changed. California says no increase, except (1) during wartime by
two-thirds' vote of the legislature, or (2) in the case of a board or com-
mission, the members of which are chosen for staggered terms, w4ien one
or more members becomes eligible for an increase at the beginning of
his term. The Model State Constitution is silent on the subject of
compensation.
Comment
There are two simple principles involved in this increase or decrease in
salary business, but in the welter of litigation the principles sometimes
seem to be forgotten. One principle is that the man ^vho determines
the amount of a salary should not be allo^ved to use that power to
influence someone who is not responsible to him. Thus, it is appro-
priate — indeed, essential — to prohibit decreases in salaries of judges, for
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that could destroy the independence of the judiciary. If judges are
appointed or elected for relatively short terms, a prohibition of an
increase is acceptable, but, particularly today, if the terms are longer
than four years, even a "normal" increase in the cost of living results in
a salary cut. (Note that United States judges are appointed for life,
and the United States Constitution prohibits only a salary cut for them,
whereas the salai-y of the President may be neither increased nor de-
creased during his four-year term. Note also that under Section 17 of
Article VI, salaries may be increased but not diminished during the
judicial term of office, whereas under the 1870 Constitution, salaries
could be neither increased nor diminished. See History and Explanation
of Sec. 17 of Art. VI, supra, pp. 370-2.)
Where compensation is set by a legislative body for executive and
administrative officials, the principle is applicable to any officials who
are elected by the voters, for under the theory of separation of powers, the
fact of election means that they are supposed to be independent of the leg-
islature. The principle is not applicable in the case of appointed officials
who are answerable to an elected official. Notwithstanding the theo-
retical possibility that, for example, the legislature might try to influence
the Governor by decreasing the salaries of stenographers so low that
he could find no one to type his letters, in general such pressure is
sufficiently remote that the danger is outweighed by the need for flexi-
bility in adjusting salaries. The close question of principle is the case
of officials appointed for a term of years where the purpose of the term
of years is to make them independent. If there were a policy that
independence would be the only reason for having a set term for an
appointive position, the inclusion of such appointive positions in a
constitutional prohibition on increases and decreases in compensation
would make sense. The very fact that the foregoing sentence is in the
subjunctive suggests the weakness in the theory, for a constitutional
prohibition ought not to rest on an assumption that people will follow
a policy that is not mandatory.
The second principle is that a man ought not to be able to increase
his own salary. Thus, it is appropriate to prohibit those people who
make appropriations — legislators, supervisors,, commissioners, council-
men, aldermen — from increasing their own salaries during the term for
which they are elected.
The foregoing, by implication, rejects two other arguments in support
of a no increase or decrease in pay provision. One is the argument that
a man running for office, or accepting an appointment, ought to know
definitely what his remuneration will be. The other is the argument —
probably the one uppermost in the minds of the delegates to the 1870
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Convention — that il kit alone, government officials will raid the treasury.
This may very well have been a problem in the middle of the Nine-
teenth Century. In today's complex world, there are problems galore
in finding money enough in the treasury to do all the things people
desire of their government. The amount of money saved by an unneces-
sarily broad constitutional prohibition on salary increases is a drop in
the bucket.
Limitation of Municipal Indebtedness— Debt Retirement
Sec. 12. No county, city, township, school district or other municipal cor-
poration, shall be allowed to become indebted in any manner or for any purpose,
to an amount, including existing indebtedness, in the aggregate exceeding five
per centum on the value of the taxable property therein, to be ascertained by
the last assessment for state and county taxes, previous to the incurring of such
indebtedness. Any county, city, school district, or other municipal corporation,
incurring any indebtedness as aforesaid, shall before, or at the time of doing
so, provide for the collection of a direct annual tax sufficient to pay the interest
on such debt as it falls due, and also to pay and discharge the principal thereof
within twenty years from the time of contracting the same.
This section shall not be construed to prevent any county, city, township,
school district, or other municipal corporation, from issuing their bonds in
compliance with any vote of the people which may have been had prior to tiie
adoption of this constitution in pursuance of any law providing therefor.
History
This section limiting municipal indebtedness was new in the 1870
Constitution. The reasons for its adoption are not entirely clear from
the debates, but apparently the main concern was over the large debts
which had been incurred by counties anci municipahties for subscrip-
tions to railroad stock. The issue of railroad debts was a very heated
one at this Convention and was reflected not only in the debates on this
section, but also in those on Section 6 (see discussion, supra, pp. 454-5)
and on the Separate Section on loaning municipal credit to private corpo-
rations see discussion, infra, p. 576). There was evidenced a considerable
downstate feeling that Chicago was attempting to impose these restric-
tions to prevent those areas from getting railroads. In any event, the pro-
ponents of this section advocated the view that excessive indebtedness
led to high taxes and that a restriction on debt-incurring power would
serve as a means of limiting taxes. Opponents of the section argued that
the people should have the right to determine their own indebtedness.
Several amendments were offered changing the amount of the limit, but
all were defeated. As originally proposed, the limitation for retirement
of the debt was ten years; this was amended to 20 years with little debate.
The saving clause for the existing debt was added to the committee
report for purposes of clarity. Many Convention members felt that the
section was so controversial that its inclusion would endanger the whole
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Constitution. They unsuccessfully advocated that it be submitted as a
separate section.
The proposed 1922 Constitution made several changes in this section.
Counties, towns, and school districts retained the 5 per cent limit, but
other municipal corporations had a 6 per cent debt limit. The mandatory
tax to retire the debt in 20 years was to be levied in "substantially equal
annual installments," except that provision could be made to retire it
before maturity. The last sentence of the secction was omitted as obso-
lete. Also, because of the extensive special provisions which were made
for Chicago and Cook County, the section did not apply to them. As to
the special sections on Cook County and the municipalities within it,
their debt limit was to be 7 per cent of assessed value. If the municipali-
ties undertook consolidation as provided for, then the limit was to be
7 per cent of the full value of real property.
Most of the debate on debt limits in the 1920-1922 Convention was
devoted to the problems of Chicago. Debate was minimal on the more
general provisions. The requirement that the tax to retire the debt be
levied in substantially equal annual installments was inserted to prevent
the practice which had become prevalent of deferring payments on the
principal until close to the bonds' maturity dates, and then refunding
them upon maturity. It is entirely unclear from the Proceedings how
or why the debt limit for "other municipal corporations" was raised to
6 per cent. The original committee report proposed the 5 per cent limit.
Possibly the change represented a compromise resulting from the defeat
of another proposal authorizing cities to issue utility bonds in the amount
of 15 per cent of assessed value, the bonds to be paid for out of revenue
from the utilities.
Explanation
The limitations of this section apply only to municipal corporations
which are local governmental units; they do not apply to administrative
units of the state government which have state-wide jurisdictions.
(People V. Illinois Toll Highway Comm'n, 3 111. 2d 218 (1954).) This
section limits the powers of the General Assembly in one respect
— it
cannot authorize a debt for a municipal corporation in excess of 5 per cent
of assessed valuation. However, in creating those corporations, it may
specify a limit under 5 per cent and may increase or decrease that limit
without the consent of the voters of the municipality. (People ex rel.
Adamowski v. Metropolitan Sanitary Dist., 14 111. 2d 271 (1958).) There is
a further indirect limitation on the power of the General Assembly to
control the taxing authority of municipal corporations. Since the section
requires the levy of a tax sufficient to pay bonded indebtedness, the
General Assembly may not restrict the taxing power so as to make this
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requirement impossible to meet. (See the discussion below in respect to
the necessity to levy a tax.) This section in no way restricts the General
Assembly in fixing the assessment ratio for pinjjoses of taxation. In fact,
it has been a not unusual practice for the General Assembly to increase
assessment ratios while at the same time adjusting tax rates so that no
more revenue is produced, the sole purpose of the change being to in-
crease the fjorrowing power of numicipalities. (People ^.v rel. Camjje v.
Board of Review, 290 111. 467 (1919).)
Although the language of this section is negative, it has been inici-
preted as conferring upon numicipalities the power to borrow money,
at least in the absence of any statutory restriction. The City of Chicago
extended taxes to pay for general expenses up to the statutory limit.
This left a budget deficit of $8,000,000, and the city issued bonds to
cover this amount. The bond issue was attacked by taxpayers as being
without statutory authority and merely a scheme to get around the tax
rate limit. The Court held, however, that the city could borrow money
under this section for whatever corporate purposes it desired so long as
the constitutional limit was not exceeded. (People ex rel. Carr. v.
Chicago &: N.W. Ry., 308 111. 54 (1923).) This section does not restrict
the power of municipalities to levy taxes. Where a school district issued
bonds up to the constitutional limit and the proceeds were not sufficient
to complete the building, it was proper for the district to levy taxes up
to the statutory maximum in order to finish it. (People ex rel. Trobaugh
V. Chicago &: T.R.R., 223 111. 448 (1906).)
It was clearly understood by the 1870 Convention that this section
was a limitation only on the indebtedness of municipal corporations,
and was not a limitation of the amount of indebtedness as applied to
particular property within those corporations. Thus it was frequently
pointed out in the debates on this section that although municipalities
had a 5 per cent debt limit, property itself might bear a municipal debt of
20 per cent if all of the enumerated governments incurred the maximum
debt. What the Convention probably did not foresee was the extent to
which this section would encourage the creation of numerous overlapping
municipal corporations, each with a limited function, in order to evade
the debt limitations. The Supreme Court sanctioned this trend in an
early decision which held that functions which ordinarily w'ere per-
formed by the city (in this case, construction and maintenance of a
sewer system) could be vested in an independent mimicipal corporation
which would have its own taxing powers and debt limit. (Wilson v. Board
of Trustees, 133 111. 443 (1890).) In many cases, the proliferation of over-
lapping municipalities, particularly of school districts, led to extremely
inefficient administration. Efforts to effect consolidation were hampered
by problems of distributing existing debt between the old and new dis-
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tricts and required continuous legislative supervision. (For a thorough
treatment of this problem in relation to school consolidation, see
McLain v. Phelps, 409 111. 393 (1951); People ex rel. Community High
School Dist. V. Hupe, 2 111. 2d 434 (1954). See also Kocsis v. Chicago Park
Dist., 363 111. 24 (1935).)
The problem of ascertaining the limit to which a municipality may
become indebted has not created much difficulty. The SujDreme Court
originally held that the assessment value to be used as the basis for
the 5 per cent limit was that of the county board of review, not the State
Board of Equalization. (People ex rel. Standerfer v. Hamill, 134 111. 666
(1888).) However, four years later, without reference to the Hamill case,
the Court held that the state's ecjualized value was the proper base, and
this rule has since been followed. (Wabash R.R. v. People ex rel. Reed,
202 111. 9 (1903).) For purposes of determining the constitutionality of a
debt, the limit is figured as of the time of the incurring of the debt; thus
a subsequent drop in property assessment value does not cause a debt
that was legal when incurred to become illegal. (Kocsis v. Chicago Park
Dist., 362 111. 24 (1935).) Where there is an outstanding debt, a sinking
fund which may by law be applied only to the reduction of that debt
may be set off against that debt tor purposes of determining the amount
of additional debt which may be incurred. (People ex rel. Lindeheimer
v. Hamilton, 373 111. 124 (1940).) But general funds in the treasury may
not be set off against the debt limit, since the question is one of indebted-
ness, not insolvency. (City of Chicago v. McDonald, 176 111. 404 (1898).)
Municipal obligations may take a wide variety of forms and may be
incurred in many ways. For purposes of analyzing the effect of this sec-
tion, these obligations may be divided into three classifications. First
are those obligations which are voluntarily assumed and for which the
general credit of the municipality is pledged; such obligations are debts
within the limits of this section and may not be incurred in excess of
the constitutional limit. The second classification includes obligations
for which the general credit of the municipality is liable, but which
are not voluntarily assumed; these are debts for purposes of determining
the limit to which further indebtedness may be voluntarily incurred,
but this section is not a bar to their incurrence by the municipality.
The final classification includes a group of obligations which are volun-
tarily incurred by the municipality, but the municipality's liability is
substantially restricted; these obligations are not subject to any of the
restrictions of this section. Each of these classifications will be discussed
individually.
Voluntarily assumed obligations which fall within the restrictions of
this section can be of many different types. The most obvious debt which
this section sought to control is long-term, general-obligation bonded
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indebtedness, and the incurrence of such indebtedness is subject to the 5
per cent Hniit. In determining the amount ol bonds wiiich can be issued
within this limit, the amoimt ol interest which the bonds will carry is
not to be included; the 5 per cent limit applies to the principal amount
only. (Goodwine v. County ot Vermilion, 271 111. 126 (1915).) Also, con-
tracts which are to be paid tor solely out of the proceeds of bond issues are
not considered as debts; otherwise, the projects to be funded by the bonds
could not be undertaken. (Hartmann v. Pesotum Community Consol.
School Dist., 325 111. 268 (1927).) Other than this exception, long-term
contracts and leases are debts within this section; and the total amount
of the contractual liability must be included in determining the debt
limit. (People ex rel. Adamowski v. Public Bldg. Comm'n, 11 111. 2d 125
(1957) (long-term lease of space for municipal ofhces); Wade v. East Side
Levee & Sanitary Dist., 320 111. 396 (1926); Baltimore & O. Sw. R.R. v.
People ex rel. Gaston, 200 111. 541 (1903) (13-year contract with private
power company to furnish city lights culminating in purchase of power
plant).) Mortgages of municipal property are debts within this section
(City of Joliet v. Alexander, 194 111. 457 (1902)), and at one time it was
thought that this ride applied to pledges of future income from revenue-
producing municipal property (Schnell v. City of Rock Island, 232 111. 89
(1908)). However, this latter position has been overruled; see the discus-
sion below of revenue-producing projects. The public benefits assessed
against a city in a local improvement project are also debts under this
section if they are to be financed by credit; however, if they can be paid
for out of current taxes, they are not debts. (People ex rel. Toman v.
Crane, 372 111. 228 (1939).)
One of the most difficult questions was whether the liabilities for
current operating expenses of a municipality constitute debts within the
meaning of this section. Tax levies and budget appropriations are made
by the municipality at the beginning of the year, but taxes are not
actually collected until the end of the year. To carry on normal opera-
tions in the interim, unless there is a huge surplus carried over from
the prior year (a rare occurrence in municipal finance), the municipality
must rely on temporary credit in some form, either contingent contracts
or outright loans. In deciding whether such credit is a debt within this
section, the Court faced a dilemma. On the one hand, to hold it a debt
subject to the 5 per cent limit would mean that a very large number of
municipalities already indebted to the limit would simply have to
cease carrying on their governmental functions. On the other hand, if it
were not considered a debt, the opportimity would arise to carry over
such ostensibly "temporary" debt from year to year, possibly resulting in
a total indebtedness greatly in excess of the 5 per cent limit. Most states
with similar constitutional debt limits had decided that they applied only
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to long-term debts. While the 1870 Convention had not addressed itself to
this question, directly, there is considerable evidence in the debates that
these long-term debts were what it had in mind. Furthermore, this posi-
tion was buttressed by the provision requiring an annual tax sufficient
to pay off the principal and interest of the debt within 20 years; obviously
such a requirement could apply only to a long-term debt. However,
after due consideration in a series of cases, a divided Court held that
even current liabilities of a municipality were to be considered debts
within the requirements of that section. (City of Springfield v. Edwards,
84 111. 626 (1877); Law v. People ex rel. Huck, 87 111. 385 (1877);
Prince v. City of Quincy, 105 111. 138 (1882); Prince v. City of Quincy,
105, 111. 215 (1883^; City of Chicago v. McDonald, 176 111. 404 (1898).)
The harsh restilts of this conclusion on municipalities which have reached
their debt limit are mitigated to some extent by the Court's decisions
permitting tax anticipation warrants, a restricted form of short-term
borrowing. This subject is discussed below in relationship to obligations
which do not fall within this section.
There is a large group of obligations which a municipality may incur
and for which it is generally liable even though it is already indebted
beyond the 5 per cent limit. These generally may be classified as "obliga-
tions imposed by law." It is not accurate to say that these obligations do
not constitute debts within the meaning of this section, for they must be
included in the amount of existing indebtedness when determining
whether a municipality has reached its constitutional limit, and the
requirement that an annual tax be levied to pay them is also applicable.
However, they must be distinguished from ihe obligations discussed
above in that this section cannot be invoked as a bar to their aquisition
by a municipality, whereas with obligations voluntarily incurred, both
the municipality and the taxpayer have numerous remedies based on this
section by which to avoid them. (See the discussion of remedies below.)
Probably the most common kinds of obligations within this classifi-
cation are funding and refunding bonds — general obligation bonds
issued to finance unfunded debt or to refinance funded debt. Such bonds
can be issued if the underlying debt was valid when incurred, even
though at the time of issuance the debt limit has been reached. (Kocsis
V. Chicago Park Dist., 362 111. 24 (1935).) The reasoning here is that since
the underlying debts are valid and enforceable, a municipality should
not be denied rational means of retiring them, and no additional new
debt is created by the funding mechanism. For the same reason, bonds
issued to fund valid judgments are not barred by this section. (Elmhurst
Nat'l Bank v. Village of Bellwood, 372 111. 204 (1939).)
Judgments, of course, can represent a wide variety of obligations im-
posed by law, and the cases give numerous examples of these obligations.
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Municipalities are responsible lor their torts (City ol Blooniington v.
Perdue, 99 111. 329 (1881)); statutory liability may be imposed for
lailure to maintain the jjeace ((>ity ot Chicago v. Manhattan Cement
Co., 178 111. ,S72 (1899) (property damage resulting Irom riot)); and
general liability may result Irom a breach ol fiduciary duty as trustee
of a special fund (Indiana Harbor Belt R.R. v. City of Calumet City, 391
III. 280 (1945) (misaj^jMopriation of special assessment funds)). A munici-
pality may not enter into voluntary contracts which are illegal because of
this section and by collusion have them reduced to judgements to be
funded by judgment bonds. (See the discussion of remedies below.) How-
ever, where valid contracts are made, they must be jjerformed in good
faith; and where the municipality by its own fault breaches those con-
tracts, liability may still be imposed on a (jutnitinn inrriiit or contract
tlieory, whichever is appropriate, Avithout regard to this section. (City of
Chicago V. Sexton, 115 111. 230 (1885); DeLeuw, Cather R: Co. v. City of
Joliet, 327 111. App. 453 (1945).)
There is finally to be considered a group of municipal obligations
which, while they are debts in the ordinary sense of that term, are not
debts within the meaning of this section; that is, they need not be
included in determining the amount of municipal indebtedness, and there
is no constitutional limit on the amount which may be incurred. In
general, the liability of a municipality for these debts is very strictly
limited, and the rationale for excluding them is that this section was
designed to prevent property from being overburdened with taxes which
would have to be raised in order to support excessive debt. Hut where
the liability of the municipality is very strictly limited, so that creditors
cannot force a resort to general taxation in order to collect the debt,
then the reason for the restrictions of this section disappears and it
should not apply.
One of this kind of indebtedness is local improvement bonds which are
financed solely from special assessments on the property benefitted. The
theory here is that there is no taxation in the general sense, but merely
an equal exchange of values; and so long as the municipality is liable to
the bondholders only from the special assessment fund, there is no debt.
\\'^hile there appear to be no direct holdings on this subject in Illinois,
the doctrine was already established in 1870 and has been commented on
favorably in a niuiiber of cases. Indeed, the 1870 Convention itself recog-
nized that many projects which were then financed by general taxation,
and hence subject to this section, could be financed by special assessment
and escape its restrictions.
From the standpoint of municipal finances, probably the most impor-
tant form of obligation in this classification is tax anticipation warrants.
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As was noted above, taxes are levied early in the year bvit are not
collected until much later, usually the following year. In the interim,
some way must be found of paying for governmental operations. There
may be a cash surplus, or there may be enough ordinary debt-incurring
power to carry on credit transactions. But if neither of these situations
obtains, resort is usually had to tax anticipation warrants. If these
warrants conform to a strictly prescribed form, they will not be con-
sidered debts within this section. The taxes must already have been
levied for the year in question, and the warrants must clearly state on
their face that the only liability is out of the tax funds collected for
that year. If the warrants do not follow this prescription, they are
considered ordinary debts and are subject to the requirements of this
section. (City of Springfield v. Edwards, 84 111. 626 (1877); Law v.
People ex rel. Huck, 87 III. 385 (1877); Hodges v. Crowley, 186 111. 305
(1900); Holmgren v. City of Moline, 269 111. 248 (1915).)
Local improvements which are revenue-producing may be financed
by long-term contracts which pledge only the revenue from the project
in payment of the debt. At one time the Court held that only revenue
from new projects could be so pledged; to pledge revenue (which was
available to the general fund) from existing municipal property was
thought to constitute a mortgage of existing property and thus a debt.
Hence, a sewer extension could not be financed out of charges from
the existing system plus the new one. (Schnell v. City of Rock Island,
232 111. 89 (1907).) However, in a later case involving the expansion
of a water supply system, the city undertook a joint venture with a
private company in which the revenue from the whole system was
pledged as payment; and this was upheld without reference to the
Schnell case. (Maffit v. City of Decatur, 322 111. 82 (1926).) Maffjt has
since been cited as
"modifying" Schnell, and such projects are uniformly
upheld as not being debts within this section. (Ward v. City of Chicago,
342 111. 167 (1930); Poole v. City of Kankakee, 406 111. 521 (1950).)
By the same token, bonds issued to fund revenue-producing projects,
whose payment is to be solely from the revenue of the project, are not
Section 12 debts. (City of Edwardsville v. Jenkins, 376 111. 327 (1941);
see the discussion of state debt under Art. IV, Sec. 18, supra, pp. 189-91).)
The requirement of this section that an annual tax be levied to pay
the interest and principal within 20 years is self-executing. How-
ever, it does not apply to every obligation which is a debt under this
section. It applies only to debts whose payment is deferred to a fixed
future date and whose amoimt is certain. (Town of Kankakee v. McGrew,
178 111. 74 (1899); County of Coles v. Goehring, 209 111. 142 (1904).)
The levy should include an amount sufficient to cover loss and coUec-
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tion expenses. (People ex rel. Korzen v. Engleinann, 32 111. 2d 196
(1965).) Because ol its seli-executing nature, the constitutional pro-
vision may override a statute. For example, sanitary districts were
authorized to levy bond taxes tor two years in advance. Because there
had been considerable delays in tax collection for lour years, a district
levied tor two and one-half years in order to be sure of a sutficient
amount to pay maturities. The Court held that because of the Section 12
requirement, the district was justified in exceeding its statutory author-
ity, and the tax was legal. (People ex rel. Gill v. 110 S. Dearborn St.
Corp., S6S HI. 286 (1936).) Where a statutory tax rate limit is too low
to produce an amount sufficient to pay the bonds, the municipality
may validly exceed the statutory limit. (People ex rel. Henry v. New
York Cent. R.R. Lines, 381 111. 490 (1942).)
The question arises as to what remedies arc available to enforce the
provisions of this Section 12. In general, those who deal with a munic-
ipal government are bound to know its powers, and if it exceeds its
powers in contracting indebtedness, the debt is void and there can be
no recovery. This section may be pleaded by a municipality as a bar to
collection of a debt. Thus, a city contracted with a plaintiff to con-
struct a waterworks system which the city was then to lease for 30 years.
After several years, the city broke its lease, and in the subsequent suit
pleaded that the contract was void because it violated this section.
This was held to be a complete defense to the claim, and in a later suit
between the same parties on the same facts, the plaintiff was denied a
recovery based on quantum meruit. (Prince v. City of Quincy, 128 111.
443 (1889); Prince v. City of Quincy, 105 III. 215 (1883).) Recovery on
ordinary instruments of indebtedness may be denied where at the time
of issuance the municipality was indebted over the limit. (East St. Louis
Gas Light & Coke Co. v. City of East St. Louis, 45 111. App. 591 (1892).)
A more common situation is for a municipality to attempt voluntarily
to exceed the constitutional debt limit, and in this situation the most
effective means of enforcing this section is by taxpayers' remedies. An
objection to the collection of a tax on an illegal debt will be sustained.
(Baltimore & O. Sw. R.R. v. People ex rel. Allen, 195 111. 423 (1902).)
The shortcoming of this method is that it gives relief only to the object-
ing taxpayer. Broader remedies are to enjoin the issuance of illegal
bonds or the making of illegal contracts (Village of East Moline v.
Pope, 224 111. 386 (1906), or to enjoin the extension and collection of
taxes on illegal debts (Green v. Hutsonville Townshij) High School
Dist., 356 111. 216 (1934). Compare Austin v. Healy, 376 111. 633 (1941)).
Comparative Analysis
Constitutional limitations on municijjal and county indebtedness are
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very common. For purposes of general analysis here, restrictions on
municipal corporations may be divided into six categories, with several
qualifications to be noted. (1) Twenty-nine states have no constitutional
restrictions on debt of municipal corporations. (2) In three states, there
is no limit to the amount of debt which can be incurred, but the debt
must be approved by a referendum. (3) In five states, the authorities may
incur debt up to a certain limit (usually low) without referendum
approval; above that limit there must be a referendum, and in any event
indebtedness cannot exceed a maximum upper limit. (4) In three states,
there is a maximum upper limit, but any debt incurred within this limit
must be submitted to a referendum. (5) In ten states, including Illinois,
there is a maximum limit, but no referendum is required.
The above breakdown applies to municipal corporations generally.
Many constitutions have provisions applicable only to specific munici-
palities, such as school districts or counties. For example, while only 21
states restrict municipalities generally, 31 restrict counties, with these
provisions distributed generally among the categories discussed above.
The details of these requirements, such as the amount of the limit and
the vote required in the referendum, vary widely. In addition, it should
probably be noted that many states having no specific constitutional
debt limitations have enacted statutory limits.
The Model State Constitution is silent on this subject.
Comment
The merits of a constitutional debt limit can be questioned on three
counts. First of all, its effect on holding down taxes is doubtful. To
the extent that necessary (or even desired) municipal services cannot be
financed by boiTOwing, they must be financed by higher taxes. Secondly,
the limits can be evaded to a large extent. Despite a statutory requirement
of full-value assessment, j^roperty is currently equalized at the state level
at about 50 per cent of value. Thus municipal borrowing power could be
administratively doubled. The large number of overlapping municipali-
ties, often with resulting inefficiency of administration, is directly
attributable in part to the need for evading the debt limit. And the many
devices discussed above for limiting municipal liability and thus avoid-
ing Section 12 altogether enable municipalities to conduct large amounts
of credit transactions in excess of the 5 per cent limit. But this situation
raises the third objection. To the extent that liability on borrowed funds
is limited, the cost of that credit is much more expensive than with ordi-
nary borrowing, thus increasing the net cost to a municipality.
There are at least three possible alternatives which the Convention
may consider. First, the section may be eliminated entirely. This would
not necessarily leave municipalities with unlimited borrowing power, for
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the legislature could still impose statutory limitations to the extent
thought desirable. The second possibility would be to retain the limit,
but allow it to be exceeded by relerendum aj^proval. Ol course, the pro-
vision could simply be retained as is, with possible consideration being
given to increasing the amount ol the limit.
World's Columbian Exposition
Sec. 13. The corporate authorities of the city of Chicago are hereby author-
ized to issue interest-bearing bonds of said city to an amount not exceeding five
million dollars, at a rate of interest not to exceed five per centum per annum,
the principal payable within thirty years from the date of their issue, and the
proceeds thereof shall be paid to the treasurer of the World's Columbian
Exposition, and used and disbursed by him under the direction and control
of the directors in aid of the World's Columbian Exposition, to be held in the
city of Chicago in pursuance of an act of Congress of the United States: Proxndcd,
that if, at the election for the adoption of this amendment to the constitution,
a majority of the votes cast within the limits of the city of Chicago shall be
against its adoption, then no bonds shall be issued under this amendment.
And said corporate authorities shall be repaid as large a proportionate amount
of the aid given by them as is repaid to the stockholders on the sums subscribed
and paid by them, and the money so received shall be used in the redemption
of the bonds issued as aforesaid: Provided, that said authorities may take, in
whole or in part of the sum coming to them, any permanent improvements
placed on land held or controlled by them: And provided further, that no
such indebtedness so created shall in any part thereof be paid by the State, or
from any State revenue, tax or fund, but the same shall be paid by the said
city of Chicago alone.
History
This section was added by the fifth amendment to the 1870 Constitu-
tion. The amendment was necessary because at the time the City of
Chicago had reached its constitutional debt limit. The proposed 1922
Constitution omitted this section.
Explanation
The Supreme Court subsequently held that the Columbian Exposition
bonds did not have to be counted in computing the city's debt for pur-
poses of determining whether the constitutional limitation had been
reached. (Stone v. City of Chicago, 207 111. 192 (1904).)
Comparative Analysis
Obviously, no other state has a provision just like this one. Presum-
ably, other states with rigid debt limits have had to amend their consti-
tutions to permit additional borrowing.
Comment
This section is obsolete and should be dropped.
Article X
COUNTIES
New Counties
Sec. 1. No new county shall be tormecl or established by the General Assem-
bly, which will reduce the county or counties, or either of them, from which it
shall be taken, to less contents than four hundred square miles; nor shall any
county be formed of less contents; nor shall any line thereof pass within less
than ten miles of any county seat of the county or counties proposed to be
divided.
History
This section first appeared in the 1848 Constitution and only minor
stylistic changes were made in 1870. At the Convention, however, there
was extended debate on lour occasions. The principal battle was over a
proposal to include an exception permitting any city over 200,000 in
population — i.e., Chicago — to form itself into a separate county. This
was apparently objectionable to the delegates from that part of Cook
County outside of Chicago and at almost the last moment the words
were deleted under a suspension of the rules.
The proposed 1922 Constitution considerably shortened the section
but retained its substance. The proposed section was part of a block of
sections with a subheading "Comities other than the County of Cook."
Another block of sections covered "County of Cook" and contained a
specific authorization for legislation consolidating the city and the
county subject to a referendum and approval by a majority of those vot-
ing on the question both within and outside the city.
Explanation
In 1851, the legislature combined two counties into one. In a case
attacking the statute, the Supreme Court held that consolidation could
not be effected without the concurrence of the people affected. Although
the Court noted that the thrust of this section and Sections 2 and 3, all
of which were substantially the same under the 1848 Constitution, was to
prevent division of counties and shifting of parts from one county to an-
other, it ruled that the legislature coidd not by indirection thwart the
interests of coimty residents. (People ex rel. Stephenson v. Marshall, 12
111. 391 (1851) (A. Lincoln and R. Wingate for the winning party).)
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The present statutory system for consolidating counties provides, first,
for a petition by not fewer than 200 voters, "one-half of such members
being freeholders," residing in a county desiring to be annexed; second,
for a vote in each county at a county or state regular election; and, third,
for ratification by a majority of the votes "polled" in each cotmty "at
such election." (111. Rev. Stat. (h. 34, §151 (19G7).) No case appears to
have arisen under this section, and it is not known whether this statutory
scheme meets all constitutional requirements. The only serious question
arises under the second half of the first sentence of Section 3. (Infra,
p. 492.) That calls for ratification by a majority of the voters of any county
to which territory is to be added. Section 151 of Chapter 34 requires only
a majority "polled" in the election.
The Attorney General has stated that the tenmile minimum distance
from county line to county seat is measured from the municipal line
and not from the county buildings in the county seat. But he went on
to state that subsequent extension of a numicipal boundary has no con-
stitutional significance, that the critical boundary is that of the time of
establishment as a county seat. (1908 111. Att'y Gen. Rep. 706.) In 1954,
the Supreme Court held that the Chicago Regional Port District, a
municipal corporation, is not a "county." (People ex rel. Gutknecht v.
Chicago Regional Port District, 4 III. 2d 363 (1954).)
Comparative Analysis
Approximately 22 states have constitutional geographical limitations
on making little comities out of big counties. Just over half of them use
the magic number of 400 square miles. Except for Tennessee, the remain-
ing states require larger areas, from 432 square miles (12 townships), to
900 square miles. Tennessee permits the formation of a county of not
fewer than 275 square miles, biu the old county's area may not be reduced
below 500 square miles. Approximately ten states have provisions con-
cerning proximity of the comity seat to the county line. \'irginia has an
interesting exception to a 600 squaie mile minimum. It is provided that
any county which is three times as long as its mean breadth or any county
more than 50 miles long can be divided at the legislature's discretion. The
Model State Constitution requires the legislature by general law to pro-
vide for "methods and procedures of . . . merging, consolidating and
dissolving [counties] and of altering their boundaries . . . ."
Comment
There are only five states that have more than 102 counties. Originally,
counties tended to be no larger than would recpiire a one-day trip l)y
horse and buggy to the county seat. With modern transportation, this
traditional limitation has no meaning. Ne\ertheless, there are many
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factors inhibiting rational consolidaton of counties and it is not likely
that great strides in reducing the number of counties would take place
even were the Constitution silent on the subject. In the light of this
practicality, it is arguable that a provision substantially as flexible as the
Model State Constitution's requirement quoted above should suffice. The
Convention must weigh, however, the desirability of flexibility for the
future against the danger that the very interests that inhibit county con-
solidation might oppose any constitutional revision that even potentially
makes consolidation easier. Nevertheless, the Convention should be able
to combine this section and Sections 2 and 3 into one simple provision
comparable to the 1922 proposal quoted in the History of Section 2
below. Such a provision could, of course, contain a minimum allowable
area for new counties, but even though the foregoing argument indicates
that the wave of the future is believed to be consolidation of counties,
there is no necessary virtue in constitutionally foreclosing alternatives
that could result in smaller counties or even more counties.
Division of Counties— Referendum
Sec. 2. No county shall be divided, or have any part stricken therefrom, with-
out submitting the question to a vote of the people of the county, nor unless
a majority of all the legal voters of tiie county, voting on the question, shall vote
for the same.
History
This section was first adopted in the 1848 Constitution and carried
over unchanged into the 1870 Convention. An unsuccessful effort was
made on the floor to permit the legislature to switch one or two town-
ships from one county to another without the affirmative vote called
for by this section. The proposed 1922 Constitution combined this sec-
tion and Section 3 into a concise section, the first sentence of which
read:
"No county shall be changed in area unless the change is approved by a major-
ity of those voting on the question in each county and each part affected." (art.
Vlll, §168.)
In most situations, this wotdd appear to require four separate approv-
als: (1) by the group moving from one county to another; (2) by the
entire old county; (3) by the people left in the old county; and (4) by
the county to which the move is to be made. Under Sections 2 and 3 as
they stand, approval (3) above is not required.
Explanation
No problems appear to have arisen under this section. There were 102
counties in 1870, and of these only 15 are large enough to permit division
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into two (oiinties, since Section 1 woukl iccjuiie each (oinity to contain
no fewer than 400 square miles. Moreover, 30 counties are already below
the minimum ol 400 square miles, and imder the restrictions of Section
1 no territory can be taken from them. Another 18 counties have more
than 400 square miles of territory but fewer than 500, and this limits the
feasibility of transfer of area. All in all, considering these geographical
limitations, the stringent petition recjuirement in Section 3 below, and
the traditional reluctance to change, it is no surprise to find o\cr the past
century a lack of activity in altering comity lines.
Comparative Analysis
Approximately 24 states have a constitutional provision limiting the
division of counties. In most instances, a referendum is required, usually
of the voters of the areas affected, biu in some cases only the voters in
the area to be stricken have to approve. In some states, a majority of
those voting on the question is sufficient; in others, a majority of the
voters is required. In at least four states, the requirement is a two-thirds'
vote, of those voting (two states) or of the voters (two states). The Model
State Constitution has no referendum provision.
Comment
.\lthough counties are theoretically only convenient administrative
subdivisions of the state and not necessarily to be frozen into the Constitu-
tion, it is consistent with democratic principles for county residents to
have some voice in their fate. It would seem appropriate to preserve this
principle by a simple referendum provision along the lines of the pro-
posed 1922 Constitution quoted earlier. It does not seem appropriate
to put a premium on the preservation of the status quo, which is the
effect of a requirement that a majority "of all the legal voters of the
county" approve a geographic alteration. This assumes, of course, that
"voting on the question" means "at an election." The sentence can be
read to mean a
"majority of those voting on the question at an election
open to all the legal voters of the county." At the very least, it is appro-
priate, if not imperative, to tidy up the referendum language.
Counties— Territory Added or Taken
Sec. 3. There shall be no territory stricken from any county, unless a major-
ity of the voters living in such territory, shall petition for such division; and
no territory shall be added to any county without the consent of the majority
of the voters of the county to which it is proposed to be added. But the portion
so stricken off and added to another county, or formed in whole or in part into
a new county, shall be holdcn for, and obliged to pay its proportion of the in-
debtedness of the county from which it has been taken.
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History
The first sentence of this section appeared in the 1848 Constitution in
the same form. The second sentence is new. Tliere was a related section
in the 1848 Constitution, but it simply stated that if a new county did
not organize within the prescribed period, the county remained a part of
the old county until otherwise provided by law. In the 1870 Convention,
the section proposed by the Committee on Counties consisted of the first
sentence only. The second sentence was added by an amendment agreed
to without debate. Tlie proposed 1922 Constitution contained the sen-
tence quoted in the History of Section 2. (Supra, p. 491.) A second sen-
tence provided that "[a]ny territory taken from a county shall be liable
for its proportion of the debt of such county."
Explanation
In an early case, the Supreme Court held in effect that Section 2 and
this section could not be bypassed by legislation purporting to settle a
boundary dispute but in reality taking land from one county and adding
it to another. (Rock Island County v. Sage, 88 111. 582 (1878).) The Attor-
ney General was asked whether in proposing to form a new county out
of parts of two existing counties, the petition must be signed by a major-
ity of the voters of each part. He suggested that it would be advisable
so to do. (1908 111. Att'y Gen. Rep. 706.)
Comparative Analysis
The Comparative Analysis of Section 2 (supra, p. 492) is applicable
to the underlying principle of this section. Only two states besides
Illinois appear to require a petition by a majority of the voters of an
area that wishes to move out of a county. Approximately 20 states have
a provision for apportionment of debt. Three states optimistically pro-
vide for apportionment of assets. There is no comparable provision in
the Model State Constitution.
Comment
The requirement that a petition contain the names of a majority of
the voters of an area that wishes to move from one county to another
seems luiduly harsh. It would seem sufficient to provide in the Constitu-
tion for referenda along the lines of the provision quoted earlier. (Supra,
p. 491.) It would seem unnecessary to include words giving the legisla-
ture authority to set up the ground rules, but in an abundance of caution,
the words "in such manner as shall be provided by law" could be inserted
at the appropriate place. The legislature could provide for an appro-
priate initiating petition and for such details as apportionment of debt.
In short, it is suggested that Sections 1, 2 and 3 could easily be compressed
into one simple sentence.
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Removal of County Seats
Sec. 4. No tounty seal shall be removed iiiitil tiie [joint lo uliith it is pro-
posed to be removed shall be fixed in pursuance of law, and ihrce-fifths of the
voters of the county, to be ascertained in such manner as siiall !); provideil i)y
general law, shall have voted in favor of its removal to such point; and no per-
son shall vote on such cjueslion who has not resided in the county six months,
and in the election precinct ninety days next preceding such election. The ques-
tion of the remo\al of a county seat shall not l)e oftener submitted than once
in ten years, to a vote of the people. But when an attempt is made to remove
a county seat to a point nearer to the center of the county, then a majority vote
only shall be necessary.
History
The first lialf of the first sentence of this section appeared in the IHIH
Constitution with two differences. Tlie required vote was only a niajoi;-
ity and the words "to be ascertained in such manner as shall be provided
by general law" were not included. In the 1870 Convention this section
produced extended debate. As one delegate remarked: "1 have known of
no more violent or lasting quarrels than those arising from attempts to
remove county seats." (Debates 1331.)
The debate centered on two issues: how difhcult should it be to make
a county seat change and how frequently should an effort to change be
permitted. After several alternatives were considered, the Convention
agreed on frecjuency of efforts to change county seats. How difficult
change should be was left up to the voters. The referendum on the Con-
stitution included a separate vote on whether the required approval
should be three-fifths or a majority. The voters chose three-fifths. (There
were only 1 1 counties in which the vote was in favor of a majority
for changing the county seat. See Debates 1894-95.)
The proposed 1922 Constitution changed the substance of the section
only in regard to the required vote. The vote was increased to three-
fourths, but of those voting on the question and not of the "voters of
the county," and the exception for "nearer to the center of the county"
was made a majority of those voting on the question.
Explanation
There are some fascinating wrinkles in the statute implementing this
section. In order to start the ball rolling, a petition to remove the county
seat must be filed with the clerk of the circuit court. One particularly
significant requirement is that the petition must be signed by a number
of voters equal to two- fifths of the votes cast in the county in the pre-
ceding presidential election, but no one who lives in the existing county
seat may sign the petition. (111. Rev. Stat. ch. 34, §203 (1967).) As of the
1960 census, there would appear to be nine counties, including Cook, in
which 60 per cent or more of the population lives in the existing county
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seat. Assuming equal distribution of voters between the county seat and
the balance ot the county, it would be mathematically impossible to
change any of those county seats. In another eight counties, over 50 per
cent of the population lives in the county seat. On the same assumption of
distribution of voters, it would be impossible, as a practical matter, to
produce a petition that would have to contain the names of at least 80 per
cent of the voters living outside the county seat. It should be noted, how-
ever, that this stringent petition rec^uirement is not constitutionally re-
quired, but is consistent with the stringent three-fifths' vote requirement.
The implementing statute provides that the number of legal votes cast
at a county seat election, which by the tenor of the statute is expected
to be a special election on the county seat issue alone, shall be taken as
prima facie evidence of the number of legal voters of the county. The
statute further provides that if the election is contested, the court "may
ascertain the number of such voters by taking or causing to be taken, legal
evidence tending to show the actual number of legal voters . . . ." (111.
Rev. Stat. ch. 34, §213 (1967).) This provision is in accordance with the
words, added in 1870 as noted above, "to be ascertained in such manner
as shall be provided by general law." Those words were added because
under the 1848 Constitution, the courts had had difficulty in determin-
ing how many voters there were in a county. Interestingly enough, the
method used by the legislature is the same as that devised by the courts.
(People ex rel. Mitchell v. Warfield, 20 111. 160 (1858).)
The Supreme Court has held that "county seat" means the county
town of the seat of government and not the county buildings. (Dunne v.
County of Rock Island, 283 111. 628 (1918).)
Comparative Analysis
Just under half of the states require a referendum on changing the
county seat. Some states require a two-thirds' vote of all voters, and some
only of those voting on the question. Three states use the three-fifths' rule,
but only of those voting. One of the three states also requires a two-thirds'
vote of those voting in the city or town to which the county seat would be
moved. One state besides Illinois permits a lower vote if the new seat is
nearer the center of the county; one state, if it is from more than five
miles from the center to within five miles; and one, if from not on a rail-
road to a "railroad seat." Approximately 12 states limit the frequency
of referenda, but only Oklahoma requires as long as a decade. There is
no comparable provision in the Model State Constitution.
Comment
It can be argued that, if there is little reason in the last half of the
Twentieth Century for constitutionally enshrining the existing county
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lines, there is even less reason to enshrine county seats. l>ut as the cjuota-
tion from tlie 1870 Convention illustrates, there may be a \ariani of
Parkinson's Law of Triviality operating in the constitutional area: the less
fiuulamental a constitutional issue, the more controversial it becomes.
W^hether or not this is the case with county seats today, a cautious dis-
position of the county seat issue would be a simple section along the
follo\\ing lines: Xo comity seat shall be changed without the approval
of a majority of those voters of the county \oting on the question in such
manner as shall be provided by law.
Counties under Township Organization
Sec. 5. The General Assembly shall pro\icle, b) general law, lor township
organization, under which any county may organize whenever a majority of the
legal voters of such county, voting at any general election, shall so determine,
and whenever any county shall adopt township organization, so much of this
constitution as provides tor the management of the fiscal concerns of the said
county by the board of county commissioners, may be dispensed with, and the
affairs of said county may be transacted in such maimer as the General .Assembly
may provide. .And in any county that shall have adopted a township organiza-
tion, the question of continuing the same may be submitted to a vote of the
electors of such county, at a general election, in the manner that now is or may
be provided by law; and if a majority of all the votes cast upon that question
shall be against township organization, then such organization shall cease in
said county; and all laws in force in relation to counties not having township
organization, shall inmiediately take effect and be in force in such county. No
two townships shall have the same name, and the day of holding the annual
township meeting shall be uniform throughout the State.
History
In order to understand the significance of this section and the next
section, it is necessary to recall a little general history of the state. The
county as the principal unit of local rural government developed in the
South. In New England, the town was the princii^al unit. When the 1818
Constitution was adopted, the county form of rural government was in
place and the Constitution reflected this system. By 1848, the northern
part of the state had been largely settled by people from New England
and other northern areas where town/ township government was tradi-
tional. This northeastern inlliience resulted in a section substantially
the same as the first sentence of Section 5. It is ^vorth noting that today
only 17 counties are not under to\vnshi]) oiganization. Fourteen of these
are in the southernmost portion of the state and the other three are
south and west of Springfield.
In the 1870 Convention, there was considerable debate over whether
to go beyond the 1848 provision and spell out the details of township
government, but in the end the delegates were content to j^rovide con-
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stitutional protection to the privilege ot abandoning township govern-
ment. The final sentence of the section was accepted without debate.
The proposed 1922 Constitution contained three new sections that,
presumably, were to take the place of Sections 5 and 6, but to what extent
the Convention intended to make substantive changes is not clear. The
official explanation states as to each section, "This section is new." (P.N.C.
38.) One section provided that the board of supervisors in township
counties, the Cook County commissioners, and the commissioners of non-
township coimties "shall constitute the county board of their respective
counties." (art. VIII, § 163.) The second section authorized changes in
organization "by law uniform as to classes of counties; but any such law
shall become effective in a county only after approval by a majority of
those voting on the question." (art. VIII, § 166.) The third section stated
that no county could abandon or adopt any form of organization unless
ratified by a majority of those voting on the question, (art. VIII, § 167.)
Explanation
It is to be noted that to adopt township organization requires a major-
ity vote of the legal voters of a county, voting at a general election, but
to abandon it requires only a majority vote of those voting on the ques-
tion at a general election. Interestingly enough, the required majority
was the same for both adoption and abandonment when the Convention
referred the
"Township Article" to the Conmiittee on Revision and
Adjustment, but the present language appeared when that Committee
reported back the Article on Counties. There does not appear to be any
explanation of the substantive change. (See Debates 882, 1835.)
The implementing statute for adoption and abandonment is 111. Rev.
Stat. ch. 139, §§ 1-24 (1967). Chapter 34 of the Revised Statutes (111. Rev.
Stat. ch. 34 (1967)) covers the manner in which the "affairs of said county
may be transacted" on the comity level. The balance of Chapter 139
(§§ 25ff) covers the manner in which the "affairs of said county may be
transacted" in the townships. One would assume that the legislature's
power over the affairs of townships, like its power over cities, towns and
villages, is an attribute of general state power, but the courts have held
otherwise. The Supreme Coint has said:
"A town organized under the township organization laws of the State is, as be-
fore said, a political or civil subdivision of a county. It is created as a subordinate
agency to aid in the administration of the general State and local government.
The distinction between such a town and other chartered municipal corpora-
tions proper, sometimes denominated towns, is, that a chartered town or village
is given corporate existence at the request or by the consent of the inhabitants
thereof for the interest, advantage or convenience of the locality and its people,
and a town under township organization is created almost exclusively with a
view to the policy of the State at large for purposes of political organization
and as an agency of the State and county, to aid in the civil administration of
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affairs pertaining to the general administration of the State and county govern-
ment, and is imposed upon the territory inchidcd within it without consulting
the wishes of the inhabitants thereof." (People ^'.v rcl. Dencen v. Martin. 178
111. 611, 621 (1899).)
Accordingly, the quotetl words ironi Section 5 are the constitutional
basis for legishuion concerning township government. Although the
quoted words do not include the phrase "by general law," the legislature
is required to provide for the government of townships by general law,
but reasonable classifications are permitted. {E.g., People ex rel. Hatfield
V. Grover, 258 111. 124 (1913).)
Comparative Analysis
There appear to be three other states that specifically provide for the
adoption of township organization with approval by referendum. Two
states require the legislature to provide for township organization.
Oklahoma provides for abolition of township organization by referen-
dum and for re-establishment by referendum, the implication being that
all counties were under such organization when the Constitution was
first adopted. Several states call for a general law covering the govern-
ment of townships. No other state appears to have a provision compar-
ale to the last sentence of this section.
The Model State Constitution provides:
"Section 8.01. Organization of Local (jovcrunient. The legislature shall pro-
vide by general law for the government of counties, cities and other civil divi-
sions . . . including provisions:
(1) For such classification of civil divisions as may be necessary, on the basis
of population or on any other reasonable basis related to the purpose of
the classification;
(2) For optional plans of municipal organization and government so as to
enable a county, city or other civil division to adopt or abandon an
authorized optional charter by a majority vote of the qualified voters
voting thereon;
(3) For the adoption or amendment of charters by any county or city for its
own government, by a majority vote of the qualified voters of the city or
county voting thereon, for methods and procedures for the selection of
charter commissions, and for framing, publishing, disseminating and
adopting such charters or charter amendments and for meeting the ex-
penses connected therewith."
Comment
Notwithstanding the judicial theory that this section grants power to
the legislature to legislate concerning township government, it seems
likely that the delegates to the 1870 Convention meant only to cover
the subject of type of county government. Otherwise, it would seem
likely that there would have been some grant of power concerning or-
ganization of cities and incorporated villages. A section including such
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language was offered in a minority report of the Committee on Munici-
pal Corporations in the 1870 Convention but was not accepted. (De-
bates 1672-74.) But whatever the constitutional theory accepted by
the 1870 Convention, it is important that agreement be reached on the
operative theory for the next Constitution. For purposes of the present
discussion, it will be assumed that the Convention will proceed on the
theory that there is no need to grafit power to the legislature, but
that there is a need to limit power. This is, of course, the purpose of a
bill of rights and of limitations on taxation and indebtedness. It is also
the purpose of the first four sections of Article X and of this section. In
all of these sections, except Section 1, the limitation is in the nature of
local home rule. It would be appropriate to consider all local govern-
ments together and to frame an article that includes the following:
(1) a requirement that applicable legislation be general, but with
reasonable classifications;
(2) a general grant of power to local governments to govern them-
selves subject to legislative limitation by general law;
(3) a limitation on legislative power to impose forms of government
without the consent of the local unit;
(4) a mandate to the legislature to provide suitable mechanisms by
which alternate forms of government may be adopted by local units; and
(5) such constitutional limitations as may be desired — for example,
debt limits, taxing power, and the like.
Such an approach — and this is only an approach, for under (5) above,
the substance of power can be controlled — has two important advan-
tages. First, it ends such conceptual distinctiojis as set forth by the Court
in the Martin case; and second, it kills off the "Dillon rule" that, as
creatures of the state, the powers of local governments should be strictly
construed. The Dillon rule has been relied on as recently as 1967, when
the Supreme Court said: "County boards may exercise only such powers
as are expressly granted by the State or arise by implication from these
granted powers or are indispensable to the purpose of their existence."
(Crumpler v. County of Logan, 38 111. 2d 146, 149 (1967).) In this con-
nection, it should be noted that the provision from the Model State
Constitution quoted in the Comparative Analysis of Section 34 of Article
IV {supra, p. 251) is specifically designed to kill off the Dillon rule.
Counties not under Township Organization
Sec. 6. At the first election of County Judges under this Constitution, there
shall be elected in each of the counties in this State, not under township organ-
ization, three officers, who shall be styled "The Board of County Commissioners,"
who shall hold sessions for the transaction of county business as shall be pro-
vided by law. One of said commissioners shall hold his office for one year, one for
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two years, ami one lor three years, to be (Icterinined in lot; aiul every year there-
after one such oHicer shall be elected in each of said counties for the term of
three years.
History
The Schedule ol the 1818 Constitution provided that each county
shotdd have three elected county commissioners to transact county busi-
ness, with term ol service, power and duties to be regulated and defined
by law. As noted in the History ol Section 5 (supra, p. 496), the 1848
Constitution authorized township coiuity government. For counties not
opting for such government, tlic management of the fiscal concern ol
the county rested with the county court in accordance with a section of
the Judicial Article that provided: "The county judge, with such jus-
tices of the peace in each county as may be designated by law, shall hold
terms for the transaction of county business, and shall perform such
other duties as the General Assembly shall prescribe. . . ." (art. V, § 19.)
Both the Committee on Counties and the Committee on the Judiciary
of the 1870 Convention proposed to replace the county court with a
board of county commissioners in nontownship counties. The Con-
vention adopted the language proposed for the Judicial Article, but the
Committee on Revision and Adjustment transferred the material to the
Article on Counties and rearranged it in the manner now appearing in
Section 6. The Schedule, Section 4, continued the county court system
until boards of county commissioners could come into existence.
Since the original language was proposed by the Committee on the
Judiciary, it is not surprising to find that county commissioners were in-
cluded in the eligibility section that required judges of lower courts to
be at least 25 years old, a United States citizen, and a resident of the
state for the preceding five years. Commissioners are not included in the
new Judicial Article and presumably the only existing eligibility re-
cjuirement is that contained in Section 6 of Article VII. (Supra, p. 394.)
The pioposed 1922 Constitution continued the staggered three-year
terms of commissioners. (See also, History of Sec. 5, supra, p. 497).)
Explanation
Seventeen counties continue to operate under boards elected pursuant
to this section, but there do not appear to have been any problems in
construing the section. The implementing statute required by this section
is contained in Sections 801-804 and 806 of C^lhapter 34 of the Revised
Statutes (1967).
Comparative Analysis
There appear to be about 17 states besides Illinois that refer to a
board of county commissioners. Approximately seven states have refer-
Art. X, §7 501
ences to a board oi supervisors, l)ut not all of those states appear to oper-
ate exclusively by such boards in all comities. Six states appear to con-
tinue to operate under the traditional county court system, but one of
them combines the county court and the commissioners for the trans-
action of county business. Another five states appear to authorize the
legislature to determine the form of county government. The balance of
the states presumably do not specify in their constitutions the form of
county government. For the Model State Constitution, see Comparative
Analysis of Section 5. {Supra, p. 498.)
Comment
In a sense this section is an historical anachronism. In the 1870 Con-
vention, the delegates decided to end the county coint system of admin-
istration in comities not mider township organization and did so by this
section. It would seem appropriate today, at the very least, to permit the
legislatme to have the same power for the 17 coimties not under town-
ship organization that it has for the 84 counties under township organ-
ization. At most, the comments above on Section 5 are in part applicable
here. (See discussion, supra, p. 499.)
Cook County Government
Sec. 7. The county affairs of Cook county shall be managed by a Board of
Commissioners of fifteen persons, ten of whom shall be elected from the city
of Chicago, and five from towns outside of said city, in such manner as may be
provided by law.
History
At the time of the 1870 Convention, Cook County was organized as a
township county. It was pointed out to the Convention that the Board of
Supervisors of Cook County was almost as large as the Convention, which
consisted of 88 delegates. It was also pointed out that Chicago contained
seven-eighths of the population of the county, but a majority of the Board
of Supervisors came from otitside of the city. The delegate who pointed
out the foregoing noted that he came from an agricidtural area of tlie
cotinty and had no hesitation in saying that the limited representation
of Chicago was tuifair and tuijust. He proposed to add what is now
Section 7 to the Article on Counties which, he hoped, would be adopted
unanimously and withotit debate. Upon completion of his explanation,
the Convention, sitting in Committee of the Whole, adopted the pro-
posal by voice vote. (Debates 1366-67.) The proposed 1922 Constitution
retained the substance of this section.
Explanation
Very early, the Supreme Court field that this section did not remove
Cook County from the class of counties under township organization.
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(People ex rel. Miller v. liri^liii, 80 111. 428 (1875).) But the Supreme
Court has also held that by virtue ot the words "in such manner as may
be provided by law," the legislature could adopt special legislation con-
cerning the management ot Cook County, notwithstanding the prohibi-
tion on special legislation contained in Article IV, Section 22, supra,
pp. 203-4. (People ex rel. Stuckart v. Day, 277 111. 543 (1917).) The legisla-
ture cannot, however, change the size oi the boaid or its ten and five
apportionment. (See Connnoit below concerning the dralting problem
exemplified by this case.)
Although the legislature can legislate tor Cook County alone, the
Supreme Court has assured the Board ot Conmiissioners that it has
some implied powers. In Nye v. Foreman (215 111. 285 (1905)), the Court
permitted the board to appropriate money for assistant state's attorneys
in the absence of legislative authorization therefor. Almost 40 years later,
however, the Court denied the board the power to engage private attor-
neys to collect delinquent taxes even though the state's attorney and his
assistants were too busy to do so. (Ashton v. County of Cook, 384 111.
287 (1943).) Moreover, notwithstanding legislative authorization to man-
age county property, including such powers as were deemed necessary for
the proper maintenance and operation of all buildings, the Court held
that because the common law duties of a sheriff include those of custodian
of courthouses and because he is a constitutional officer, he cannot be de-
prived of the power to select and appoint the janitorial force for the
courthouses. (People ex rel. Walsh v. Board of Comm'rs, 397 111. 293
(1947.) See also Dahnke v. People, 168 111. 102 (1897).)
The implementing statute provides for four-year terms, no staggering
of terms, election of the ten from the city and the five from the towns
at large, respectively, and filling vacancies in either group by appoint-
ment by the remaining members of the group. (111. Rev. Stat. ch. 34, §901
(1967).) Prior to 1914, terms were for two years.
Comparative Analysis
Obviously, there is no comparable provision in any other state. In
New York there is a
"county" exception for New York City because there
are five counties wholly inside the City. In Washington there is a county
exception for counties that are a combination of city and county. In
Missouri, St. Louis is an independent city and not part of St. Louis
County. The same is true of Baltimore, Maryland. For the Model State
Constitution, see Comparatwe Analysis of Section 5. [Supra, p. 498.)
Comment
No matter how it is looked at, Cook County is a difficult problem. As
noted in connection with Section 1 (supra, p. 489), there was an abortive
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effort in the 1870 Convention to permit Chicago to be a separate county.
The adoption of Section M of Article IV {supra, pp. 246-7) reinforces the
complex status of the city. The comments concerning home rule (supra,
p. 499) must be tailored to the Cook County problem, for so long as Cook
County includes a city containing an estimated 65 per cent of the popula-
tion of the county, it is not feasible to grant total home rule to the county.
The "one man-one vote" rule would, of coiuse, preclude a home rule
charter that gave the city more representation in county government
than its share of the popidation warranted. Indeed, it is remarkable that,
a century later, the mandated distribution of seats on the county board
is still fair. Remarkable though that may be, it is arguable whether a
specific form of government for Cook County should be frozen in the
Constitution. It should be sufficient to permit the legislature to set the
ground rules for Cook County government subject to a veto power by
referendum of the people of the city and the county.
It has been observed from time to time in comments on various sec-
tions that the principles of good constitution-writing must be tempered
with political realities. "Tempered" is, ))erhaps, an luiderstatement so far
as Chicago, Cook Comity, and the remainder of the state are concerned.
There are formidable political difficulties facing any Convention that
has to deal with Chica"o and its relation to the rest of the state. This
was true in 1870 and 1920, and will be true in 1970. In advance of a
Convention, there are just two comments to be made, one by way of
caution, one by way of principle laced with caution. Everyone concerned
with the Convention should be alert to the danger that uncompromis-
ing rigidity on any proposed constitutional solution to the Chicago-Cook
County-downstate problem can spell disaster for the Convention's prod-
uct or its acceptability to the people, or both. But whatever the com-
promises demanded by the political realities, they shoidd be flexible.
That is, they should be limited to determinations of who sliares in the
decision-making process on forms of government through time. If at all
politically possible, the structure of government for Chicago and Cook
County should not be frozen in the Constitution. And in no event should
compromises be in terms of the substance of government. For example,
it would be most unfortunate to have a constitutional requirement either
that state aid to public schools must be on the basis of average daily at-
tendance or nuist be on the basis of initial enrollment. That sort of com-
promise, even if in trade for something of constitutional significance, is
mixing apples with oranges. The result is to give constitutional status
to a legislative compromise on an ephemeral problem.
It is worthwhile to conmient on an interesting drafting ambiguity in
Section 7. As noted earlier, the Supreme Court held that the final clause.
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"in such iiKiiinei as ina\ be provided 1)\ law,
"
jjennits special legislation
tor Cook County. This is based on ihe premise that the clause modifies
both
"managed by a Board ol C^onmiissioners" and "elected." The Court
explicitly rejected the ecjually, perhaps more, appropriate reading of the
clause to modily only "elected." No great harm has come trom this am-
biguity. Indeed, the ambiguity was uselul, lor special legislation lor
Cook County makes good sense, and it the 1870 Convention had meant
otherwise and expressed itselt clearly, the courts might not have been
able to get around the language. Nevertheless, as a general rule, this sort
of drafting imj^recision is to be avoided.
County Officers — Term of Office
Sec. 8. In each county there shall be elected the following County Officers
at the general election to be held on the Tuesday after the first Monday in
November A.D. 1882, a County Judge, County Clerk, Sheriff and Treasurer, and
at the election to lie held on the Tuesday after the first Monday in November
A.D. 1884, a Cioroner and Clerk of the Circuit Court (who may be ex-ofjuio
recorder of deeds, except in Counties having 60.(KM) and more inhabitants, in
which Counties a Recorder of deeds shall be elected at the general election in
1884) each of said officers shall enter upon the duties of his office, rcsi)ecti\ely
on the first Monday of December, after his election, and they shall hold their
respective offices for the term of four years, and until their successors are elected
and qualified. Provided that no person ha\ing once been elected to the office
of SherifT or Treasurer shall be eligible to reelection to said office for four years
after the expiration of the term for which he shall have been elected.
History
The only elected county officials provided for in the 1818 Constitution
were the sheriff and coroner, both of whom had two-year terms. The
1818 Constitution also provided that circuit court judges were to appoint
their own clerks. The 1848 Constitution continued the election of a
sheriff every two years, but provided that no person coidd be eligible to
serve more than once in any four years. The coroner was dropped as a
constitutional officer. County jtidges and clerks of the circuit court were
to be elected in each county for four-year terms.
In the 1870 Convention, the Committee on Comities proposed a sec-
tion not differing greatly from Section 8. Considerable debate and many
amendments occinred before the section reached its final form \\hich,
of coinse, differed from the present amended section. In that form it
provided for the election of all the officers now listed in Section 8 plus
a surveyor. The sheriff, treasmer and coroner were elected for two years
and the rest for four years. There were no prohibitions on re-election.
The significant changes made by the amendment adopted in 1880 \\ere
to drop the surveyor, to extend all terms to four years, and to make the
treasurer and sheriff ineligible for re-election.
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Several changes were proposed in the 1922 Constitution. All of the
elective county offices were continued as elective lor tour-year terms
except for the county judge, whose term was extended to six years. (Ac-
tually, the county judge was covered in the Judicial Article, and other
changes were made concerning the county court but are not pertinent
here.) The task of collecting taxes was shifted from the sheriff to the
treasurer, and the sheriff, but not the treasurer, was allowed to succeed
himself. In counties other than Cook, the proposed Constitution man-
dated an assessor but left details up to the legislature. Likewise, in coun-
ties over 50,000 population, an auditor was authorized but not mandated.
(An auditor is a statutory elected official in all counties over 75,000 popu-
lation except Cook County. (111. Rev. Stat. ch. 34, § 1501 (1967).)
Beginning in 1944, tour amendments to this section were put to the
voters. All received a favorable plurality, but all failed to receive a con-
stitutional majority. The first three efforts, voted upon in 1944, 1952 and
1958, simply omitted the proviso against re-election of the sheriff and
treasurer. The fourth try, voted upon in 1966, left the proviso in as to
the sheriff, but omitted the treasurer.
The new Judicial Article adopted in 1962 abolished the office of
county judge. A county clerk and a clerk of the circuit court continue to
be elected in each coimty. (For some strange reason, the amendment
voted upon in 1966, which was after the abolition of the office of county
judge, still called for his election.)
Explanation
The most important judicial gloss put upon this section is the proposi-
tion that duties of a constitutional ofhcer may be added to by statute,
but traditional duties, especially those known at the common law, may
not be taken away. (Peoj)le ex rel. Walsh v. Board of Comm'rs (379 111.
293 (1947)), discussed supra, p. 502. See also People ex rcl. Nelson v. West
Englewood Trust k Sav. Bank, 353 111. 451 (1933) (county treasurer).)
The Attorney General has had occasion to make many rulings con-
cerning the prohibition against succession in office. He has ruled that a
sheriff can run for treasurer where the treasurer's term begins at the ex-
piration of the sheriff's term (1925 111. Att'y Gen. Rep. 408); that the
wife of a treasurer may succeed him (1925 111. Att'y Gen. Rep. 184); that
a person appointed to fill out an unexpired term as treasurer imtil the
election could succeed himself (1928 111. Att'y Gen. Rep. 51; 1912 111.
Att'y Gen. Rep. 69()); that a change from commission form to township
organization does not permit succession in office (1926 111. Att'y Gen.
Rep. 85); and that a person elected to fill out an unexpired term as sheriff
or treasurer is not eligible to succeed himself. (1925 111. Att'y Gen. Rep.
187; 1918 111. Att'y Gen. Rep. 778, 798.)
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Comparative Analysis
The lollowing table ajjproxiniates the constitutional county officers
in the several states. Many other states may elect one or more oi these
county officers, hut jnirsuant to statute or home rule charter.
Number of States
Office
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a county charter under which any or all of the constitutional offices could
be abolished. In any event, it would seem most desirable to include
language that would blunt the thrust ot the Walsh case. It is one thing
to preserve some historical offices; it is another to preserve almost the
entire county system of the Eighteenth Century.
Salaries of Officers— Cook County
Sec. 9. The clerks of all the courts of record, the Treasurer, Sheriff, Coroner
and Recorder of Deeds of Cook county, shall receive as their only compensation
for their services, salaries to be fixed by law. which shall in no case be as much
as the lawful compensation of a Judge of the Circuit Court of said county, and
shall be paid, respectively, only out of the fees of the office actually collected.
All fees, perquisites and emoluments (above the amount of said salaries) shall
be paid into the county treasury. The number of the deputies and assistants of
such officers shall be determined by rule of the Circuit Court, to be entered of
record, and their compensation shall be determined by the County Board.
History
This section, in a slightly different form, was presented to the 1870
Convention as part of the Article on the judiciary. The only significant
debate was over whether excess fees should be paid into the county treas-
ury. Delegates from downstate, relying on the complaints of Cook County
delegates that county officers were earning fantastic sums, asserted that
once compensation was cut back to reasonable amounts, a large surplus
would be paid into the county treasury and that this would benefit the
taxpayers of Cook County at the expense of the many nonresidents who
paid fees. Debate became fairly acrimonious in the Committee of the
Whole and the matter was referred back to the Convention without
recommendation. At a later date, a substitute section in substantially
the present form was offered and accepted with a minimum of debate.
(Debates 1172-78; 1480-81.) The Committee on Revision and Adjustment
transferred the section to the Article on Counties. The proposed 1922
Constitution retained much of the substance of this section, but removed
the fee limitation as to the source of compensation and made the section
applicable to all county officers.
Explanation
This is the first of five consecutive sections which the 1870 Convention
developed to end the abuses of the fee system of compensation for county
officials. For the purpose of the discussion of this and the next four sec-
tions, it is essential to consider the ambiguity of "fee." One meaning of
fee is that charge made directly to the person for whom a service is
rendered as, for example, the fee charged for recording a deed. A second
meaning is that of a compensation based on a percentage of some value
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related to the service perlonned, as, lor example, j)aying a tax collector a
fee of 2 per cent of- the amount of his collections. A third meaning is anal-
ogous to salary, as in the case of paying part-time officials a per diem for
each day worked, it is not crystal clear, but it would appear that "fee" is
used only in the first two senses in this section and Section 10, but in all
three senses in Sections 11, 12 and 13.
This separate and potentially more flexible section for Cook County
presumably was adopted in recognition of the development of Chicago
as an inban center which would recjuire a larger and costlier govern-
mental structure than the rest of the local governmental units. Never-
theless, the section both retains state control over compensation and con-
stitutionally preserves some indirect control over what the state can
permit. Compensation for the named officers is set by law but the amount
cannot equal or exceed that of circuit court judges, and it seems unlikely
that the legislature would raise judicial salaries solely to raise the ceil-
ing on county salaries. It woidd appear that the delegates to the 1870
Convention were also worried about overstaffing, presumably either for
patronage purposes or to permit a county officer to delegate all work and
collect pay for doing nothing. Thus, the section gives the staffing author-
ity to the circuit court judges.
As might be expected, disputes arose over this administrative tangle
and the courts had to resolve them. The Supreme Court has pointed out
that tlie Board of County Commissioners must appropriate the funds
necessary to pay deputies and assistants and must set a reasonable level
of compensation. (People ex rel. Meyering v. Whealan, 356 111. 402
(1934).) The Court also held that the Cook County sheriff was entitled
to a writ of mandamus commanding the circuit court to determine the
number of assistants required by the sheriff, but such writ could only
command some action, not what action. (People ex rel. Walsh v. Board
of Comm'rs, 397 111. 293 (1947).)
It is also to be noted that the rules of compensation under this section
apply only to the named officers and their deputies and assistants. Sec-
tion 10 sets forth the rules for all other county employees. Thus, the
legislature cannot set the compensation of the Board of Commissioners of
Cook County. (Wulff v. Aldrich, 124 111. 591 (1888).)
A great many other cases have involved questions arising under this
section, but only one of them need be cited here. The Supreme Court
has noted that the limitation on payment of compensation out of fees
actually collected applies only to the named officials and not to their
deputies and assistants and that, by virtue of the "except" clause of
Section 10, the limitation therein is inapplicable to Cook County.
(County of Cook v. Hartney, 169 111. 566 (1897).)
Art. X, § 10 509
Comparative Analysis
Although no other state has a section like this, there are some states
that have a provision that singles out a specific county for special rules
ot compensation. Alabama, tor example, requires laws regulating lees,
commissions, or allowances to be applicable to all counties, but there
are 22 amendments with detailed exceptions for named counties. Florida
added a section in 1956 requiring all fees of county officers of Escambia
County to be paid into the treasury and calling for special legislation to
compensate such officers. There does not appear to be any other state
that puts the control over the number of assistants and deputies in the
hands of the general trial court judges. In Idaho, the control is in the
hands of the county commissioners. In West Virginia, the assessor must
get the approval of the county court when appointing assistants.
Comment
It would seem that the time has come to drop most of what is con-
tained in this and the next four sections. As the History of the several
sections demonstrates, they constitute a quasi-statute to end or regulate
an evil in the system. That purpose has been served. The most that
could be worth saving is a prohibition on local legislation as to fees, a
requirement that fees be paid into the treasury, a statement concerning
who sets compensation levels, and, in the case of elected officials, a prohi-
bition against salary increases or decreases during the term. As for a pro-
hibition on local legislation, it is more appropriately covered in the Legis-
lative Article. Details on compensation levels depend on the extent to
which the principle of home rule is accepted. Fees and salary changes
can be adequately covered in two simple sentences. (See also Comment
on Sec. 11 of Art. IX, supra, pp. 476-7.)
It almost goes without saying that the last sentence of Section 9 should
be dropped. Under all sound principles — separation of powers, inde-
pendence of the judiciary, professional personnel management — circuit
court judges should not be given any power over county nonjudicial
personnel matters.
Salaries of Officers— Other Counties
Sec. 10. The county board, except as provided in Section 9 of this article,
shall fix the compensation of all county officers, with the amount of tlieir neces-
sary cleric liire, stationery, fuel and otiier expenses in sucli manner and subject
to such limitations as may be prescribed by law, and in all cases where fees
are provided for, said compensation shall be paid only out of, and sl\all in no
instance exceed, the fees actually collected; Provided, that tlie compensation of
no officer sliall be increased or diminished during liis term of office. All fees or
allowances by tliem received, in excess of tlieir said compensation, shall be paid
into the County Treasury.
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History
This section dates in part troni an amendment adopted in 1952. That
amendment added the words "in such manner and subject to such limi-
tations as may be prescribed by law," and deleted the tollowing maximum
compensation limitations, shown in tabulai lorin:
County Population Maximum Compensation
Up to 20,000 $1,500.00
20,000 to 30.000 2.000.00
30,000 to 50.000 2,500.00
50,000 to 70,000 3,000.00
70,000 to 100,000 3,500.00
100,000 to 250.000 4,000.00
For eacli 100,000 For an additional
over 250,000 1.000.00
The original section was "dreamed up" by the 1870 Convention as a
device to eliminate the evils ol the tee system ot compensation. As pro-
posed by the Committee on Counties, the section, so tar as is pertinent
here, ditlered trom the section as finally adopted only in omitting the
limitation on compensation to fees actually collected and the incre-
mental compensation scale tor counties over a cjuarter of a million. Not-
withstanding the limited nature of the changes made, there was a pro-
longed debate on this section. It is clear that the delegates were deejjly
incensed over the existing system. One evil of the system was that, in the
more poj^idous counties, officials drew down excessive sums. This section
was aimed at that problem. Sections 11, 12 and 13 dealt with other evils
that will be discussed in connection with those sections. The drafters
of the proposed 1922 Constitution disposed of this entire problem by
simply ending fees on the cotmty level. In one section, county officers were
forbidden to receive to their own use any fees, fines, costs, and the like;
and in another section, the county board in all counties other than Cook
was empowered to .set the compensation of all officers, othier than school
superintendents, and the munber and compensation of their employees.
Long overdue relief from the stringencies of Section 10 came, of course,
with the adoption of the Ninth Amendment in 1952.
Explanation
This is the second of the five consecutive sections dealing with abuse
of the fee system. Prior to amendment in 1952, it was obviously the
most obnoxious of the stringent controls devised by the 1870 Conven-
tion. The error was in setting up a scale of maximum salaries in absolute
dollars. (Today, with a large number of elderly people living on fixed
incomes and watching the inexorable increase in the cost of living, it
seems unlikely that sucli a mistake will be made again.) Presumably, the
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section as amended in 1952 is tolerably workable. At least, there does
not appear to have been any litigation involving construction of the
amended section.
Prior to 1952 there was an incredible amount of litigation concerning
this section. Reading between the lines, one can easily discern various
devices adopted in an effort to get around the unreasonably low maxi-
mum salaries allowed under the original section. With the underlying
causes eliminated, it seems pointless to review these cases. It is worth
noting, however, that the constitutional power of the county board to
fix the compensation of all county officers is limited to the constitu-
tional county officers provided for in Section 8. {See McFariane v. Hotz,
401 111. 506 (1948).) The foregoing was not applicable to the county
judge. Evidently, the courts put him under Article VI to get away from
the salary limitations of the unamended Section 10. But this is all aca-
demic, since there is no longer a county judge. Likewise, the "no change
in compensation" proviso applies only to constitutional county officers,
but it must be recalled that statutory county officers, in effect, liave been
brought under the proviso by judicial gloss on Section 11 of Article IX.
(See supra, pp. 474-5.)
Comparative Analysis
Among those states providing for constitutionai county officers there
is a profusion of provisions concerning compensation, running from a
flat maximum of |5,000 in one state to a simple "shall be fixed by faw."
A few states have a "no change during term of office" provision. Some
seven states require all fees to be paid into the treasury and another
three states modify this with some iegisiative authority. A few states limit
payment of compensation to the amount collected in fees. In Kentucky,
the sheriff in any county with a population over 75,000 is to be paid a
salary, but his salary, that of his deputies, and office expenses may not
exceed 75 per cent of all fees collected. Several states call for classification
of counties for purposes of setting salary levels. At least two states speci-
ficafly permit special or local legislation for fixing compensation. A few
states provide for focat determination of salaries, usually for counties
that liave adopted a home rule charter. There is no comparable provi-
sion in the Model State Constitution.
Comment
See the Comment for Section 9. (Supra, p. 509.)
Fees of County and Township Officers
Sec. 11. The fees of township officers, and of each class of county officers,
shall be uniform in tlie class of counties to which they respectively belong. The
compensation herein provided for sliall ajjply only to officers hereafter elected.
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but ;ill ices establislied by spcciiil laws shall tease al the adoption of this Cloii-
stitutioii. and muIi officers shall receive only siuh fees as are pro\ ided by general
law.
History
One of the abuses ot the iec system thai a])pears to have been particu-
larly galling to the delegates in 1870 was the practice ol local officials
lobbying for special acts that increased the tees to be charged tor services
in their county. There was apparently general agreement that the new
Constitution sltould forever end this abuse, but devising a methoci proved
difficult. .Since the effort in this section and the next section was to de-
stroy a body ot statute hnv, the delegates got tangled up in all sorts of
legislative problems, such as repeal by implication, uncertainty as to
whether their new "statute" covered all existing legislative schemes, and
the like. There was also, apparently, a recognition of the need for some
flexibility in the limited authority to be granted to the legislature. The
end result of the deliberations was the adoption of .Sections 11 and 12,
wliich together comprise a constitutional scheme for legislating fee sclied-
ules and a quasi-statute repealing existing laws and providing for a
transition to new laws to be enacted.
The proposed 1922 Constitution discarded the obsolete matter in the
two sections and substituted one simple sentence reading:
"Fees of county and town officers, as provided by law, shall be uniform as to
classes of counties or towns and for this purpose there shall not be more than
three classes of counties." (art. Vltl, § 165.)
Explanation
It appears from the litigation invohing this section and Section 12
that "fees" refers to any system of compensation other than a salary for
a full-time employee. (See, e.g., People ex rel. Olson v. Atchison, T. R:
S.F. Ry., 889 111. 204 (1945). But see Board of Supervisors v. Johnson, 64
111. 149 (1872) (per diem for days w'orked was compensation, not
"fees.").) "Fees" presumably also refers to the fees that are charged to
the public. (See the discussion of the meaning of "fee" in the Explana-
tion of Sec. 9, supra, p. 507.)
Comparative Analysis
No other state has a comparable provision. Several states prohibit
special legislation concerning fees.
Comment
See the Comment for Section 9. (Supra, p. 507.)
Regulation of Fees by General Laws
Sec. 12. All laws fixing the fees of State, County and Township officers shall
terminate witli the terms, respectively, of those who may be in office at tlie
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meeting of the first General Assembly after the adoption of this constitution;
and the General Assembly shall, by general law, uniform in its operation, pro-
vide for and regulate the fees of said officers and their successors, so as to reduce
the same to a reasonable compensation for services actually rendered. But the
General Assembly may, by general law, classify the counties by population into
not more than three classes, and regulate the fees according to class.
This article shall not be construed as depriving the General Assembly of the
power to reduce the fees of existing officers.
History
This is the fourth of the five consecutive sections aimed at ending the
abuse of the fee system of compensating government officials. As noted
in the History of Section 11 (supra, p. 512), these two sections must be
read together. Except for limiting classes to three, this section speaks
solely to the immediate transition after adoption of the Constitution.
This is reflected in the comparable section of the proposed 1922 Con-
stitution. (Supra, p. 512.)
Explanation
In view of the limited purpose of this section, it is hardly worthwhile
to trace its judicial gloss. Nevertheless, it is worthy of note that the 1870
Convention left a loophole in the section, for the Supreme Court upheld
a statute granting the City Council of Chicago the authority to fix
municipal court fees. The Court pointed out that the clerk of the
municipal court is not included in "State, County and Township of-
ficers." (People ex rel. Soble v. Gill, 358 111. 261 (1934).)
There has, of coiuse, been litigation over whether more than three
classes of counties have been created. (See e.g.. People ex rel. City of
Peoria v. Weston, 358 111. 610 (1934).)
Comparative Analysis
No other state has a comparable provision. Several states authorize
classification of counties, and, in one instance, of townships, for the
purpose of setting compensation levels.
Comment
See the Comment for Section 9. (Supra, p. 509.)
Reports by Fee Officers
Sec. 13. Every person who is elected or appointed to any office in this State,
who shall be paid in whole or in part by fees, shall be required by law to make
a semi-annual report, under oath, to some officer to be designated by law, of all
his fees and emoluments.
History
This is the last of the sections designed to end abuses in the fee system.
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In the manner of good statute-drafting, it simply talis for reports to
assure proper sujiervision of the constitutional j^olicy. The section was
offered on the floor of the Convention, was quickly amended to add
"under oath," and accepted wittiout debate. In contrast to the simplifi-
cation of Sections II and 12 (see Histoty of Sec. 11, supra, p. 512), the
proposed 1922 Constitution not only preserved tliis section in substance
but added a recjuirement that evei^ such officer pay over "at least monthly
to some official designated by law all public moneys and interest thereon
received by or for liim."
Explanation
The Supreme Court has held that this section apj)lies to constituitonal
officers and not statutory officers. (People ex rel. North Am. Restaurant
v. Chetlain, 219 111. 248 (1905) (statute need not require official court
reporter to report his fees).)
Comparative Analysis
Approximately nine states provide for accounting by county officers,
eitlier in detail or by mandating appropriate legislation. Three states
require accoimting by township officers.
Comment
See the Comment for Section 9. (Supra, p. 509.)
Article XI
CORPORATIONS
Organization of Corporations
Sec. 1. No corporation shall be created by special laws, or its charter extended,
changed, or amended, except those for charitable, educational, penal or reforma-
tory purposes, which are to be and remain under the patronage and control
of the State, but the General Assembly shall provide by general laws, for the
organization of all corporations hereafter to be created.
History
The first section of the Corporations Article of the 1848 Constitution
provided that corporations, not possessing banking powers or privileges,
could be formed under general laws, and in the last section of the Article
instructed the legislature to "encourage internal improvements, by passing
liberal general laws of incorporation for that piupose." The first section
also prohibited creation of corporations by special acts, except for muni-
cipal purposes, but ended with a glorious loophole in the form of an
exception "in cases where, in the judgment of the general assembly, the
objects of the corporation cannot be attained under general laws."
From the fact that, in the 1870 Convention, the Committee on the
Legislative Department included corporate charters in its section pro-
hibiting special acts on various subjects (see History of Sec. 22 of Art. IV,
supra, p. 205), and the Committee on Miscellaneous Corporations in-
cluded a like prohibition, it is evident that the practice under the 1848
Constitution was to grant corporate charters by special act. There was
no debate on either of the proposals, and although the Convention chose
the Legislative Article wording, the Committee on Revision and Adjust-
ment placed the section in Article XI.
In the proposed 1922 Constitution, the prohibition on special acts of
incorporation and the exceptions thereto were placed in the section pro-
hibiting local and special legislation and the mandate to the legislature to
provide for corporations by general law was dropped.
Explanation
Judicial interpretation pertinent to this analysis consists of (1) cases
concerning reasonableness of classifications as a factor in distinguishing
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between general and special legislation, a subject discussed in the analysis
of Section 22 of Article IV (supra, pp. 212-15); (2) a determination that
only private corporations are covered, thus permitting special legislation,
not otherwise prohibited, chartering public corporations other than those
specifically exempted in this section (Owners ol Lands v. People ex rcl.
Stookey, 118 111. 296 (1885) (Drainage District)); and (.H) cases holding
that corporations chartered by special acts under the 1848 Constitution
continued in existence, and were subject to ajiplicablc provisions ol that
Constitution (Chicago Home lor Girls v. Carr, 300 111. 478 (1921)).
Comparative Analysis
Approximately three-fourths of the states authorize the formation of
corporations by general law and almost as many forbid formation by
special acts. About ten states have a "charitable, educational, penal or
reformatory" exception to the general law recjuirement. The Model
State Constitution is silent as to corporations but has a general pro-
hibition on special legislation. (See Comparative Analysis of Sec. 22,
Art. IV, supra, p. 224.)
Comment
There is no need for any affirmative statement about legislative power
to authorize the creation of corporations. Nor is there any need for a
specific section prohibiting the creation of corporations by special act.
(For that matter, there really is no need for an Article on Corporations
at all. This argument will be developed in the Comments to the various
sections of Art. XI.) The problem of special legislation is generic, and
such limitations as are appropriate should appear in a comprehensive
section in the Legislative Article. (See Comtnent to Sec. 22 of Art. IV,
supra, p. 226.)
Revocation of Certain Special Charters
Sec. 2. All existing charters or grants of special or exclusive privileges, under
which organization shall not have taken place, or which shall not have been in
operation within ten days from the time this constitution takes effect, shall
thereafter have no validity or effect whatever.
History
This section is the result of a protracted debate in the 1870 Convention
over a section designed to undo what the delegates evidently thought
was the damage previously done through the granting of corporate char-
ters by special acts. The section as originally proposed included, in ad-
dition to a slightly different version of Section 2, a provision that no
existing special act could thereafter be changed except by a two-thirds'
vote of the legislature. A learned discussion on constitutional principles
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ensued and it was eventually agreed that the United States Constitution's
prohibition on states' impairing the obligation of contracts, as well as
the general uncertainty oi the effect of such a limitation on legislative
power of amendment of special charters, made it advisable to be content
with killing off special charters that existed only on paper. The proposed
1922 Constitution omitted the section.
Explanation
Since this section is now obsolete, it serves no purpose to discuss the
judicial interpretations in the early years following adoption of the 1870
Constitution.
Comparative Analysis
There are apparently about 15 other states that had the same need to
kill off unused special act charters as did Illinois in 1870. There are three
states with a continuing provision covering revocation of unused charters,
but this would cover charters issued under a general corporation act.
Comment
This section is obsolete and should be dropped.
Election of Directors
Sec. 3. The General Assembly shall provide, by law, that in all elections for
Directors or managers of incorporated companies every stockholder shall have
the right to vote, in person or by proxy, for the number of shares of stock owned
by him, for as many persons as there are directors or managers to be elected,
or to cumulate said shares, and give one candidate as many votes as the
number of directors multiplied by the number of his shares of stock, shall
equal, or to distribute them on the same principle among as many candidates
as he shall think fit; and such directors or managers shall not be elected in any
other manner.
History
When this section was brought up for consideration in the Committee
of the Whole in the 1870 Convention, the delegate from Greene County
said: "As this is a matter for the Legislature to dispose of, I move to
strike it out." Joseph Medill, who, it will be recalled, was the principal
architect of cumulative voting in the House of Representatives (see
supra, pp. 136-8) immediately arose and said, in part:
"Mr. Chairman: I hope the committee will consider and reflect a little on this
section, before striking it out. My friend from Sangamon [Mr. Hay] suggests to
me that it is
'legislation.' Well, we have been doing a good deal of that, all along,
and this is not the first, nor will it be the last 'legislation.' A very large portion
of our work is
'legislative.' In one sense, it is all legislative in character.
"The object of this section is simply to protect the rights of stockholders in
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incorporated companies — to protect the right of every stockholder, and to pre-
vent the formation of rings to control absolutely, to abuse and plunder the prop-
erty of the minority of every incorporated conii)any. The object of this section is
not to take away any rights of the majority of the company, but to protect the
minority."
Another delegate from Cook County spoke vigorously in favor ol the
section, ending with these comments:
"I admit that it is a new principle sought to be incorporated in our Constitu-
tion, in the management of corporations. But with the reflection I have given it,
and the thought I have bestowed upon it, I believe that it is the assertion of a
principle of right, the insertion of wliich in the fundamental law can wrong
nobody. . . .
"I hope it will not be stricken out, but that we will give honest minorities
protection against the rapacity and dishonesty of reckless majorities in the man-
agement and control of all corporations within the limits of our authority.
"Mr. ENGLISH. Mr. Chairman: I withdraw my motion to strike out the
section. Having no interest in the matter myself, and supposing it was a matter
the General Assembly could provide for and control, I made the motion. But
inasmuch as gentlemen interested in it desire to have it adopted, I, having no
other objection to it than I have stated, withdraw the motion to strike out." (De-
bates 1666-67.)
No one spoke against the section and it was agreed to by voice vote.
The proposed 1922 Constitution preserved cumulative voting for banks
only.
Explanation
Since, as Mr. MecHlI conceded, this section is legislation, it is not
surprising that there has been considerable litigation arising out of the
section. The landmark case is Wolfscm i'. Avery (6 111. 2d. 64 (1955))
involving the battle for control of Montgomery Ward. There the Su{)reme
Court outlawed staggered terms for directors. Tlie Court has also out-
lawed nonvoting (for directors) preferred stock (People ex rel. Watseka
Tel. Co. V. Emmerson, 302 111. 300 (1922)); a bylaw allowing bondholders
to vote for directors (Durkee v. People ex rel. Askren, 155 111. 354 (1895));
a contract among stockholders giving one stockholder a long-term ir-
revocable power to vote all their stock (Luthy v. Ream, 270 111. 170 (1915)
(but the Court probably would have held the contract contrary to public
policy even without Section 3)): and a statute permitting directors to
fill vacancies on the board (Peojjle ex rel. Weber v. Cohn, 339 111. 121
(1930)). The Court has, however, upheld irrevocable voting trusts created
as part of a reorganization under the Bankruptcy Act. (Rittenberg v.
Murnighan, 381 111. 267 (1942).) The section is not applicable to not-for-
profit corporations. (Westlake Hosp. Ass'n v. Hlix, 13 111. 2d. 183 (1958).)
The Court has even stated that a corporation may vote its stockholding
in another corporation notwithstanding a statute prohil)iting such voting
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where the effect might be to lessen competition. (Hall v. Woods, 325*111.
114 (1927) (but the Court noted that it the result was to lessen competi-
tion, such result would be unlawful under Illinois laws).)
Comparative Analysis
There appear to be another ten states with comparable cumulative
voting requirements. It would appear at first glance that these are all in
constitutions adopted after 1870 and are presumably copied after the
Illinois provision. At least two states have adopted amendments cutting
back the blanket coverage of the section. In one of those cases, West
Virginia, the cutback did not include banking institutions.
Comment
Notwithstanding the fact that a few states appear to have copied this
unusual constitutional brain-child of Joseph Medill, it seems inadvisable
to preserve it. The intricacies of corporation law call for the flexibility
available only to the legislature. Moreover, the competitive nature of
state corporation laws tends to j)ut a state with unusual restrictions at
a disadvantage. There may very well be good arguments for cumulative
voting — several "professional" stockholder gadflies constantly recom-
mend it — but at the very least it seems to be a matter for legislative,
not constitutional, consideration.
Street Railroads
Sec. 4. No law shall be passed by the General Assembly, granting the right to
construct and operate a Street Railroad within any city, town, or incorporated
village, without requiring the consent of the local authorities having the control
of the street or highway proposed to be occupied by such street Railroad.
History
This was one of the sections proposed by the Committee on Miscel-
laneous Corporations. It was accepted without explanation or debate.
The proposed 1922 Constitution broadened the provision to read: "The
general assembly shall not grant the right to occupy the streets or public
grounds of any municipal corporation without its consent." (art. Ill, § 61.)
Explanation
It is to be noted that this section is not a referendum provision. The
operable words are "local authorities." These are the officials chosen by
the community to act for them in a formal manner, as, for example, by
ordinance duly adopted in accordance with the city charter. (See Potter
v. Calumet Elec. St. Ry., 158 F. 521 (7th Cir. 1908).) This requirement
for local consent gives the local authorities power to impose reasonable
conditions on the street railway company, but these conditions can be
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superseded l>y ihe state. {See City ot Chicago v. O'Connell, 278 111. 591
(1917).) The section conlers absolute power only to determine whether
or not the railway may operate and il so, upon wliich streets. (Id.) It is
also to be noted that the section is limited to street railways. Elevated
lines, for example, are not covered. (Hoyne v. Chicago R; O.P. Elev. R.R.,
291 111. II.S (1920).)
Comparative Analysis
There appear to be only a couple ot states with comparable require-
ments for local authority consent. (Strangely enough, the Index, the
source for comparable provisions, does not list Section 4 under the ap-
propriate heading.)
Comment
The underlying principle ot this provision is home rule. It houie rule
is to be given any significant status, it shoidd be by some general state-
ment, not by such limited, specific protections as evidenced by this sec-
tion. (Compare the 1922 proposal quoted above.) In any event, street
railroads are a thing of the past and this section as such can be con-
sidered obsolete.
State Banks Forbidden — Bank Laws— Referendum
Sec. 5. No State Banlc shall hereafter be created, nor shall the State own or be
liable for any stock in any corporation or joint stotlc company or association for
banking purposes, now created, or to be hereafter created. No act of the General
Assembly authorizing or creating corporations or associations, with banking
powers, whether of issue, deposit or discount, nor amendments thereto, shall go
into effect or in any manner be in force, unless the same shall be submitted to
a vote of the people at the general election next succeeding the passage of the
same, and be approved by a majority of all the votes cast at such election for or
against such law.
History
A section of the bill of rights of the 1818 Constitution provided that
there should be "no other banks or moneyed institutions in this state
than those already provided by law, except a state bank and its branches."
This was followed by a grant of power to the legislature to establish and
regulate the state bank. The 1848 Convention stomped on the state bank
with a vengeance. In the Legislative Article, as noted earlier (supra, p.
234), the section prohibiting lotteries also denied to the legislature the
power "to revive or extend the charter of the state bank, or the charter of
any other bank heretofore existing in the state." In the 1848 Article on
Corporations, one section was the same as the first sentence of Section 5
ex-
cept for the omission of the words "now created, or." A second section was
the same in substance as the second sentence of Section 5 except for the
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omission ot the words "whether ot issue, deposit or discount, nor amend-
ments thereto." The Committee on Banks and Currency ol the 1870 Con-
vention proposed as two sections what is now Section 5, that is, inchiding
the words noted above as omitted Irom the 1848 Constitution. When the
two sections and the otlier sections on banking were taken up in Commit-
tee of the Whole, the Chairman ol the Banknig and Currency Committee
did not discuss the several sections, which he said were "plain and simple,"
but contented himself with the observation that the United States was
providing currency and would presumably continue to do so, but just
in case the United States might change its mind, his Committee thought
it best to place "a necessary amount of limitation on the Legislature,
that they might not at any time inaugurate a State banking system that
might prove as disastrous as the banking law under which we organized
our banks in 1851 — for fear that the disastrous results might follow that
we experienced in 1857 and 18(")1, when our banks broke." (Debates 1678).
The proposed 1922 Constitution indicated total confidence in the con-
tinued issuance of currency by the Ignited States. In place of the first
sentence was the following:
"No law shall be passed authorizing any bank of issue or authorizing the state
to conduct, own any interest in or incur any liability for any banking business."
(art. Ill, §49.)
The referendum sentence was omitted. That sentence, of course, permits
the legislature to authorize banks with powers of "issue." Not long after
national banks were authorized, Congress enacted a tax on state bank
notes. That killed oif all state currency "issue." This was the state of
affairs in 1870, equally so in 1922, and continues to be so.
Explanation
There has been no occasion for an interpretation or ruling on the
first sentence of the section. As can be imagined, a lot of problems
have arisen under the second sentence, but they have substantially all
concerned the one question — Is the legislation at issue of the type
recjuired to be submitted to referendum? There seems to be little point
in reviewing the many cases. Assuming a general consistency over the
years, the essence of the judicial gloss is that a referendum is required
only for those legislative acts that affect "banking powers" as commonly
understood. Thus, on the one hand, a statute regulating corporations
generally might have to be read as not covering banks because the regula-
tion would affect corporate banking powers, whereas, on the other hand,
legislation specifically regulating banks might not be subject to referen-
dum because the regulations did not atfect banking powers. (Represent-
ative cases include Gorham v. Hodge, 6 111. 2d 31 (1955); American
Legion Post No. 279 v. Barrett, 371 111. 78 (1939); People v. Gould,
345 111. 288 (1931); Boor v. Tolman, 113 111. App. 322 (1904).)
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Comparative Analysis
State Bank: Two stales, Missouri and Oregon, sj^ecifically prohiijit a
state bank. Four more states prohibit state ownership ol bank stock. Iowa
specifically authorizes a state bank, i)ui only on an aduai specie basis.
Rejerenda: Ihree other states, Iowa, Kansas and Ohio, also require
a popular relerendinn on banking laws. Three states re(juirc a two-thirds
vote lor legislative passage ol banking bills.
Comment
It would seem ajjpropriate to take a leal Irom the proposed 1922 Con-
stitution and have confidence that the United States will continue to
provide a monetary system. It hardly seems necessary to go so tar as to
prohibit banks of issue, but the restriction, being so obviously unneces-
sary, is certainly harmless. It would also seem unnecessary these days
to prohibit the state from buying bank stock, but retention ol the pro-
hibition woidd be relatively harmless. It is possible to imagine a crisis
situation when the state might have to rescue state banks, and in such
a situation the state ought to have the power to secure any loans by such a
device as a pledge of the bank's stock, or the like. But the realities of bank-
ing today are national in scope, and in any crisis only the Federal Govern-
ment will be able to cope with the situation.
It would also seem appropriate to take a second leaf from the proposed
1922 Constitution and drop the referendum recjuirement. The voters
have enough to worry about without getting snarled up in the intricacies
of banking, a subject about which precious few people have even a little
knowledge. Moreover, with two coexisting banking systems, national
and state, it ill serves the state system to make it less flexible than the
national system.
A word about the ambiguity at the end of the section is appropriate.
The required majority appears to be of those voting on the question —
i.e., "votes cast at such election for or against such Laws." The Index,
page 51, states that the majority rec[uired is that of all votes cast at the
election. Professor Garvey, in his treatise on Illinois government, makes
the same statement. (N. Garvey, The Government and Administration
of Illinois 438 (1958).) The Banking Act of 1965 requires only a majority
of those voting on the question. (Law of July 23, 1965, §82, [1965] 111.
Laws 2071.)
Liability of Bank Stockholders
Sec. 6. No stockholder of a banking corporation or institution shall be indi-
vidually responsible or liable to its creditors for the liabilities of such banking
corporation or institution under any constitutional or statutory provisions hereto-
fore creating or declaring such stockholder responsibility or liability, provided,
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however, that any rights of creditors existing at the date of the adoption hereof
shall not be impaired hereby, provided that action to enforce such stockholder
responsibility or liability with respect to any existing bank liability which is
payable on demand or for which a cause of action has already accrued shall be
commenced within one year from the date of the adoption hereof, and with
respect to any other existing bank liability shall be commenced within one year
from the time when the cause of action therefor first hei»eafter accrues against
such banking corporation or institution, or could so accrue by demand. No law
creating or declaring any such stockholder responsibility or liability shall be
passed.
History
Hie original section as adopted in 1870 provided lor the traditional
donble liability of stockholders in banking institutions. The section was
a modification of a section in tlie 1848 Constittition which provided for
doidjle liability if the banking institution issued bank notes, "or any
kind of paper credits to circidate as money." On the floor of the 1870
Convention, three delegates proposed to make stockholders' liability
iMiIimited, but it Avas quickly pointed out that double liability was the
usual requirement and that unlimited liability would totally destroy the
possibility of corporate banking. Indeed, the Chairman of the Committee
on Banks and Cinrency said that the entire Article as proposed by his
Conmiittee "is almost a prohibition against starting banks in Illinois."
Unlimited liability was rejected by voice vote. (Debates 1679.) When the
Convention considered the action of the Conmiittee of the Whole, un-
limited liability was again proposed and under the rides a roll call vote
was taken. The proposed change was defeated 44 to 11, with 28 absent
or not voting.
The proposed 1922 Constitution retained the principle of double
liability, but a change was made to permit the legislature to regulate
the manner in which bank creditors could enforce their rights.
The 1952 amendment was designed simply to kill double liability,
but the amended section contains the detail necessary to avoid any im-
pairment of creditors' rights as of the time of adoption of the amend-
ment.
Explanation
In view of the fact that the 1952 amendment ended double liability,
there is no point in discussing the voluminous litigation produced by the
original section. No problems of interpretation appear to have arisen
imder the amendment.
Comparative Analysis
There is, of course, no constitutional provision concerning banking as
such in the United States Constitution, but it is worth recalling that the
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oii^inal Sctlion (> was moilclcil on ihc original National liaiik. Act, aiul
that the (loiil)le liability provision thcrcol was dropped as to new stock
in I9:i1, permissibly as to old stock in 19:'.7, and tully in 195.8. (See 12
U.S.C Sec. ()la (19(vl).) Six states appear to tontinue donble liability,
bnl in lour ol ilicni double lial)ilii\ is lilletl so Ion" as the bank is insined
through the Federal Deposit Insuiance Cx:)rporation. A seventh state
empowers the legislatine to impose doidjle liability.
Comment
This section, and the residting amendment, are an object lesson in
the dangers implicit in putting statutory material into a constitution.
Specie Payment— Bank Reports
Sec. 7. The suspension ot specie payments by Ijaiiking institutions, on tlieir
circulation, created by the laws of this State, sli;ill niver be permitted or sanc-
tioned. Every banking association now, or which inav hereaiter be, organi/xcl
imder the laws of this State, shall make and publisii a full and accurate cpiartcrly
statement of its affairs, (which shall be certified to, under oath, by one or more
of its officers) as may be pro\ided by law.
History
This section is a combination of t\vo sections proposed to the 1870
Convention. The first sentence, which was one of the sections, was, as a
practical matter, inoperative when adopted because the federal tax on
state bank notes made state currencv uneconomical. Fhe delegates were
aware of this, but as noted earlier {supra, p. 521), the restriction was in-
cluded jirst in case the United States Government changed its mind. In
presenting the second sentence, which was the other section, the Chair-
man of the Committee on Hanks and Ctnrency pointed out that in Illinois
theie were a lot of banking institutions, "in regard to the financial con-
dition of which nobody, except the parties engaged in them, know any-
thing." He went on to say: "A law recpiiring a publication of the business
affairs of the institution \vill give the people some idea of their soimd-
ness and of their financial condition, which I regard as very important."
(Debates 1678. Emphasis added.) The two sentences \\ere accepted with-
out debate. (Actually, when the Convention considered the action of the
Committee of the Whole, a previous amendment to correct a grammatical
error was ratified. This means that there is an omission in the Debates
as printed. See 1679 and 1685.)
The projjosed 1922 Constitiuion omitted this section. In the light of
that Constittition's prohibition of banks of issue (supra, p. 521), the first
sentence woidd have been meaningless. The second sentence is not limited
to publication of data concerning note issues, and it is not immediately
obvious why this sentence was also dropped. (The Official Explanation
makes no reference to omitted sections.)
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Explanation
The only judicial interpretation ot this section appears to be an ancient
case in which the Supreme Court said that the opening phrase ot the
second sentence cHd not legalize all banks in business in 1870, that is,
did not include those not legally constituted prior to 1870. (People ex rel.
Badger v. Loewenthal, 93 111. 191 (1879).)
The implementing statute lor the second sentence is Section 147 of
Chapter 161/9 of the Revised Statutes.
Comparative Analysis
Specie Payments: Four other states have a comparable provision.
Quarterly Report: Only one other state, Alabama, appears to require
a report, and that is a semi-annual report not specified to be under oath.
Comment
The first half of tliis section is clearly unnecessary in today's world,
and the second half is hardly earth-shaking in its fiuidamental nature.
Indeed, it is perhaps appropriate to point out that in any case where,
as here, there is an inijilementing statute on the books, the need for
continuing a constitutional reporting requirement seems nonexistent.
Surely, no legislator woidd seriously entertain a recpiest from Illinois
bankers to repeal the reporting rec^uirement once the constitutional com-
mand was removed. It is inconceivable that legislators would put them-
selves in the position of saying, in effect, "There is no need for quarterly
banking reports; the only reason we used to require them was that the
1870 Constitution forced us to."
Requirements of General Banking Law
Sec. 8. If a general banking law shall be enacted, it shall provide for the reg-
istry and countersigning, by an officer of State, of all bills or paper credit, designed
to circulate as money, and require security, to the full amount thereof, to be
deposited with the State Treasurer, in United States or Illinois State Stocks, to
be rated at ten per cent below their par value; and in case of a depreciation of
said stocks to the amount of ten per cent below par, the bank or banks owning
said stocks shall be required to make up said deficiency, by depositing additional
stocks. And said law shall also provide for the recording of the names of all stock-
holders in such corporations, the amount of stock held by each, the time of any
transfer thereof, and to whom such transfer is made.
History
This section, modeled after the requirements of the National Bank
Act, was proposed in the 1870 Convention as a contingency in case the
national banking system was ever disbanded. (As noted earlier, supra,
p. 521, it was not feasible under the national system for state banks to
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issue paper currency.) There was an impassioned debate on the door
over this section, but the argument was between the Populists and the
sound money people. The latter won, which is to say that so far as Illinois
was concerned, locally issued currency would have to l)e l)acked 100 per
cent plus by United States or Illinois bonds.
Since the proposed 1922 Constitution lorbade local currency, this sec-
tion was necessarily omitted.
Explanation
No occasion has ever arisen lor the first sentence ol this section to
come into operation and there has been no interpretation oi it. It is
not clear whether the requirement lor recording the names of all stock-
holders "in such corporations" is operative since there are no banks of
issue. (See Comment below.) The fact is that Section 115 (8) of Chaj)ter
I61/2 of tlie Revised Statutes (19G7) requires such recording, including
all transfers "not later than thirty days after such transfer."
Comparative Analysis
Money: Several states specifically prohibit the circulation of state cur-
rency. Approximately eight states have provisions comparaI)le to Illinois,
but these are, of course, also inoperable.
Stockholder Records: No other state appears to have a comparable con-
stitutional requirement.
Comment
The first sentence of this section is fairly obviously obsolete. The Com-
ment under Section 7 concerning reporting {supra, p. 525) is equally
applicable here.
It is appropriate to note a bit of careless draftmanship in the second
sentence of this section. The reference is to "such corporations." (At
least in this sentence, the grating word "said" was not used as in the
first sentence.) The problem is that "such" is a referent and there are no
"corporations" mentioned in the first sentence. If one is to go back to
Section 7, an improj:>er assunqjtion, the only references are to banking
"institutions" and "association." If one is to go all the way back to the
original Section 6, the reference is "banking corporation or institution."
Although this is an equally improper assumption, Section 6 is probably
the correct reference because there is an obvious need to have an accurate
list of stockholders for purposes of imposing double liability.
Railroad Corporations
Sec. 9. Every railroad corporation organized or doing business in this State,
under the laws or authority thereof, shall have and maintain a public office or
place in this State for the transaction of its business, where transfers of stock
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shall be made and in which shall be kept, for public inspection, books, in which
shall be recorded the amount of capital stock subscribed, and by whom; the names
of the owners of its stock, and the amounts owned by them respectively; the
amount of stock paid in and by whom; the transfers of said stock; the amount
of its assets and liabilities, and the names and place of residence of its officers.
The directors of every railroad corporation shall, annually, make a report, under
oath, to the Auditor of Public Accounts, or some officer to be designated by law,
of all their acts and doings, which report shall include such matters relating to
railroads as may be prescribed by law. And the General Assembly shall pass laws
enforcing by suitable penalties the provisions of this section.
History
This section, as offered, was the first section ot the Article proposed
by the Committee on Railroad Corporations of the 1870 Convention.
When the Committee of the Whole took up the Article, the first words
after the reading of the section by the Clerk were:
"Mr. HAINES, of Lake. Mr. Chairman: The word 'railroad' seems to have
been omitted before
'corporations.' I move to insert it."
"Mr. ALLEN, of Crawford. The section was intended to embrace all corpo-
rations." (Debates 1637.)
After a short debate, Mr. Haines' motion was agreed to. Three other
changes were made before the section reached its present form. One added
the requirement for a transfer office in Illinois, one added the sentence
requiring an annual report under oath, and the third removed a command
that the legislature pass the penalty laws referred to "at its first regular
session after the adoption of this Constitution." In connection with the
last-mentioned change, Mr. Fox, a delegate from Schuyler County, irioved
to strike the whole sentence, saying:
"I think the provision is merely mandatory, and will amount to nothing, as
there is no power to enforce a mandatory constitutional provision. I am certain
it will amount to nothing, if the Legislature has no more respect for this Con-
vention, than the Convention has shown for the Legislature." (Id.)
There was some parliamentary by-play, but no one responded to Mr.
Fox. By voice vote, they rejected his motion. (Id. at 1638).
The section was omitted from the proposed 1922 Constitution.
Explanation
The Supreme Court has noted that this section, and the remaining
sections of Article XI, are aimed at "steam trunk line" railroads and not
commuter lines. (People v. City of Chicago, 349 111. 304 (1932).)
The requirements of the first sentence of this section are implemented
by Sections 7 and 30 of Chapter 114 of the Revised Statutes (1967) in
substantially the language of the Constitution. Section 31 provides for a
fine of not less than $ 4,000 for failure to carry out the statutory require-
ments. The reporting requirement of the second sentence, including
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appropriate penalties, is now covered by Section 19 ol C^hapter 114-/>
of the Revised Statutes (1967) which calls ior annual reports to the Com-
merce Conniiission Irom all pul)li( utilities. Prior to 19.H9, there were
provisions in Chajiter 114 specifically imj^lenKnting the second sentence
ol this section, including suitable penalties.
Comparative Analysis
Approximately six states have some or all ot the several requirements
contained in the first sentence of this section. About eight states require
reports to be made to an appropriate state office.
Comment
Inasmuch as all of the requirements of this section are embodied in
existing statutes, it seems appropriate, for the reasons set forth earlier
(supra, p. 525), to drop this section.
Railroads — Personal Property
Sec. 10. The rolling stock, and all other movable property belonging to any
railroad company or corporation in this State, shall be considered personal
property, and shall be liable to execution and sale in the same manner as the
personal property of individuals, and the General Assembly shall pass no law
exempting any such property from execution and sale.
History
This was the second section of the Article proposed by the Committee
on Railroad Corporations of the 1870 Convention. The section was ac-
cepted unchanged, without debate, and without a recorded vote.
The proposed 1922 Constitution shortened the section to read:
"Rolling stock and other movable property of common carriers shall be sub-
ject to execution sale." (art. XII, § 227.)
Explanation
Prior to 1870, the Supreme Court had held that rolling stock was realty,
at least for the purpose of coverage by railroad mortgages. (Titus v.
Mabee, 25 111. 232 (1851).) Apparently, the sole purpose of this section
was to overrule the Court. The United States Supreme Court did not
so read the section, however, and went right ahead and included rolling
stock under an equity decree of foreclosure and sale under a mortgage
of an entire railroad. (Hammock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 105
U.S. 77 (1881).) Presumably, this section has had no significant effect on
the body of private law governing creditors' rights.
Comparative Analysis
Apparently, some ten states besides Illinois have a comparable pro-
vision.
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Comment
Whatever value this section may have had in 1870, it surely has long
since outlived its usefulness. In the high finance of railroad operations,
including the practice of mortgaging rolling stock by ecjuipment trusts,
a provision like Section 10 is probably no more than an inconvenience
to the financial lawyers who arrange for and draft the many papers in-
volved in railroad financing.
Railroad Consolidation
Sec. II. No railroad corporation shall consolidate its stock, property or
franchises with any other railroad corporation owning a parallel or competing
line; and in no case shall any consolidation take place except upon public notice
given, of at least 60 days, to all stockholders, in such manner as may be pro-
vided by law. A majority of the directors of any railroad corporation, now
incorporated or hereafter to be incorporated by the laws of this State, shall be
citizens and residents of this State.
History
Early in the deliberations of the 1870 Convention, it was evident that
there were unusually strong feelings about the power of railroads. Several
resolutions were offered, one of which included the concept of preservation
of competition. This was, of course, more than a decade before the passage
of the Interstate Commerce Act and more than two decades before
passage on the Sherman Act. The Article submitted by the Committee on
Railroads included a section consisting of the first sentence of what is
now Section 11. In Conmiittee of the Whole, the proposal was accepted
without debate.
When the section was taken up by the Convention proper, proposals
were made to prohibit all consolidations. After much debate, in the
course of which several delegates, particularly Joseph Medill — "It is
a mere sieve, through which everything can run, without any trouble at
all. . . ." —
, pointed out that there was no real way to prevent consoli-
dations, the Convention accepted the original section with the addition
of the sentence concerning Illinois directors. (Debates 1718-20.)
The section was omitted from the proposed 1922 Convention.
Explanation
Notwithstanding Mr. Medill's pessimistic observation quoted above,
the first half of the first sentence operated to prevent a merger of two
competing belt line railroads in the East St. Loins area. (East St. Louis
Connecting Ry. v. Jarvis, 92 F. 735 (7th Cir. 1899).)
No other significant case appears to have arisen, but since the railroad
world is essentially interstate and regulated by the United States Govern-
ment, this is not surprising.
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Comparative Analysis
Competing Lines: About a do/en states join Illinois in prohibiting
the consolidation of
"parallel or competing" lines. A few states have other
restrictions on consolidation, jjarticidarly with foreign corporations.
Kentucky and Wwishington also prohibit a railroad's combining with
another common carrier whereby the earnings of the one doing the car-
rying are shared with the one not doing the carrying.
Public Notice: Four other states recjuire at least 60 days' public notice
of a proposed consolidation.
Residence of Directors: No other state has a comparable provision.
Comment
In the light of the wave of railroad mergers, as well as every other
kind, which the orthodox anti-trusters have been imable to stem, it seems
inilikely that this little local prohibition will have much effect. In any
event, it seems tuilikely that in the foreseeable future the railroads
of Illinois will have such political power that the legislature would fail
to protect the public against monopolistic practices. As was proposed in
1922, this section could safely be omitted.
Railways as Public Highways— Regulation of Rates
Sec. 12. Railways heretofore constructed or that may hereafter be constructed
in this State, are hereby declared public highways, and shall be free to all persons,
for the transportation of their persons and property thereon, under such regula-
tions as may be prescribed by law. And the General Assembly shall, from time
to time, pass laws establishing reasonable maximum rates of charges for the
transportations of passengers and freight on the different railroads in this State.
History
The essence of this section was accepted by the 1870 Convention, sitting
in Committee of the Whole, as a substitute for a section proposed by the
Committee on Railroads. (That proposed section eventually was adopted
as Sec. 15. See infra, p. 534.) When the proposed Article on Railroads
was considered by the Convention proper, there was a learned debate
that, paradoxically, ran in opposite directions. Some delegates thotight
the section added nothing, that it really only was declarative of the com-
mon law rules for common carriers. Other delegates were worried that
the section went too far, that it purported to give the legislature power
that, under the United States Constitution, would be invalid. At the
conclusion of the debate, the section was accepted and referred to the
Committee on Revision and Adjustment, including a final clause for
forfeiture of charters. (See the final clause of Sec. 15, infra, p. 534.) For
some unexplained reason, that clause was omitted when the Corporation
Article was reported back for final action.
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The proposed 1922 Constitution retained the substance of this section.
Explanation
Judicial interpretation of this section has, in the main, dealt with tech-
nical matters. The first sentence, of course, adds up to the declaration
that railroads are common carriers and as such, to use the honored term,
are "affected with the public interest." That term became distorted in
the decades of judicial interference with economic regulation and is now
of little significance. But the concept that some businesses are not privi-
leged to pick and choose their customers is still valid, and the first sentence
ot this section is one way of expressing that concept in the area of trans-
portation. The foregoing comment reinforces the remarks of some dele-
gates in 1870 that the sentence did not in fact add anything to the tradi-
tional common law.
The only important case dealing with the second sentence held that
the legislature could both set a maximum rate for transportation and
authorize an administrative agency to fix a rate lower than the legislated
rate. (State Pub. Util. Comm'n ex rel. Mitchell v. Chicago &: W. T. Ry.,
275 111. 555 (1916).) Judicial review of the reasonableness of any rate set
has traditionally been a matter of due process of law. (See discussion
of Sec. 2 of Art. II, supra, pp. 9-14.)
Comparative Analysis
Public Highivay: Some 17 states declare railroads to be public high-
ways. Thirteen of the states pile Pelion on Ossa by also declaring rail-
roads to be common carriers. Two states are content to declare them com-
mon carriers.
Maximum Rates: Four states have comparable provisions. Oklahoma
sets a maximum rate of two cents per mile for "first class" passenger fares,
"unless otherwise provided by law," with a proviso that the Corporation
Commission can exempt any railroad that offers satisfactory proof that
it cannot earn a
"just compensation" unless it charges more than two
cents per mile.
Comment
In the light of the comprehensive statutory system for the regulation
of all public utilities provided in Chapter 111% of the Revised Statutes
(1967), this section seems unnecessary.
Railroads— Stock— Bonds
Sec. 13. No railroad corporation shall issue any stock or bonds, except for
money, labor or property, actually received, and applied to the purposes for
which such corporation was created; and all stock dividends, and other fictitious
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increases of the capital stock or indebtedness of any such corporation, shall be
void. The capital stock of no railroad corporation shall be increased for any
purpose, except upon giving sixty days public notice, in such manner as may
be provided by law.
History
The essence of the first sentence of this section was proposed by the
Committee on Railroads of the 1870 Convention and was initially ac-
cepted with a minor change to make it applicable only to railroads. 1 he
second sentence was proj^osed from the floor as an additional section
and was accepted without debate. The two sentences were accepted by
the Convention proper after one minor technical correction. The Com-
mittee on Revision and Adjustment combined the sentences to make
Section 13 of the Corporations Article. The section was omitted from the
proposed 1922 Constitution.
Explanation
There have been some important cases construing this section, but,
interestingly enough, they probably say no more than would have been
said without the section. For example, the Court held that a prima facie
case under the section is not made out by an allegation that more secur-
ities had been issued than
"money, labor or property actually received."
Fraud must be alleged. (People v. Union Consol. Elev. Ry., 263 111. 32
(1914). Fraud was alleged the next time around. People v. Union Elev.
R.R., 269 III. 212 (1915).) It is' not possible to be certain what courts
would have done in the absence of Section 13, but it seems fairly clear
that the law would have developed as it did had the Constitution been
silent. The foregoing comments do not, of course, apply to the second
sentence of the section.
Comparative Analysis
This provision appears to be unique to Illinois.
Comment
Except for the honor of having a unique provision, there seems to be
no reason for keeping this section.
Railroads— Eminent Domain
Sec. 14. The exercise of the power, and the right of eminent domain shall
never be so construed or abridged as to prevent the taking by the General As-
sembly, of the property and franchises of incorporated companies already orga-
nized, and subjecting them to the public necessity the same as of individuals.
The right of trial by jury shall be held inviolate in all trials of claims for com-
pensation, when, in the exercise of the said right of eminent domain, any
incorporated company shall be interested either for or against the exercise of
said right.
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History
At the conclusion oi the consideration ot the proposal oi the Committee
on Railroads in the 1870 Convention, a rejjort was received from the
Committee on the Judiciary proposing the addition ol three sections, the
first two of which arc the two sentences of Section 14. The third proposed
section purported to preserve the right of users of railroads to have a
jury trial in cases where the railroads denied service. There was consider-
able confusion among the delegates concerning this third proposal and
some disposition to feel that the bill of rights would provide adequate
protection to the public. In the end, the proposal was rejected. The other
parts were accepted ^vith little opposition.
With a minor reservation, this section was dropped from the proposed
1922 Constitution. In one of the sections concerning the powers of the
City of Chicago, the proposed Constitution made it clear that the City's
power of eminent domain covered "public utilities and the privileges
or licenses held in connection therewith."
Explanation
The Constitution as printed at the end of the proceedings of the 1870
Convention did not have headings for each section. The print did have
the word "Railroads" inserted at the end of Section 8 and before Sec-
tion 9. (The word "Banks" appears between Sections 4 and 5, and
the word
"Corporations" heads the Article.) (Debates 1877.) The inter-
esting thing about this is that of the seven sections following the word
"Railroads," all except Section 14 are by their terms clearly limited
to railroads. Section 14 refers in the first sentence to
"incorporated com-
j:)anies already organized" and in the second sentence to "any incorpo-
rated company." It is clear from the debates that, at least as to the first
sentence, the delegates were thinking only of railroads. For example:
"Mr. ROSS. I would ask the gentleman whether that refers to railroads here-
after to be built, as well as those now built?
"Mr. CHURCH. In the case of railroads established under this Constitution,
there will be no necessity to apply the provision, as the whole power of regu-
lation will be reserved by the clause in tlie bill of rights, 'No irrevocable franchise
or privilege shall be granted.' Also, by the reservation in the legislative article,
which provides for full control in the General Assembly of all charters hereafter
granted." (Debates 1656.)
There was no clear indication of the delegates' understanding of the
words
"any incorporated company." The Supreme Court has spoken as if
the second sentence is not limited to railroads. (See e.g., Wabash R.R.
V. Coon Run Drainage & Levee Dist., 194 111. 310 (1901).) The difficulty
with that case, and others, is that the complainant was, in fact, a railroad.
Moreover, the statute in question was held defective in its jury trial
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provisions under both Section 11 and Section 1 :> ol Article II {suj)ra,
pp. ')(), ();;), which also call lor trial by jury in (ondenmation cases.
Comparative Analysis
Some 20 states authorize the taking ol the jjroperty ol cor|)orations.
Only Illinois limits such power to corjjoralions "already oigani/.ed." The
I'oregoing reads as it the Illinois power ol eminent domain is less extensive
than that ol the other states. This is not true, just as Section 11 was lui-
doubtedly unnecessary wlien adopted, so the reservation ol powei over
corporations in tlie other states \vas j^robably unnecessaiy. Approximately
ten states provide lor trial by jury in condenniation cases. Another five
states limit the privilege ol jury trial to cases otlier than a taking by the
state. Two states limit the prixilege to cases ol the taking ol jm ivate roads.
Comment
An eminent domain jjrovision is essential, i)ut it belongs in the bill
ol rights. There are important [iolicy cjuestions in the determination ol
both the substance and procedure ol the jnovision, but these have already
been considered. (See Sec. 1-^ of Art. II, .supra, p. !'}(').) There is no earthly
need lor a separate section concerning "any corpoiation," already organ-
ized or not.
In all fairness to the 1870 Convention, the foregoing categorical dis-
missal of this section would not have been an appropriate comment at
that time. As the c^tioted explanation by Mr. Church indicates, the dele-
gates were worried about the status ol then-existing corporations that
might have received special privileges by special acts. The thrust ol the
section was to try to kill off any claim that such an existing corporation's
property coidd not be taken by the state. Under the provision of the
United States Constitution forbidding the impairment of the obligation
of contracts (art. I, § 10.), Section 14 probably did not in fact add any-
thing, but the delegates were certainly justified in trying.
Regulation of Freight and Passenger Rates
Sec. 15. The General Assembly shall pass laws to correct abuses and prevent
unjust discrinu'nation and extortion in the rates of freight and passenger tariffs
on the different railroads in this State, and enforce such laws by adecjuate penal-
ties, to the extent, if necessary for that purpose, of forfeiture of their property
and franchises.
History
As noted earlier (supra, p. 5.^0), this was one ol the sections proposed
by the Committee on Railroads ol the 1870 Convention. \V^hat is now
Section 12 was substituted on the lloor, but, as the Convention was com-
pleting action on the railroad provisions, this section was proposed again.
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The argument was that the courts might decide that the legislature had
no power to set maximum rates, as provided tor in Section 12, and that
this Section 15 would give the legislature something to fall back on.
The argimrent was convincing enough to lead to adoption ot the section
by a vote ol 32 to 27, with 24 not voting or absent.
The stibstance ot this section \vas retained in the proposed 1922 Con-
stitution.
Explanation
In an early case, the Supreme Court substantially emasculated this
section. First, the Court noted that under the legislature's inherent "police
power," it could enact laws prohibiting unjust and tmreasonable dis-
crimination in rates. Second, the Court noted that, at common law, com-
mon carriers had to charge reasonable rates and cotUd not unjustly
discriminate. Third, the Court said that all this section did was to tell
the legislature to carry out the traditional policy. Fointh, the Court said
that the common law prohibited only unjust and imreasonable discrim-
inations and by implication, theretore, the legislature could not prohibit
discriminations not luijust and unreasonable by common law. Finally,
the Court held that a statutory provision recjuiring the torteiture of all
franchises for a first otfense violated this section since the penalty of
forfeitine should be invoked only in cases of extreme necessity, after more
lenient penalties, stich as graduated fines, had proved to be ineffectual.
(Chicago & A. R.R. v. People ex rel. Koerner, 67 111. 11 (1873).)
Comparative Analysis
Approximately 14 states have a comparable provision concerning unjust
discrimination.
Comment
Since the Supreme Court made it clear over a century ago that this
section was both unnecessary and substantially ineffective, no harm can
come from omitting it.

Article XII
MILITIA
Membership
Sec. 1. The militia of the State of Illinois shall consist of all able-bodied male
persons, resident in the State, between the ages of eighteen and forty-five, except
such persons as now are, or hereafter may be, exempted by laws of the United
States, or of this State.
History
The substance of this section first appeared in the 1818 Constitution
and was carried over into the 1848 Constitution unchanged. There was
one significant difference between that section and the present one: only
"free" persons were in the militia and "negroes, mulattoes and Indians"
were specifically excluded. The Committee on Military Affairs of the
1870 Convention proposed the section in substantially its present form,
but a minority report was filed which specifically preserved the old
provision limiting militia service to white men. There was a short,
sharp debate in the Committee of the Whole and upon a division, the
committee voted 23 to 18 against the white only proposal. There was
also a motion to change the minimum age from 18 to 21. The delegate so
moving observed that "while we will not permit a young man to vote,
we shoidd not compel him to do military service." The motion was
defeated by voice vote. (Deljates 8(31.) The proposed 1922 Constitution
retained the section unchanged except for the removal of some of the
commas.
Explanation
No problems appear to have arisen luider this section. In the early
case of Dunne v. People (94 111. 120 (1879)), the Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality of the section against the claim that Congress had
exclusive power over militias.
The present statutoi-y scheme, as provided lor in Chapter 129 of the
Revised Statutes (§220.01 (1967)), first defines those subject to military
duty in the Illinois State Militia as "[a]ll able-bodied citizens of this State
and all other able-bodied residents in this State who have declared their
intention to become citizens of the United States, between the ages of 18
and 45, except such as are expressly exempted by the laws of the United
States and the State of Illinois...." The Illinois State Militia is then
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divided into tlie Organi/cil and ilic linorgani/cd Militia. Tlie loinier
is the National Guard and the Naval Militia; the latter are all others
within the definition. When the Organi/cd Militia is called into federal
service, the Governor by proclamation may call into existence the State
Guard to serve initil the emergency is over. The State Guard woidd be
formed out ol the Unoiganized Militia and oihei \oIunteers. The State
Guard is strictly a war-time expedient.
Comparative Analysis
Approximately 19 states have a j)rovision nuuh like that of Illinois. A
couple of states have different age limits, and a few states leave details up
to the legislature. The new Michigan (Constitution omits the detailed
article on the militia, one section of which was similar to Section 1,
and sidistitutes the following:
" Fhe militia shall be organized, ecjuipped
and disciplined as provided by law." (art. ill, i^ 1.) New York had
a detailed article on the militia which was removed by an amendment
in 1962 that states that everyone has an obligation to defend the state,
and provides for statutory imj^lcmentation as in the new Michigan
Constitution. The Model State Constitution is silent on the subject
except for the "'Commander-in-C^hief' provision of the Executive Article.
(See Coinparalh'c Analysis of Sec. 14, Art. V, supra, pjx 291-2.).
Comment
In the Compnratix>e Analysis of the Micliigan Constitution, prepared
in 1961, the chapter on the Militia Article was written by Brigadier
General (Retired) Philip C. Pack, a former Judge Advocate General of
Michigan. After discussing the several federal laws on the subject, he
conclutled that "to all practical intents annd [sic] purposes, the United
States has taken over the organized militia" and that the United States
"has placed such an inclusive priority label upon the unorganized, in-
choate militia by [tfie Universal Military Training and Service Act of
19.51] as to leave the states virtually without any manpower pool potenti-
ally responsive to state military draft." (C.A.M.C. at xv-3.)
In his study, State Constitutions: The Shape of the Document (19()8),
Professor Robert B. Dishman concludes a discussion of the militia with
this recommendation:
"Even if the militia provisions in our state constitutions were not so archaic,
it would be well to drop them altogether. If this were done, only two references
to the militia would be needed in the constitution. One would simply declare
the governor to be the commander-in-chief of the National Guard (or organized
militia), except when called into the service of the United States. . . . The other
would simply empower the legislature to provide for the organization, equipment
and regulation of an adequate militia in conformity with federal laws governing
the armed forces of the United States. This has already been done in Missouri
and a few other states." (Id. at 47.)
Art. XII, § 2 539
A comment is in order concerning the statutory definition. It difi:ers
Irom the constitutional definition in two
respects: the word "male" is
omitted, and "persons" has become citizens or aliens who have taken
out first papers. From the context ot the definition, one can conclude that
"citizen oi the State" means "citizen oi the United States who resides
in this State." This meaning grows out ot the Fourteenth Amendment
which.provides that all "j^ersons born or naturalized in the United States,
and subject to the juridiction thereof, are citizens of the United States
and of the State wherein they reside." It is a logical fallacy, however, to
conclude that citizens of Illinois can only be United States citizens resi-
dent therein. All that the Fourteenth Amendment commands is that
a state's definition of "citizen" must include United States citizens
resident therein. To be sure, the distinction is technical, but, as always,
it is appropriate to be accurate, and unless Illinois specifically defines
and limits state citizenshi]j to United States citizenship and residency in
Illinois, it is better to avoid the undefined term "citizen of this State."
Organization — Equipment— Discipline
Sec. 2. The General Assembly, in providing for the organization, equipment
and discipline of the militia, shall conform as nearly as practicable to the regula-
tions for the government of the armies of the United States.
History
At the end of the section that is now Section 1, the 1818 and 1848
Constitutions added the words "and shall be armed, ecjuipped and trained
as the general assembly may provide, by law." Section 2 as proposed to the
1870 Convention purported to gi\e the legislature power to act in con-
nection Avith the militia, but only in conformance with federal regula-
tions. A delegate protested that it was unnecessary to grant such power
and moved to strike the section. The Committtee Chairman argued that
the section was important because of the conformance limitation on the
legislature's power, but when the protesting delegate then proposed a
substitiue not essentially different from Section 2, he was voted down.
In some unexplained way, the Committee on Revision and Adjustment
changed the section to meet the original objection. (As a general ride,
a Committee on Revision and Adjustment, or Style and Arrangement,
is not permitted to make substantive changes in the Articles referred to
it by the Convention. The change made in this instance was not a change
in substance in constitutional fact, but it was a change that the Con-
vention sitting in Committee of the Whole had specifically rejected.)
The race question came up again in the consideration of this section.
An amendment was proposed that would have required segregated troop
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units. This was voted clown. A proposal was also made to add a section
prohibiting a Negro troni ever coinnianding white militia. This was also
voted down. (Debates 865. There is an error ot some sort in the transcript,
lor ihc loll call vote shows the proposal passing. The vote may have
been on a motion to table.)
The proposed 1922 Constitution omitted this section.
Explanation
No questions appear to have arisen under this section. The statute
governing the militia contains a similar section. (111. Rev. Stat. ch. 129,
i^ 220.41 (1967).)
Comparative Analysis
Five states substantially dujjlicate the Illinois section. Another nine
states have minor variations in wording, and four states use the negative
lormulation ot providing that the legislature shall act in a manner not
inconsistent with federal requirements.
Comment
The very fact that a section like this one is included in an Article on
the Militia reinforces the recommendation c[uoted earlier, supra, pp.
538-9, that the rest of the Article be drojjpcd.
Officers
Sec. 3. .\11 militia officers shall be commissioned by the Governor, and may
hold their commissions for such time as the General Assembly may provide.
History
The 1818 Constitution provided that officers should hold their com-
missions
"during good behavior, or until they reach the age of 60 years."
The 1848 Constitution read "for such time as the legislature may pro-
vide." The section as originally offered to the 1870 Convention combined
the two earlier ideas by providing that commissions be held "during good
beiiavior, or for such time as the General Assembly may provide." A
proposal to strike "during good behavior, or" was immediately accepted
by the Chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs, and the section
sailed through without debate. The proposed 1922 Constitution removed
the comma from the sentence.
Explanation
The implementing statute. Section 220.40 of Chapter 129 of the Revised
Statutes, provides that officers in the Organized Militia must have United
States Commissions. (See also 111. Rev. Stat. ch. 129, §§ 220.37, 237, 240-242
(1967).)
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Comparative Analysis
Eleven states provide that all officers are commissioned by the governor.
Some states make distinctions bet^veen low-ranking and certain high-
ranking officers, ret;[uiring the latter to be confirmed by the legislature,
or the senate. In a few states, certain officers are to be elected by their
men. In at least one state, the adjutant- and inspector-general are elected
by the voters for toin-year terms. Three states join Illinois in leaving
the term of commissions to the legislature. One state provides that the
term shall not be longer than six years.
Comment
Since the Organized MiUtia is effectively controlled by the United
States, the many state provisions are not significant. Presinnably, most
of those states have a comparable statutory provision making a federal
commission a condition precedent to a state commission. Except for the
very highest ranks, particularly the adjutant-general, the Governor's com-
missioning act is probably pro fortna.
Freedom from Arrest
Sec. 4. The militia shall, in all cases, except treason, felony or breach of the
peace, be privileged from arrest during ttieir attendance at musters and elections,
and in going and returning from the same.
History
This section is in substance the same as the section originally adopted
in 1818 and carried unchanged into the 1848 Constitution except for the
omission of t^vo words. Under the earlier Constitutions, the words "of
officers" followed "elections." Under those Constitutions, commanding of-
ficers from captains through major generals were elected to their positions
by the members of the units from companies through divisions, respec-
tively. The committee report in the 1870 Convention omitted these
provisions. In order to make Section 4 consistent wath the omission,
the committee dropped the words "of officers." No one mentioned the
fact that this change turns the section in part into a suffrage section
duplicating Section 3 of Article VII. (Supra, p. 391.) The proposed 1922
Constitution retained the section, but inserted the word "military" in
front of "elections." Interestingly enough, the Official Explanation states
that the "section is the same as Sec. 4, Art. XII, constitution of 1870."
(P.N.C. 45.)
Explanation
The only interpretation of this section appears to have been the opinion
of the Attorney General discussed earlier in connection with Section 14
of Article IV. (See Explanation, supra, p. 174.)
542 Art. XII, § 5
Comparative Analysis
Seven otiier states have a prixilege from arrest section. Only one other
state refers to "elections," but three states refer to "elections of officers."
Comment
Apait from the meaningless inclusion of "elections," there is nothing-
wrong with the i)ro\ ision excejjt that it is unnecessary and j^rohahly in-
effective in any real sense. (See discussion of the "treason, felony or
breach of the peace" exception, supra, p. 174.)
Preservation of Records
Sec. 5. The military records, banners and relics of the State, shall l:)e preserved
as an enduring memorial of the patriotism and valor of Illinois, and it shall be
the duty of the General Assembly to provide by law for the safe-keeping of the
saine.
History
This hortatory salute to the men in blue was offered by the Committee
upon Military Affairs to the 1870 Convention without explanation or
justification. U)Jon the reading of the section by the Clerk, the following
"debate" took place:
"Mr. FOX. Mr. Chairman: f object to that section because it is a species of
special legislation. 1 am opposed to all legislation in the organic law.
"The cjuestion being upon the adoption of section five, it was agreed to."
(Debates 863.)
The proposed 1922 Constitution, coming on the heels of World War I,
preserved the sentiment in an aj^propriately plural wording:
"The military records, banners and relics of the state shall be preserved as
enduring memorials of the patriotism and valor of the men of Illinois." (art.
XI, § 215)
Explanation
Obviously, there have been no problems in interpreting the section. In
accordance with the constitutional command, the legislatiae has pro-
vided for the
"safe-keeping of the same" in Section 220.25 of Chapter
129 of the Revised Statutes (1967).
Comparative Analysis
Seven states join Illinois in directing the legislature to provide for
preservation of records, banners and relics.
Comment
This section is both unnecessary and harmless. Since no one wishes to
appear to be opposed to patriotism and valor, it may not be possible to
drop the section.
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Conscientious Objectors
Sec. 6. No person having conscientious scruples against bearing arms, shall be
compelled to do militia duty in time of peace: Provided, such person shall pay an
equivalent for such exemption.
History
The substance ot this section appeared in both the 1818 and 1848 Con-
stitutions. In the 1870 Convention, the Committee on Military Affairs
omitted the section from its proposed Article. The delegate who had ob-
jected to the inclusion of Section 5 (supra, p. 542) offered the conscientious
objector section as it had appeared in the 1818 and 1848 Constitutions.
According to the transcript there were shouts of "That's right" wlien the
Clerk read the section, and it was accepted by voice vote without debate.
The final wording came from the Committee on Revision and Adjust-
ment.
Tlie proposed 1922 Constitution added this section to Section 1 and
changed the thrust from the positive to the negative, thus: "No person,
because of conscientious scruples against bearing arms, shall be exempted
by the laws of this state from any military service declared by the gover-
nor to be noncombatant." (art. XI, § 212)
Explanation
There has been no direct interpretation of this section, but there was
an ironic case involving a conscientious objector who was denied admis-
sion to the bar because he could not conscientiously swear to uphold
Section I of this Article. (In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945).)
Comparative Analysis
Some 19 states provide for conscientious objectors, either by a self-
executing provision or by providing for mandatory or permissive legis-
lative action. Eleven of those states include a requirement for payment
of an equivalent. Only four other states appear to limit the exemption
to peacetime.
Comment
In the light of the comprehensive federal system concerning consci-
entious objectors, it seems pointless to preserve a constitutional provision
such as this one, particvdarly one with a "payment of equivalent" ana-
chronism.

Article XIII
WAREHOUSES
Public Warehouses
Sec. 1. All elevators or storehouses where grain or other property is stored for
a compensation, whether the property stored be kept separate or not, are declared
to be public warehouses.
History
In the 1870 Convention, the Chairman ot the Connnittee on Miscel-
laneous Corporations offered an Article on Warehouses consisting ot seven
sections, each ot wliich was somewhat different trom the section as finally
adopted, but all ot which covered the same grotmd as the final product.
In order to understand the occasion tor the adoption ot an Article like
this one, it is appropriate to quote at some length trom the opening de-
bate, beginning with the remarks ot the committee chairman:
"Mr. GARY: Mr. Chairman: This is a matter of very great importance to every
grain producer, grain dealer and farmer in the State of Illinois, who has anything
to do with selling or shipping grain. Elevators and warehouses have got to be
great monopolies. The elevator men control the whole grain trade of the north-
west, and control it in such a manner that it becomes necessary, for the welfare
of the people of this State, and of all who do business with the grain dealers of
the State, that they should have some protection.
"It has been said, sir, that there is too much legislation in this article. But, sir,
there is no more legislation here than in many other articles that we have passed.
And if there is legislation in it, it is legislation for the great mass of the people
of the State." (Debates 1622.)
"Mr. BROWNING: Mr. Chairman: This is a subject of difficulty, and one that
I tliink the Convention ought to enter upon with very great circumspection, if it
touches it at all. In my opinion, we ought not to touch this subject. There are
very few of us who know anything of these complications of trade. There has
been no investigation here, and I am sure that I am not so informed as to be able
to give a vote that will satisfy myself. It is a subject that is completely under the
control of the General Assembly. Why not leave it to the General Assembly?
". . . It is not a matter for a Constitution; it is not elemental or fundamental
law. It is mere police regulations, that has (sic) no more place in the Constitution
than the provision of penalties for selling liquor.
". . . The General Assembly will possess one advantage that we have not, as
they can appoint committees, and enter upon an investigation. They can send for
worehousemen (sic), for members of the board of trade, for grain-brokers, for
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farmers, elicit all tlie inloiniaiit)!! tliat can be elicited upon this complicated
subject, and then be prejKired to prescribe just and proper remedies for the
evils that exist." {Id. at 1624-25.)
"Mr. COOLB.AUGH. Mr. Chairman: . . .
"Gentlemen may say this is a species of legislation. Well, ii it is, I am glad we
are legislating for once in the interest of the people against the extortions of
corporations. Whenever we do that, and raise that issue, I desire to put myself
O'n the side of the people. But I tleny that it is any more legislation than the
people of the State require." {Id. at 1626.)
•MR. UNDERWOOD. Mr. Chairman: . . .
"The misfortune, in undertaking by constitutional provision to regulate ware-
houses, is that we may go too far or not far enough. A Constitution is not flex-
ible, but the Legislature may change the law from time tcj time so as to meet the
dishonesty of men in any kind of business. It is one of those subjects over which
the General Assembly should, with the greatest care and circumspection, legislate.
1 do not believe we have time enough to fully examine the subject in all its
aspects so as to legislate wisely on tiie subject." {Id. at 1628.)
Section 1, at least, is a statement oi general principle, and even il not
of constitutional stattne, is, one would asstnne, not particidarly contro-
versial. Nevertheless, there ^vas considerable debate over the wording.
Apparently, a statute passed in 18()7 had made a distinction between
private and public warehousemen in teims ol whether grain was kept in
separate bins or was mixed in a connnon bin. Although the section as
jjroposed appeared to cover both types, an amendment \\as proposed and
accepted that added the words "whether the property stored be kejn
separate or not."
Warehouses and grain elevators \ve)e still a touchy item in 1920, and
the proposed 1922 Constitution preserved the Article on Waiehouses not-
withstanding a general recognition that it was ptncly legislative. (See
Proceedings 3862-63.) In the'case ol Section 1, the statement of princijile
was shortened, principally by removing the clatise which had been added
on the floor ot the 1870 Comention.
Explanation
In some respects, the courts ha\e recognized the legislative nattne ol
this Article and treated it as il it \\ere a statute. For example, the Stipreme
Cotnt has said that the iegisiatine's power to regulate -warehotises is not
derived from this Article, but is part of what is commonly called the
"police power." (State Pub. Ltil. (^ounnn \. .Monarch Refrig. Co., 2(i7
111. 528 (1915).) Moreover, the declaration ol what constitutes a public
warehotise is not necessarily accepted by the cotirts. For example, one
may occasionally store property for compensation and not become a puij-
lic warehouseman. (.See Mayer \'. Springer, 192 111. 270 (1901).)
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But to the extent that this "statute" sets loi th a pohcy, the legislature
has no power to change it. In Central EleTtilur Company xk People ex
rel. Moloney (171 111. 2.03 (1898)), the Supreme Court had decided as a
matter of equity that the owner ot a public warehouse could not store his
own grain in his own warehouse. W^hile the Central Ele~i>ator case was
in the Supreme Court, the General Assembly authorized the practice in a
carefully worded amendment to the implementing statute. The amend-
ment provided in effect that there shoidd be additional assistant grain
inspectors in any warehouse where the owner conniiingled grain with
that of others, that the Railroad and W^arehouse Commission had lidl
power to issue regulations governing such connningling to the end that
the warehouse owner shotdd have no benefit or advantage over others,
and that the assistant inspectors shotdd take care to assure compliance
with such regulations. When the case came back up, the Supreme Court
held the act void as in conflict with the policy of Article XIll. (Hannah
v. People ex rel. Attorney General, 198 111. 77 (1902).) In 1965, the legis-
lature again opened the door to permitting warehousemen to commingle
their own grain with depositors' grain, but the new statute has not yet
been tested. {See Eaton, "Present Problems of Article XIll," 17 De Paul
L. Rev. 545, 551 (1968).)
As with banks, there is a national system of warehouse regulation, and
the United States Supreme Court has held that a warehouseman who
complies with the requirements of the United States Warehouse Act can-
not be regulated by the state in any area covered by the federal statute.
(Rice V. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947).)
Comparative Analysis
California has a comprehensive provision concerning the regulation of
public utilities. Any private corporation, individual or association di-
rectly or indirectly furnishing storage or wharfage facilities to or for the
public is declared to be a public utility. Kentucky has a definition sub-
stantially the same as Section 1. Except for a provision in North Dakota
empowering the legislature to create state-owned or -operated grain ele-
vators and an Oklahoma provision concerning railroad connections to
grain elevators, no other state appears to have any constitutional provi-
sion specifically covering warehouses. The Model State Constitution
has no substantive provision in the area of economic regulation.
Comment
Mr. Eaton concludes his article on warehouses with this observation:
"In conclusion, Article XIII has caused serious problems making it more dif-
ficult for a large industry to function as it should. Experience under the "United
States Warehouse Act" which does authorize grain warehouses to mix their own
grain with c'epositors' grain should alleviate concern over authorizing elevators
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licensed by the State of Illinois to engage in the same practice. Article XIII is an
excellent example of detailed constitutional provisions wiiich have outlived con-
ditions whicli existed at the time they were written. If the provisions of Article
XIII had been written into statutory law, the legislatiuc cf;uld have corrected
the problem. .\s a part of our Clonstitution, even if obsolete, the legislature and
the grain industry are witlioul power to correct llie ])rob]em. (Eaton, Mtj>y(i
at 553.)
Warehouses— Grain — Reports
Sec. 2. 1 he owner, lessee or manager of each and e\ery public warehouse
situated in any town or city of not less than one hundred thousand inhabitants,
shall make weekly statements under oath, before some ofhcer to be designated
by law, and keep the same posted in some conspicuous place in the office of such
warehouse, and shall also file a copy for public examination in such place as
shall be designated by law, which statement shall correctly set forth the amount
and grade of each and every kind of grain in such warehouse, together with such
other property as may be stored therein, and what warehouse receipts have been
issued, and are, at the time of making such statement, outstanding therefor; and
shall, on the copy posted in the warehouse, note daily such changes as may be
made in the c|uantity and grade of grain in such warehouse; and the different
grades of grain shipped in separate lots, shall not be mixed with inferior or
superior grades, without the consent of the owner or consignee thereof.
History
This, the first oi the detailed, stibstaiuive, self-executing provisions in
this Article, was olFered to the 1870 Convention wilhotit the 1()(),()00 popu-
lation limitation. A delegate Ironi W^arren Connty exi^ressed the fear
tiiat the Convention, "by assuming to this extent legislati\e functions,"
might put into the organic law provisions "which may prove stumbling
blocks and embarrassments in all future legislation." (Debates 1()97.) He
indicated that he imderstood the princij>al e\ils to ix- in the opera-
tion ol the large grain elevators, and to piotect the small-to\vn warehouse-
man from complicated paper work, he offered the limitation, but with
the population figine left blank. He stated that he left the figure out
because he was not sufficiently knowledgeable to choose a mininumi popu-
lation. Alter the Convention settled on 1()(),00(), an eliort was made to
substitute a section that simply commanded the legislatiue to pass appro-
priate regulatory legislation and a motion was made to strike the entire
section, not only because it was legislative in natine, btit because it was
a species of special legislation by virtue of the popidation limitation.
The motion to strike was defeated 39 to 11 on a roll call, and the substi-
tute was rejected by voice vote. The section as originally projiosed did
not contain the final provision for consent before mixing dillerent grades
of grain. This addition was proposed by Mr. Medill of Cook County and
after an explanation by him, was accepted by voice vote.
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The proposed 1922 Constitution retained the substance of the section
and made one significant change. In connection with the 100,000 popu-
lation limitation, the words "or such population as may be provided by
law" were added. (See Connncul , infra, p. 550, lor a discussion of this
change.)
Explanation
It is fairly clear from the 1870 debates that the delegates believed that
the 100,000 population figure was a dividing line between the constitu-
tional self-executing regulation and the legislature's power to enact the
same, or similar, regulations lor other parts of the state. Unfortunately,
in the early case of People x>. Harper (91 111. 357 (1878)), the Supreme
Court read the section otherwise. The Court said that Section 2 "dis-
criminates between public warehouses in cities of not less than 100,000
inhabitants, and those in cities of less population, and recognizes that
there is a necessity for regulations in respect to the former, not necessary
to the latter." (Id. at 370.) But since the Court was answering an argu-
ment that it was unconstitutional to put the big city warehouses in a
separate class in the implementing statute, too much should not be read
into the quoted sentence.
Prior to 1955, the statutory scheme for regulating warehouses was an
amended version of the original act passed in 1871 pursuant to the re-
quirements of Article XIII. The first section of the 1871 statute divided
public warehouses into three classes, and the second section defined those
classes in a manner that was imchanged until 1935, when warehouses for
the storage of personal property were excluded from the definition. Under
that definition. Class A and Class B warehouses were those in which grain
was stored in bulk and commingled;.and for A, located in cities of 100,000
and iq:); and for B, located somewhere else. Class C embraced all other
public warehouses. (Act of April 25, 1871, ch. 114, §2, [1871] 111. Laws
762 (repealed 1955).)
Under the 1955 scheme, the Public Grain Warehouse and Warehouse
Receipts Act, the class distinctions are abolished, and in all respects ex-
cept one, the 100,000 limitation has disappeared. In order to comply
literally with Section 2, the act requires a warehouseman with a ware-
house in a city of not less than 100,000 inhabitants to make the required
weekly statements under oath. (111. Rev. Stat. ch. 114, §214.15 (1967).
The act begins with Section 214.1. In 1961, Illinois adopted the Uniform
Commercial Code and in connection therewith repealed the warehouse
receipts' portion. Sections 233-292 of Chapter 114.)
Comparative Analysis
No other state has such a provision.
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Comment
In the 1920-22 Convention, ellorts were made to take out the 100,000
limitation or to substitute 50,000. in the course ol the debate, there was
a learned discussion on implied limitations — the judicial doctrine that
a grant ol detailed power to the legislature implies a denial ol power
to go beyond the detailed grant. No relerertce was made to the Harper
case quoted from above. The compromise solution was the addition
of the words quoted above, "or such ])ojjulation as may be provitled
by law." (See Proceedings 3863-61.) It should be noted that this solu-
tion did not get around the implied limitations problem, if there is
one. The solution would have permitted the legislature to extend the
coverage of the stated requirement, but not to set up a tlifferent require-
ment. If anything, the added words increased the likelihood that a court
would be tempted to invoke the doctrine of implied limitations.
Whether there is any need for weekly postings under oath ought to be
a question of legislative determination. And if there is a need, the legis-
lature ought to be able to decide the appropriate classification of ware-
houses to which it shoidd
ajjjjly. Population of the community in which
the warehouse is located is not necessarily the most appropriate classifi-
cation.
Right to Examine Property
Sec. 3. The owners of property stored in any warehouse, or holder of a receipt
for the same, shall always be at liberty to examine such property stored, and all
the books and records of the warcliouse in regard to such property.
History
This section, as originally proposed by the Committee on Miscel-
laneous Corporations, was somewhat more detailed than it is now, but
the additional details were dropped almost before debate began, and it
seems unnecessary to disctiss the earlier wording. It shovdd be noted,
however, chat the usual complaint was made that the section, in any
event, was
"special legislation," and was unnecessary. The proposed 1922
Constitution retained the substance of the section in a still further sim-
plified version.
Explanation
The section seems self-evident and, indeed, appears never to have been
litigated. Actually, the privilege accorded the receipt holder is a normal
one, and it is not far-fetched to say that all the section really does is pre-
vent the legislature from depriving the receipt holder of his normal privi-
lege. (111. Rev. Stat. ch. 114, §214.16 (1967) provides for examination.)
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Comparative Analysis
No other state has such a provision.
Comment
Since there is a statutory protection for examination that is not hkely
to be taken away, this insignificant section could certainly be dropped.
Grain Shipments— Weighing— Liability of Carrier
Sec. 4. All railroad companies and other common carriers on railroads shall
weigh or measure grain at points where it is shipped, and receipt for the full
amount, and shall be responsible for the delivery of such amount to the owner
or consignee thereof, at the place of destination.
History
The section as originally proposed in the 1870 Convention read as
follows:
"All railroad companies and other common carriers shall be required to weigh
grain into the cars at points where it is shipped, and receipt for the amount, and
be held responsible for the delivery of the amount received, at the place of
destination."
The changes made by the Convention can be demonstrated by the fol-
lowing composite in which omitted words are in brackets and added
words are italicized.
All railroad companies an other common carriers on railroads shall [be re-
quired to] weigh or ineasiire grain [into the cars] at points where it is shipped,
and receipt for the full amount, and shall be [held] responsible for the delivery
of [the] such amount [received,] to the oivner or consignee thereof, at the place
of destination.
Of the several changes, only two were made by the Committee on Re-
vision and Adjustment. These were the grammatical shifts to direct
commands to
"weigh" and "be responsible" from the third party iriethod
of wording the commands. All other changes were made by the delegates
in the course of debating the proposal. In almost all cases, the delegate
proposing the change was either aiming at removing a specific evil or was
seeking to grant an exemption to someone. For example, "or measure"
was added because, a delegate pointed out, some shipments, particularly
by steamboat, were by the bag rather than by weight. At the second round
of debate, a delegate argued that the river carriers ought to be excluded
because they could not afford to maintain the necessary weighing equip-
ment, and so the words "on railroads" were added. (For the full flavor
of the
"legislative process" in operation, see Debates 1632-33, 1700-01.)
The proposed 1922 Constitution made a substantive change by remov-
ing the words "on railroads," and otherwise greatly simplified the wording.
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Explanation
The courts appear to have heeded the strong feehngs against railroads
exhibited by the 1870 delegates. Although the Supreme Court observed
that the carrier is not an absolute insurer oi the grain, it did rule out any
limitation of liability lor leakage, shrinkage or discrepancies in elevator
weights. In so ruling, the Court made inapplicable in Illinois a limitation
apparently permitted by the Unilorm Bills oi Lading Act. (Shellabarger
Elevator Co. v. Illinois Cent. R. R., 278 111. 3.S3 (1917).)
Comparative Analysis
No other state has such a provision.
Comment
In the last hall of the Twentieth Century, one would assume that most
people in business, including most farmers, are sufficiently knowlegeable
to require appropriate determination of the cj^uantity of a product in-
volved in a transaction and to know the significance of who bears the risk
of loss. On this assumption, it seems unnecessary to have a constitutional
command to weigh grain or a constitutional allocation of risk of loss. It
should be sufficient for the legislature to provide for regulation of the
accuracy of weighing devices and to forbid unconscionable shifts in risks.
Railroads — Delivery of Grain
Sec. 5. All railroad companies receiving and transporting grain in bulk or
otherwise, shall deliver the same to any consignee thereof, or any elevator or
public warehouse to which it may be consigned, provided such consignee or the
elevator or public warehouse can be reached by any track owned, leased or used,
or which can be used, by such railroad companies, and all railroad companies
shall permit connections to be made with their track, so that any such consignee,
and any public warehouse, coal bank or coal yard may be reached by the cars on
said railroad.
History
This section appears to have been aimed at one specific evil as explained
by the Committee Chairman to the delegates at the 1870 Convention:
"Many of the elevators are built along the sides of that public track, and I
was shown, when there, an elevator that was built on the supposition that all
the railroads running on that track would deliver grain at this warehouse or
elevator, but the owner of that elevator could not get the grain he had pur-
chased in the country, shipped in the cars, and sent to Chicago to his own eleva-
tor, without having it shipped to other elevators, and first paying tribute to
them, as I understand." (Debates 1634.)
There were several amendments from the floor of the Convention, but
none of them represented any substantial change. The one significant
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alteration was a proposal to extend the section to cover coal yards. The
extension was defeated on a roll call vote. Coal yards were presumably
added by the Committee on Revision and Adjustment.
The proposed 1922 Constitution made one change of substance by
limiting the jirivilege of spur connection to public warehouses, coal banks
and coal yards. The present section allows "any such consignee," that is,
any consignee of grain, to demand a spur connection.
Explanation
It is interesting to find that half the reported cases arising under this
section concerned those coal yards that were slipped into the section at
the last moment. But the several coal cases, as well as those involving
warehousemen and elevators, are of such limited technical natme that no
purpose is served in digesting them here.
Comparative Analysis
Oklahoma has a provision that, with the ajjproval of the Corporation
Commission, any owner or operator of a grain elevator, a coal, lead, iron,
or zinc mine, or sawmill, or other industry, may connect a spur with a
railroad provided that the railroad is reimbursed for the cost of the
connection.
Comment
In these days of ubiquitous concrete ribbons all over the landscape
with mammoth tractor-trailers whizzing by, it is inconceivable that any
railroad would turn away a proj:)Osed spur connection or refuse to deliver
grain to the consignee.
Warehouse Receipts
Sec. 6. It shall be the duty of the General Assembly to pass all necessary laws
to prevent the issue of false and fraudulent warehouse receipts, and to give full
effect to this article of the constitution, which shall be liberally construed so as
to protect producers and shippers. And the enumeration of the remedies herein
named shall not be construed to deny to the General Assembly the power to
prescribe by law such other and further remedies as may be found expedient,
or to deprive any person of existing common law remedies.
History
The original proposal offered to the 1870 Convention simply said that
the legislature should pass all necessary laws to give full effect to the
Article, which, of course, was to be liberally construed. In a bewildering
series of rapidly accepted amendments, the section evolved to its present
wording. (The Committee on Revision and Adjustment made no changes
in the wording.) One delegate rather timidly suggested that the liberal
construction clause could just as well be stricken. It "means nothing in
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law," he observed, "aiKl is at the most liiit a stump speech." (Debates
16.85.) The delegates did not agree with him.
This section caused a great deal of trouble in the 1920-22 Convention.
\Vlien the section was under consideration in Connnittee of the Whole,
an amendment was offered and accepted to include "consumers and
other interests" imder the
"liberally construed" clause. (Proceedings
1765.) When the Article came back from the Connnittee on Phraseology
and Style in tlie customary greatly shortened wording, the Chairman of
the Agricultural Committee asked to have "consumers and other inter-
ests" removed. He explained that under the existing Warehouse Article,
warehousemen could not mingle iheii own grain in their own warehouse.
(See Explanatioyi for Sec. i, supra, p. 547.) He further explained that
inclusion of "consumers and other interests" might open the door to a
change in the Supreme Court's ruling. The chairman was unsuccessful
in his argument and after losing, served notice that he would move to
reconsider. (Proceedings 3876-79.) On a subsecjuent day, he was success-
ful in his motion to reconsider. {Id. at 4035.) He then moved to retain
Sections 6 and 7 exactly as they appeared in the 1870 Constitution rather
than in the shortened, combined wording of the Committee on Phrase-
ology and Style. After much debate, the Convention accepted Section 6.
{Id. at 4039.) When Section 7 was taken up, an effort was made to include
consumers in the list of people to be protected, but the effort failed and
Section 7 went back in unchanged. {Id. at 4045.)
Explanation
Since the entire section is not much more than a
"stump speech," the
appellation suggested for one portion of it, it is not surprising to find
that, with one exception, the section has had no life of its own. That
exception was a case in 1945 wherein it was argued that the section pre-
cluded a local licensing ordinance designed to prevent spontaneous com-
bustion or dust explosions in grain elevators. The argument was unsuc-
cessfid. (Edward R. fiacon Crain Co. v. City of Cliicago, 325 111. App.
245 (1945).)
Comparative Analysis
No other state has such a provision.
Comment
The hassle in 1920 over including "consumers or others interested" is
instructive on two scores. It demonstrates the inadvisability of tampering
with constitutional language with an accepted meaning. This was not a
case where someone wanted to improve on the wording for its own sake,
but the proposal to add consumers was almost as irrelevant, and certainly
was not sufficiently significant to jeopardize an accepted and settled inter-
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pretation ot the entire Article. (For purposes oi this discussion, it is not
pertinent whether that interpretation was a good one then or now.) It was
presumably in recognition ol the importance of not changing language
that the Chairman ol the Agricultural Committee used the gambit ot
trying to restore the original language ot Sections 6 and 7.
The other point to be made is that a group that has a vested interest
in a particular constitutional doctrine, whether spelled out in the docu-
ment or the result ot judicial decisions and whether appropriately in the
Constitution or not, can be expected to exert great pressiue to preserve
their interest. One can read bet^veen the lines ot the debates in 1922 and
see that there was great pressiue trom shippers and dealers to preserve
the policy ot prohibiting connningling ot warehousemen's grain with de-
positors' grain. But having said all this, the moral is only partly helptul.
One shoidd not put into constitutions provisions that give rise to such
vested interests. Once in a constitution, the damage is done and it may
be next to impossible to remove the provision.
Inspection of Grain
Sec. 7. The General Assembly shall pass laws for the inspection of grain, for
the protection of producers, shippers and receivers of grain and produce.
History
The essence ot this section was oflfered on the floor of the 1870 Conven-
tion by a delegate who explained: "Having caught the animal and built
a pen to keep him, this section is needed to tie him." (Debates 1636.) An-
other delegate observed that there were serious complaints about inade-
quate grain inspection and that the legislature ought to be charged with
cioing something about the complaints. The section was agreed to.
The foregoing occurred while the Convention was sitting in Committee
of the Whole. Just before the Committee rose, a delegate offered an addi-
tional section, as follows:
"This act shall be deemed a public act and shall be in force from and after
its passage." (Debates 1637.)
The proposal was voted down. As the Convention proper was subse-
quently about to refer the Warehouse Article to the Conmiittee on Revi-
sion and Adjustment, another delegate offered an additional section,
reading: "Be it enacted by the people of the State of Illinois, in Conven-
tion assembled." The proposal was ruled out of order.
The proposed 1922 Constitution inserted the word "and" after "inspec-
tion of grain" and before "for the protection." The Official Explanation
states that the section is the same as Section 7, but this is arguable. (P.N.C.
47.) Incidentally, the same assertion is made concerning Sections 4 and 5
(Id.), but these were clearly changed. (See supra, pp. 551 and 553.)
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Explanation
This section appears to tell the legislature to pass laws for the inspec-
tion ol grain, the purpose of \\liich inspection is to protect producers,
shippers and leceivers ol grain and produce. This is the way the section
was paraphrased in the liaco)! case. (Supra, p. 551.) The addition ot
the word "and" as proposed in the 1922 C^onstitution would ha\e told
the legislatiue to pass laws tor the inspection ot grain and to pass other
laws lor the protection ot producers, shippers and receivers. This is the
way Clhiel' Justice W'aite paraphrased the sentence in the tanious case
oi Munn x>. Illinois (94 U.S. 11.1, \:V1 (1876)). .Actually, the ditference is
academic since there is no way to torce the legislature to act. Moreover,
the Supreme Court noted that the legislature under its police power
could jjass grain inspection laws without this section. (People v. Harper,
91 III. 357 (1878).)
As noted above, it is not possible to torce the legislature to act under
one of these mandatory instructions. It is also not possible to knock out
the legislature's effort on the ground that it has not done a good enough
job. See Board of Trade x'. Coxcen (252 111. 554 (191 1)), where the Supreme
Comt turned aside an argument that tlic inspection law was unconsti-
tutional because the legislature did not approj^riate enough money for
adecjuate inspections.
Comparative Analysis
No other state has such a provision.
Comment
In addition to the ambiguity caused by the absence of the word "and,"
there is the curious inclusion of the word
"produce." It may be that the
two ambiguities make a clear sentence. It the sentence has the meaning
suggested at the beginning of the Explanation, then "jModuce" is mean-
ingless. But it the sentence should be read as it "and" were included,
then
"produce" makes sense.
Article XIV
AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION
Constitutional Convention
Sec. 1. Whenever two-tliirds ol the members ol each house of the General
Assembly shall, by a vote entered upon the journals thereot, concur that a Con-
vention is necessary to revise, alter or amend the constitution, the cjuestion shall
be submitted to the electors at the next election. If a majority voting at the
election vote for a convention, the General Assembly shall, at the next session
provide for a con\ention, to consist of double the number of members of the
Senate, to be elected in the same manner, at the same places, and in the same
districts. The General Assemblv shall, in the act callino the Convention, desig-
nate the day, hoin- and place of its meeting, fix the pay of its members and
officers, and provide for the payment of the same, together with the expenses
necessarily incurred by tlie Convention in the performance of its duties. Before
proceeding the members shall take an oath to support the Constitution of the
United States, and of the State of Illinois, and to faithfully discharge their duties
as members of the Convention. Ilie qualification of members sliall be the same
as that of members of the Senate, and vacancies occinring shall be filled in the
manner provided for filling vacancies in the General Assembly. Said Convention
shall meet within three months after such election, and prepare such revision,
alteration or amendments of the Constitution as shall be deemed necessary,
which shall be submitted to the electors for their ratification or rejection, at an
election appointed by the Convention for that purpose, not less than two nor
more than six months after the adjournment thereof: and unless so submitted
and approved, by a majority of the electors voting at the election, no such re-
vision, alterations or amendments shall take effect.
-History
The 1818 Constitution provided that, upon the initiative of "two-
thirds of the General Assembly," the question of calling a convention
should go to the voters. If a "majority of all the citizens of the state,
voting for representatives," voted lor a convention, tlie General Assem-
bly at its next session was to provide for one. Tliere were to be as
many delegates as members of the General Assembly, "to be chosen
in the same manner, at the same place, and by the same electors that
choose the General Assembly." There was no provision for a referen-
dum on tlie product of the Convention.
Tlie 1848 Constitution made tliree changes. First, it was specified
that two-tliirds of the members elected to each liouse had to vote for a
convention. Second, tlie word "electors" was substituted for "citizens"
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in defining the majority ie(jiiiied to approve the calling ol a conven-
tion. Ihird. tlu' number ol delegates was to ecjiial the number ot
representatives.
In the 1870 Convention, the Clonnnittee on Future Amendments
split three ways over the issue ol an oath to be taken by delegates to a
convention, and three \ersions ol a convention section were placed
before the Connnittee of the Whole. The majority proposal was silent
as to oaths, one minority jiroposal cmpo\\ered the delegates by major-
ity vote to })rescribe an oath to be taken, and the other minority pro-
prosal contained the oath sentence now apjjearing in Section 1.
This problem of an oath ^vas taken most seriously by the delegates.
In fact, three of the first lour days of the C>onvention were spent in what
Joseph Medill described as "one of the ablest debates . . . which it has
been my pleasiue e\er to have heard." (Debates ,^7.) The immediate
subject of debate was whether oi not a delegate coidd swear to sujjport
the Illinois Constitution, but the substance of the debate was over the
philosophical cjuestion of how delegates chosen to "revise, alter or
amend" the Illinois Constitution could properly take an oath to sup-
port it. A sidjsidiary question was whether the legislature, which fiad
mandated the oath in the Enabling Act, could exercise such control
over delegates. The debate concluded \vith the adoption of an oath to
support the Illinois Constitution, "so far as its provisions are com-
patible with, and applicable to my position and duties as a member of
the Convention." Following the taking of this oath, consent was given
to permit any delegates so desiring to rise and take a second oath in
the words of the Enabling Act.
Both in Committee of the Whole and in the Convention proper, the
various proposals on oaths were brought up, but there was no debate to
speak of. The arguments had been amply aired at the outset of the
Convention. It is interesting to note, however, that most delegates had
refused to take an oath in the form which they subsecpiently put into
Section 1.
One of the other changes made in 1870 also grew out of the experi-
ence of the delegates. This was the addition of the words "and vacancies
occurring shall be filled in the manner provided for filling vacancies in
the General Assembly." In the course of the Convention, several dele-
gates died and there was considerable debate over whether the Con-
vention shoidd "order" an election, "invite" an election, recommend to
the Governor that he order an election, or simply announce that if the
voters of the deceased delegate's district elected someone, the Conven-
tion would seat him. The decision \\as to in\ ite the district to hold an
election on a stated date.
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The 1870 Convention made two other additions to the 1818 provision.
One was instructions to the General Assembly concerning material to
be included in the Enabling Act. The other, which was the subject of
debate, was the size ot the C^onvention — whether, in effect, there should
be ajjproximately 50, 100, or 150 or more delegates. The choice was
"double the niuiiber ot members ol the Senate." The only change made
in the proposed 1922 Constitution ^vas to add seven members at large
from Cook County to "double the niuiiber" ot Senators. This addition
is related, of course, to the 1922 permanent apportionment of 19 senate
seats to Cook County and 38 seats to the rest of the state. (See Histoiy of
Sec. 6 of Art. IV, supra, p. 132.) Under the 1922 proposal. Cook County
would have had 45 delegates and the rest of the state would have had 76.
Explanation
Prior to July 10, 1969, there were no definitive rulings concerning
Section 1. At the time of the 1920-1922 Convention, there was a belief
that delegates could not be elected on a nonpartisan basis and the
Attorney General is reputed to have issued an opinion to that effect.
(The opinion is cited in Annotation 284, but no one has been able to
find the actual opinion.) l^he same Attorney General is reported to
have issued an opinion to the effect that a member of the General As-
sembly could run as a delegate but if elected, he would vacate his legis-
lative seat when he c^ualified as a delegate. (Annotations 283. This
opinion has never been foimd, either.) Apparently, some legislators were
elected and qualified as delegates, but retained their legislative seats.
No objections appear to have been raised and no lawsuit appears to have
contested the dual office holding.
The crucial words in Section 1 that raise the two problems discussed
at the time of the 1920-1922 Convention are the reference to election
of delegates "in the same manner" as senators are elected, and the state-
ment that the
"qualification of members shall be the same as members
of the Senate." In the first case, the question is whether "in the same
manner" covers party primaries, since senators are so nominated. In
the second case, the question is whether a legislator serving as a dele-
gate would be holding a "lucrative office" contrary to the prohibition
in Section 3 of Article IV. {Supra, p. 120.)
The Enabling Act for the forthcoming Convention provides for non-
partisan primaries and elections, and also provides that "legislators and
other public officials, so long as they retain their elected or appointed
offices and serve as members of the Convention, shall receive no com-
pensation for their Convention services other than [expenses]." (Act
76-40, Laws 1969.) A test case, Livingston v. Ogilvie ( - 111. - 2d (1969)),
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was broii<^lu to dclci iiiiiic the const ilulionalil) ol tlu-sc two parts of
tlie Knablint; Ad. riic test case also included {]uestions concerning
the leceni one man-one \<)te cases liaiuletl down 1)\ the Ignited States
Supreme Court, discussed in connection with Scciion 7 ol Article 1\'
(siipid. J))). 138-9); the requirement that a delegate be a c|uali(ied voter; the
non-Conmumist afhda\ it recpiired ot a candidate; and the provision
purporting to terminate the authority ol the Convention on fune 30,
1971.
The Supreme Court handed down an opinion in I.i\'i}i(j;s(on ?'. Ogilx'ie
on July 10, 1969, upholding the Enabling Act in almost all resj)ects.
The decision was unanimous as to all decided issues excejjt eligibility
to be members ol the Conxention, and on that the Court split five to
two. Two ot the original issues in the suit — voter stattis and termination
date — aie not mentioned in the oj:)inion ol the Court, but the dissenting
judges make use ot the tact that the Enabling Act has a termination date
without addressing themselves to its constitutionality.
Even though these t\\o issues were not discussed, a \vord about them
is in order. Actually, even in a declaratory judgment action, which this
suit was, it is appropriate to a\oid issues that are, so to speak, speciUa-
tive, and both voter status and date ot termination are speculative. As
a practical matter, no one ^vho is not a \oter is likely to rtm tor delegate,
but it stich a jjerson does, he alone has sufficient interest to litigate the
issue ot his qualification. W^ere such litigation to arise, the decision
should be that the recjuirement is invalid. Voter status is not a quali-
fication tinder Section 3 of Article IV, and the Supreme Court has said
that the constitutional qualifications lor membership in the legislature
cannot be added to. (See ExpUuKiiioji of Sec. 3, supra, p. 122.) The effort
to set a termination date for the work ot the C^onxention — a laudable
effort, to be sure — will not be significant legally tmless the Convention
in fact continues to work past June 30, 1971. (See Comvicut below tor
the theoretical issue involved.)
The Court came down with all tour feet on the issue of the non-
Comnumist affidavit. The Court first observed that Section 1 provides
for the oath to be taken by the membeis of the Convention, and held
that the Enabling Act was unconstitutional because it went beyond Sec-
tion 1 in including loyalty provisions other than that of supporting the
United States and Illinois Constitutions. The Court went on to say that
the loyalty oath was also unconstitutional imder the Fourteenth Amend-
ment of the United States Constitution.
The Court disposed ot the other minor issue — one man-one vote — in
a straightforward but not wholly convincing manner. Relying upon
cases from other states, the Court concluded that the one man-one vote
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principle is not relevant to a constitutional convention because a con-
vention can do no more than propose something to the voters. This is
an example ot disposing ot a difficult problem by a too-simple answer.
If, as an extreme example, the Constitution had been silent on appor-
tionment of delegates and the legislature had provided tor a convention
with no delegates trom Chicago, the Court's argument would not fly.
In all fairness to the Court, one nuist concede that it was in a box.
The present senatorial districts were court-created and it is a little diffi-
cult for the Court to condenni its own handiwork. There is a way around
the recent one man-one vote cases, but it is a sophisticated argument
that is not particularly becoming for a court to spell out. The recent
United States Supreme Court cases are designed to close avenues by
which legislatures can give the appearance ot honoring the one man-one
vote rule but simultaneously subvert it. Courts are not likely to engage
in the same devious maneuvers, and this alone should protect the exist-
ing judicially determined senatorial districts in Illinois. But, as sug-
gested above, this is not an argument that a coint would find it easy to
make. The end result in the Liinno^stu)! case is undoubtedly a good one,
and, as a matter of practicality, it is unlikely that the Court's reasoning
will ever return to haunt it.
On the major question of nonpartisan elections of convention mem-
bers, the Court discussed the intricate arguments that revolve around
"manner" — that is, convention members are to l)e elected in the same
"manner" as senators — but came up ^vith the simple, straightforward
conclusion that the word means no more than "elected by the people"
in "free and equal" elections by "ballot." The Court brushed aside all
invocations to political parties, party primaries, and legislative imple-
mentation of the party system. These, the Court implied, are simply
not essential parts of the Constitution.
On the remaining major issue, that of eligibility to serve as a member
of the Convention while holding another state office, the Court reached
a conclusion that is clear enough but by a route that is most confusing.
The conclusion, in short form, is that legislators can be members of the
Convention without giving up their seats in the legislature, that judges
may be members if they give iqo their judgeships, that the Governor and
the other executive officers listed in Section 5 of Article V {supra, p.
267) cannot be members, and that any other office-holder may be a
member of the Convention. For present purposes, nothing is gained
by explaining the way in which the Court reached its conclusion, or the
way in which the dissenting judges said the Court should have reached
a different conclusion.
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Comparative Analysis
It may tome as a bLiipii>>c lo man) to Icaiii that the constitutions ol
a fifth of the states have no provision for the caUint^ of a constitutional
convention, it may be equally surprising to know that two of these
states, Pennsylvania antl Rhode Island, recently had constitutional con-
ventions, and that one of them, Arkansas, has a convention underway
now. (The Connnentary to the Model State Constitution (p. 109) states
that all except one of tliese "no convention" slates have held at least
two conventions.) As a matter of constitutional tlieory, it is generally
accepted that the absence of specific authoritv for a convention is no
insurmountable oi)stacle. Indeed, it can ])e argued that if a legislature
adopts an entirely new constitution and submits it to the people and
the) ratify it, the new constitution becomes the organic law of the state.
The argument is particularly approjjriate if no machinery for a conven-
tion is provided in the existing constitution. The theory is, of course,
that the people have the inherent power to change their government.
When, however, the people have provided the machinery for a conven-
tion, the theoretical argument is "stickier," and in any event hypothetical.
All other states provide for constitutional conventions, usually on the
initiative of the legislatine but std^ject to a referendum by the elector-
ate. In approximately a do/en states there is a mandatory requirement
that every so often, usually either every 20 years or every ten years, the
cpiestion of whether or not to hold a convention goes on the ballot auto-
matically. In Maryland, this is the only road to a convention; in the
other states, the method is in addition to legislative initiative. Two
states, Georgia and Maine, permit the legislating to call a convention
without a referendum. Legislative initiati\e for calling a convention
usually requires a two-thirds' \ote, but a half dozen states require only
a simple majority. In Kentucky, the simple majority is required of two
successive legislatures. In a number of states, the size of the legislative
majority is not specified.
In most states, the referendum on whether or not to hold a convention
must take place at a general election. The states are about ecjually
divided between those retjuiring ap])roval by a majority of those voting
on the question and those recjuiring a majority of those voting at the
election. In Kentucky, the simple majority must be at least 25 per cent
of the vote cast at the preceding gubernatorial election, and in Nebraska
the majority must be at least .^5 per cent of the votes cast in the election.
There are so many variations among the several states in the details
concerning a constitutional convention that only a few generalizations
can be made. There is, for example, a great range in the quantity of
detail provided. The ne\\- Connecticut Constitution simply says that
Art. XIV, § 1 563
the legislature, by a two-thirds' vote, shall prescribe by law the manner
ol selecting delegates, the date ot convening a convention and the
date of final adjournment. The New York Constitution goes to the
other extreme and provides such abundant detail that an Enabling Act
is almost unnecessary. A good many states specify the size of a conven-
tion, or a maximum or minimum ninnber of delegates, but only a few
join Illinois in ])redetermining the districts from which the delegates
are to be chosen. Two states, iMissomi and New York, provide for elec-
tion of 15 delegates at large, a number that is 18 per cent of the total size of
a Missouri convention but only 8 per cent of the New York membership.
The requirements for ratification of the results of a convention's work
are spelled out in detail in some states, left up to the convention in
other states, and in still other states, including Illinois, are spelled out
in part and in part left up to the convention.
The United States Constitution provides that "on the Application of
the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States," Congress shall call
a convention for proposing amendments. Recently, this mode of amend-
ment has been much in the news, for there is a proposal for a convention
going the rounds of the several states. Since an "application" has never
before been made, there is a great deal of controversy concerning what
happens if two-thirds of the states do act.
There are several interesting suggestions in the Model State Consti-
tution. The Model provides, as would be expected, for legislative ini-
tiative of a referendum for a convention and for automatic submission
of the question, but only if 15 years have passed since the last referen-
dum. Then appears this sub-section:
"The legislature, prior to a popular vote on the holding of a convention, shall
provide lor a preparatory conniiission to assemble inlormation on constitu-
tional questions to assist the voters and, it a convention is authorized, the com-
mission shall be continued for the assistance of the delegates. If a majority of
the qualified voters voting on the question of holding a convention approves
it, delegates shall be chosen at the next regular election not less than three
months thereafter unless the legislature shall by law iiave provided for election
of the delegates at the same time that the cpiestion is voted on or at a special
election." (art. XII, §12.03.)
The Model continues with provisions for any qualified voter to be
eligible as a delegate and for a single delegate from each district of the
imicameral legislature. The Model also sets forth a limited number of
convention rules, such as that proposals nuist be upon the desks of dele-
gates three days before final passage, and a self-executing provision for
adoption of convention proposals.
The Model's article on constitutional revision ends with the following
section:
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"If conllit liiii^ constitiitioiKil aiiiciulincuis or revisions suljinittcd to the voters
at the same elec tion are appro\e(l, the amendment or revision receiving llie high-
est nimiber of alhrmative votes shall prevail to the extent of such conlliti." (art.
XII, 4? 12.01.)
One state, New York, has an analogous section to the effect that a
convention proposal snhniitiecl at the same election as an amendment
proposed by the legislature shall, il adopted, supersede the legislative
proposal. In the inisiiccessfid proposed 1967 (Constitution, this provision
woidd have been altered to be ojierative only il the proposals were
"inconsistent" and then only to liic "extent ol stub inconsistency" \v()uld
one supersede the other.
Comment
As jjointed out above in connection with the oath debate in 1870,
there is a nice, but rather theoretical, c|uestion concerning the extent to
which a constiliuional convention is a
"sovereign" body, a free agent,
not subject to any limitation imposed by the legislatine or by a pre-
ceding constitution. But, as noted, the cjuestion is mainly theoretical.
For one thing, the supposed restrictions on the "sovereign" convention
usually are not too bindensome to live with. For another thing, a con-
vention would be a bit rash and insensitive to the needs of its constitu-
ency to jeopardize its work product solely to flaunt its "sovereign" power.
Finally, most restrictions are likely to i)e sensible ones. For example,
the section of the Enabling Act that repeals it on Jiuie 30, 1971, is a
sensible nudge to make sine that the Convention proceeds with all delib-
erate speed, ft woidd be foolhardy, to say the least, lor tlie Convention
to set out on a deliberate plan to sit past Jiuie .HO, 1971. But if imforeseen
events forced the Convention past that day, the theoretical argument
that a constituent assembly is "sovereign" would probably serve to vali-
date the work of the CCopvention.
One minor point about a constitutional convention provision is that
delegates shoidd hesitate before spelling out details for the next con-
stitutional convention. As noted above in connection with the 1870 Con-
vention, two changes in the convention provision arose out of problems
confronting that Convention. This projjensity to insert solutions to known
problems for the benefit of a futine generation has two drawbacks: it
is likely to clutter up a constitiuion, probably producing an inibalanced
provision; and it projects a problem of the jjast into the relatively distant
future when things may be so clianged that the provision ends up in-
cluding nonsolutions to nonproblems. By far the best route is to tell
the legislatine to set up a convention and stop. The legislature in, say,
1990 or 2010, is likely to be better qualified to anticipate convention
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problems ol that day than are the most prescient convention delegates
ot 1970.
It was noted above that the Model State Constitution covers the un-
likely event ot duplicate constitutional proposals lacing the voter at a
single election. The Model Commentary concedes that this is "not com-
mon," but "may happen." (Model State Constitution 111.) The tact that
the New York 1967 Comention tiissed around
"pertecting" the New
York provision is evidence enough that this is the sort of constitutional
provision that is dreamed up by a perlcciionist overly anxious to antic-
ipate every possibility.
Constitutional Amendments Proposed by Legislature
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may be proposed in either House
of the General Assembly, and if the same shall be voted for by two-thirds of all
the members elected to each of the two houses, such proposed amendments, to-
gether with the yeas and nays of each house thereon, shall be entered in full on
their respective journals, and said amendments shall be submitted to the electors
of this State for adoption or rejection, at the next election of members of the
General
.Assembly, in such manner as may be prescribed by law. Each proposed
amendment shall be published in full at leasj three months preceding the elec-
tion, and if either a majority of the electors voting at said election or two-thirds
of the electors voting on any such proposed amendment shall vote for the pro-
posed amendment, it shall become a part of this Constitution. But the General
As.sembly shall have no power to propose amendments to more than three articles
of this Constitution at the same session, nor to the same article oftener than
once in four years. The proposition for the adoption or rejection of the proposed
amendment or amendments shall be printed on a separate ballot or in a separate
column on the ballot as tlie General Assembly by law may provide and the votes
thereon shall be cast by voting upon such separate ballot or in such separate
column as the case may be.
History
The 1818 Constitution did not provide tor amendment by legislative
proposal. With two major exceptions, the section in the 1848 Constitu-
tion was stibstantially as Section 2 appeared before adoption of the Gate-
way Amendment in 1950. One major difierence was a recpurement that
a proposed amendment be passed a second time after an intervening
general election. The second vote was to be by a majority of the elected
members of each house. The second major difference was that, in the
1848 Constitution, there was a prohibition against proposing amend-
ments to more than one article at a time, but there was no requirement
for a four-year gap between submissions. In the 1870 Convention, the
principal debate was on whether the "one article evei^ four years" limita-
tion was too restrictive. Notwithstanding the assertion that no other con-
stitution in the United States had such a limitation, the Convention up-
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held it. The section as adopted in 1870 differed from the present Section 2
in the omission of the "two-thirds of the electors voting" on the amend-
ment, in the limitation of amendments to a single article, and in the
omission of the last sentence.
After five failures, a Gateway Amendment was finally adopted in 1950
following an unusually vigorous campaign. The "majority of those voting
at the election" problem did not even exist imtil after 1890. In fact, the
first five amendments proposed were all adopted. The turning point was
the adoption of the Australian ballot in 1891. I*rior thereto, each political
party printed its own ballot and a \oter who used a party ballot and
marked the party circle was counted as voting for any amendment that
was on the ballot. W^ith the adojjtion of an official ballot, the amend-
ment question was separately stated and separately counted.
A Gateway Amendment Avas the first amendment to appear on the
ballot following adoption of the Australian ballot. Almost 80 per cent of
the voters failed to vote, but the 20 per cent who did vote rejected the
amendment. It would have permitted amendments to two articles at a
time, but otherwise made no change. Four years later another effort was
made, this time to authorize amendments to three articles at a time and
resubmission every two years. This one was favored two to one, but again,
almost 80 per cent failed to vote.
In the midst of the Gateway Amendment efforts came the proposed
1922 Constitution. It included a proposal to permit amendments to
two articles at a time and the four-year-gap requirement was changed
from amending an article to amending a section. The majority required
to adopt was changed from those voting at the election to those voting
for members of the House of Representatives. (This was designed to
"overrule" the Stevenson case discussed below.) After defeat of the pro-
posed Constitution, a third Gateway Amendment was proposed. This
one increased coverage of permitted simultaneous amendments from
one to two articles and left the four-year gap unchanged, but provided
that no constitutional amendments could be
"proposed or voted on
during the time that the United States is engaged in Avar or within
one year following the declaration of peace." The favorable vote was
almost two to one, but 57.3 per cent failed to vote on the amendment.
The fourth Gateway Amendment was submitted in 1932. It increased
coverage of simultaneous submission from amendment of one to amend-
ment of three articles, but made no other change. This was favored al-
most four to one, but 60.9 per cent did not vote. The fifth effort was in
1946. For the first time, other than the minor 1922 proposed change, atten-
tion was given to the required majority problem. The proposal was to
drop the majority voting at the election and substitute tA\o-thirds of those
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voting on the question. Amendment ol three articles simultaneously was
also proposed. Again, the tavorable vote approached four to one, but
55 per cent failed to vote. The sixth and successfid Gateway Amendment is
the current Section 2 with its alternative recj[uired majorities. The favor-
able vote was better than three to one, and the absolute majority was
better than 67 per cent. Only 13 percent of those voting failed to mark
their blue ballot.
Explanation
The Gateway Amendment is clear and explicit and few questions ap-
pear to have been raised about it. The Supreme Court did rule that a
direction by statute that a voter must mark his ballot with a cross re-
quired the voiding of ballots marked with a check or the word "Yes."
(Scribner v. Sachs, 18 111. 2d iOO (I960).) Presumably, the legislature
could revise the direction and permit alternative markings.
The most important case under the earlier Section 2 was People v.
Stevenson (281 111. 17 (1917)), where the Supreme Court held that
"electors voting at said election" must include those who did not vote
for members of the General Assembly. As noted above, the proposed
1922 Constitution ^vould have changed this. In the light of this history,
it would be normal for a court to construe the Gateway Amendment
wording the same way as the Court did in the Stex>enson case.
In City of Chicago v. Reeves (220 111. 274 (1906)), the Supreme Court
ruled that the original limitation of amendment of a single article at a
single session was not violated because an amendment explicitly amending
one article amended other articles by implication. (Compare the discus-
sion of "Revival and Amendment" under Sec. 13 of Art. IV, supra, p.
165-6.) The rule of the Reeves case has recently been reaffirmed. (People
ex rel. Engle v. Kerner, 32 111. 2d 212 (1965).) The Attorney General once
ruled that the limitation could not be evaded by proposing additional
amendments at special sessions. ('1912 111. Att'y Gen. Rep. 1102.)
An amendment becomes a part of the Constitution upon approval by
the voters. In an early case, the Supreme Court said that an amendment
is operative at least from the moment it is proclaimed operative by the
proper canvassing authorities and, in theory, from the moment the polls
close. (People ex rel. Lynch v. Board of Supervisors, IOO 111. 495 (1881).)
For the record, the fate of amendments since the adoption of Gateway
in 1950 can be summarized as follows: Fifteen amendments have been
submitted to the voters. Six carried and nine failed, but only one of the
nine had more votes cast against it than for it. Five of the six that carried
received a two-thirds' vote of those voting on the question, but three of
them also received a majority vote of those voting in the election. One,
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the judicial Article, recei\ecl a majority vote ol those voting in the
election but tailed to receive two-thirds ol the votes cast on the amend-
ment. So tar, at least, the two-thirds' alternative has tacilitated the
adoption ot only two out ot 15 jiroposed amendments. (See Kitsos, Consti-
tutional Amendments and the V^oter, \9y2-]9C)C) at 4 (1968).)
Comparative Analysis
InitiatiJig the Amendmcut: Illinois is one ol 35 states that permit an
amendment to be submitted to the voters alter one passage through the
legislature. Eleven states ret[uire passage twice, almost invariably with
the reqiurement that a general election tor the legislature intervene.
Three states have alternatives ot two passages by simple majority or one
passage by an extraordinary majority, as tollows: Connecticut (three-
fourths); Hawaii (two-thirds); and New Jersey (three-htths). Delaware
requires passage by two-thirds' vote by two consecutive legislatures, but
no ratification by the voters.
The 35 states requiring only one passage ot a proposed amendment
divide, as to size ot vote, thus: two-thirds— 18, including Illinois; three-
fifths — eight; simple majority — nine, but in at least t\\o of the states
there are certain circumstances when an extraordinary majority is re-
quired. All except three of the states requiring double passage call for
only a simple majority vote each time around. (The three exceptions
have combinations of majority and two-tliirds as between houses of the
legislature and between first and second passage.)
Restrictions on Initiation: Only three states join Illinois in limiting
the frequency with which the same article may be amended: Kentucky
(every five years); Pennsylvania (same); New Jersey (every three general
elections). Five states join Illinois in limiting the niuiiber of amend-
ments to be submitted at any one election: Arkansas, Kansas and Montana
(three); Colorado (six); Kentucky (two). Three states, Florida, Missouri,
and Oklahoma, have an ecjuivalent of the "one subject to a bill" rule —
i.e., a single amendment may apply to only one article or one general
subject. (This restriction is different from the claim in the Reeves case
discussed above, for Section 2 used to allow onh one article to be amended
at a time. Today, presimiably, a single amendment coidd amend three
articles at once.) Vermont permits the legislature to propose amendments
only every tenth year. Prior to 1964, New Hampshire did not authorize
initiation of amendments by the legislature.
J'oter Ratification: About 30 states call for approval by a majority of
the voters voting on the amendment and 1 1 appear to require a major-
ity of those voting at the election. Rhode Island requires a 60 per cent
majority of those voting on the question, and Hawaii and Nebraska
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require that the majority on the question be at least 35 per cent of the
total vote cast. (A 35 per cent requirement would have constituted ap-
proval of all but one of the amendments that have failed since the Gate-
way Amendment was adopted and that one, in 1956, had more votes
against it than in favor of it.) New Mexico allows approval by a majority
of those voting on any amendment except one applying to or affecting
either the Suffrage or the Education Article, in which case three-fourths of
those voting in the election and two-thirds of those voting in each county
must ratify. No other state appears to have the jjrecise requirements of the
Gateway Amendment.
Uriited States Constitxiiion: Article V provides that Congress by two-
thirds' vote of each house may propose amendments subject to ratifica-
tion by the legislatures or conventions of three-fourths of the states, "as
the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Con-
gress . . . ." There is also a proviso "that no State, without its Consent,
shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate." The only amend-
ment ever proposed for ratification by convention was the Twenty-first,
repealing prohibition.
Model State Constitution: The Model provides for legislative initiation
of amendments by a simple majority of all the members and approval in
a referendum by a majority of those voting on the question.
Amendynent by initiative: A third method of amendment is by initi-
ative petition. Fourteen states authorize this method. There are, of
course, a great many possible details involved in an initiative system,
but for present purposes, it seems sufficient to quote the language of the
Model State Constitution:
"Amending Procedure: Proposals.
"
(a) Amendments to this constitution may be proposed by the legislature or
by the initiative.
"
(b) An amendment proposed by the legislature shall be agreed to by record
vote of a majority of all of the members, which shall be entered on the journal.
"
(c) An amendment by the initiative shall be incorporated by its sponsors in
an initiative petition which shall contain the full text of the amendment pro-
posed and which shall be signed by qualified voters equal in number to at least
.... per cent of the total votes cast for governor in the last preceding guberna-
torial election, fnitiative petitions shall be filed with the secretary of the
legislature.
"
(d) An amendment proposed by the initiative shall be presented to the legis-
lature if it is in session and, if it is not in session, when it convenes or reconvenes,
ff the proposal is agreed to by a majority vote of all the members, such vote
shall be entered on the journal and the proposed amendment shall be submitted
for adoption in the same manner as amendments proposed by the legislature.
"
(e) The legislature may provide by law for a procedure for the withdrawal
by its sponsors of an initiative petition at any time prior to its submission to the
voters." (art. Xlf, §12.01.)
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"Amendmcnl Proccdinc: Adojyhon .
"(a) Ihe question of tlie adopuOn of a constitutional anundiiK'nt sliall he
submitted to the voters at the first reguhir or special statewide election Iield no
less than two months after it has been agreed to by the vote of the legislature
and, in the case of amendments proposed by the initiative which have failed to
receive such legislative approval, not less ihan two iiioiitlis alter the end of tiie
legislative session." (art. XII, §12.02)
Comment
It has been argued that a decision on whether to make amendment
difficult or easy depends upon whether a constitution is limited to trtdy
fundamental matters or includes statutory details. It has also been said,
in eftect, that the foregoing argument confuses cause and effect, that con-
stitutions with statutory detail get amended frequently whether or not
the amending process is difficult and that true constitutions do not get
amended frequently no matter how easy amendment is. It is not neces-
sary to choose between these propositions, and it is probably not possible
to settle the matter, anyway. The imjjortant thing to do is to keep one's
eye on the ball by keeping statutory detail out of the constittitions.
A less controversial argtunent in constitutional theory is that, since
a constitution is the people's fundamental law, they ought to retain the
power to change it. Such a power exists, of course, in those states that
mandate a periodic cpiestion on the ballot: Should there be a constitu-
tional convention? But some wotdd argue that this "all or nothing"
power is not sufficient and that selective amendment by initiative peti-
tion is a proper supplement to the power to call a convention.
At the turn of the century, "initiative, referendum and recall" was all
the rage as the latest thing for bringing democracy to the people. Over
the years, the bloom has worn off and there is much less interest in
initiative, referendum and recall as the answer to the ills of society.
Indeed, it is ironical that the proponents of 70 years ago were the
Populists and the radicals whereas today one is likely to find ultra-
conservatives advocating initiative. This is simply to say, perhaps,
that legislatures tend to be less unrej^resentative of majority opinion
than many critics claim.
Some may say, however, that the initiative's "black eye" has come from
ill-advised legislation and that it remains appropriate to preserve initiative
for constitutional amendments. This argument had a great deal more ap-
peal before the one man-one vote cases came down, for it did seem dif-
icidt to induce legislators to commit political suicide by redistricting
in a manner that the voters would undotd^tedly prefer. But today, with
that problem taken care of, the dangers of initiative seem to outweigh
the claimed advantage of a bypass around an insensitive legislature. For
the danger of the initiative route to constitutional amendment is that it
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will be used to adopt ill-advised legislation. In short, if you close the
door to
"crack-pot" laws but leave the constitutional window open,
they will get in anyway. (By way of analogy, a behind-the-scenes develop-
ment at the 1967 New York Constitutional Convention is instructive.
New York is a "two session" amendment state, and it was proposed in
committee to adopt the Connecticut approach of permitting submission
after one session upon a three-fourths' vote of the total membership of
each house. At the last minute, some legislative leaders suggested that
such a change was ill-advised on the ground that frequently the first
vote was taken under such pressure that an almost unanimous vote could
be obtained for a "bad" amendment, whereas two years later things
would have quieted down and there would be no difficulty in killing the
proposal. It is this sort of high-pressure, emotional situation that creates
problems in a state permitting initiative.)
In the discussion of Section 18 of Article IV (supra, p. 190), it was
pointed out that a pending lawsuit attacks the "majority voting in the
election" requirement for bond issues. If that lawsuit is successful, it
does not necessarily follow that Section 2 would fall by the wayside since,
under the Gateway Amendment, there is an alternative vote count for
adoption under which failure to vote on the question is not a vote
against the amendment. Nevertheless, consideration should be given to
changing the rule here so that under no circumstance does a failure to
vote necessarily count as a vote against the amendment. If a simple
majority voting on the question is not deemed a high enough hurdle,
then the requirement could be an extraordinary majority or an affirma-
tive vote that was also equal to or in excess of some percentage, less than
50, of course, of those voting in the election. (As noted above, the per-
centage in Hawaii and Nebraska is 35.) In neither case, does a failure
to vote necessarily count as a vote against the amendment.

SECTIONS SEPARATELY SUBMITTED
Illinois Central Railroad
No contract, obligation or liability whatever of the Illinois Central Railroad
Company, to pay any money into the State treasury, nor any lien of the State
upon, or right to tax property of said Company, in accordance with the pro-
visions of the charter of said company, approved February tenth, in the year
of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and fifty-one, shall ever be released,
suspended, modified, altered, remitted or in any manner diminished or impaired
by legislative or other authority; and all monies derived from said company,
after payment of the State debt, shall be appropriated and set apart for the
payment of the ordinary expenses of the state government, and for no other
purposes whatever.
History
For several years prior to 1851, Illinois had attempted without success
to get a railroad built in the state. Because of its unhappy financial con-
dition it was unable to finance such a project. Finally in 1851, with the
aid ot the federal government, the Illinois Central Railroad project was
undertaken. Over two and one-half million acres ot lands were granted
from the federal government to the state for railroad purposes. The state
chartered the Illinois Central Railroad to build two lines totaling
approximately 700 miles across the state. The charter gave to the com-
pany the lands received from the federal government plus a right of way
across state lands. In return for these grants. Section 18 of the charter
required the company to pay 5 per cent of its gross receipts to the state
treasiay. Section 22 of the charter fixed the tax liability of the company.
All lands of the company were exempted from taxation until they were
sold. Stock and other property ot the company was exempted for six years,
and after that was to be listed with the State Auditor and taxed tor state
purposes. If the state tax exceeded three-fourths of 1 per cent, the excess
was to be deducted from gross receipts. The total of payments under
Sections 18 and 22 was to be at least seven per cent of gross receipts. Sec-
tion 22 expressly provided: "The said corporation is hereby exempted
from all taxation of every kind, except as herein provided tor." The reve-
nue from the railroad was to be applied to the payment of the state debt.
This section was included in the 1870 Constitution for two reasons.
The state debt had by then largely been retired and there was soine fear
that political pressure from the railroad might persuade the legislature
to amend the charter and reduce the payments required of the railroad.
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Secondly, and more importantly, there was considerable agitation from
the counties through which the railroad passed to have some oi the rail-
road revenue retm ned to them since it was exempt from local taxes. But
the majority of delegates felt thai the liiiul should be applied solely to
state purposes.
The section was retained in identical form in the proposed 1922 Con-
stitution, although the question \\as again debated in that Convention
as to whether the counties should receive part of the revenue.
Explanation
This section of the Constitution has not been judicially interpreted,
since there has never been any legislative attempt to depart from its pro-
visions. However, the charter provisions of the railroad have been liti-
gated several times. The issues have concerned the method of accounting
and the formula for the assessment of the tax. (See People v. Illinois
Cent. R.R., 273 111. 220 (191G); State v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 246 111. 188
(1910).) It should be pointed out that the 1851 charter applies only
to the so-called "charter lines" of the original grant. They do not apply
to the lines and property acquired subsequently to the original charter,
which of course constitute the bidk of the company's holdings and
revenues. This property is subject to ordinary taxation.
The most recent decision of the Supreme Court in regard to the tax
status of the railroad was in 1921 and is worthy of attention here because
of its implications shoidd it be determined not to retain the present
section in the proposed new Constitution. (Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Emmer-
son, 299 111, 328 (1921).) In 1919 tJie legislature passed a comprehensive
corporate franchise tax. With respect to railroads, the tax was measured
by the percentage of its lines within the state in relation to its total
length, averaged with the percentage of its business within the state to
its total business. The Court held that while the tax could be applied to
the Illinois Central's noncharter lines (about 1400 miles) it could not
be applied to the charter lines (about 700 miles). Four reasons were given
for this holding. (1) The franchise tax was a property tax from which the
corporation was exempt by the terms of its charter. (2) Even if it were
not a property tax, the language "taxation of every kind" would exempt
it from the tax. (3) The charter was a contract between the state and the
corporation, protected by Article II, Section 14, which forbids impair-
ment of contracts, thus precluding a legislative change in the tax pro-
visions. (4) By the same token, on the authority of Citizen's Bank x>.
Parker (192 U.S. 73 (1904)), the charter and its tax provisions were pro-
tected by Article I, Section 10, of the Constitution of the United States
which prohibits state impairment of the obligations of contract.
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Two questions of current interest arise in connection with the tax
status of the Illinois Central Railroad. The more immediate one is
whether the newly enacted state income tax is applicable to the charter
lines. If the Emmerson case is to be taken literally, namely, that taxation
of any kind other than as specified in the charter is forbidden, one would
have to conclude that it is not. However, it might be argued that all of
the Illinois Central litigation, including the Emmerson case if read nar-
rowly, established only that the railroad was exempt from property taxes;
and that property taxation was the only form of tax exemption which
the legislature intended in its charter grant, as this was the only common
form of taxation in 1851. Of course, the broad language of the Article II,
Section 22, exemption militates against this interpretation. If the charter
lines are exempt from the income tax, substantial accounting and legal
problems will arise.
The other question posed by Einincrsoti is what the powers of the state
would be with respect to the charter in the absence of this section of
the Constitution. Here the Court was probably correct in its conclusion
that the provisions of the state and federal constitutions protecting the
obligations of contract would prevent the state from taking any unilateral
action to amend the charter.
Comparative Analysis
There are no comparable provisions in other state constitutions.
Comment
This section could be retained as is.
It might be thought desirable now to amend the section so as to permit
distribution of the revenue from the railroad tax to the counties through
which it passes. At the time this section was adopted, the railroad tax
represented as much as 15 per cent of the state revenue. However, in 1961,
the tax was only 3.6 million dollars out of total state revenue, not includ-
ing federal grants, of over one billion dollars. Today the percentage is
unquestionably lower. Thus, it is currently a much less important item
in state finances than formerly. The revenues would be of considerable
value to the counties. Such an amendment would be permissible, since
no contractual obligations under the charter would be impaired.
Finally, the section might be eliminated altogether. This would open
the way for renegotiation of the charter between the state and the
railroad if mutually agreeable terms could be found, or for unilateral
action by the state to the extent permitted by the contract clauses of
the state and federal constitutions. The elimination of the section would-
probably be vigorously opposed by the railroad.
576 Separate Sections
Municipal Subscriptions to Railroads or Private Corporations
No countv. ciiv, town, township, or other municipality, shall ever become
subscriber to the capital stock, ol any railroad or pri\ate corporation, or make
donation to or loan its credit in aid of, such corporation: Provided, however,
that the adoption of this article shall not be construed as affecting the right of
any such municipality to make such subscriptions where the same have been
authorized, under existing laws, by a vote of the people of such municipalities
prior to such adoption.
History
Under the Constitution ot 1848, Article III, Section 38, the state was
prohibited from aiding private corporations. (See Art. IV, Sec. 20, supra,
p. 197.) But this did not prevent counties and other municipalities from
such undertakings, the principal form of which was subsidies to rail-
roads. (Prettyman v. Supervisors of Tazewell County, 19 111. 406 (1858).)
The competition among communities for railroads reached such propor-
tions that many projects were very unsound financially and many muni-
cipalities were on tlie verge of bankruptcy. This section was proposed
by the 1870 Convention to put an end to such practices, but was submitted
separately so as not to endanger the rest of the Constitution. Although
it engendered considerable controversy in the Convention debates, it was
adopted by a large majority in the election.
This section was omitted in the proposed 1922 Constitution and the
Proceedings of the Convention do not reveal wliy.
Explanation
This section is largely self-explanatory and was effective in stopping
the practices complained of. For many years, the only litigation under
this section involved the question of what subscriptions were valid
under the saving clause. {See Louisville v. Savings Bank, 104 U.S. 469
(1881); Williams v. People ex rel. Wilson, 132 111. 574 (1890); Richeson v.
People ex rel. Jones, 115 111. 450 (1886); People ex. rel. Springfield, E. &:
S. R.R. V. Town of Bishop, til 111. 124 (1884).)
Since 1900, the section has been used sporadically to attack various
public projects undertaken by municipalities, but these attacks have
uniformly failed for one or more of three reasons. First, the section does
not prohibit all dealings between municipalities and private corpora-
tions. If there is a fair exchange of values between the municipality and
the corporation — i.e., if the corporation gives consideration for the bene-
fits it receives — then there is no violation of this section. (People ex rel.
Gutknecht v. City of Chicago, 414 111. 600 (1953); City of Chicago v.
Pittsburg, C.C. & St. L. Ry., 244 111. 220 (1910). Compare Schuler v. Board
of Educ, 370 111. 107 (1938), where there was no consideration; this is the
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only modern case finding a violation of this section.) Secondly, it does
not violate this section tor municipalities to allow private corporations
to use public facilities to carry on their business, where a reasonable
charge is made for that use. (People ex rel. Curren v. Wood, 391 111. 237
(1945) (airports); People v. City of Chicago, 349 111. 304 (1932) (sub-
ways).) Finally, the section prohibits municipal aid only to corporations
having a capital stock or being organized for profit; it does not apply to
nonprofit organizations or miniicipal corporations. (People ex rel.
Adamowski v. Chicago R.R. Terminal Authority, 14 111. 2d 230 (1958)
(municipal services made available to mimicipal corporation); People
ex rel. Adamowski v. Public Bldg. Connn'n, 11 111. 2d 125 (1957) (loan of
municipal personnel and grant of property to public corporation); People
ex rel. Royal v. Cain, 410 111. 39 (1951) (public hos])ital districts not within
section); Cremer v. Peoria Housing Authority, 399 111. 579 (1948) (subsidy
to nonprofit housing development)).
Comparative Analysis
Eighteen state constitutions have provisions similar to the Illinois pro-
vision. In two states, municipal aid to corporations is prohibited unless
approved by referendum. In one state only aid to railroads is prohibited,
while another state prohibits aid to all private corporations except rail-
roads. The Model State Constitution does not consider the subject.
Comment
This section seems harmless, although its contemporary utility might
be doubted. Consideration could be given to eliminating it for the sake
of simplicity. The subject coidd, of course, be covered by legislation.
Canal
The Illinois and Michigan canal or other canal or waterway owned by the
State may be sold or leased upon such terms as may be prescribed by law. The
General Assembly may appropriate for the operation and maintenance of canals
and waterways owned by the State.
History
This section was amended in 1954, replacing the separate section on
canals as originally adopted in 1870 and amended in 1908.
The Illinois and Michgian Canal, connecting the Illinois River with
Lake Michigan, was open for navigation in 1848. Its operation was highly
successful, and in 1871 its original cost was paid off. The original section
on canals prevented the General Assembly from leasing or selling the
canal, unless approved by a referendimi. This was designed to prevent
the railroads from obtaining control over the canal and drying it up to
suppress competition. The original section also prohibited the General
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Assembly Ironi approj^riating iunds or lending cretlii in aid ol railroads
or canals. This was inicndcd to make the canal sell-suppoi ting. The
1908 Amendment allowed a bond issue lor the consli lu lion oi a deep
waterway irom Utica to Lockport.
The 1922 (vonvention proposal dealt extensively with canals and
waterways, providing, among other tilings, lor an additional .$10,000,000
appropriation, payable by a bond issue, lor dee])ening the waterway;
prohibiting sale or lease ot a state-owned waterway or canal without
reterendinn aj)proval, except as a lease ol all or part ol the Illinois and
Michigan C^anal was permitted to provide terminals with the Illinois
Waterway or other navigable channels.
Explanation
This section as it now stands has never been the subject oi litigation.
Decisions interpreting the prior provisions were few and have no current
relevance. By its terms, the present section gives the General Assembly
full control over the subject.
Comparative Analysis
Eleven other states have constitutional provisions regulating canals
in some way, none of which is comparable to the Illinois provision.
Comment
As it now stands, this section is entirely legislative in nature and can
be safely eliminated.
Convict Labor
Hereafter it shall be unlawful for the Commissioners of any Penitentiary, or
other reformatory institution in the State of Illinois, to let by contract to any
person, or jiersons, or corporations, the labor of any convict confined within said
institution.
History
There seems to have been some confusion in the 1870 Convention
about convict labor. A Stonecutters' Association sent in a petition pro-
testing the use of convict labor on pidjlic works. The petition was re-
ferred to the Committee on Penitentiary and Relormatc:)ry Institutions.
A petition from another Stonectitters' Association endorsing the first
petition was referred to the Committee on Mines and Mining. A dele-
gate's resolution on the same subject was referred to the Committee on
State Institutions and Pid:)lic Buildings. There were two other resolu-
tions objecting to the use of convict labor, both of which were referred
to the Committee on Penitentiary and Reformatory Institutions. Nobody
appears to have taken any action on any of the petitions and resolutions.
The separate section was proposed by the General Assembly in 1885
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and ratified by the voters at the general election in November, 1886. In
the proposed 1922 Constitution the wording was simjilified and the sec-
tion was placed in the Legislative Article.
Explanation
No questions appear to have arisen over this section.
Comparative Analysis
About eight states have constitutional prohibitions against contracting
out convict labor. The Model State Constitution is silent on the subject.
Comment
Although this sort ol provision should never have gone into the Con-
stitution and is clearly unnecessary now, it is just the sort ot provision
that probably cannot saiely be taken out. Although it is poorly dratted
as a constitutional provision, it is probably not advisable to tamper with
the wording. If it does seem safe to fix up the language, the proposed
1922 provision is a good one to start with. It read:
No law shall be passed authorizing the labor of any convict confined witliin
any penitentiary or other reformatory institution to be let to any corporation,
association or person, (art. Ill, § 50.)
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SCHEDULE— Year 1870
That no inconvenience may arise from the akerations and amend-
ments made in the constitution of this State, and to carry the same into
complete effect, it is hereby ordained and declared:
Existing Laws Continued
Section 1. That all laws in force at the adoption of this Constitu-
tion, not inconsistent therewith, and all rights, actions, prosecutions,
claims, and contracts of this State, individuals, or bodies corporate, shall
continue to be as valid as if this Constitution had not been adopted.
Accrued Items Due State Preserved
Section 2. That all fines, taxes, penalties and forfeitures, due and
owing to the State of Illinois under the present Constitution and laws,
shall inure to the use of the people of the State of Illinois, under this
Constitution.
Existing Recognizances and Bonds Preserved —
Prosecutions Continued
Section 3. Recognizances, bonds, obligations, and all other instruments
entered into or executed before the adoption of this constitution, to the
people of the State of Illinois, to any State or County officer or public
body, shall remain binding and valid; and rights and liabilities upon
the same shall continue, and all crimes and misdemeanors shall be tried
and punished as though no change had been made in the Constitution
of this State.
Existing County Courts Continued
Section 4. County courts for the transaction of county business in
counties not having adopted township organization, shall continue in
existence, and exercise their present jurisdiction until the board of
county commissioners provided in this Constitution, is organized in
pursuance of an Act of the General Assembly; and the county courts
in all other counties shall have the same power and jurisdiction they
now possess until otherwise provided by general law.
Other Courts Continued
Section 5. All existing courts which are not in this Constitution
specifically enumerated, shall continue in existence and exercise their
present jurisdiction until otherwise provided by law.
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Existing Offices Continued
Section 6. All persons now filling any office or appointment shall
continne in the exercise oi the duties thereof, according to their respec-
tive commissions or appointments, unless by this Constitution it is other-
wise directed.
Election of Judges
Section 7. On the day this Constitution is submitted to the people for
ratification, an election shall he held for judges ol tlic Supreme Court
in the second, third, sixth and seventh judicial election districts desig-
nated in this Constitution, and for the election of three judges of the
Circuit Court in the County of Cook as provided for in the article of
this Constitution relating to the judiciary, at which election every
person entitled to vote, according to the ternrs of this Constitution, shall
be allowed to vote, and the election shall be otherwise conducted, re-
turns made and certificates issued, in accordance with existing laws,
except that no registry shall be required at said election: Provided, that
at said election in the county of C>ook no elector shall vote for more
than t^vo candidates for circuit judge. If, upon canvassing the votes for
and against the adoption of this Constitution, it shall appear that there
has been polled a greater number of votes against than for it, then no
certificates of election shall be issued for any of said Supreme or Circuit
Judges.
Date and Method of Submission
Section 8. This Constitution shall be submitted to the people of the
State of Illinois for adoption or rejection, at an election to be held on
the first Saturday in July in the year of our Lord one thousand eight
hundred and seventy, and there shall be separately submitted at the
same time for adoption or rejection, sections nine, ten, eleven, twelve,
thirteen, fourteen and fifteen, relating to railroads, in the article en-
titled
"Corporations;" the article entitled "Counties;" the article en-
titled "VV^arehouses;" the question of requiring a three-fifths vote to
remove a county seat; the section relating to the Illinois Central Rail-
road; the section in relation to minority representation; the section re-
lating to Municipal subscriptions to railroads or private corporations;
and the section relating to the Canal. Every person entitled to vote
under the provisions of this Constitution, as defined in the article in
relation to
"Suffrage," shall be entitled to vote for the adoption or re-
jection of this Constitution, and for or against the articles, sections and
question aforesaid, separately submitted; and the said qualified electors
shall vote at the usual places of voting, unless otherwise provided; and
the said election shall be conducted, and returns thereof made accord-
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ing to the laws now in lorce regulating general elections, except that
no registry shall be required at said election: Proinded, hoivever, that
the polls shall be kept open lor the reception ot ballots until sunset of
said day of election.
Ballots and Election Supplies
Section 9. The Secretary of State shall, at least twenty days before
said election, cause to be delivered to the County Clerk of each county
blank pollbooks, tally lists and forms of return, and twice the number of
properly prepared printed ballots for the said election that there are
voters in such county, the expense whereof shall be audited and paid as
other pulilic printing ordered by the Secretary of State is, by law, re-
quired to be audited and paid; and the several county clerks shall, at
least five days before said election, cause to be distributed to the board
of election, in each election district in their respective counties, said
blank poll-books, tally-lists, forms of return, and tickets.
Form of Ballot
Section 10. At the said election the ballots shall be in the following
form:
For all the propositions on this ticket which are not cancelled with
ink or pencil; and against all propositions which are so cancelled.
For the New Constitution.
For the sections relating to railroads in the article entitled "Corpo-
rations."
For the article entitled "Counties."
For the article entitled "Warehouses."
For a three-fifths vote to remove County Seats.
For the section to the Illinois Central Railroad.
For the section relating to Minority Representation.
For the section relating to Municipal Subscriptions to Railroads or
Private Corporations.
For the section relating to the Canal.
Each of said tickets shall be counted as a vote cast for each proposi-
tion thereon not cancelled with ink or pencil, and against each propo-
sition so cancelled, and returns thereof shall be made accordingly by
the judges of election.
Canvass of Election Returns
Section 11. The returns of the whole vote cast, and of the votes for
the adoption or rejection of this Constitution, and for or against the
article and sections respectively submitted, shall be made by the several
County Clerks, as is now provided by law, to the Secretary of State,
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within tweiUy clays alter the cledion, and the returns ol' the said votes
shall, within five days therealter, l)e examined and canvassed by the
Auditor, Treasurer and Secretaiy ol State, or any two ol tluni, in the
presence ol the Governor, and proclamation shall he made by the
Governor, forthwith, ol the lesult ol the canvass.
EfTective Date
Section 12. 11 it shall appeal that a majority ol tlie votes polled are
"For the New Constitution," then so much ol this Constitution as was
not separately submitted to be voted on by articles and sections, shall
be the supreme law ol the State ol Illinois, on and alter Monday the
eighth day ol August, in the yeai ol our Lord one thousand eight
hundred and seventy; but il it shall appear that a majority of the votes
polled were "Against the New Constitution," then so much thereof as
was not separately submitted to be voted on by ai tides and sections, shall
be null and void.
If it shall appear that a majority ol the votes polled, are "for the
sections relating to Railroads in the article entitled 'Corporations';"
sections nine, ten, eleven, twelve, thirteen, fourteen and fifteen, relating
to Railroads in the said article, shall be a part ol the C^onstitution of this
State; but if a majority of said votes are against such sections, they
shall be niUl and void. II a majority ol the votes polled are "for the
article entitled "Counties," such article shall be a part of the Constitu-
tion of this State and shall be substituted for article seven in the present
constitution entitled "counties;" but if a majority of said votes are
against such article, the same shall be null and void. II a majority of
the votes polled are for the article entitled "Warehouses," such article
shall be a part of the Constitution of this State, but if a majority of
the votes are against said article, the same shall be null and void.
If a majority of the votes polled are lor either ol the sections separately
submitted, relating, respectively, to the "Illinois Central Railroad,"
"Minority Representation," "Municipal Subscriptions to Railroads or
Private Corporations," and the "Canal," then such ol said sections as
shall receive such majority shall be a part ol the Constitution of this
State; but each of said sections so separately submitted against which,
respectively, there shall be a majority of the votes polled, shall be null
and void: Provided, that the section relating to "Minority Representa-
tion," shall not be declared adopted unless the portion of the Constitu-
tion not separately submitted to be voted on by articles and sections shall
be adopted, and in case said section relating to "Minority Representa-
tion" shall become a portion of the Constitution, it shall be substituted
for sections seven and eight of the Legislative Article. If a majority of
the votes cast at such election shall be for a three-fifths vote to remove a
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County seat, then the words "a majority" shall be stricken out of section
four of the Article on Counties, and the words "three-fifths" shall be
inserted in lieu thereof; and the following words shall be added to said
section, to-wit: "But when an attempt is made to remove a county seat
to a point nearer to the center of a county, then a majority vote only
shall be necessary." If the foregoing proposition shall not receive a
majority of the votes, as aforesaid, then the same shall have no effect
whatever.
First Apportionment of House of Representatives
Section 13. Immediately after the adoption of this Constitution, the
Governor and Secretary of State shall proceed to ascertain and fix the
apportionment of the State for members of the first House of Repre-
sentatives imder this Constitution. The apportionment shall be based
upon the Federal census of the year of our Lord one thousand eight
hundred and seventy of the State of Illinois, and shall be made strictly
in accordance w^ith the rules and principles announced in the article on
the Legislative Department of this Constitution: Provided, That in case
the Federal census aforesaid can not be ascertained prior to Friday, the
twenty-third day of September, in the year of our Lord one thousand
eight hundred and seventy, then the said apportionment shall be based
on the State census of the year of oin- Lord one thousand eight hundred
and sixty-five, in accordance with the rules and principles aforesaid.
The Governor shall, on or before Wednesday, the twenty-eighth day of
September, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and
seventy, make official announcement of the said apportionment, under
the great Seal of the State; and one hundred co))ies thereof, duly certified,
shall be forthwith transmitted by the Secretary of State to each county
clerk for distribution.
Districts on First Apportionment
Section 14. The districts shall be regularly numbered, by the Secre-
tary of State, commencing with Alexander County as Number one, and
proceeding then northwardly through the State, and terminating with
the county of Cook; but no county shall be numbered as more than one
district, except the county of Cook, which shall constitvite three districts,
each embracing the territory contained in the now existing representa-
tive districts of said county. And on the Tuesday after the first Monday
in November, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and
[and] seventy, the members of the first House of Representatives under
this Constitution shall be elected according to the apportionment fixed
and announced as aforesaid, and shall hold their offices for two years, and
until their successors shall be elected and qualified.
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Senate at First Session
Section 15. The Senate, at its fnst session imdei this Consiiuiiion,
shall consist ol fifty members, to be chosen as follows: At the General
Election held on the first Tuesday after the first Monday of November,
in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and seventy, two
Senators shall be elected in districts where the term of Senators expire
on the first Monday of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand
eight hundred and seventy-one, or where there shall be a vacancy, and
in the remaining districts one Senator shall be elected. Senators so elected
shall hold their oHice two years.
Apportionment by New General Assembly
Section 16. The General Assembly, at its first session held after the
adoption of this Constitution, shall proceed to apportion the State for
members of the Senate and House of Representatives, in accordance with
the provisions of the article on the Legislative Department.
First Election Under New Constitution
Section 17. When this constitution shall be ratified by the people,
the Governor shall forthwith, after having ascertained the fact, issue
writs of election to the sheriffs of the several counties of this State, or
in case of vacancies, to the coroners, for the election of all the officers,
the time of whose election is fixed by this Constitution or schedule, and
it shall be the duty of said sheriffs or coroners to give such notice of the
time and place of said election as is now prescribed by law.
English to be Official Language
Section 18. All laws of the State of Illinois, and all official writings,
and the Executive, Legislative and Judicial proceedings, shall be con-
ducted, preserved and published in no other than the English language.
Laws to Make Constitution Effective
Section 19. The General Assembly shall pass all laws necessary to
carry into effect the provisions of this Constitution.
Circuit Clerk as Recorders
Section 20. The circuit clerks of the different counties having a
population over sixty thousand, shall continue to be Recorders (ex-
ofjicio) for their respective counties, under this Constitution, until the
expiration of their respective terms.
Judges' Salaries— Cook County
Section 2L The judges of all courts of record in Cook county shall,
in lieu of any salary provided for in this Constitution, receive the com-
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pensation now provided by law until the adjournment of the first session
of the General Assembly after the adoption of this Constitution.
Circuif Court — Lake County
Section 22. The present judge of the circuit court of Cook county
shall continue to hold the circuit court of Lake county until otherwise
provided by law.
Certain Tax Discontinued
Section 23. When this constitution shall be adopted, and take effect
as the supreme law of the State of Illinois, the two-mill tax provided
to be annually assessed and collected upon each dollar's worth of taxable
property, in addition to all other taxes, as set forth in article fifteen of
the now existing constitution, shall cease to be assessed after the year of
our Lord one thousand eight hundred and seventy.
City of Quincy — Provision Concerning
Section 24. Nothing contained in this Constitution shall be so con-
strued as to deprive the General Assembly of power to authorize the
city of Quincy to create any indebtedness for railroad or municipal
purposes for which the people of said city shall have voted and to which
they shall have given by such vote, their consent, prior to the thirteenth
day of December, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred
and sixty-nine; Provided, that no such indebtedness, so created, shall,
in any part thereof be paid by the State, or from any State revenue tax
or fund, but the same shall be paid, if at all, by the said City of Quincy
alone, and by taxes to be levied upon the taxable property thereof: and
provided, further, that the General Assembly shall have no power in
the premises, that it could not exercise under the present Constitution
of this State.
Prior Constitution to Cease
Section 25. In case this Constitution, and the articles and sections
submitted separately, be adopted, the existing Constitution shall cease
in all its provisions, and in case this Constitution be adopted and any
one or more of the articles or sections submitted separately be defeated,
the provisions of the existing Constitution, if any, on the same subject
shall remain in force.
Temporary Provisions to Take Effect
Section 26. The provisions of this Constitution required to be exe-
cuted prior to the adoption or rejection thereof, shall take effect and be
in force immediately.
588 Schedules
SCHEDULE— Year 1954
( Reapportionment)
(Article IV, Sections 6, 7 and 8)
While this amendment of Sections 6, 7 and 8 ot Article IV, il adopted,
shall be effective upon its adoption, nevertheless the General Assembly
meeting in 1955 or 1956 shall consist of fifty-one Senators and one
hundred and fifty-three representatives as provided in Sections 6, 7 and
8 of Article IV of the 1870 constitution of Illinois before the adoption of
this amendment.
If the 1955 General Assembly in its regular session redistricts and re-
apportions, as required, or if upon its failure the commission does so,
then those senators, who are still residents in odd numbered districts
and who were elected in 1954, will retain their offices until the expira-
tion of their terms. But in those odd numbered chstricts, as created in
1955, where no senator elected in 1954 has been a resident for one year
next preceding the election in 1956, a vacancy in the office of senator for
such districts exists. Likewise, a vacancy exists in the office of senator in
such odd numbered districts where two or more senators elected in 1954
are residents of the district. In either case, a senator in such an odd-
numbered district shall be elected in 1956 for a term expiring in 1958. The
main purpose of this schedule is to provide for a senate with a full
quota of members in 1957-1958.
Any senator elected in 1954, who is eliminated from his office by tlie
redistricting, and who is not re-elected in 1956 for the two-year term,
shall be paid the salary for 1957-1958, that he would have received if
he had been able to serve the full term of his office and shall receive such
other benefits as would have accrued if he had served such term.
SCHEDULE— Year 1954
(State Treasurer)
(Article V, Sections 1 , 2 and 3)
This amendment shall first apply to the office of the treasurer
elected in November, 1958.
SCHEDULE— YEAR 1962
( Judiciary)
(Article VI)
Paragraph 1. This Article and Schedule, with the exception of
Schedule provisions expressly authorizing or directing earlier action,
shall become effective on January 1, 1964, hereinafter called the "Effec-
tive Date." After the adoption of this Article the General Assembly shall
enact such laws and make such appropriations and the Supreme Court
shall make such rules as may be necessary or proper to give effect to its
provisions.
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Paragraph 2. Except to the extent inconsistent with the provisions
of this Article, all provisions of law and rules of court in force on the
Effective Date of this Article shall continue in effect until superseded in
a manner authorized by the Constitution.
Paragraph 3. Until changed by law, (a) The Second Judicial District
consists of the Counties of Jo Daviess, Stephenson, Carroll, Ogle, Lee,
Winnebago, Boone, McHenry, Lake, DeKalb, Kane, Kendall, and
DuPage; the Third judicial District consists of the Counties of Mercer,
Rock Island, Whiteside, Henry, Bureau, LaSalle, Grundy, Stark, Putnam,
Marshall, Peoria, Tazewell, Will, Kankakee, Iroquois, Henderson, War-
ren, Knox, Fulton, McDonough, and Hancock; the Fourth Judicial Dis-
trict consists of the Counties of Adams, Pike, Calhoixn, Schuyler, Brown,
Cass, Mason, Menard, Morgan, Scott, Greene, Jersey, Macoupin, Sanga-
mon, Logan, McLean, Woodford, Livingston, Ford, DeWitt, Macon,
Piatt, Moultrie, Champaign, Douglas, Vermilion, Edgar, Coles, Cum-
berland, and Clark; and the Fifth Judicial District consists of all the
counties south of the Fourth District; and
(b) the existing judicial circuits shall be continued.
Paragraph 4. Each supreme court judge, circuit judge, superior court
judge, county judge, probate judge, judge of any city, village or incorpo-
rated town court, chief justice and judge of any municipal court, justice
of the peace and police magistrate, in office on the Effective Date of this
Article, shall continue to hold office until the expiration of his term, as
follows:
(a) Judges of the Supreme Court shall continue as judges of said court.
(b) Circuit judges shall continue as circuit judges of the several circuit
courts.
(c) In Cook County, the judges of the Superior Court, the Probate
Court, the County Court, and the Chief Justice of the Municipal Court
of Chicago shall be circuit judges; the judges of the Municipal Court of
Chicago, and the judges of the several municipal, city, village and in-
corporated town courts shall be associate judges of the Circuit Court.
(d) In counties other than the county of Cook, the county judges,
probate judges, and the judges of municipal, city, village and incorpo-
rated town courts shall be associate judges of the Circuit Court.
(e) Police magistrates and justices of the peace shall be magistrates
of the several circuit courts, and unless otherwise provided by law shall
continue to perform their non-judicial functions for the remainder of
their respective terms.
(f) The provisions of this Article governing eligibility for office shall
not affect the right of any incumbent to continue in office for the re-
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mainder pi his existing lerin pursuant to the provisions ot this para-
graph. For the remainder ot" such existing term, the provisions of this
Article concerning prohibited activities shall not apply to a judge of a
county, probate, city, village or incorporated town court, a justice of the
peace or police magistrate.
Paragraph 5. On the Effective Date of this Article,
(a) All justice of the peace courts, police magistrate courts, city,
village and incorporated town courts, municipal courts, county courts,
probate courts, the Superior Court of Cook County, the Criminal Court
of Cook County and the Municipal Court of Chicago are abolished and
all their jurisdiction, judicial functions, powers and duties are trans-
ferred to the respective circuit courts, and until otherwise provided by
law non-judicial functions vested by law in comity courts or the judges
thereof are transferred to the circuit courts;
(b) All the jurisdiction, functions, powers and duties of the several
appellate courts shall be transferred to the Appellate Court provided for
in this Article, in the appropriate district.
(c) Each court into which jurisdiction of other courts is transferred
shall succeed to and assume jurisdiction of all causes, matters and pro-
ceedings then pending, with full power and authority to dispose of them
and to carry into execution or otherwise to give effect to all orders, judg-
ments and decrees theretofore entered by the predecessor courts.
(d) The files, books, papers, records, documents, moneys, securities,
and other property in the possession, custody or under the control of
the courts hereby abolished, or any officer thereof, are transferred to the
Circuit Covnt; and thereafter all proceedings in all coiuts shall be
matters of record.
Paragraph 6. Each clerk of court in office on the Effective Date of
this Article shall continue to hold office, until the expiration of his
existing term as follows:
(a) The clerk of the Supreme Court shall continue in such office.
(b) The clerks of the several appellate courts shall continue as clerks
of the Appellate Court and shall perform such services as may be pre-
scribed by order of the Supreme Court.
(c) In Cook County, the Circuit Court shall by rule designate one of
the clerks as clerk and the others as associate clerks to perform such
services as may be prescribed by rule of the Circuit Court.
(d) In judicial circuits outside Cook County, the clerks of the circuit
courts in their respective counties shall continue in said offices, and the
clerks of the other courts of record shall be associate clerks of the circuit
court in their respective counties, shall perform such services as may be
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prescribed by rule of the Circuit Court and shall continue to perform
other duties prescribed by law.
Paragraph 7. On the Effective Date of this Article, the bailiff of the
Municipal Court of Chicago shall continue in offfce for the remainder of
his term, and he, his deputies and assistants shall perform such services
as may be prescribed by rule of the Circuit Court.
Paragraph 8. Notwithstanding the j^rovisions of Section 8 of this
Article, masters in chancery and referees in office in any court on the
Effective Date of this Article shall be continued as masters in chancery or
referees, respectively, until the expiration of their terms, and may there-
after by order of court, wherever justice requires, conclude matters in
which testimony has been received.
Paragraph 9. Until otherwise prescribed by the General Assembly,
the cases assigned to magistrates shall be those within the jurisdiction of
justices of the peace and police magistrates immediately prior to the
Effective Date of this Article.
Paragraph 10. Notwithstanding the terms of office provided in this
Schedule and unless otherwise provided by law, of the twelve judges of
the Appellate Court initially elected from the first Appellate Court
district pursuant to Section 10 of this Article, four shall be elected for
a term of ten years, four for a term of eight years and four for a term of
six years; and of the three judges of the Ap]:)ellate Court so initially
elected for the Second, Third, Fourth and Fifth Judicial districts re-
spectively one shall be elected for a term of ten years, one for a term
of eight years and one for a term of six years.
Paragraph II. The Supreme Court shall assign judges of the circuit
courts and of the Superior Court of Cook County to serve on the Appel-
late Court, in the Appellate Court Districts in which they respectively
reside, from the Effective Date of this Article until the commencement
of the terms of judges of the Appellate Court selected pursuant to Section
10 of this Article.
Paragraph 12.
(a) Those elected judges in offce on January 1, 1963 shall be entitled
to seek retention in office under Section 1 1 of this Article.
(b) The terms of all judges in office on January 1, 1963 expiring
otherwise than on the first Monday in December in an even numbered
year are extended to the first Monday in December after the general
election following the date at which such terms would otherwise expire.
For the purpose of application of any laws providing for an increase in
judicial salaries, every judge whose term is thus extended shall be re-
garded as commencing a new term on the date prescribed by prior law
for the election of his successor.
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(c) Judges in office on the Effective Date shall not he suhjcct to com-
pulsory retirement at a prescribed age until after expiration of their then
current terms.
Paragraph 13.
(a) Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 4 of this Article, elec-
tions on declarations of candidacy of judges of the Supreme Court in
office on the Effective Date shall be held in the Judicial Districts estab-
lished under Section 3 as follows:
(i) For incumbents from the former First and Second Supreme
Court Districts, in the Fifth Judicial District;
(ii) For incumbent from the former Third Supreme Court
District, in the Fourth Judicial District;
(iii) For incumbents from the former Fourth and Fifth Sujjreme
Court Districts, in the Third Judicial District;
(iv) For incumbent from the former Sixth Supreme Court
District, in the Second Judicial District;
(v) For incumbent from the former Seventh Supreme Court
District, in the First Judicial District.
(b) The first vacancy in the office of judge of the Supreme Court
which occurs in the former First and Second Supreme Court Districts,
and the first vacancy which occurs in the former Fourth and Fifth
Supreme Court Districts, and the vacancy which occurs in the former
Seventh Supreme Court District shall be filled by the selection of resi-
dents of the First Judicial District created under Section 3 of this Article.
(c) The office of any judge shall be deemed vacant upon his death,
resignation, removal, retirement, or failure to be retained in office pur-
suant to Section 1 1 of this Article.
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Cook County, 501
discontinuing, 497
meetings, 496
township names, 496
County Officers
Cook County
deputies, 507
salary, 507
duties, 410, 505, 513
election, 410, 504
impeachment, 292
offices established, 504
qualifications, 394^ 410
re-election, 504
salary ^
amount, 410, 509
changes, prohibited, 509
terms of office
extension prohibited, 236
length, 410, 504
County Seats
See Counties
county line restriction, 490
removal restrictions, 494
special legislation, 216
County Superintendent of Schools
duties, 410
election, 410
powers, 410
qualifications, 394, 410
salary, 410
term of office
extension prohibited, 236
length, 410
County Treasurer
See County Officers
Courts
administrative control of, 332
appellate
decisional requirement, 343
districts, 343
jurisdiction, 345
organization, 342
quorum, 343
circuit
chief judge, 351
circuits, 349
divisions, 351
integrated trial courts, 349
jurisdiction, 350
organization, 349
court practice, special
legislation, 216
establishment of, 329
rule-making, 333
Supreme
Chief Justice, 336
decisional requirementt, 336
districts, 336
jurisdiction, 338
organization, 336
quorimi, 336
Criminal Offenses
See Offenses
Cross-Examination
right of, 41
Cumulative Voting
corporations, directors, 517
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General Assembly
House of Representatives, 137
Senate, 131
Debt
See Indebtedness
defined, 54
imprisonment for, 54
limits, 477
restrictions
assumption, 197
release, 226
Deep Waterway
generally, 577
Defamation
See Speech
Delegates to Constitutional
Convention
dual office holding, 559
election procedure, 559
expenses, 559
number, 558
oath, 558
partisan or nonpartisan, 559
qualifications, 394
salary, 559
vacancies, 559
Delegation of Power
generally, 114
private groups, 115
separation of powers, 104
Demonstrations
See Assembly; Petition
Departments
See Administrative Agency;
Branches; Executive Department;
Judicial Department; Legislative
Department; Separation of Powers
Descent
special legislation, 220
Directors
corporate
cumulative voting, 517
election, 517
qualifications, railroads, 529
Discrimination
See Religion
exclusive privilege, 221
racial, 540
Disqualification
See specific office
members of General Assembly, 127
municipal officers, 474
Distribution of Powers
See Executive Power; Separation
of Powers
Districts
See Apportionment; Redistricting
debt limit, 477
drainage, 242
judicial, 333
Divorces
special legislation, 215
Double Jeopardy
defined, 47
dual sovereignty, 48
prohibited, 43
Drainage
districts, 242
drains and ditches,
establishment, 241
Dual Office Holding
elective offices, 267
generally, 121, 127, 176, 369, 561
separation of powers, 108
Due Process of Law
defined, 9
eminent domain, 57
generally, 9
incorporation doctrine, 5, 43, 79
judicial expansion, 112
legislative, affecting, 112
police power, 112
procedural, 11
Education
See Schools
Elections
See Suffrage; Vote
delegates to Constitutional
Convention, 557
directors, corporate, 517
executive officers
canvassing, 264
contests, 264
generally, 253, 262
ties, 264
614 INDEX (Continued)
free and equal, 83
general, defined, 363
judge of, 147, 150, 152
judicial. 355, 359
judicial districts, 333
primary, 85
privileges of electors, 391
special legislation, 219
Elevators
See Warehouses
Emergency Laws
effective date, 167
generally, 167
Eminent Domain
compensation
jury determination, 56, 63, 533
just, 62
corporations, 532
damage, when constituted, 56
defined, 57
drainage, 242
fee retained, 56
generally, 56
police power, 57
public use, 62
"quick taking" procedure, 64
roads, establishing, 239
taking, defined, 57, 63
Employment
definition, 322
Enacting Clause
generally, 155
English Language
medium of school instruction, 400
Equal Laws
See Equal Protection
Equal Protection
equivalent of, 207, 221
generally, 114
Executive Department
See Executive Power; Separation
of Powers
generally, 253
Executive Offices
See Appointments; Elections;
Removal from Office; Succession
account, duty to, 313
election, 262
eligibility, 267
generally, 255
Governor-Lieutenant Governor
team system, 263
long versus short ballot, 260
oath, 323
powers, 254, 270
qualifications, 394
re-election eligibility, 261
report, duty to, 315
salary, 319
term of office, 253, 262
Executive Power
See Commutations; Pardons;
Reprieves; Separation of Powers;
Veto
constitutional powers, 254
defined, 100
distribution, 270
generally, 254
inherent, 255
supreme. Governor's, 270
Exemption Laws
generally, 244
Exemptions
military, 537, 543
tax, 435
Expenses
See specific office; Appropriations;
Indebtedness
report of, 182
Ex Post Facto Laws
application, 66
generally, 65
Expulsion
General Assembly, members, 147
Fees
defined, 507
officers, 352
regulation, 512
report of, 513
restrictions, 320, 507, 510, 512, 513
uniformity, 512
Fines
special legislation, 220
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Forfeiture
estate, 52
franchises, railroads, 535
Franchise
See Suffrage
railroads, forfeiture of, 535
tax, 416, 422, 435
Free Speech
See Speech
Fundamental Principles
generally, 97
Gambling
not prohibited, 234
Gateway Amendment
generally, 565
General Assembly
See Appropriations; Elections
Mjournment
disagreement between houses, 278
generally, 152
power of Governor, 278
bills
amendments, 157, 165, 169, 172
effective date, 167, 169, 173
Governor's veto power
item veto, 298, 302
procedure, 294, 302
means of enacting law, 155
origin, 156
passage
procedure, 157
rejection, 156
yeas and nays
journal entry, 157
required, 158
printing, 162, 168, 170
reading, 162, 168, 170
revival of laws, 165, 169, 172
signing, 163, 168, 170
subject, 163, 168, 171, 179
title, 163, 168, 171
branches. 111
contempt, power to punish, 147
control of state contracts, 230
denying suffrage, 397
House of Representatives
canvass of election returns, 264
size, 136
impeachment procedure, 228
journal
entries
dissent and protest, 153
yeas and nays, 153, 157
generally, 152
laws
amendment, 165, 169, 172
effective date, 167, 169, 173
emergency, 167
Governor's veto power
item veto, 298, 302
procedure, 294, 302
revival, 165, 169, 172
style, enacting clause, 155
subject, 163, 168, 171
title, 163, 168, 171
members
compensation, 200
disqualification, 127
election, judging, 147, 150, 152
elections, 117
expenses, 200
expulsion, 147
impeachment, 228
legislative immunity, 174
lucrative offices prohibited, 121
oath, 129
other offices prohibited, list, 121
privileges, 173
qualifications, 120, 147, 394
restrictions, 176
terms of office
extension prohibited, 236
House of Representatives, 136,
140
Senate, 131, 133
vacancies, 117
officers, 146, 150, 152
organization, 145
presiding officers, 146, 308
quorum, 146, 149, 152
redistricting, 141
rules of procedings, 146, 150
Senate
approval of Governor's
appointments, 281, 184
President, Lieutenant Governor,
308
President Pro-Tempore, 308
size, 131, 133
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sessions
adjournment by Governor, 278
commencement, 145, 149, 151
open, 152
secret, 153
special, 275
Gift Enterprises
prohibited, 234
Government
See Separation of Powers
Governor
See Dual Office Holding; Elections
accounting, 273
appointment power, 280, 283
approval of state contracts, 230
duties, 253, 273, 315
election, 262
execution of laws, 270
General Assembly
power to adjourn, 278
power to convene, 275
vacancies filled by writ of
election, 118
impeachment, 228, 292
message to General Assembly, 273
militia
control of, 290
officers, commission, 540
oath, 323
pardons, reprieves, commutations,
287
powers, 254, 270, 273, 275, 278, 280,
283, 285, 287, 291, 294, 313, 357,
540
qualifications, 267, 394
recommendations to General
Assembly, 273
removal power, 285
residence, 253
salary, 319
'"state of state" message, 273
succession to office, 303, 310
team system, 263
temporary appointments, 283
term of office
extension prohibited, 236
length of, 253, 262
vacancies, power to fill, 283, 313, 357
\ct() power
item veto, 298, 300, 302
procedure, 293
Grain
See Warehouses
inspection, 555
liability of carrier, 551
shipments, railroad duties, 551
Grand Jury
abolition of, 35
defined, 37
generally, 34
indictable offenses, 34
Habeas Corpus
generally, 32
Happiness
pursuit of, 8
Highways
See Roads
Home Rule
Chicago, 248, 250
Cook County, 503
corporations, control, 520
taxation, 467
Homestead and Exemption Laws
generally, 244
House of Representatives
See General Assembly
Illinois Central Railroad
generally, 573
tax status, 574
Immunity
grant of, 66, 74
legislative, 174
sovereign, 233
Impeachment
See Office; Removal from Office
definition, 229
effect of, Governor, 303
jurisdiction, 339
members of General Assembly, 229
persons liable, 292
procedure, 228
Imprisonment
See Debt
Indebtedness
Chicago, 246, 488
county
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assumption, 493
limit, 477
districts limit, 477
municipal limit, 477
power to contract, 185
release of, 226
state limit, 186
township limit, 477
Indictment
generally, 34
Information
prosecution by, 37
Injuries
remedy provided, 89
Inspection
grain
laws providing for, 555
owners' rights, 550
Insurrection
habeas corpus suspended, 32
suppression of, militia, 291
Interest
special legislation, 219
Invasion
repulsion of, militia, 290
Items
See Appropriations
Jeopardy
double, 43
dual sovereignty, 48
Journal
See General Assembly^
/
Judges /
appellate court
number, 344
circuit court
assignment of magistrates, 361
chief judge, 351
classification, 350
number, 351
expenses, 370
fee officers, 352
impeachment, 228, 292, 373
judicial conference, 376
judicial districts, 333, 336, 343
judicial independence, 360
magistrates
appointment, 361
generally, 351
jurisdiction, 362
term of office, 362
masters in chancery, 352
prohibited activities, 368
qualifications, 366
reduction in number, 360
removal, 372
retention, 359
retired judges, assignment of, 374
retirement, 372
running on record, 357, 360
salaries, 370
salary changes, 370, 474
selection, 355
Supreme Court
number, 336
report, duty to, 315
suspension, 372
temporary assignments of, 332, 344
terms of office
extension prohibited, 236
length, 364
tenure, 355, 359, 364, 365. 366
vacancies, 356
Judicial Conference
generally, 376
Judicial Department
See Judicial Powers; Separation of
Powers
history, 327
judicial conference, 376
Judicial Officers
See specific offices
Judicial Powers
See Separation of Powers
bill of rights-judicial expansion,
112
defined, 100
exercise of, 329
legal practice, control of, 101
rule-making, 101
Jurisdiction
appellate court
review of administrative
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decisions, 345
final orders, 347
generally, 345
circuit court
generally, 350, 353
justiciability, 354
review of administrative
decisions, 355
special legislation, 217
state, 3
Supreme Court
appellate, 339
generally, 338
original, 339
Jury
civil cases
guaranteed, 24
size of, 24
trial by, 24
criminal cases
impartial, 41
required, 41
grand jury, 34
summoning, special legislation, 218
Justice
generally, 89
Justices of the Peace
Chicago, abolition, 247
Cook County
jurisdiction, 247
impeachment, 228
lucrative- office, 121
qualifications, 394
term of office
extension prohibited, 236
Laws
See General Assembly
execution of. Governor, 270
execution of, militia, 291
Legislation
See Special Legislation
classification of, 113
emergency, 167
general and special, 113
police power, 112
Legislative Department
See Legislative Powers; Separation
of Powers
generally, 1 1 1
grants of power to, 116
Legislative Immunity
generally, 174
Legislative Power
See Separation of Powers
defined, 100
generally, 1 1 1
grants to legislature, 116
limitations, 1 1 1
police power, 1 12
Levee
districts, 241
generally, 241
Liability
See Stockholders
Libel
members of General Assembly, 174
irutli a defense, 19
Liberty
deprivation of, due process, 9
secured, 8
Lieutenant Governor
See Dual Office Holding; Elections
duties, 256, 303, 308, 313, 315
election, 262
impeachment, 228, 292
oath, 323
powers, 257, 270
President of Senate, 308
qualifications, 267, 394
salary, 319
succession to Governor, 303
team system, 263
term of office
extension prohibited, 236
length of, 253, 262
Life
deprivation of, 9
inherent right, 8
Literacy
qualification for voting, 386
Local Improvements
See Special Assessments
Local Legislation
definition, 207
generally, 206
Lotteries
prohibited, 234
Lucrative Office
defined 123
INDEX (Continued) 619
delegates to Constitutional
Convention, 559
members of General Assembly, 121
Magistrates
See Judges
Mental Condition
qualification for voting, 387
Message
Governor's, "state of state," 273
Mileage
expenses, member of General
Assembly, 200
Military
See Militia
subordination of, 76, 291
Miners
protection of, 237
Mines
protection of miners, 237
Ministry
support of, 15
Minority Representation
plan of, 138
Misdemeanors
cause for impeachment, 292
Municipal Charters
Chicago, 250
special legislation, 217
Municipal Corporations
See Corporations
drainage districts, 241
indebtedness limit, 477
officers
compensation, 473
defined, 475
disqualification, 474
property tax exemption, 438
Municipal Courts
See Courts
Chicago, 250
Municipal Subscriptions
private corporations, 576
railroads, 576
Name Changes
special legislation, 215
Navy
See Militia
Nonpartisan
See Partisan
Notary Public
not lucrative office, 121
qualifications, 394
Oath
civil officers, 323
delegates, Constitutional
Convention, 558, 560
members of General Assembly, 129
not dispensed with, 15
Obscenity
See Speech
Offenses
bail, 32
commutation, 288
double jeopardy, 43
indictment, 34
information, 37
pardons, 287
penalties, 50
reprieves, 288
rights of accused criminals
compelling witnesses, 39
confrontation of witnesses, 39
cross-examination, 41
impartial jury, 39
jury trial, 41
local jury, 39
notice of accusation, 39
representation by counsel, 40
right to appear, 40
self-incrimination, 43
speedy public trial, 39
Office
See Executive Officers; General
Assembly; Governor; Judges;
Lieutenant Governor; Lucrative
Office; Succession
appointments
generally, 280
temporary, 283
defined, 322
disqualification
default, 473
generally, 127
members of General Assembly, 127
extension of term prohibited, 236
impeachment, 228
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oath
civil officers, 323
delegates to Constitutional
Convention, 558, 560
General Assembly, 129
profitable, 121
qualifications
attorney, 366
citizenship, 366, 394
residency, 366, 394
removal from, 285
vacancy
declaration of, 285
filled by appointment, 283
Officers
See Executive Offices; General
Assembly; specific office
militia, 540
One Man-One Vote
See Apportionment
Opinions
See Religion
Pardons
conditional, 288
defined, 288
Governor's power to grant, 287
impeachment conviction, 230, 288
Partisan
delegates to Constitutional
Convention, 559, 561
judicial officers, selection, 328, 356
redistricting, 143
Penalties
limitations, 50
proportioned to offense, 51
Pensions
restrictions, 195
Petition
prior restraint, 81
right of, 79
Police Magistrates
See Judges
Police Pov^er
due process, 1 1
eminent domain, 57
generally, 112
impairment of contracts, 71
regulation of rates, 72, 534
religion, 17
Powers of Government
See Separation of Powers
limitations, 5, 1 1
Preamble
generally, 1
President of Senate
Lieutenant Governor, 308
temporary, 145
Private Laws
See Local Legislation; Special
Legislation
definition, 207
Privileges
electors, 391
grants of special, 66, 74, 516
special legislation, 221
Proceedings
rules of. General Assembly, 146, 150
Property
See Eminent Domain
minors, special legislation, 219
protection of, 8
railroad
eminent domain, 532
forfeiture, 535
personal property, 528
school, 402
Prosecutions
See Offenses
Protest
demonstrations, 80
entry in journal, 153
Public Laws
definition, 207
Punishment
See Commutation; Pardons
cruel and unusual, 51
exile, 53
penalty limitations, 50
Qualifications
See Age; Citizenship; General
Assembly; Residence; specific
office
Quorum
appellate court, 343
General Assembly, 146, 149, 152
Supreme Court, 336
Railroads
bonds, restrictions, 531
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capital stock
dividends, restrictions, 531
increases, restrictions, 531
issue, restrictions, 531
consolidations, 529
director's qualifications, 529
director's report, 527
eminent domain, 532
grain shipments
liability for, 551
regulations, 551, 552
Illinois Central, 573
organization, 527
personal property defined, 528
public highways, 530
rates, regulation of, 530, 534
special legislation, 221
stockholders' list, 526
Rates
railroad, regulation of, 530, 534
Real Estate
See Taxation
Rebellion
See Insurrection
Recorder of Deeds
See County Officers
Records
preservation of military, 542
Redemption
tax sales, 448
Redistricting
generally, 141
Referendum
banking laws, 520
Chicago municipal government
generally, 248
constitutional amendments, 557, 562
county divisions, 491
county seat, 494
county territory changes, 492
generally, 115
state house expenditures, 245
township organization, 497
Religion
denial of civil and political rights, 15
establishment of
aid to sectarian institutions,
404, 442
generally, 16
released-time program, 406
freedom of, 14
improper practices, 15
licentiousness, 15
oaths and affirmations, 15
school aid, 405
tax exemption, 435, 442
Remedy
provided, 89
Removal from Office
See General Assembly; Impeach-
ment; specific office
Governor, 285
Reports
banks, 524
fees received, 513
judicial, 315, 376
railroad corporations, 527
state officers, required, 315
warehouses, 548
Representatives
See General Assembly
Reprieves
defined, 288
Governor's power; to grant, 288
Reputation
See Libel
Residence
executive officers, at capitol, 253
military personnel, 393
militia members, 537
qualifications for office
civil office, 394
executive officers, 267
General Assembly, 120
judges, 366
military office, 394
qualification for voting, 381, 386,
388, 392
railroad directors, 530
Revenue
See Taxation
generally, 413
Revivication of Laws
generally, 165
Rights of Accused Criminals
See Offenses
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Riots
See Insurrection
suppression of, 291
Roads
establishing, eminent domain, 239
ferries and bridges, special legisla-
tion, 220
special legislation, 215
Rolling Stock
personal property, railroads, 528
Salaries
See specific office
change during term, 200, 220, 319,
370, 474, 509
executive officers, 319
Schools
See County Superintendent of
Schools
aid to sectarian institutions, 404
free, 399
grants, 403
management, special legislation, 218
property, gifts, 402
school contracts, 409
standards, 400
tax exemption, 435, 439
Sectarian Institutions
See Religion
aid to, 404
Seal of State
generally, 318
Search Warrants
See Searches and Seizures
Searches and Seizures
generally, 27
health inspections, 30
illegally seized evidence, 29
search warrants
basis for, 28
generally, 27
self-incrimination, 46
unreasonable, 28
wire-tapping, 31
Secretary of State
See Dual Office Holding; Elections
duties, 256, 313, 315, 318
election, 262
impeachment, 228, 292
oath, 323
powers, 256, 270
presiding officer of House, 145
qualifications, 394
residence, 253
salary, 319
term of office
extension prohibited, 236
length, 253, 262
vacancy, 313
Seizures
See Searches and Seizures
Self-incrimination
right against
extent of, 44
generally, 43
Senate
See General Assembly
Senatorial Districts
apportionment, 131
redistricting, 141
Senators
See General Assembly
Separation of Powers
departments defined, 100
dual office holding, 108
executive encroachment, 14
generally, 99
judicial encroachment, 105
legislative encroachment, 101, 255
permitted encroachments, 106
Sessions
General Assembly, 145, 149, 152
open, 152
secret, 153
special, 275
Sheriff
See County Officers
Soldiers
quartering of, 76
residence, 393
suffrage, 392
Sovereign Immunity
generally, 231 „
Speaker of House
See General Assembly
selection, 147
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Special Assessments
drainage districts, 241
local improvements, 460
Special Legislation
classification, 208
corporations, creating, 515
definition, 206
enumerated cases, 203
generally, 203
relating to Chicago, 248
Special Session
convened by Governor, 275
subject matter, 275
Speech
censorship, 19
defamation, 18
demonstrations and assemblies, 22
freedom of, 18
libel, 18, 174
obscenity, 20
prior restraints, 20
State
See Sovereign Immunity
judicial salaries, 370
State Treasurer
See Elections
duties, 256, 313, 315
election, 262
impeachment, 228, 292
oath, 323
powers, 256
qualifications, 394
re-election, eligibility, 261
residence, 253
salary, 319
security required, 261
term of office
extension prohibited, 236
length, 253, 260, 262
vacancy, 313
States Attorneys
impeachment, 228, 292
qualifications, 379, 394
salary, 379
selection, 379
term of office
extension prohibited, 236
length, 379
Statute of Limitation
adoption of, 227
Stockholders
cumulative votinsr, 517
election of directors, 517
liability
banks, 522
double, 523
list
banks, 525
railroads, 526
Street Railways
construction, restrictions, 519
operation, restrictions, 519
Succession
generally, 310
office of Governor, 303
Suffrage
absentee voting, 382, 392
loss of, criminals, 397
Negro, 381, 388
poll tax, 388
voters' privileges, 391
voter qualifications, 381
woman, 382
Superintendent of Public Instruction
See Dual Office Holding; Elections
duties, 256, 313, 315
election, 262
impeachment, 228, 292
oath, 323
powers, 256, 270
qualifications, 394
residence, 253
salary, 319
term of office
extension prohibited, 236
length, 253, 262
vacancy, 313
Supreme Court
See Courts
Taxation
county
defined, 458
limitations, 457
curative legislation, 472
defined, 465
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exemptions, 435
franchise, 416. 422, 435
generally, 413
income, 42, 432, 435
limitations, 413
municipal
corporate purposes, 465, 470
local improvements
defined, 463
general taxation, 465
generally, 460
special assessments, 460
special taxation, 463
taxing power, 461
nonproperty, 416, 420, 432
occupation, 416, 422, 432
payment into state treasury, 456
privilege, 416, 422, 426, 435
property
classification, 415, 432
exemptions, 435
generally, 413
rate limitations, 457
valuation, 415
release from, 454
sales, 422
structure of, 415
tax delinquency sale
methods, 450
procedure, 446, 448
redemption, 448
uniformity, 415, 419, 422, 425
Tenure
See Judges
Title of Acts
generally, 163
Townships
See Counties
indebtedness limit, 478
Treason
legislators, 174
Treasurer
See State Treasurer
Trial by Jury
5^^J"T
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Uniformity 75«'46T
See Taxation Q
Vacancies
See Apjjointmcnts; specific offices
Valuation
See Taxation
Venue
change of, special legislation, 217
Veto
Governor's power to, 293
item veto, 298, 300, 302
procedure, 294
Vote
See Suffrage; Voter
ballot required, 390
one man-one vote, 133, 139, 142
secret, 390
Voter
absentee, 382, 384
criminals, 397
poll tax, 388
privileges, 391
qualifications, 381
residence, 392, 393
Warehouses
definition, 545
examination rights, 550
owner's duties, 548
railroad's duties, 552
receipts, regulations, 553
reports required, 548
Warrants
See Searches and Seizures
treasury, 181
Witnesses
compulsory process, 39
confrontation, 39
cross examination, 41
Worship
See Religion
Wrongs
remedy provided, 89
Yeas and Nays
See General Assembly
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